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This thesis is a defence of constitutional history – a once prosperous field of study in the 
UK, but now fallen into disrepute and neglect. The first question addressed by this thesis, 
therefore, is: Why has constitutional history fallen from favour? It is argued that it is 
principally due to a fundamental and widespread misunderstanding as to the nature of 
constitutions and laws, and how these things change over time. Moreover, it is due to the 
field’s association with a group of nineteenth-century writers, elements of whose 
approach and assumptions have – rightly – come to be regarded as outmoded and 
distasteful. These things need to be put aright if constitutional history is to be revived. 
Certainly, there has been some movement to resurrect the field, but this is unlikely to be 
successful or profitable without a solid underlying constitutional theory. This is still 
lacking.  
This thesis, therefore, seeks to provide that solid underlying constitutional theory. It does 
so by suggesting an interpretative framework for constitutional theory and history in Part 
I. This consists of three theories: the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity; the Associational 
Theory of Law; and the Generational Theory of Law. These are complemented by a 
chapter on the theory of succession and two appendices. Together, these argue that all 
societies – regardless as to time or place – have constitutions, which can and do change 
over time. Consequently, there is no reason why constitutional history should be 
disregarded. That it has been is regrettable.  
Parts II and III seek, firstly, to show the framework’s validity and explanatory power, 
and, secondly, to show how constitutional history might look in the future. They do this 
by considering constitutions in, primarily, mediaeval thought and practice – the 
mediaeval period being a time in which the existence of constitutions is often dismissed 
or, at least, viewed with considerable scepticism. Part II, concerning mediaeval thought, 
argues that people throughout the mediaeval period were primed to think about 
constitutional matters. Part III considers mediaeval and early modern practice through the 
lens of succession and governance vis-à-vis the royal minorities of mediaeval England. It 
argues that contemporary practice shows clear regard for what can rightfully be called a 
constitution, though it changed from generation to generation.  
Having charted constitutional history’s rise and fall, and having made the argument for 
its resuscitation based on the principles set out in the framework, the thesis concludes by 
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1 – Constitutional History’s Rise and Fall 
1.1 Introduction 
This is a defence of constitutional history. The field was once prosperous and well-
respected in Britain. 1  Indeed, it played a pivotal role in establishing History as a 
discipline in its own right, lending it ‘academic respectability’. 2  However, whilst 
academic interest in constitutional history persists elsewhere, 3  that same interest is 
conspicuously lacking in Britain. Since the mid-twentieth century, the field of 
constitutional history has fallen into disrepute, 4  particularly among historians. As 
Carpenter has said, “many late mediaevalists would like to deny its existence all 
together”.5  
The obvious question, therefore, is: Why has constitutional history fallen so far from 
favour? The purpose of this chapter is to outline the field’s development and to begin to 
consider the reasons for its decline. As will be seen, many factors were at work. However, 
as argued across this chapter and the next, one factor stands before all others: It is the 
ways in which constitutions and laws have been understood and interpreted, both 
regarding what they are and how they change over time, even to the point of 
                                               
1 Cosgrove has gone so far to say that constitutional history, alongside legal history, “reigned as the 
historical subdiscipline whose status overshadowed other fields of historical inquiry”. Indeed, it was 
“perhaps the most prestigious form of historical inquiry on both sides of the Atlantic”: Richard A Cosgrove, 
“The Culture of Academic Legal History: Lawyers’ History and Historians’ Law 1870-1930,” Cambrian 
Law Review 33 (2002): 23. 
2  Christine Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” in The 
McFarlane Legacy: Studies in Late Medieval Politics and Society, ed. RH Britnell and AJ Pollard (Alan 
Sutton Publishing Ltd, 1995), 177. 
3 One need only look at the wealth of scholarship on the constitutional history of the Constitution of the 
United States for ample demonstration of this; one might also consider Verfassungsgeschichte (literally, 
‘constitutional history’) in Germany, which charts how the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) came about; 
see, e.g., Werner Frotscher and Bodo Pieroth, Verfassungsgeschichte, 7th ed. (CH Beck, 2008); Reinhold 
Zippelius, Kleine Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte: Vom Frühen Mittelalter Bis Zur Gegenwart, 7th ed. 
(CH Beck, 2006). 
4 As Cogrove has said, constitutional history “stands far down the list of preferred historical specialities 
and many readers may have suffered the approach of colleagues that you must be brain dead to work in 
such an unfashionable field”: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 23. Moreover, as he was 
later to write with Brundage: “Scholars continue to work in mediaeval constitutional history in particular, 
as well as legal and constitutional history in general, are likely to draw pity from colleagues.” Anthony 
Brundage and Richard A Cosgrove, The Great Tradition: Constitutional History and National Identity in 
Britain and the United States, 1870-1960 (Stanford University Press, 2007), 232. 
5 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 175. This has caused 
some researchers, if not to disassociate themselves from constitutional history, to at least accept that it is 
an artefact of a bygone era. Something of this can be seen on George Garnett’s academic profile on the 
University of Oxford’s Faculty of History’s website, where it says that “[h]is first research interests lay in 
English history of the tenth to thirteenth centuries, specifically what used to be called constitutional 




misunderstanding. Indeed, it was the misunderstandings underpinning the writings of the 
constitutional historians of the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries that, as much as 
anything else, contributed to the field’s decline;6 their misunderstanding blackened the 
field’s reputation, even in spite of its overwhelming value. 
This thesis seeks to redress this misunderstanding. It does so by setting out a solid 
constitutional theory (i.e. a solid interpretative framework) to underpin any future work 
– not only in constitutional history, but all fields interacting with constitutions. It is vital 
to do this,7 and to do so before discussing anything else,8 because it fundamentally 
affects the shape and direction of constitutional discourse. It determines the permissible 
and pertinent techniques of study and avenues of enquiry;9 what is selected for inclusion, 
the manner of its inclusion, the vocabulary that is used,10 and general tone.11 Indeed, it 
determines whether or not constitutional history is a valid pursuit.  
                                               
6 As Watts has said: “Scepticism about Victorian views of the constitution and of its productive role in the 
politics of periods other than the later middle ages has led political historians to reject the whole notion of 
an integrated, national and self-conscious political body which the constitutional approach assumes. The 
result, as McFarlane famously noted in 1938, was that the collapse of the ‘Stubbsian framework’ was 
followed not by the erection of ‘a new order’, a new model for the understanding of contemporary political 
and governmental arrangements, but instead by a state of ‘anarchy’. In many respects, this state persists 
today.” John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3. Cf. KB 
McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford University Press, 1973), 279ff. 
7 As Jouanjan has rightly said, “constitutional history not only needs historical methods, it also requires a 
constitutional legal theory”: Olivier Jouanjan, “What Is a Constitution? What Is Constitutional History?,” 
in Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences, ed. Kelly L Grotke and 
Markus J Prutsch (Oxford University Press, 2014), 323. I would disagree with Jouanjan when he follows 
Carl Schmitt and says “[e]very fundamental concept in constitutional law is…but a secularized theological 
concept”, although, as it will be seen, I would argue that he was nevertheless correct in concluding that 
belief and faith, though not in the religious sense, are at the heart of constitutions around the world and that 
“Everyone has to imagine his own personal constitution”: Jouanjan, “What Is a Constitution? What Is 
Constitutional History?,” 331. 
8 Loughlin and others have drawn on the metaphor of ‘theories as maps’; they help to orientate us and give 
us our bearings. It is better to have even a rough map before setting out than to have no map at all. See: 
Martin Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 1992), 37–38. Obviously, if 
a map is to be accurate and useful, it must be developed as the territory it delineates and describes is 
explored; if it is not, then it will be but fantasy and speculation. I should not wish to give any impression, 
therefore, that the theoretical chapters of this thesis were developed in any way in isolation. They were 
developed in tandem with the historical sections and through wider reading, which things often forced me 
to revisit my theoretical ideas; to correct, refine, and improve them.  
9 Cf. Peter J Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 2nd ed. (University of California Press, 1989), 16. 
10 The provision of definitions is a crucial element to any intellectual enterprise, much as Bodin said: “For 
a definition is nothing else than the very end and scope of the matter propounded, which if it be not well 
and surely grounded, whatsoever you build thereupon must together and in a moment fall.” Jean Bodin, 
The Six Bookes of a Commonweale, trans. Richard Knolles (Impensis G Bishop, 1606), 1 [1.1].  
11 Cf. Hayek: “Social theory, in the sense in which I use the term, is, then, logically prior to history. It 
explains the terms which history must use. This is, of course, not inconsistent with the fact that historical 
study frequently forces the theorist to revise the constructions or to provide new ones in terms of which he 
can arrange the information which he finds. But in so far as the historian talks, not merely about the 
individual actions of particular people but about what, in some sense, we can call social phenomena, his 
facts can be explained as facts of a certain kind only in terms of a theory about how its elements hang 
12 
 
Part I, therefore, sets out three complementary theories that are intended to provide this 
interpretative framework and which together move towards something of a new 
paradigm. The first, concerning the nature of constitutions, is called the Theory of 
Constitutional Ubiquity; the second, concerning the nature of laws, is called the 
Associational Theory of Law; and the third, concerning how constitutions and laws 
change over time, is called the Generational Theory of Law. Together, these argue that 
all societies have constitutions, which can and do change over time. There is no time or 
place to which constitutional history is unsuited. Part I is concluded with a further theory, 
the Tripartite Theory of Succession, which concerns a crucial aspect of constitutions – 
how positions within groups are transferred from one individual to another. This will be 
particularly useful when it comes to the case studies later in the thesis.  
It should be said that the ideas set out in Part I are not necessarily new in all of their 
particulars. Indeed, as can be seen from the volume of the footnotes and bibliography, I 
am in a great many ways indebted to the work of a great many people. However, if 
constitutional history is to be revived and placed on a solid footing, it is necessary for 
there to be a coherent and considered expression, as well as fusion, of all of these ideas. 
The aim of Part I, therefore, is to weave them together, and to synthesize and systematize 
them, adding in my own contributions where possible. Furthermore, it is to provide a 
defence where necessary of some of them, especially that of memetics (see Chapter 4).12 
Having laid down the foundations in the first part, Parts II and III seek, firstly, to show 
the veracity and value of these theories through their application to history;13 secondly, 
to give a sense of what constitutional history might look like in the future. To do this, I 
have chosen to focus on mediaeval thought and practice, and, more specifically regarding 
the latter, the royal minorities of mediaeval England. I chose the mediaeval period 
                                               
together. The social complexes, the social wholes which the historian discusses, are never found ready 
given as are the persistent structures in the organic (animal or vegetable) world. They are created by him 
by an act of construction or interpretation – a construction which for most purposes is done spontaneously 
and without any elaborate apparatus. But in some connections where, for example, we deal with such things 
as languages, economic systems, or bodies of law, these structures are so complicated that, without the help 
of an elaborate technique, they can no longer be reconstructed without the danger of going wrong and being 
led into contradictions.” Friedrich August Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1948), 72. 
12 Part I is also complemented by Appendices I and II. The first of these outlines how the Theory of 
Constitutional Ubiquity relates to corporations and States; the second to how the Framework ties in with 
ideas of the Rule of Law.  
13 It is hoped that it will pass Loughlin’s tests of credibility, coherence, and utility. See: Martin Loughlin, 




because, as has already been seen, there is some belief that it and constitutional history 
are incompatible. To show that they are, in fact, compatible would go a long way to 
rehabilitating constitutional history’s reputation.  
Part II concerns mediaeval thought and seeks to demonstrate that people during the period 
conceived of the world in constitutional terms. Part III concerns mediaeval practice and 
seeks to demonstrate that people during that time, as evidenced by their behaviours, 
clearly had a regard for constitutional principles and frameworks; for what can rightfully 
be called constitutions. This is demonstrated through two case studies presented in 
Chapters 8 and 9.14 Chapter 8 focuses on the matter of royal succession and, more 
specifically, transmission; Chapter 9 focuses on government and, more specifically, 
provision.15 All of this is designed to show that there is no reason why constitutional 
history cannot be pursued as an object of study in these ages – that constitutional history 
is a valid and valuable pursuit.  
Having charted constitutional history’s rise and fall, and having made the argument for 
its revival based on the framework set out in Part I, the thesis concludes by considering 
the future of constitutional history. The thesis begins, therefore, by looking to the past 
and ends by looking to the future. There is reason for optimism.  
It is perhaps worthwhile saying something about the development of this thesis. It was 
always going to be a mixture of theory and history; the historical part was always going 
to focus on the royal minorities. One of the principal reasons for choosing the royal 
minorities was that little work has been done specifically on them heretofore,16 and even 
                                               
14  In writing these, I have principally relied upon secondary sources, although I have attempted to 
familiarize myself with and cite the primary sources where possible.   
15 The terms transmission and provision will, naturally, be explained in due course and in the proper place. 
It can be noted that Chapter 9 is complemented by Appendix III, which discusses the concepts of regency 
and minority. 
16 Henry III’s minority is probably the one that has received the most targeted and direct attention, e.g.: 
Kate Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1912); David A Carpenter, The 
Minority of Henry III (University of California Press, 1990); GJ Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part 
I,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 18 (1904): 245–95; GJ Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. 
Part II,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 1 (1907): 205–62. For the most part, the discussion 
of the other minorities has been subsumed within broader narratives. See, e.g.: W Mark Ormrod, Edward 
III (Yale University Press, 2011); Nigel Saul, Richard II (Yale University Press, 1999); Bertram Wolffe, 
Henry VI, Yale English Monarchs (Yale University Press, 2001); Ralph A Griffiths, The Reign of King 
Henry VI, 2nd ed. (Sutton Publishing, 1998). Naturally, because Edward VI did not outlive his minority, 
any work discussing his reign necessarily treats only his minority. See, e.g.: Jennifer Loach, Edward VI, 
ed. George Bernard and Penry Williams (Yale University Press, 2002). For a recent, comparative study of 
mediaeval royal minorities, see Ward’s PhD thesis: Emily Joan Ward, “Child Kingship in England, 
Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250” (University of Cambridge, 2018). Further, for a volume 
in which all of the post-Conquest minorities are discussed – though not compared or particularly considered 
14 
 
less attention has been given to their constitutional dimension.17 However, having found 
no (satisfactory) integrated constitutional theories that could have facilitated quick 
passage to the historical analysis, I found it necessary to develop the theories set out in 
Part I. After all, as has already been argued, such historical analysis would have been of 
questionable value without a solid underlying theory to support it – particularly in light 
of the current opposition to constitutional history. As this had to be done properly, the 
theoretical section naturally expanded to the expense of the historical section. 
Nevertheless, it was important that the historical chapters retained their place – both for 
their intrinsic and instrumental value.18 
This thesis is very much future-facing – looking forward to a revival of constitutional 
history. However, to fully appreciate the current state of the field and to ensure that it 
moves forward appropriately, one must first understand its background. This is where we 
begin. 
1.2 Course of Constitutional History 
If one were to chart on a graph the interest in, and significance of, the field of 
constitutional history, one would be faced with a bell curve.  
Phase I presents a relatively flat line throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
during which time the history of the constitution was often touched upon, but incidentally. 
It is difficult to say that constitutional history was a field in its own right at this time. 
Phase II begins in the first quarter of the nineteenth century: the history of the constitution 
came to be studied by a group of scholars that can comfortably labelled as ‘constitutional 
historians’. Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, the field experienced a 
marked and steady rise. However, around the turn of the twentieth century, interest in the 
field began to peter out. It then entered Phase III: terminal decline. Since the 1960s, it has 
lived a half-life, operating at the fringes of political and historical analysis. Arguably, this 
represents Phase IV.19 The following sections explain this process in more detail. 
                                               
from any legal or constitutional angle – see: Charles Beem, ed., The Royal Minorities of Medieval and Early 
Modern England (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008). 
17 I attempted to start to address this gap in my MA thesis, which was a study of the constitution during 
Henry III’s minority: Stephen Gates, “The Nature and Identity of the Constitution during the Minority of 
Henry III (1216-1227)” (University of Exeter, 2014). 
18 The reasons for focusing on the royal minorities is resumed and expanded at 8.1. 
19 This pattern of rise and fall is broadly in keeping with that identified by Brundage and Cosgrove: “Our 
argument concludes that the status of English constitutional history rose in the 1870s concurrently with new 
standards of historical research to prominence that peaked before 1914. After World War I, its place as the 
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1.2.1 Early Modern Antiquarians 
The early modern antiquarians were a diverse group with diverse interests. They include 
Lambarde, Camden, Coke, Dodderidge, Spelman, Hakewill, Selden, Twysden, and 
Dugdale.20  
The history of the constitution was not the object of their undivided attention; it was 
enmeshed within broader narratives. They are perhaps most notable for their belief in an 
ancient constitution;21 this is an extreme form of the continuity thesis, which idea will be 
explained later.22 They did not invent the idea of an ancient constitution. This had existed 
for a long time. However, one could reasonably argue, as Greenberg has, that they 
radicalized it.23 
As their appellation suggests, ancient constitutionalists believed that the constitution – 
particularly as embodied by the common law – had existed since time out of mind. There 
was something convenient in this. It has not gone unnoticed that many of these writers, 
besides being educated at Oxford or Cambridge, also received training at the Inns of Court 
(“a third university in the early modern period”24). Many became practising lawyers and 
judges.25 By placing the origins of the constitution so early, they made it, and the law 
which they practised, antecedent to (and, consequently, superior to) everything else – an 
idea put to both royalist and anti-royalist purposes.26  
                                               
premier area for historical investigation had already begun to erode. By 1930, its prestige as a research field 
had declined dramatically. As a taught tradition, however, constitutional history lasted into the early 1960s 
as a preferred teaching field.” Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 231. 
20 William Lambarde (1536-1601), William Camden (1551-1623), Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), Sir John 
Dodderidge (1555-1628), Sir Henry Spelman (c.1562-1641), William Hakewill (1574-1655), John Selden 
(1584-1654), Sir Roger Twysden (1597-1672), and William Dugdale (1605-1686). See: Janelle Greenberg, 
The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution: St Edward’s ‘Laws’ in Early Modern Political Thought 
(Cambridge University Press, 2001), esp. 4, 32, 36; Glenn Burgess, The Politics of the Ancient Constitution: 
An Introduction to English Political Thought, 1603-1642 (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1992); JW Gough, 
Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford University Press, 1955); JGA Pocock, Ancient 
Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Reissue with a Retrospect (Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
21 As Gough has said, there was widespread agreement in England during the seventeenth century that 
England had a constitution and, moreover, that it was “both real and ancient”; the sticking point was how 
it was to be interpreted. See: Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History, 67. 
22 Infra, 2.7.  
23 Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, esp. at 3. 
24 Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, 17. 
25 William Lambarde (Lincoln’s Inn), William Camden (Oxford), Sir Edward Coke (Inner Temple), Sir 
John Doddridge (Oxford, Middle Temple), Sir Henry Spelman (Cambridge), William Hakewill (Oxford, 
Lincoln’s Inn), John Selden (Oxford, Clifford’s Inn then Inner Temple), and Sir Roger Twysden 
(Cambridge, Gray’s Inn), and William Dugdale (N/A). 
26 Dugdale, for example, appears to have turned it to royalist purposes: See: Greenberg, The Radical Face 
of the Ancient Constitution, 252. 
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Even though the ancient constitutionalists were all agreed upon the “immemorial nature 
and continuity of English political and legal institutions”,27 there was some disagreement 
as to how ancient it was exactly. Coke, for instance, argued that it began with Brutus of 
Troy, who came to England in 1103BCE and established the Laws of the Britons; these 
were, naturally, in the ‘Greek tongue’.28 They were administered by druids, who Coke 
thought, based on his reading of Caesar, originated in Britain.29 He concluded: “the laws 
of England are of much greater antiquity than they are reported to be, and than any the 
constitutions or laws imperial of Roman Emperors”.30 These laws had been collated into 
“seven volumes or books intituled Leges Britannorum [laws of the Britons]” prior to the 
Norman Conquest,31 which event, if it represented any break with the past, was repaired 
by Henry I.32 Indeed, any breaks were ultimately mended: 
“…I have observed, that albeit some time by acts of parliament, and some 
time by invention and wit of man, some points of the ancient common law 
have been altered or diverted from his due course, yet in revolution of time, 
the same…have been with great applause, for avoiding many inconveniences, 
restored again…”33 
The Trojan originary myth was common throughout the mediaeval period.34 It is first to 
be found in Nennius (fl. ca. 830),35 but its later popularity is largely due to Geoffrey of 
                                               
27 Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, 4. 
28 Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt., ed. George Wilson, vol. 2 (J Rivington and Sons; 
W Owen; T Longman and G Robinson; G Kearsly; W Flexney and W Cater; E Brooke; T Whieldon and 
Co., 1777), viii. 
29 Coke’s claims are probably too strong. Caesar – who might not be an infallible source, in any account – 
does not seem to say that the druids originated in Britain but, rather, a particular system of druidic 
government or administration: Coke, Reports, 2:ix; Cf. Caesar, The Gallic War, trans. HJ Edwards 
(Harvard University Press, 1917), 341-346 (Bk. VI, 13–21, esp. 13).  
30 Coke, Reports, 2:x. Fortescue, in the fifteenth century, had gone even further: “Indeed, neither the civil 
laws of the Romans, so deeply rooted by the usage of so many ages, nor the laws of the Venetians, which 
are renowned above others for their antiquity - though their island was uninhabited, and Rome unbuilt at 
the time of the origin of the Britons - nor the laws of any Christian kingdom, are so rooted in antiquity”: 
John Fortescue, “In Praise of the Laws of England,” in On the Laws and Governance of England, ed. 
Shelley Lockwood (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 26-27 (17). 
31 There is, it should be said, absolutely no evidence that these ever existed.  
32 Coke, Reports, 2:xi–xii. 
33 Coke, Reports, 2:xviii. 
34 Trojan originary myths were, of course, far from new. Virgil’s Aeneid attempted to found Roman origins 
in Troy under the eponymous hero Aeneus – who was the supposed father of the Brutus supposed to have 
come to Britain. It should also be said that the Franks, in the seventh century, also developed a similar myth, 
which was “satisfyingly assertive of parity with the Romans”: PD King, “The Barbarian Kingdoms,” in The 
Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350-c.1450, ed. JH Burns (Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 137. 
35 JA Giles, ed., Six Old English Chronicles (Henry G Bohn, 1848), 388. 
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Monmouth (fl. ca. 1136), who even credited London’s foundation to Brutus.36 We find 
the likes of Fortescue adopting this myth,37 as well as Coke’s contemporary, Doddridge.38 
However, even before the time of Coke and Doddridge, a new orthodoxy had started to 
develop.  
This new orthodoxy can be traced to the time of the Reformation. For Burrow, the 
Reformation had caused England to withdraw “into a proud, defensive insularity”, thus 
prompting a search for a new national past – one not quite so dependent upon ancient 
(foreign) empires.39 There is perhaps something to this, but it is also in no small part due 
to the fact that the historicity of the Trojan story had started to be undermined, particularly 
by Polydore Vergil.40 
In its place, there arose ‘Anglo-Saxonism’. This is found in authors like “Lambarde, 
Owen, Digges, and Pym” who “identified the Saxons as [the constitution’s] authors”.41 
Hakewill and Selden adopted a slightly more nuanced approach, allowing for Danish and 
Norman influences; the Saxon influence nevertheless remaining ‘predominant’.42 Even 
though there had been “few enthusiasts for race theories lauding Germanic origins and 
Saxon superiority” prior to the late sixteenth century,43 from that time onwards Anglo-
Saxonism waxed ascendant. In particular, it found a home in the works of Camden and 
Verstegen.44 Although, it could at times be a dangerous argument to make, as Isaac 
Dorislaus discovered to his disadvantage, 45  Anglo-Saxonism went from strength to 
strength. Indeed, “its influence is still obvious in the high-Victorian scholarship of Stubbs, 
                                               
36 Originally, it was supposedly called Troia Nova and then, later, Trinovantum: Geoffrey of Monmouth, 
The History of the Kings of Britain, ed. Lewis Thorpe (Penguin Books, 1966), 54–74. Cf. Hugh A 
MacDoughall, Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons (Harvest House Ltd., 
1982), chap. 1. 
37 Sir John Fortescue (c. 1394-1479). See: Fortescue, “In Praise of the Laws of England,” 22 (13). 
38 Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, 32. 
39  John Wyon Burrow, A Liberal Descent: Victorian Historians and the English Past (Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 108–9. 
40 This was in his Anglica Historia, which was produced in the early to mid-sixteenth century. For a modern 
translation, see: Polydore Vergil, The Anglica Historia, A.D. 1485-1537, ed. and trans. Denys Hay (Royal 
Historical Society, 1950). 
41 Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, 32. Those mentioned here for the first time 
are Sir Roger Owen (1573-1617), Sir Dudley Digges (1583-1639), and John Pym (1584-1643). 
42 Greenberg, The Radical Face of the Ancient Constitution, 32, 149–50. 
43 MacDoughall, Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons, 45. 
44 Richard Verstegen, né Rowlands (c.1550-1640). See: MacDoughall, Racial Myth in English History: 
Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons, 45–48. 
45 Dorislaus was assassinated in 1649, having supported the republican cause against Charles I and, indeed, 
was held partly responsible for Charles’ ‘murder’. His republicanism was informed by his Anglo-Saxonist 
interpretation of history. See: P Alessandra Maccioni and Marco Mostert, “Isaac Dorislaus (1595–1649): 
The Career of a Dutch Scholar in England,” Transactions of the Cambridge Bibliographical Society 8, no. 
4 (1986): esp. 423-429, 436; Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 110. 
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Freeman and Green”.46 Ancient constitutionalism remained. However, with the advent 
of Anglo-Saxonism, that ancient provenance was translated from Troy and the British 
Isles to the ancient Teutonic forests. In general tenor, little changed.  
1.2.2 Eighteenth Century 
During the eighteenth century, ancient constitutionalism and Anglo-Saxonism remained 
the orthodoxy. There was some disquiet regarding the idea of ancient constitutions,47 but 
this was negligible. 48  The principal change wrought in the late-seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was that, whereas writers before 1688 might turn the ancient 
constitution as easily to the profit of the people as the Crown, those after 1688 spoke more 
exclusively of ancient liberties belonging to all. One can see this clearly in the writings 
of Bolingbroke:49 
“We [English] have been surprized, betray’d, forced, more than once, into 
Situations little better than that of downright Slavery. But the Usurpations 
have not become Settlements. They have disorder’d the Frame, but not 
destroy’d the Principles of a free Government. Like cloudy Mornings, they 
have soon pass’d over, and the sun of Liberty has broke out again with double 
Force, and double Lustre.”50 
The following passage also merits quoting: 
“Yet neither he [William I], nor they [William II and Henry I] could destroy 
the old Constitution; because neither he, nor they could extinguish the old 
Spirit of Liberty. 
On the contrary, the Normans and other Strangers, who settled here, were soon 
seized with it themselves, instead of inspiring a Spirit of Slavery into the 
Saxons. 
                                               
46 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 109. 
47 See, e.g.: Daniel Defoe, Jure Divino (1706), Book IX, at 205-206 and Jonathan Swift, A Discourse of 
the Contests and Dissentions Between the Nobles and Commons in Athens and Rome (first published 1701, 
FH Ellis (ed.) 1967) 118; 87  
48 MacDoughall, Racial Myth in English History: Trojans, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons, 77. 
49 Henry St John, Viscount Bolingbroke (1678-1751). 
50 Henry St John, Remarks on the History of England, From the Minutes of Humphrey Oldcastle, 2nd ed. 
(R Francklin, 1747), 50. 
19 
 
They were originally of Celtick, or Gothick Extraction, (call it which you 
please) as well as the People they subdued. They came out of the same 
northern Hive; and therefore they naturally resumed the Spirit of their 
Ancestors, when they came into a Country, where it prevail’d.”51 
What Bolingbroke characterized as an inextinguishable flame, Edmund Burke 
characterized as a natural tendency trammelled by respect for precedent and authority.52 
Reflecting on the French Revolution, Burke was at pains to stress that liberty without law 
was liberty not worth having;53 the rule of law can only be guaranteed by reference to 
history and precedent. In England, this was the natural way of things: 
“The [Glorious] Revolution was made to preserve our antient indisputable 
laws and liberties, and that antient constitution of government which is our 
only security for law and liberty. […]. The idea of the fabrication of a new 
government, is enough to fill us with disgust and horror. We wished at the 
period of the Revolution, and do now wish, to derive all we possess as an 
inheritance from our forefathers. Upon that body and stock of inheritance we 
have taken care not to inoculate any cyon alien to the natural of the original 
plant. All the reformations we have hitherto made, have proceeded upon the 
principle of reference to antiquity…”54 
                                               
51 St John, Remarks on the History of England, 53–54. 
52 Edmund Burke (1729-1797).  
53 “I should therefore suspend my congratulations on the new liberty of France, until I was informed how 
it have been combined with government; with public force; with the discipline and obedience of armies; 
with the collection of an effective and well-distributed revenue; with morality and religion; with the solidity 
of property; with peace and order: with civil and social manners.”: Edmund Burke, Reflections on the 
Revolution in France, ed. Conor Cruise O’Brien (Penguin Books, 2004), 90–91. 
54 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 117. For further discussion of Burke’s ideas with respect 
to the constitution, see, inter alia: JGA Pocock, “Burke and the Ancient Constitution-A Problem in the 
History of Ideas,” The Historical Journal 3, no. 2 (1960): 125–43; Adrian Vermeule, “Common Law 
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason,” Columbia Law Review 183 (2007): 1–36. 
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The eminent jurist, William Blackstone, expressed similar sentiments. 55  Blackstone 
waxed lyrical about the constitution of his day;56 preferred native sources;57 believed in 
resumption of an ancient constitution;58 and disliked irreverent, ill-educated, reckless 
legislators. 59  Whilst Blackstone is noteworthy for his historical approach, his 
Commentaries fall some distance short of a constitutional history – even the first volume, 
which deals most overtly with constitutional matters.60 
There were important changes happening, however, in the light of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. In the context of historiography, this is found most importantly in the 
writings of Hume, Smith, Ferguson, and Millar.61 The most important introduction was 
                                               
55 Blackstone lived 1723-1780. He is particularly noted for his Commentaries on the Laws of England, the 
most recent edition of which has been published by Oxford University Press under the general editorship 
of Wilfrid Prest: William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book I: Of the Rights of 
Persons, ed. David Lemmings, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2016); William Blackstone, Commentaries 
on the Laws of England. Book II: Of the Rights of Things, ed. Simon Stern, vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 
2016); William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book III: Of Private Wrongs, ed. 
Thomas P Gallanis, vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, 2016); William Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. Book IV: Of Public Wrongs, ed. Ruth Paley, vol. 4 (Oxford University Press, 2016). 
56 For example, Blackstone expressed his belief, in his concluding comments to his Commentaries, that, 
through the progress of time, the “laws and liberties” of England had reached a state of “perfection”. 
Moreover, “Of a constitution, so wisely contrived, so strongly raised, and so highly finished, it is hard to 
speak with that praise, which is justly and severely its due – the thorough and attentive contemplation of it 
will furnish its best panegyric.” Blackstone, Commentaries, 2016, 4:285. 
57 For example, Blackstone said: “But we must not carry our veneration [of the civil law] so far as to 
sacrifice our Alfred and Edward [I] to the manes [revered ghosts] of Theodosius and Justinian; we must not 
prefer the edict of the praetor, or the rescript of the Roman emperor, to our own immemorial customs, or 
the sanctions of an English parliament; unless we can also prefer the despotic monarchy of Rome and 
Byzantium, for whose meridians the former were calculated, to the free constitution of Britain, which the 
latter are adapted to perpetuate.” Blackstone, Commentaries, 2016, 1:10. He later drew out Alfred and 
Edward I for distinctive praise in the closing comments of the final volume: Blackstone, Commentaries, 
2016, 4:265,274. 
58 This is evident throughout the thirty-third chapter of Book IV of the Commentaries, but, in particular: “I 
have endeavoured to delineate some rude outlines of a plan for the history of our laws and liberties; from 
their first rise, and gradual progress, among our British and Saxon ancestors, till their total eclipse at the 
Norman conquest; from which they have gradually emerged, and risen to the perfection they now enjoy, at 
different periods of time.” Blackstone, Commentaries, 2016, 4:285. 
59  For example, Blackstone said: “The mischiefs that have arisen to the public from inconsiderate 
alterations in our laws, are too obvious to be called in question; and how far they have been owing to the 
defective education of our senators, is a point well worthy of public attention. The common law of England 
has fared like other venerable edifices of antiquity, which rash and unexperienced workmen have ventured 
to new-dress and refine, with all the rashness of modern improvement. Hence frequently its symmetry has 
been destroyed, its proportions distorted, and its majestic simplicity exchanged for specious embellishments 
and fantastic novelties. For, to say the truth, almost all the perplexed questions, almost all the niceties, 
intricacies, and delays…owe their original not to the common law itself, but to innovations that have been 
made in it by acts of parliament…”: Blackstone, Commentaries, 2016, 1:13. 
60 It is devoted to the “rights of persons”; his other volumes are largely devoted to the laws of property, 
law of torts, and criminal law. 
61 David Hume (1711-1776), Adam Smith (1723-1790), Adam Ferguson (1723-1816), and John Millar 
(1735-1801). See: Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 21–22. Millar is especially important, as he wrote one of the 
earliest books on constitutional history, even if it was not ovetly so-called: John Millar, An Historical View 
of the English Government, From the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain to the Revolution in 1688, ed. 
Mark Salber Philips and Dale R Smith (Liberty Fund, Inc., 2006). The first two parts of An Historical View 
were published in 1787, but the text remained unfinished at Millar’s death. His nephew, John Craig, 
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the “conception of stages of the history of civil society” in which there could be “no 
appeal to earlier ‘stages’ to determine questions of right”.62 This presented a considerable 
challenge to the idea of an ancient constitution.63 However, one must not overstate the 
position. The Scottish historians, like their English contemporaries, still believed in the 
possibility of essential continuities; they were simply more inclined to accept 
discontinuities and the contingency of history. In the context of English history, this 
challenge was most forcefully represented in Hume’s History of England (1754-61), 
which was successful and enduring, even though it was “in defiance of almost every Whig 
prepossession”; many of the nineteenth-century constitutional historians, at one point or 
another, “announced…his intention of refuting the distortions of Hume”.64 
It is here necessary to introduce the idea of ‘Whig historiography’,65 hinted at in the 
penultimate quotation. Whig interpretations of history have underlying narratives of 
continuity overlaid with narratives of progress, both of which are interlaced with a sense 
of pride and triumphalism;66 they are typified, moreover, by their preoccupation with 
liberty as an inseparable feature of some supposedly ongoing national life.67 Furthermore, 
they tend to see their own age as a ‘culmination of a major stage’ in the evolutionary 
                                               
published, from Millar’s papers, in 1803, an edition with two further parts: the third part carrying the history 
down to 1688 and the fourth to Millar’s own day. Millar’s earlier more theoretical work The Origin of the 
Distinction of Ranks (1771) is also of great interest: John Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks; 
or, An Inquiry into the Circumstances Which Give Rise to Influence and Authority in the Different Members 
of Society, ed. Aaron Garrett (Liberty Fund, Inc., 2006). Millar’s An Historical View first appeared sixteen 
years after another early work on constitutional history of note, which was the posthumously published 
lectures given by Francis Stoughton Sullivan (1715–1766): Francis Stoughton Sullivan, An Historical 
Treatise on the Feudal Law, and the Constitution and Laws of England: With a Commentary on Magna 
Charta, and Necessary Illustrations of Many of the English Statutes : In a Course of Lectures Read in the 
University of Dublin (London, 1772). 
62 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 23. See further: John Wyon Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in 
Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1966), 10ff. 
63 On Millar and the idea of an ancient constitution, see: Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, 6ff. 
64 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 25–26. 
65 It is so-called Whig because of the earlier writers associated with this kind of historical writing tended 
to have associations with the British Whig Party, who were essentially conservative liberals. 
66  Cf. Lee’s definition: “So-called ‘Whig’ interpretations focus on British history as a process. This 
involves the gradual evolution of institutions and society through stages which are integral links in a chain 
of development. An underlying assumption is the triumph of progress.” Stephen J Lee, Aspects of British 
Political History, 1815-1914 (Routledge, 1994), 11. 
67 As Brundage and Cosgrove have said, Whig narratives tend to demonstrate a belief in “the long-term 
development of the English constitution and the placing of that development at the centre of the English 
national story. The country’s history was considered to be largely one of incremental progress, punctuated 
indeed by some dramatic events and even a few setbacks, yet overall moving majestically forward toward 
greater inclusion and freedom.” Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 3. 
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process;68 in some cases, as a state of perfection.69 Perhaps their greatest sin, however, 
is their study of “the past with reference to the present”;70 it is ‘present-centred’71 or 
‘temporocentric’,72 such that it is “unable to meet the past on its own terms and value it 
for its own sake”.73 The result: grand narratives of progress throughout the centuries, 
undergirded by basic continuities. English history was essentially “the story of the 
triumph of constitutional liberty and representative institutions”.74  
The challenge, posed particularly by Hume, led to what Burrow called the ‘Whig 
compromise’, in which “[t]he constitution was not ancient, in the sense of Saxon, but it 
was certainly not merely modern”. 75  Whilst writers of the seventeenth and early 
eighteenth centuries were happier to accord the starting-date of their constitution to a very 
early period, by the late eighteenth century this was less tenable. Even though the 
narrative might still begin early, its date had to be moved forward in time; the period 
theretofore became a ‘formative period’. Furthermore, whilst the earlier writers were 
content to adopt a more straightforwardly substantive continuity thesis, this was 
modified into a more overtly essential continuity thesis. In other words, earlier writers 
were happier to say that the constitution had remained exactly the same in form and 
content, whereas later writers claimed only that it had retained some essential properties. 
Nevertheless, there remained a desire to preserve as early a date as possible; it would then 
not only be old,76 but also venerable: 
                                               
68 This is a phrase taken from Gusfield, who had used it to refer to successive generations of sociological 
writers: Joseph R Gusfield, Community: A Critical Response (Basil Blackwell, 1975), 4. 
69 For example, George III, in writing to Pitt thanking him for having saved the constitution, said that the 
British constitution was “the most perfect of human formations”. George to Pitt, 9 Mar. 1784, PRO. 
30/8/103 fol. 71. Quoted in: Jeremy Black, George III: America’s Last King (Yale University Press, 2006), 
270. One might also think of James Bryce (1838-1922) who declared the British constitution to be “the 
Paragon of the World”; as Brundage and Cosgrove reported it, “a beacon of hope to other nations still 
struggling to find constitutional success”: Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 21. 
70 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (WW Norton and Company, 1965), 11. 
71 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 177. 
72 This is a phrase from: Robert Bierstadt, “The Limitations of Anthropological Methods in Sociology,” 
American Journal of Sociology 54, no. 1 (1948): 22–30. Cf. Colin Bell and Howard Newby, Community 
Studies: An Introduction to the Sociology of the Local Community (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971), 
63. 
73 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 178. Cf. Butterfield, The 
Whig Interpretation of History, 16. 
74 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 3. 
75 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 33. 
76 As Lockwood noted in a footnote to Fortescue: “This is not a claim that the laws are best because they 
are most ancient. Fortescue states that English laws are best because they are most just and have therefore 
not had to be changed. Thus the antiquity of the laws is the proof that they are the best, not the reason for 
their being so.” Fortescue, “In Praise of the Laws of England,” 27, fn. 96. 
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“We procure reverence to our civil institutions on the principle upon which 
nature teaches us to revere individual men; on account of their age; and on 
account of those from whom they are descended.”77 
1.2.3 Hallam and the Victorian Constitutional Historians 
During the nineteenth century, the Whig interpretation was “part of the landscape of 
English life”; indeed, it was not so much a ‘Whig’ interpretation as an ‘English’ 
interpretation.78 It was during this period that constitutional history came to form a field 
in its own right – it would not be an understatement to say that it experienced a Golden 
Age. However, it could neither escape the prejudices of the time nor Whiggism. In many 
ways, it typified the High Victorian mindset. It remains highly readable, but has come to 
be regarded as fundamentally flawed.79  
Constitutional history owes a great debt to Henry Hallam.80 In particular, to his View of 
the State of Europe during the Middle Ages (2 vols., 1818) and Constitutional History of 
England from the Accession of Henry VII to the Death of George III (2 vols., 1827). The 
Middle Ages was essentially a collection of the constitutional histories of the major 
European countries until the end of the central Middle Ages; the Constitutional History 
continued the narrative for England whence the Middle Ages ended until the end of 
George III’s reign. It is illuminating to note that Hallam was both a trained lawyer and 
highly active in Whig circles.81 
It would be too much to say that Hallam single-handedly created the field,82 but his 
importance cannot be underestimated. All later constitutional historians interacted with 
                                               
77 Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 121. 
78  Herbert Butterfield, The Englishman and His History (Cambridge University Press, 1944), 2; Cf. 
Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 92. 
79  One might here turn to Butterfield’s refutation of the Whig approach: Butterfield, The Whig 
Interpretation of History. 
80 Lived 1777-1859. 
81 He was called to the bar in 1802; though active in the Whig party, he never became a Member of 
Parliament. See: Timothy Lang, “Hallam, Henry (1777–1859),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/12002. [Accessed 19 February 
2016]. 
82 Sullivan’s and Millar’s work must not be forgotten (see supra 1.2.2). Moreover, it would be remiss not 
to mention the work of Hallam’s contemporaries, Jean-Louis De Lolme (1740-1806) and Sir Francis 
Palgrave (1788-1861). De Lolme was born in the Republic of Geneva, but fled to England when he found 
himself at odds with the local authorities. He had studied and practised law, so it is not unsurprising that he 
should have taken interest in English legal affairs. In 1771, he published – in French – his Constitution de 
l’Angleterre. This was subsequently revised and released in an English edition under the title: The 
Constitution of England; or, An Account of the English Government. Although it was primarily an 
expository and comparative study of the English constitution as contrasted with other contemporary 
constitutions, The Constitution of England is marked by passages of historical discussion. We can note De 
24 
 
his works; in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, they were set texts at both 
Cambridge and Oxford.83 This latter fact also cannot be underestimated. Constitutional 
history formed an integral part of the syllabi at those institutions and came to exist as a 
standalone subject – separate, for example, from political history, which was rather the 
leftover of constitutional history than vice versa.84 This intensive teaching could only 
lead to the generation of interest in the subject – which there was in abundance. 
Hallam was followed by a “great age of constitutional history”,85 which was made by a 
golden generation of constitutional historians. Their names have become almost 
inseparable from the subject. All of these writers were born in or around the second 
quarter of the nineteenth century, thus growing up in Hallam’s shadow; they continued to 
contribute to the area throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and into the 
early years of the twentieth century. Given that this period coincides almost exactly with 
Queen Victoria’s reign (r.1837-1901), these can aptly be called the Victorian 
Constitutional Historians. 
Among this generation can be counted Erskine May, Freeman, Stubbs, Taswell-
Langmead, Pollock, and Maitland.86 Some of these stand more prominently: Freeman 
and Maitland in particular, but Stubbs most of all.87 It would be wrong, however, to 
ignore the contributions of foreign scholars. We can include, for example, American 
scholars like Taylor and Adams,88 as well as German scholars, especially Gneist and 
                                               
Lolme’s belief, expressed on page 24, that ‘the real foundation’ of the English constitution is to be found 
at the time of the Norman Conquest. See: Jean-Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England; or, An 
Account of the English Government, ed. David Lieberman (Liberty Fund, Inc., 2007). Turning to Palgrave: 
He was the Deputy Keeper of the Public Record Office from its foundation in 1838 until his death. Of 
especial importance in terms of constitutional history are the following titles: Francis Palgrave, The Rise 
and Progress of the English Commonwealth: Anglo-Saxon Period, Containing the Anglo-Saxon Policy, and 
the Institutions Arising Out of Laws and Usages Which Prevailed Before the Conquest, vol. 1 (John Murray, 
1832); Francis Palgrave, The Rise and Progress of the English Commonwealth: Anglo-Saxon Period, 
Containing the Anglo-Saxon Policy, and the Institutions Arising Out of Laws and Usages Which Prevailed 
Before the Conquest, vol. 2 (John Murray, 1832); Francis Palgrave, An Essay Upon the Original Authority 
of the King’s Council (Commissioners on the Public Records of the Kingdom, 1834). 
83 Peter RH Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education: The Study of Modern History in the Universities of 
Oxford, Cambridge, and Manchester 1800-1914 (Manchester University Press, 1986), 34, 40–42, 47. 
84 See: Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education, 90–91. 
85 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 177. 
86 Thomas Erskine May (1815-1886); Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892); William Stubbs (1825-
1901); Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead (1840-1882); Sir Frederick Pollock (1845-1937); Frederic William 
Maitland (1850-1906). 
87 As Richardson and Sayles have said, Stubbs has enjoyed something of an ‘inexpungable dominance’: 
Henry Gerald Richardson and George Osborne Sayles, The Governance of Medieval England from the 
Conquest to Magna Carta (Edinburgh University Press, 1963), v–vi. For a positive account of Stubbs’ 
legacy, see: “Stubbs Seventy Years After” in Helen M Cam, Law-Finders and Law-Makers in Medieval 
England: Collected Studies in Legal and Constitutional History (Merlin Press, 1962), 188–211. 
88 Hannis Taylor (1851-1922); George Burton Adams (1851-1925). 
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Liebermann, 89  whose influence was not only felt on constitutional history but the 
undertaking of history in general.90  
The Whiggish predilections of the Victorian Constitutional Historians have been 
thoroughly, albeit densely, studied by Burrow.91 It is therefore not proposed to enter here 
into an extensive analysis of their writings. However, it is worthwhile briefly outlining 
who they were and their impact on the field.  
We begin with William Stubbs – “a Tory with a whig historical understanding”.92 He 
began and ended his career in the Church,93  but it is for his accomplishments as a 
mediaeval and constitutional historian that he is famed. Stubbs read Classics and 
Mathematics at Oxford, graduating in 1848. His first historical work, Registrum sacrum 
Anglicanum, was published in 1858. In 1863, he became an editor in the Rolls Series. 
After some attempts to gain a Chair at Oxford, Stubbs was appointed Regius Professor of 
Modern History in 1866. He held this post until 1884, during which time he produced his 
most important works.  
In 1870, Stubbs published his Select Charters,94 which was followed by his monumental 
three-volume Constitutional History of England.95 It was this that firmly established him 
as the preeminent authority on English constitutional history.96 The fact that this work 
begins with Caesar’s and Tacitus’s descriptions of the contemporary Germanic peoples 
                                               
89 Rudolph Gneist (1816-1895) and Felix Liebermann (1851-1925). See: Gneist, Das englishe Parlament 
(1886, translated the same year as The English Parliament); Felix Liebermann, The National Assembly in 
the Anglo-Saxon Period (Halle a.S. Max Niemeyer, 1913). It is interesting to note that Liebermann met 
Stubbs in Göttingen in 1875 and they continued to correspond thereafter: See: William Holden Hutton, 
William Stubbs, Bishop of Oxford 1825-1901 (Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1906), 88–90. The work of 
the Austrian jurist Josef Redlich (1869-1936) might also be mentioned in this context, see esp.: Josef 
Redlich, Local Government in England, ed. Fracis W Hirst, vol. 1 (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1903). 
90 See: Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 119–21; Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and 
After McFarlane,” 177, 180; Cf. Slee, Learning and a Liberal Education, 131–32. 
91 Burrow, A Liberal Descent. 
92 Michael Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870-
1970 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10. 
93 He began in Navestock, Essex in 1850 and ended as Bp. Oxford, which post he held 1888 to 1901. 
94 This covered the period from “the earliest times” to the reign of Edward I. It went through nine editions, 
see: William Stubbs, Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History from the 
Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the First, ed. HWC Davis, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1913). 
95 These were originally published between 1874 and 1878, but each underwent a number of revisions 
during his lifetime. 
96 Indeed, his biographer, William Hutton, went so far as to say that “Nothing on so great a scale had been 
attempted in England since Gibbon; and the insight, the breadth, the extraordinary accuracy of the work 
recalled the memory of the greatest English historians”: Hutton, William Stubbs, Bishop of Oxford 1825-
1901, 85. A more recent biographer, J Campbell, appears to have largely agreed with this assessment, see: 
J. Campbell, “Stubbs, William (1825–1901),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University 
Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/36362. [Accessed 19 February 2016]. 
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and ends at the close of the late mediaeval period is important for this is precisely the 
timespan in which constitutional history is most controversial, even if Stubbs provides it 
with its most reasonable and scholarly guise.97  
Between Stubbs’s Select Charters and Constitutional History came Freeman’s The 
Growth of the English Constitution from the Earliest Times, which was first published in 
1872:98 “perhaps the most Whiggish of all histories, not only in its opinions but in its 
narrative”.99 Compared to Stubbs’s Constitutional History, it is a ‘slight work, written as 
lectures’, although covering a similar period. Indeed, “[i]t is not really fair to compare the 
two as constitutional historians”.100 Freeman’s tone is very different to Stubbs’s. Whereas 
Stubbs was rather drier and more scholarly, Freeman was more colourful and populist – 
“consciously modelling himself on Macaulay”. 101  Furthermore, it was perhaps, as 
Burrow noted, the English nation, rather than the constitution, that was truly the 
‘protagonist’ of Freeman’s work.102 Besides differences in approach, there were also 
differences in some of their conclusions. For example, Stubbs found the continuity of the 
English constitution more in local institutions, whereas Freeman found it in national 
institutions.103 However, there was no rivalry between the two: Freeman relied heavily 
on Stubbs’s work; 104  on a personal level, they were ‘lifelong friends’. 105  Although 
Freeman succeeded Stubbs as Regius Professor, he was – like his idol, Macaulay – 
essentially a private scholar.106 
A number of other works were also published, designed as textbooks for students and 
popular consumption. 107  A good example is Taswell-Langmead’s Constitutional 
                                               
97 Bentley, for example, takes Stubbs as being a “bench-mark for a sophisticated version of whiggery”: 
Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past, 10. Whether Stubbs’ high reputation is fully deserved has been 
doubted, particularly by Richardson and Sayles. They generally praised him as an editor of primary sources, 
though they found much to be desired in his historical writings – especially the Constitutional History in 
which there were not only ‘errors and misconceptions’, but also ‘large deficiencies’. See: Richardson and 
Sayles, Governance of Medieval England, v–vi, 1–22, quoted phrases at 16. 
98 Edward Augustus Freeman, The Growth of the English Constitution from the Earliest Times, 3rd ed. 
(Macmillan & Co., 1894), xii. 
99 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 195. 
100 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 129. 
101 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 157. 
102 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 206. 
103 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 139. 
104 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 193. 
105 Hutton, William Stubbs, Bishop of Oxford 1825-1901, 91, 149. 
106 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 155, 157. 
107 Early examples are two works by Sir Edward Shepherd Creasy (1812-1878), an English jurist and 
historian. In 1848, he published his Text-Book on the Constitution, which was essentially a selection of 
constitutional documents with historical commentary. When seeking to revise the Text-Book, he ended up 
substantially re-writing and reforming it. The result was the publication, in 1853, of his Rise and Progress 
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History: A Textbook for Students and Others.108 Taswell-Langmead read Jurisprudence 
and Modern History, and was called to the bar in the early 1860s. Besides practising as a 
lawyer, he tutored in constitutional law and legal history at the Inns of Court. He was co-
editor of Law Magazine and Review from 1875. In 1882, he was appointed Professor of 
English Constitutional History and Legal History at University College, London, 
although he died later that year.109  
It is necessary to consider briefly two who were avowedly constitutional lawyers, rather 
than constitutional historians. The first is Sir William Anson.110 He was called to the bar 
in 1869, held a number of positions at Oxford (including the vice-chancellorship), and 
later became an MP. His Law and Custom of the Constitution (2 vols., 3 parts, 1886-92), 
whilst principally an exposition of the late Victorian legislature and executive, was 
nevertheless keen to stress that the British constitution was the product of evolution: “The 
student of constitutional law realizes at every turn the truth of Dr. Stubbs’ saying that ‘the 
                                               
of the English Constitution; this was a narrative constitutional history. Another example is to be found in 
the Manual of Constitutional History, which was published in 1875. It was written by Sir (James) Forrest 
Fulton (1846-1926), a judge and, later, a Conservative politician. Fulton, in his preface, states that his 
motivation for writing his book was that there was a “very general feeling” that the works of Hallam, 
Stubbs, etc. were difficult to access. His intended audience, besides the general public, were law students 
preparing for examination: “Constitutional Law and History are now special subjects both for General 
Examination prior to the call to the Bar, and for the first LL.B. at the University of London”. Edward 
Shepherd Creasy, The Text-Book of the Constitution: Magna Charta, The Petition of Right, and the Bill of 
Rights, with Historical Comments and Remarks on the Present Political Emergencies (Richard Bentley, 
1848); Edward Shepherd Creasy, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, 3rd ed. (Richard 
Bentley, 1856); Forrest Fulton, A Manual of Constitutional History, Founded on the Works of Hallam, 
Creasy, May and Broom (Butterworths, 1875), quotes at v and vi. 
108 Thomas Pitt Taswell-Langmead, Constitutional History: A Textbook for Students and Others, 1st ed. 
(Stevens & Haynes, 1875). This was renamed from the second edition as English Constitutional History 
from the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time. Nevertheless, its essential purpose, as stated in the second 
edition, remained the same: “Intended primarily as a Text-book for students at the Universities and Inns of 
Court, it was my hope that the book might also prove not unacceptable to the general reader”: Thomas Pitt 
Taswell-Langmead, English Constitutional History: From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time, ed. 
CHE Carmichael, 3rd ed. (Stevens & Haynes, 1880), vii. Taswell-Langmead only lived to see the second 
edition, but its value was such that it continued to be revised by a series of editors, eventually reaching an 
eleventh edition, which was edited by TFT Plucknett: Theodore FT Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead’s English 
Constitutional History: From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time, 11th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 
1960). Besides Taswell-Langmead – as well as Creasy and Fulton, mentioned above – other noteworthy 
examples include: Feilden’s Constitutional History, first published in 1882, with its fourth edition revised 
by Etheridge in 1911; and Medley’s Manual, first published in 1894, with its sixth edition in 1925. Henry 
St Clair Feilden, W Gray Etheridge, and DHJ Hartley, A Short Constitutional History of England, 4th ed. 
(Oxford University Press, 1911); Dudley Julius Medley, A Student’s Manual of Constitutional History, 6th 
ed. (Oxford University Press, 1925). 
109 See: James McMullen Rigg and Catherine Pease-Watkin, “Taswell-Langmead, Thomas Pitt (1840-
1882),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford University Press, 2004), 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/16031. 
110 Lived 1843-1914. 
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roots of the present lie deep in the past’.”111 For Anson, the British constitution and 
constitutional history were practically one and the same.  
Likewise, Albert Venn Dicey,112 Vinerian Professor of English Law at Oxford, whilst his 
principal work, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885), was more 
concerned with the contemporary constitution, he nevertheless recognized a debt to 
constitutional history: “Not a page of my lectures could have been written without 
constant reference to writers such as Blackstone, Hallam, Hearn, Gardiner, or 
Freeman…” 113  Indeed, he showed great admiration for his ‘friend and colleague’ 
Freeman, although he simultaneously expressed reservations about the ‘historical 
method’: “it may induce men to think so much of the way in which an institution has 
come to be what it is, that they cease to consider with sufficient care what it is that an 
institution has become”;114 legal and historical analysis are different creatures.115 In 
Dicey, we see a strong vein of formalism.116 It is interesting to contrast Anson and Dicey. 
Both accepted the importance of constitutional history, although Dicey more readily 
accepted that present and past constitutions could differ. Indeed, Dicey argued at length 
in 1893 that the proposed Home Rule Bill would precipitate a ‘new constitution’.117 
                                               
111 William Reynell Anson, The Law and Custom of the Constitution, 4th ed., vol. 1 (Clarendon Press, 
1911), ix. 
112 Lived 1835-1922. 
113 Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (Macmillan & Co. 
Ltd., 1915), vi. Quotes are from this edition, unless otherwise stated. 
114 Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, vii–viii. Indeed, “in regard to English 
law and the law of the constitution, the Landesgemeinden of Uri, the witness of Homer, the ealdormen, the 
constitution of the Witenagemót, and a lot more of fascinating matter are mere antiquarianism. Let no one 
suppose that to say this is to deny the relation between history and law. […]. What one may assert…is, that 
the kind of constitutional history which consists in researches into the antiquities of English institutions, 
has no direct bearing on the rules of constitutional law in the sense in which these rules can become the 
subject of legal comment. […]. But let us remember that antiquarianism is not law, and that the function of 
a trained lawyer is not to know what the law of England was yesterday, still less what it was centuries ago, 
or what it ought to be to-morrow; but to know and be able to state what are the principles of law which 
actually and at the present day exist in England. [Knowledge of antiquarian matters] throws as much light 
on the constitution of the United States as upon the constitution of England; that is, it throws from a legal 
point of view no light upon either the one or the other.” Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, 13–14. 
115 “[Constitutional historians and legal constitutionalists] are each concerned with the constitution, but 
from a different aspect. An historian is primarily occupied with ascertaining the steps by which a 
constitution has grown to be what it is. He is deeply, sometimes excessively, concerned with the question 
of ‘origins’. He is but indirectly concerned in ascertaining what are the rules of the constitution [in the 
present day]. To a lawyer, on the other hand, the primary object of study is the law as it now stands; he is 
only secondarily occupied with ascertaining how it came into existence.” Dicey, Introduction to the Study 
of the Law of the Constitution, 15. On this point, see: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 27. 
116 See: Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, 18ff. 
117 Albert Venn Dicey, A Leap in the Dark or Our New Constitution (John Murray, 1893). 
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Next, there are two who are perhaps more comfortably labeled as lawyers and legal 
historians, although ‘constitutional historian’ would not be entirely amiss for the latter: 
Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland.118 In 1895, the pair published their 
History of English Law before the Time of Edward I.119 Even though they stated their 
intention to avoid the ‘territory’ of constitutional history where possible, they 
nevertheless saw it as a complementary endeavour; to understand the constitution 
required some understanding of, for example, the ‘law of land tenure’ and ‘civil and 
criminal procedure’.120 As Maitland was later to say, quite correctly:  
“Regarding the matter historically we may say that there is hardly any 
department of law which does not, at one time or another, become of 
constitutional importance. […]. If we are to learn anything about the 
constitution it is necessary first and foremost to learn a good deal about the 
land law. We can make no progress whatever in the history of parliament 
without speaking of tenure, indeed our whole constitutional law seems at 
times to be but an appendix to the law of real property.”121 
This comes from Maitland’s Constitutional History of England, published posthumously 
in 1908.122 Although not representing Maitland’s ‘polished and mature work’, its editor, 
HAL Fisher,123 nevertheless thought it would be a valuable teaching aid. Moreover, he 
notes that one Professor Dicey had looked over the work and ‘urged its publication’.124 
It is a pity that Maitland never published a work on constitutional history to the scale of 
Stubbs’s. As Burrow lamented: “Maitland’s was a comparable mind, sharper, finer, more 
theoretical and impressionable, but in Maitland’s case, though the oeuvre may be as 
                                               
118 Sir Frederick Pollock (1845-1937) and Frederic William Maitland (1850-1906). It should be said that 
Pollock is generally regarded as the less able of the two and the merit of some of his work has been viewed 
with scepticism. On this point, see, e.g.: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 27–28. For an 
appraisal of Maitland and his legacy, see: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 28, 30–33. 
119 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of 
Edward I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1968); Frederick Pollock and 
Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd 
ed., vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 1968). 
120 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1968, 1:cvi. 
121 Frederic William Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, ed. Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher 
(Cambridge University Press, 1908), 538. 
122 It based was on a series of lectures delivered by Maitland in 1887-8: Maitland, The Constitutional 
History of England, v. 
123 Fisher was, incidentally, also Maitland’s brother-in-law; Fisher’s sister, Florence, had been married to 
Maitland until his death in 1906.  
124 Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, vi. Dicey later wrote to Maitland’s widow, saying 
that it was "out and out the best book written on the subject from the legal point of view which I have ever 
read." This is quoted in: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 31. 
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impressive, there is no single work which is so obviously the summation of his talents 
and learning.”125 Another posthumous work of Maitland is also worth mention: A Sketch 
of English Legal History (1915). This was a compilation of some of Maitland’s writings, 
combined with writings by Francis Charles Montague.126 
From the turn of the century,127 constitutional history fell into decline. Some of the older 
textbooks continued into new editions and some new works were written, e.g. by Hannis 
Taylor,128 whose Origin and Growth of the English Constitution was published in two 
volumes in 1889 and 1898,129 and George Burton Adams, whose Origin of the English 
Constitution was published in 1912 with a revised edition in 1920.130 In truth, Taylor and 
Adams – both Americans – belong rather to the Victorian period than the twentieth 
century. They were born at the tail-end of the period in which the Victorian Constitutional 
Historians were born. Their place is, therefore, beside them. 
During this period, the continuity thesis assumed a respectable garb. Constitutional 
history became an academic pursuit and attracted attention from very able minds; it was 
considered a worthwhile and important subject. This was soon to end.  
                                               
125 Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 131. In a similar vein, Bentley has said of Maitland that he brought with 
him to historical study “a cool scepticism and a forensic legal intelligence that could only corrode structures 
that did not meet his standards of verification or styles of documentation…”: Bentley, Modernizing 
England’s Past, 33. Whether Maitland would have possessed the treasury of knowledge, at the time of his 
death, to write a work such as Stubbs’ has been doubted by Cam; she thought, following Galbraith, that 
“Maitland’s learning fell far short of that of Stubbs – as Maitland himself would have been the first to 
declare.” “Stubbs Seventy Years After” in Cam, Law-Finders and Law-Makers, 188–211. For Cam’s 
assessment of Maitland (at least, principally to history, rather than law), in which she concluded with 
Powicke that Maitland was one of the ‘immortals’, see: “Maitland - The Historians' Historian” in Cam, 
Law-Finders and Law-Makers, 212–34. 
126 Frederic William Maitland and Francis C Montague, A Sketch of English Legal History, ed. JF Colby 
(GP Putnam’s Sons, 1915). Francis Charles Montague lived 1858-1935. 
127 Maitland died in 1906, i.e. around the turn of the century. Brundage and Cosgrove have argued that, “at 
his death the subject began to divide into separate channels: historians who emphasised public law and 
lawyers who concentrated on the tracing of private law.” Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 
224. 
128 Taylor had an international, if somewhat controversial, reputation. For a discussion of his public war of 
words with Henry Goudy over allegations of plagiarism in The Science of Jurisprudence, see: John W 
Cairns, “Henry Goudy, Hannis Taylor, and Plagiarism Considered as a Fine Art,” Tulane European and 
Civil Law Forum 30, no. 1 (2015): 1–79. 
129 Hannis Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution, vol. 1 (Houghton, Mifflin and 
Company, 1889); Hannis Taylor, The Origin and Growth of the English Constitution, vol. 2 (Houghton, 
Mifflin and Company, 1898). 
130 See: George Burton Adams, The Origin of the English Constitution, 1st ed. (Yale University Press, 
1912); George Burton Adams, The Origin of the English Constitution, 2nd ed. (Yale University Press, 
1920). This was largely a collection of previously published articles, which means that it contains work 
principally published somewhat earlier: Cf. Adams, Origin of the English Constitution, 1920, vii; Benjamin 
Terry, “Review: The English Constitution - George Burton Adams,” The American Historical Review 18, 




During their ascendency, the assumptions and opinions of the Victorian Constitutional 
Historians went essentially unchallenged. Those who might have challenged them 
directly (e.g. Carlyle, Southey, Cobbett, Pugin, Disraeli, Ruskin, and Morris) did not do 
so.131 Froude, in the sense that he treated English history specifically, came closest, but 
he showed little interest in – even disdain for – ideas about constitutions. Yet, even in 
Froude, the pervasiveness of Whiggism can be detected. Even though he argued against 
continuities between the mediaeval and early modern periods, he ‘approved’ the 
discontinuity and ‘appears to endorse the progress’ made by the break: “Froude was no 
Whig, but his History ultimately supported rather than challenged a central Whig 
sentiment: a sense of the privileges the English derived from their history” – Froude 
merely placed the start date after the mediaeval period.132  
Given the resounding success of constitutional history during the nineteenth century, its 
decline is somewhat surprising. One reason stands out, but there are a number of possible 
contributory factors to its decline.133  
Even in spite of later criticisms, many of these writers remained highly regarded for the 
scope and depth of their learning. The task of surpassing their works was – and remains 
– formidable. Even Maitland was cautious of trespassing too far into constitutional history 
for fear of only saying “over again…what the Bishop of Oxford [i.e. Stubbs] has 
admirably said,” with “no hope of being able to say with any truth what he has left 
unsaid”.134 Indeed, to rival these writers, one would need to have a working knowledge 
of English, Roman, and canon law, as well as other continental legal systems. 
Furthermore, a knowledge of various languages, including: classical and mediaeval Latin; 
Old and Middle English; German;135 Anglo-Norman, Old and modern French; classical 
                                               
131 These were: Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), Robert Southey (1774-1843), William Cobbett (1763-1835), 
Augustus Pugin (1812-1852), Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), John Ruskin (1819-1900), and William 
Morris (1834-1896). 
132  On the writers mentioned in this paragraph, see: Burrow, A Liberal Descent, 236–38, 240-242. 
Quotation at 242. 
133  Cf. Brundage and Cosgrove’s argument in their book, The Great Tradition, that “Constitutional 
history’s loss of prestige certainly depended upon developments within academe, but it also hinged upon 
accelerating political, social, economic, and international transformations.” Brundage and Cosgrove, The 
Great Tradition, xi. 
134 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1968, 1:cvi.  
135 Not only does this help one to read Old English, but there is also a substantial amount of scholarship 
that has been written in modern German.  
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Greek; as well as perhaps some knowledge of Brythonic and Gaelic languages.136 Above 
all of this, one would need to have a firm understanding of historical events both in Britain 
and beyond over the course of millennia. 137  The task is not impossible, but it is 
forbidding.138 
Another contributory factor is simply changing interests. The Victorian Constitutional 
Historians wrote in the so-called ‘constitutional century’ – a century of nation-building 
and constitution-writing. 139  There had been the likes of the English Instrument of 
Government (1653) and the Swedish Regeringsformen (1719, 1772, etc.), but it was only 
from the time of the US Constitution (1789) and the French Revolution (which occasioned 
a number of constitutions, the first of which was passed in 1791) that codified 
constitutions became a mainstay of ‘States’. Even though the twentieth century saw the 
production of more constitutional documents than the nineteenth, they were by this time 
less of a novelty and, in any case, the constitutional history of Britain was felt to be largely 
settled. Moreover, with the disintegration of the British Empire and the decline of 
English/British exceptionalism, there was perhaps less impetus to study English/British 
constitutional history.140 
                                               
136 These are both families of languages within the Celtic language family. Brythonic languages include 
Welsh, Cornish, Breton, and Cumbric; Gaelic or Goidelic languages include the Irish, Scottish, and Manx 
languages. This is particularly important if one wanted to undertake a constitutional history of the British 
Isles, i.e. a truly British constitutional history. However, it is even important for English constitutional 
history, particularly during the period of the English settlements, because it helps one understand the extent 
to which the English and non-English populations interacted and the extent to which they were influenced 
by one another.  
137 It is interesting to note Maitland’s criticism of “a scheme for historical teaching on the ground that it 
was ‘far too English’.” John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (Longmans, Green and Co., 
1913), 242–43. 
138 As Chrimes said in 1936: “But the history of the English monarchy, as an institution, has still to be 
written. The great length of that history, its extreme complexity, its profound ramifications into the very 
heart of English evolution – not to mention the parliamentary preoccupations of constitutional historians, 
and the Whiggish outlook of nearly all historians except the more recent – have seriously mitigated against 
its construction, in all its fullness. A great theme – one of the very few left – as rich in the play of 
personalities as in the subtleties of law and the machinations of politics, awaits its exponent; and he will 
need to be something of a Stubbs, of a Maitland, and of a Tout, all in one.” Stanley Bertram Chrimes, 
English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge University Press, 1936), 2. Indeed, as 
Brundage and Cosgrove have said that, in regard to Maitland though it might be more generally applied, 
“such a high standard of accomplishment [had been set] that it was inevitable that the work of others would 
pale by comparison.” Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 224.  
139 Kelly L Grotke and Markus J Prutsch, eds., Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-
Century Experiences (Oxford University Press, 2014), 10. 
140  On this point, see: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 24; Bentley, Modernizing 
England’s Past, 15, 70–91. 
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There were also changes in scholarly focus. As history developed as a discipline, it 
branched off in many directions;141  constitutional history no longer represented the 
cutting edge.142 Furthermore, whereas there had once been close ties between law and 
history, the subjects became increasingly divorced from one another. Whilst lawyers 
continued to learn about constitutional history for a while longer,143 historians ceased to 
be formally schooled therein; 144  it became foreign. 145  Consequently, as other areas 
garnered increasing attention, constitutional history came to be neglected. Some interest 
remained among legal scholars, but little among historians.146 Even those who fused law 
                                               
141 For example, social history, economic history, cultural history, women’s history, etc. See: Carpenter, 
“Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 185. 
142 Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 67. 
143 It is worth noting Allison’s argument that “History has [in recent times] lost prominence in the general 
understanding of English constitutional law”. The historical dimension of the constitution has ceased to be 
written about and studied by lawyers, except, perhaps, in passing. This is undoubtedly true. Lawyers today 
are taught, generally speaking, only the most recent laws and principles of the constitution; only the law as 
it stands in modern times. Allison attributes this, in no small part, to the effect of Dicey and, in particular, 
his Law of the Constitution, written in the spirit of ‘scientific rationalism’. As noted above, Dicey’s intent 
– even if he was not wholly successful – was to focus only on current law. Arguably, this is all a lawyer 
need know; their task, after all, is merely to describe and apply the law as it stands. Indeed, perhaps the 
‘current’ law is all a lawyer should know, so as not to be encouraged to focus overmuch on antiquated 
forms and forget the present-day; to start describing and applying laws no longer valid. This descriptivism 
has certainly gained a great deal of traction. As such, as history moved away from law, law also moved 
away from history. For Allison, see: JWF Allison, “History in the Law of the Constitution,” The Journal of 
Legal History 28, no. 3 (2007): quotes at 263 and 266. 
144 See: Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past, 19–22. 
145  It should be said that this is not to say historians are entirely unfamiliar with the works of the 
constitutional historians – particularly Stubbs and Maitland. References to these are often to be found in 
historians’ writings, particularly in treatments with an overtly political and institutional angle. Their 
scholarship is clearly still respected enough to warrant interaction, even if they are not always cited 
approvingly.  
146 See: Grotke and Prutsch, Const. Legitimacy, Power Ninet. Exp., 8–9. 
34 
 
and history – legal historians, like Holdsworth147 and, later, Baker148 – tended to avoid 
constitutional history;149  their focus has rather been on the development of areas of 
private, procedural, and criminal law. However, matters were far more serious than a 
mere changing of focus or interests. 
It is largely due to the next generation of historians – born during the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century – that constitutional history withered. Within this generation one may 
count Prothero, Round, Tout, Firth, Bury, and Pollard;150 men “trained by the Stubbs 
generation at Oxford and Cambridge”.151 If the process of professionalizing history had 
begun under the previous generation, it was under this generation that it truly became 
professionalized. There arose a “desire for a truer historical picture, for the application of 
                                               
147 William Searle Holdsworth (1871-1944) was, like Blackstone and Dicey before him, Vinerian Professor 
of English Law at Oxford; he held this chair 1922-1944. He is largely responsible for the most extensive 
and comprehensive history of English law written by any single individual; his History of English Law 
amounted to some seventeen volumes (although, the latter volumes were finished by others after 
Holdsworth’s death). Whilst these volumes – almost inevitably – touch on constitutional matters (e.g. the 
constitution of the courts, the roles of various officials, and matters of jurisdiction), Holdsworth rather 
attempted to steer clear of constitutional law. The sparsity of mention of constitutions in the indexes to his 
volumes is testament to this. It is also clear that he viewed himself as a legal, rather than constitutional, 
historian. Moreover, he was of the opinion that legal and constitutional historians sometimes might “take 
divergent views of the same events”; legal historians would look “mainly at the development of private 
law” and constitutional historians would look “solely at the development of public law”. For the purposes 
of this thesis, the most relevant volumes of Holdsworth’s History are the first five: William Searle 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (Little, Brown, and Company, 1922); William Searle 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 2 (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923); William Searle 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 3 (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923); William Searle 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 4 (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1945); William Searle 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 2nd ed., vol. 5 (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1945). The quote is from Vol. 
II, p. 289. It is worthwhile adding that, whilst there can be little doubt of Holdsworth’s importance in terms 
of having provided a continuous and in depth narrative, there have been doubts cast on the merits of his 
work; on his methods, conclusions, and ability: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” 29–30. 
148 Sir John Baker (1944-present) is Downing Professor Emeritus of the Laws of England at the University 
of Cambridge. His Introduction to English Legal History has become a standard textbook and covers the 
period from the Roman occupation (albeit very briefly) to the modern day; it has just entered its fifth edition. 
As with Holdsworth, Baker inevitably touches upon constitutional matters, but, once again, this is far from 
being his principal aim and discussion of the constitution is largely disaggregated. This can be seen by the 
fact that the index listing for “Constitution”, besides two direct references, points the reader to certain other 
topics: Administrative Law; Due Process; King; Legislation; Liberty; Parliament; Royal Prerogative; Rule 
of Law; Separation of Powers; and Judges’ Tenure. See: John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal 
History, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019). It is interesting to note that Baker has written on the 
modern constitution – defending its unwritten form – but this was devoid of historical analysis: John Baker, 
“The Unwritten Constitution of the United Kingdom,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 15, no. 1 (2013): 4–27. 
149 Cf. Allison’s statement that “After several decades during which legal historians have provided careful, 
modest and impressively nuanced historical accounts but seldom of public law, many pragmatic, politically 
driven or normatively inspired public lawyers might seriously doubt the practical, political or normative 
value of much legal history.” JWF Allison, “History To Understand, and History To Reform, English Public 
Law,” The Cambridge Law Journal 72, no. 3 (2013): 557. 
150 George Prothero (1848-1922), John Horace Round (1854-1928), Thomas Frederick Tout (1855-1929), 
Charles Firth (1857-1936), John Bagnell Bury (1861-1927), and Albert Pollard (1869-1948). 
151 See: Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 180. 
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a truer historical method”.152 They took “advantage of the availability of so much more 
record material” and “began to study the records of the English government in far greater 
detail, and in a far more systematic manner”.153 Just as Polydore Vergil had started to 
unravel the historicity of an ancient Brythonic constitution through critical analysis of the 
sources, these authors began to “cast serious doubts on the impeccable Whig pedigree of 
England’s law and legislature”:154 
“The late mediaeval parliament and the historiographical tradition it had stood 
for, including even Magna Carta, were systematically debunked. The new 
heroes were the unsung administrators… The great theme of English history 
was no longer liberty and the representation of the people but the creation of 
the nation state, and the state was built in public by great kings like Henry 
VIII…and behind the scenes by the faceless apolitical ‘middle-class’ 
bureaucrats.”155  
Even still, these writers were not entirely guiltless of their teachers’ sins.156 
There followed two generations who dominated historical writing, particularly that of the 
mediaeval period. Carpenter has called this the ‘Manchester-Oxford era’, which extended 
                                               
152  These are the words of Charles McLean Andrews (1863-1943), writing in the context of the 
development of the theory of the Mark, regarding which he argued that there was something of a disconnect 
between the evidence and the conclusions that had previously been drawn: Charles McLean Andrews, The 
Old English Manor: A Study in English Economic History (The John Hopkins Press, 1892), 5. Indeed, he 
reflected on how: “The history of the hypothesis forms an interesting chapter in the relation between modern 
thought and the interpretation of past history, and shows that in the formation of an opinion both writer and 
reader are unconsciously dependent upon the spirit of the age in which they live”: Andrews, The Old 
English Manor, 1. Brundage and Cosgrove have said that the introduction to Andrews’ Old English Manor 
“asserted that a racial explanation of institutional history simply no longer persuaded”: Brundage and 
Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, 52. This is something of an overstatement. Andrews was rather arguing for 
a more nuanced and evidence-based approach. As indicated in his History of England, however, he clearly 
retained some idea of ‘peoples’; he speaks of “the life, character, and progress of the English people”, as 
well as its ‘achievements’; he speaks of ‘the social life of a nation’; he also speaks of the ‘careers of 
peoples’: Charles McLean Andrews, A History of England (Allyn and Bacon, 1903), iii, iv. Whether or not 
Andrews regarded ‘races’ and ‘peoples’ as exactly synonymous, he nevertheless appears to have perceived 
a connection between social organization, on the one hand, and some overarching and enduring entity, on 
the other. 
153  Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 180. Round, in 
particular, was important in furthering this approach and method: Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal 
History,” 28–29; Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, chap. 4. 
154 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 180. 
155 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 180–81. 
156 For example, one can detect a distinct vein of Whiggishness in Tout: “We are still rightly proud of the 
English constitution, of the continuity between our modern democratic institutions and our parliamentary 
institutions of the middle ages, and of the way in which in modern times the english parliamentary system 
has suggested the form of free institutions to nearly every civilised nation.”: Thomas Frederick Tout, 
Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England: The Wardrobe, the Chamber, and the Small 
Seals, vol. 1, 1920, 1. 
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from the early twentieth century to the 1950s.157 Here can be counted Powicke, Galbraith, 
Jacob, Cheney, Southern, and Roskell.158  
Constitutional history continued to be written during this time, but became more focused 
– both to narrower periods and subjects. We might think of Lapsley,159 Chrimes,160 
Clarke,161 Cam,162 and Wilkinson.163 New textbooks on constitutional history ceased to 
be produced, especially those with any coverage of the mediaeval period; those that had 
been written now went through their final editions.164 Joliffe produced his Constitutional 
History of Medieval England in 1937, which had its fourth and final revision in 1961,165 
and Bryce Lyon published his Constitutional and Legal History in 1960 with a second 
edition in 1980.166 However, these are very much hangovers from the earlier period. 
                                               
157 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 183. 
158 Sir Frederick Maurice Powicke (1879-1963), Vivien Hunter Galbraith (1889-1976), EF Jacob (1894-
1971), CR Cheney (1906-1987), Sir Richard William Southern (1912-2001) and JS Roskell (1913-1998) 
159 Gaillard Thomas Lapsley (1871-1949). See: Gaillard Lapsley, “The Parliamentary Title of Henry IV,” 
The English Historical Review 49, no. 195 (1934): 423–49; Gaillard Lapsley, “The Parliamentary Title of 
Henry IV (Continued),” The English Historical Review 49, no. 196 (1934): 577–606; Gaillard Lapsley, 
“Some Recent Advance in English Constitutional History (before 1485),” Cambridge Historical Journal 
5, no. 2 (1936): 119–61. 
160 Stanley Bertram Chrimes (1907-1984). See: Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth 
Century; Stanley Bertram Chrimes, An Introduction to the Administrative History of Mediaeval England, 
3rd ed. (Basil Blackwell, 1966). 
161  Maude Violet Clarke (1892-1935). See esp.: Maude Violet Clarke, Medieval Representation and 
Consent: A Study of Early Parliaments in England with Special Reference to the Modus Tenendi 
Parliamentum (Longmans, Green and Co., 1936); Maude V Clarke and VH Galbraith, “The Deposition of 
Richard II,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 14, no. 1 (1930): 125–81. 
162 Helen Maud Cam (1885-1968). See: Helen M Cam, Studies in the Hundred Rolls: Some Aspects of 
Thirteenth-Century Administration (Oxford University Press, 1921); Helen M Cam, The Hundred and the 
Hundred Rolls; an Outline of Local Government in Medieval England (Methuen, 1930); Helen M Cam, 
Liberties and Communities in Medieval England: Collected Studies in Local Administration and 
Topography (Cambridge University Press, 1944); Cam, Law-Finders and Law-Makers. 
163 Bertram (‘Bertie’) Wilkinson (1898-1981). See: Bertram Wilkinson, The Constitutional History of 
England, 1216-1399: Politics and the Constitution, 1216-1307, vol. 1 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1948); 
Bertram Wilkinson, The Constitutional History of England, 1216-1399: Politics and the Constitution, 
1307-1399, vol. 2 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1952); Bertram Wilkinson, The Constitutional History of 
England, 1216-1399: The Development of the Constitution, 1216-1399, vol. 3 (Longmans, Green and Co., 
1958); Bertram Wilkinson, Constitutional History of England in the Fifteenth Century (1399-1485), with 
Illustrative Documents (Longmans, Green and Co., 1964). 
164  For example, Feilden’s Short Constitutional History had its fourth edition in 1911 and Medley’s 
Student’s Manual had its sixth edition in 1925: Feilden, Etheridge, and Hartley, Short Constitutional 
History; Medley, A Student’s Manual of Constitutional History. 
165 John Edward Austin Joliffe (1891-1964). See: JEA Jolliffe, The Constitutional History of Medieval 
England from the English Settlement to 1485, 4th ed. (WW Norton and Company, 1961). Mention should 
also be made of the sister book to this written by Sir David Lindsay Keir (1895-1973), which was first 
published in 1938 and had its ninth and final edition in 1969. This book covered the constitutional history 
of “Modern Britain” from 1485. As such, the period that it covers is not quite as contentious as those other 
works here mentioned. David Lindsay Keir, The Constitutional History of Modern Britain Since 1485, 9th 
ed. (Adam and Charles Black, 1969). 
166 Bryce Dale Lyon (1920-2007). Bryce Dale Lyon, A Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval 
England, 2nd ed. (WW Norton and Company, 1980). The volume by Goldwin Smith might also be noted 
here, which was published in 1955: Goldwin Smith, A Constitutional and Legal History of England 
(Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955). 
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Indeed, even though many of these authors lived into the 1980s and beyond, the majority 
of their contributions to constitutional history fall before the mid-1960s. Since that time, 
the field has been largely lifeless.167 In the last few decades, the only real attempt at an 
expansive constitutional history is Ann Lyon’s Constitutional History, first published in 
2003 with a second edition in 2016, 168  though this is largely a political history. 
Seemingly, Christine Carpenter is currently writing A New Constitutional History of Late 
Medieval England,169 although what this will look like remains to be seen.  
Naturally, people have still been discussing constitutional issues,170 and there have been 
some attempts to bring these somewhat to the fore. For example, JM Roberts, in his 
General Editor’s Preface to the New Oxford History of England, a series of volumes 
commissioned in 1992, speaks of the “institutional core” that runs throughout English 
history. These volumes certainly do not neglect this, which is evident from their 
structure. 171  However, they aim to be general histories, lack a solid underlying 
constitutional theory, and do not overtly recognize constitutional history.  
Historical analysis has not been entirely devoid of analysis of constitutional matters;172 
public law has not been entirely devoid of historical analysis.173 Nevertheless, there is 
every reason to believe that constitutional history – as a field – remains on the fringe. Few 
and far between are those who would label themselves as constitutional historians. 
                                               
167 The fact that constitutional history was ceasing, around this time, to be a “taught tradition” is a point 
not to be underestimated. See: Brundage and Cosgrove, The Great Tradition, esp. 234. 
168 Ann Lyon, The Constitutional History of the United Kingdom, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2016). The lack of 
works on constitutional history in recent decades was, in fact, a large part of the impetus behind Lyon’s 
writing of the book: Lyon, The Constitutional History of the United Kingdom, 2. 
169 This will seemingly cover the period 1215 to 1509. See her academic profile on the University of 
Cambridge’s Faculty of History’s website:  https://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/directory/mcc1000@cam.ac.uk 
[accessed 19 April 2019] 
170 As will be argued subsequently, particularly in the context of the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity, 
such issues are practically inescapable. 
171 For the time period covered by the present thesis, the most relevant volumes (that have been published) 
are: Robert Bartlett, England Under The Norman And Angevin Kings, 1075-1225 (Oxford University Press, 
2002); Michael Prestwich, Plantagenet England, 1225-1360 (Oxford University Press, 2005); Gerald 
Harriss, Shaping the Nation: England 1360-1461 (Oxford University Press, 2005); Penry Williams, The 
Later Tudors: England, 1547-1603 (Oxford University Press, 1995). 
172 As McFarlane said, the attempt to perfectly ‘isolate’ political history from constitutional history would 
be in ‘vain’. There is a great extent to which, as McFarlane argued, political history is constitutional history; 
discussion of one inevitably involves discussion of the other. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval 
England, 280. 
173 On some of the influence that historical analysis and approaches to the historical method have had on 
public law and discussion thereon, see, e.g.: Allison, “History To Understand, and History To Reform, 
English Public Law.” 
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This is due in no small part to Namier and McFarlane.174 This was not so much because 
they rejected constitutional history, but, rather, because their methods and approaches 
tended towards realpolitik and microanalysis, which stood in stark contrast to the grand 
Whiggish narratives. Since the 1950s, their approach, which focuses on individuals and 
their interests, has dominated.175 The extremity of this swing is lamentable: 
“[L]ate mediaeval history is still so scared by the spectre of the Whigs that the 
institutions by which the realm was governed have all but disappeared, leaving 
politics devoid not just of conceptual structures but of the institutional 
framework within which they operated: politics are held to be about lordship, 
operating in a governmental vacuum. In sum, we now have the politics in full 
measure, but we have lost the constitution, and with it an intellectual point of 
focus.”176 
Of course, the issues that constitutional history treated have not gone away; they have 
often been treated under other guises. There is something deeply dissatisfactory about 
this; it borders on disingenuousness.  
Whilst the foregoing largely explains why constitutional history was done less, it does 
not quite explain why it came to be altogether avoided. There are, broadly speaking, two 
charges that can be laid at the door of constitutional history. First, that constitutional 
history, as applied to pre-modern societies, is anachronistic: There was nothing in such 
societies that could meaningfully be called a constitution; to undertake a constitutional 
history, then, would be meaningless for lack of a subject. Second, that constitutional 
history’s method and approach is informed by distasteful and outmoded ideas – in 
particular, by a brand of Whiggism. Any defence of constitutional history needs to deal 
adequately with both of these criticisms if it is to be successful. The framework set out in 
Part I is designed to do this.  
1.3 Historical Constitutions as Anachronism 
                                               
174 Sir Lewis Namier (1888-1960); KB McFarlane (1903-1966). 
175 This is not to say that ‘Whiggism’ disappeared: “[T]he whigs did not die: they survived science, they 
survived Maitland; they found ways to survive the First World War and by keeping their heads down, or at 
least out of the universities, they survived the twentieth century.” Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past, 7. 
176 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 192. 
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There has been a long-standing and widespread cavalier attitude to the existence of 
mediaeval constitutions. This applies as much to those who support their existence as to 
those who deny it. There is little substantive argument on either side. 
Of sceptics of mediaeval constitutions, Pickthorn and Holt are good examples. 177 
Pickthorn, in the first volume of his Early Tudor Government, said that it was “hardly too 
much to say that” the mediaeval idea of the supremacy of law was “before the sixteenth 
century…all there was in England in the way of a constitution…”178 Later, he remarked 
“how far the fifteenth century was from anything which can usefully be called a 
constitution.”179 The first remark is doubly flawed. In the first place, the supremacy – or 
rule – of law is not intrinsically a constitutional matter;180 it cannot be all there is of a 
constitution. In the second place, there was a great deal more than this in any case. The 
second remark is simply false. 
Holt did little better in his Magna Carta. Following his bold statement that “Twelfth-
century England had no constitution,” he went on seemingly to define ‘constitution’ in 
negative terms: 
“There was no general system of government in which powers were balanced, 
functions allotted and defined, rights protected, and principles stated or 
acknowledged. Instead there were the materials from which a constitution of 
some kind might ultimately and indirectly be compounded. Government was 
evolving routine procedures, methods which it found convenient to use in 
most, but not necessarily all, circumstances. It operated in a society in which 
privilege seemed to be part of the natural order of things… From these 
primitive elements to a settled constitution was a long, tortuous and often 
bloody journey in which the grant of charters of liberties was but one, and that, 
an early step.”181 
Holt provides no authority for his definition. Two fallacies are apparent. First, he appears 
to conflate constitution and constitutionalism, i.e. constitutions with the idea that power 
                                               
177 Kenneth Pickthorn (1892-1975) and Sir James Clarke Holt (1922-2014). 
178 Kenneth Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government: Henry VII (Cambridge University Press, 1934), 55. 
179 Pickthorn, Early Tudor Government: Henry VII, 101. Cf. Chrimes’s discussion of Pickthorn’s views: 
Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century, xviii, xix. 
180 See infra, Appendix I, 11.13 
181 James Clarke Holt, Magna Carta, ed. George Garnett and John Hudson, 3rd ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, 2015), 49. For the same in the previous edition, solely written by Holt, see: James Clarke Holt, 
Magna Carta, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 23. 
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ought to be delimited and divided, and that power-holders ought to be held to account. 
Second, he appears to be of the opinion that a constitution must of necessity be something 
that is settled. This rather begs the question as to at what point a constitution would be 
considered so unsettled as to no longer be a constitution.182 However, if one reads what 
he wrote carefully, he seems to imply that the ‘primitive elements’, as he called them, 
made for an unsettled constitution during the mediaeval period, although this does not 
appear to be his intended meaning. 
To Pickthorn and Holt we can add a number of others who are not historians by trade and 
who, in all fairness, have made greater effort to substantiate their positions. We find, for 
example, the statement of Ehrlich that “the chief characteristic of the feudal state is the 
fact that it has no constitutions, but only agreements.”183 As feudalism was the typical 
persuasion of mediaeval societies, so the orthodox opinion runs, the implication of this 
statement is that mediaeval societies had no constitutions. Alternatively, we can take the 
statement of Grimm that: 
“The mediaeval world did not have a constitution and it could not have 
had one. All talk about the constitution of the ancient Roman Empire, of 
mediaeval kingdoms, or of the British constitution refers to a different 
object.”184 
In all of these cases – Pickthorn, Holt, Ehrlich, and Grimm – the definitions of 
‘constitution’ used, whilst not being without their merits and applications, are, it is argued, 
rather too narrow.185 
By contrast, there are those who are prepared to interpret the term ‘constitution’ more 
expansively and extend it beyond the modern State. However, their arguments often do 
little better than to say: ‘of course there were (or are) constitutions’. We might consider 
Chrimes’ reply to Pickthorn’s previously cited argument:  
“For it is impossible to conceive of any established government without 
some sort of constitution, however primitive, crude, or unparliamentary. 
Since Mr Pickthorn analyses the government as established in 1485, at 
                                               
182 Cf. Neil Walker, “Our Constitutional Unsettlement,” Public Law, 2014, 529–48. 
183 Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, trans. Walter L Moll (Harvard Library 
Law School, 1936), 32. 
184 Dieter Grimm, “The Achievement of Constitutionalism and Its Prospects in a Changed World,” in The 
Twilight of Constitutionalism?, ed. Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (Oxford University Press, 2010), 11. 
185 See, infra, esp. 2.2-2.4. 
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considerable length, we must needs believe that some sort of constitution 
existed even in that deficient century.”186 
More recently, one might look to Carpenter’s discussion of constitutional history: 
“Thus, ‘constitutional’ means neither parliamentary nor institutional 
though, self-evidently, both may be part of the constitution, for, as 
McFarlane put it in a rather tetchy annotation to Chrimes’s English 
Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century, ‘All states have 
constitutions tho they may be difficult to define’. By the same token all 
states or their equivalent must have some constitutional thought.”187 
In many respects, it is this difficulty of defining ‘constitution’, hinted at by Chrimes and 
stated more explicitly by McFarlane, which lies at the heart of this divergence between 
the two camps. It would be fair to say that most people have some idea as to what a 
constitution is. However, it is rarely the case that this idea has been subjected to prolonged 
rigorous critical thought. This is somewhat understandable, given that determining what 
is, and what is not, a constitution is difficult. However, when such approximations and 
assumptions become bold statements, they are inexcusable; it is recklessness pure and 
simple. A person might not need to know much about engineering to know that motor-
vehicles did not exist during the mediaeval period; the same does not apply to 
constitutions. Without fully and clearly understanding what they are, one is in no position 
to make judgement.  
For the most part, those who affirm or deny the existence of constitutions beyond the 
modern State appear to regard their view as self-evident. This amounts to little more than 
pronouncements of faith. If anything is actually self-evident, it is the need for a more 
thoughtful, detailed, and rigorous definition of ‘constitution’. Only with this can we 
properly decide on their existence in other places and at other times.  
Naturally, for the (constitutional) historian, as Chrimes stated, it is important that any 
such definition is not ‘unhistorical’ – that it does not lead us into anachronism, i.e. 
superimposing ideas and objects onto backgrounds where they do not belong. However, 
Chrimes was wrong to conclude that “[t]he modern constitutional lawyer and the 
                                               
186 Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century, xix. 
187 Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane,” 176. 
42 
 
constitutional historian cannot adopt the same definition.”188 For the term constitution to 
have any real meaning, there must be some fundamental sense in which the definitions 
adopted by historians and lawyers are the same. It will be the task of the Theory of 
Constitutional Ubiquity, developed in the next chapter, therefore, to set out a definition 
of ‘constitution’, which might be equally useful to all – historians and lawyers alike – and 
so provide a common footing. 
1.4 Approach and Method 
The philosophy and worldview behind this thesis – at least, in its theoretical dimensions 
– should be made plain. After all, only by properly understanding these can one properly 
understand the arguments – of this or any work. Firstly, this thesis is informed by a 
philosophy founded in empiricism, 189  scepticism, 190  agnosticism, 191  realism, 192 
materialism,193 existentialism,194 and compatibilism;195 in a word, humanism. It will be 
unsurprising, therefore, that little stock is invested in theories of natural law, or that 
disapproval is shown for metaphysical and teleological reasoning. 196  There will be 
nothing transcendental or mystical; neither will concepts, mental constructions, nor other 
fictions be reified.  
There is also a vein of liberalism. In this light, the arguments of the Generational Theory 
of Law will be unsurprising (especially its moral strand). However, this element of 
                                               
188 Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century, xix. 
189 Knowledge, to be considered as such, must be a posteriori, i.e. the product of experience. 
190 It is impossible to know anything for certain and, paradoxically, perhaps not even that – although, 
following Descartes, it does seem relatively certain that something exists even if we cannot be perfectly 
sure of what that something is. 
191 Given that we cannot be sure whether or not there is a deity or deities, the best thing to do is to suspend 
judgement; in practical terms, however, this translates into atheism.  
192 Reality is much as we perceive it to be.   
193  All phenomena have a material or physical basis; there is nothing metaphysical, supernatural, or 
mystical; in theory, and on some level, everything is observable and measurable. 
194 There is no intrinsic meaning or purpose in the universe and, consequently, it is incumbent upon us to 
create meaning and purpose for ourselves. 
195 Even in a deterministic universe, we can be said to have free will, such that we are, in some degree at 
least, able to make choices and be responsible for our actions. 
196 In the tradition of the likes of Bentham and the legal positivists, and American and Scandinavian 
Realism, this work will seek to excise metaphysical notions from the study of law. This is not in order to 
make law into a science, but merely to firmly base it in reality. On some of the difficulties facing ideas of 
natural law and, in particular, natural rights, see: Loughlin, Sword and Scales, 201. For Loughlin, the chief 
problem with natural rights doctrines is their ‘inherent idealism’. In the first place, they face the problem 
that “the claim that humans are born equal in dignity and rights is patently untrue”; often religious 
arguments are made to defend this, but “[i]n a secular age, however, this is an unreliable method”. 
Alternatively, appeals might be made to unchanging human nature, “but given the vagaries of human 
history, this also seems doomed from the outset”. Loughlin concludes: “Claims to ‘natural’, ‘inalienable’ 
or ‘fundamental’ rights, it appears, are either tautological or fictional.”  
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liberalism should not be misconstrued. It does not build into any claim – at least, insofar 
as the framework is concerned – as to how societies ought to be structured or, indeed, 
what values societies ought to have. Indeed, the moral strand only argues that each 
generation has a choice (insofar as that is possible in a deterministic universe) as to how 
it structures itself and as to what values it wishes to champion. It says nothing concerning 
the exercise of this choice. Ultimately, what the strain of liberalism does is allow for the 
possibility of (social and constitutional) change in a way that traditionalist, conservative, 
etc. approaches typically do not.197 It opens the door to change, but goes no further than 
to argue (under the moral strand) that the door should remain open. Thus, the framework 
suggested here (with the sole exception of the moral strand, and that only to a degree) is 
descriptive, interpretative, and analytical – not evaluative or prescriptive. It falls within 
the realms of social science, not political philosophy or social engineering.198 
In the spirit of social science, this thesis is also undergirded by an approach founded in 
methodological reductionism, i.e. in the idea that phenomena can be better – or, indeed, 
only – understood and appreciated by understanding the component parts that make up 
those phenomena, and the component parts that make up those parts, etc. This is in 
keeping with the materialist and empirical elements of the humanist approach. 
This methodological reductionism is complemented by a strong vein of social 
constructionism. This approach begins with a ‘critical stance’ towards our ideas about 
the world and ourselves, and, more particularly, towards ideas of objective and necessary 
truths about reality that can be derived from observation or deduction. It “cautions us to 
be ever suspicious of our assumptions about how the world appears to be,” for “the 
categories with which we as human beings apprehend the world do not necessarily refer 
                                               
197 After all, these are typically more prejudiced against change – both as to the reality of it and its merits, 
perhaps even arguing not only that change should not happen, but that it does not or cannot happen (at least, 
in some essential way). A theory of historical study founded on such a basis would most likely operate on 
the presumption that there are continuities to be found, which only have to be identified, if not discovered; 
thereafter, to be defended and preserved. The present thesis makes no such presumption or argument. There 
might be continuities or there might not be; there is neither any particular desire nor aversion to finding 
any. Yet, as will be seen, if there are continuities to be found, they will probably be of a different quality to 
that supposed by traditionalists, etc.; any such continuities will be the result of copying and reproduction, 
not some singular penetrating thread. 
198 Consequently, the historical studies in Part III will not be studies in the history of liberal ideas, the 
‘growth’ or ‘development’ of liberalism, an attempt to impose liberal ideas on history, or an excuse to 
propound liberal values. They are purely to show that mediaeval societies had what can meaningfully be 
called ‘constitutions’ and that those constitutions changed over time – a process that was, admittedly, to a 
greater or lesser extent facilitated by the extent to which each generation felt itself to be bound to follow 
the views and practices of its predecessors. 
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to real divisions”.199 Social constructionism argues that our experience of physical reality 
is heavily influenced by the interpretative frameworks that we invent and derive from 
others; moreover, that our social reality is largely – if not wholly – socially constructed, 
i.e. our social relations and the nature thereof are determined, however consciously or 
unconsciously, by us; their fountainhead and seat is in our minds, even if the material 
basis of the objects to which they refer and concern are situated in the external world.200 
This means that, to understand social phenomena, we must turn to individuals and to 
individuals’ minds (i.e. ultimately to neurology and psychology). This approach will be 
particularly apparent in the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity and the Associational 
Theory of Law, and, in many respects is in keeping with the existentialism integral to the 
humanist approach – i.e. with the idea that meaning and value are not inherent in nature, 
but created by us. 
In terms of historical approach, this thesis rejects the narratives of continuity and 
progress; it discards any feelings of pride or triumph. There is no danger of Whiggism 
here. Things change over time; sometimes we might think for the better, other times for 
the worse, but we must not confuse opinion with fact. The historian should always aim to 
be unassuming and non-judgemental. Moreover, following the Annales school, we must 
remember socio-economic context.201 
The purpose of historical study is to understand the past better; wie es eigentlich gewesen, 
to quote Ranke.202 As Tout said: “We investigate the past, not to deduce practical lessons, 
but to find out what really happened.” 203  Even though historical study aids us in 
                                               
199 Vivien Burr, Social Constructionism, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2003), 2. 
200 For an alternative example of this approach, see esp.: John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality 
(Penguin Books, 1995); John R Searle, Making the Social World: The Structure of Human Civilization 
(Oxford University Press, 2010). 
201 We might think of Voltaire’s sarcastic remark on political history in his Essai sur les Moeurs et l’esprit 
des nations: “For the last fourteen hundred years, the only Gauls, apparently, have been kings, ministers 
and generals.”: Quoted in: Jacques Le Goff, “Is Politics Still the Backbone of History?,” trans. Barbara 
Bray, Daedalus 100, no. 1 (1971): 1. 
202 “History has had assigned to it the task of judging the past, of instructing the present for the benefit of 
the ages to come. To such lofty functions this work does not aspire. Its aim is merely to show what actually 
occurred [Er will bloss zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen].” Quotation and translation in: George Peabody 
Gooch, History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd ed. (Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 78. 
For the original, see: Leopold von Ranke, Geschichten Der Romanischen Und Germanischen Völker von 
1494 Bis 1514, 3rd ed. (Duncker & Humblot, 1885), vii. Ranke’s original formulation is not grammatically 
complete; the auxiliary verb (ist), which should be in the end position, is missing. The reason for this 
appears to be – not a typographical error – but, rather, the fact that the omission of the final verb, where it 
could be readily imagined by the reader, was a not uncommon literary feature of nineteenth-century 
German.  
203 Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England: The Wardrobe, the Chamber, and 
the Small Seals, 1:7. 
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understanding why things are as they are and better predicting how things will be 
tomorrow, we must never confuse the past and the present; neither should we be quick to 
assume that similarities between the past and the present entail some singular identity.  
There have been a number of failings in the scholarship, including a lack of 
interdisciplinarity, theoretical frameworks, and system-building. The upshot is that there 
has been a signal failing in connecting everything together. There have been calls for a 
new kind of constitutional history; 204  there are even some who seem to think that 
constitutional history is already making a revival.205 The latter opinion seems optimistic. 
Those historians who have made the call have yet to step outside the bounds of traditional 
history. They appear to be unacquainted with constitutional theory; they have made no 
real attempt to set out a theoretical framework to underpin their narratives. As a result, 
the chapters of their books that proclaim to outline medieval political ideas rather tend 
towards meandering discussions of the importance of kingship.  
This thesis is highly interdisciplinary and integrative in approach. It draws on fields like 
jurisprudence, sociology, anthropology, psychology,206 social psychology, neurology, 
social network analysis, zoology, memetics, Begriffsgeschichte, 207  philosophy, 
mathematics, and logic.208  Through the synthesis in Part I, it seeks to start moving 
towards a more comprehensive system – one that reflects the unity of reality, rather than 
arbitrary disciplinary divisions.209 After all, the attempt to understand constitutions and 
                                               
204 These are, in particular, Edward Powell, Christine Carpenter, and John Watts. See: Edward Powell, 
Kingship, Law, and Society: Criminal Justice in the Reign of Henry V (Oxford University Press, 1989), 1–
22; Edward Powell, “After ‘After McFarlane’: The Poverty of Patronage and the Case for Constitutional 
History,” in Trade, Devotion and Governance. Papers in Later Medieval History (Stroud, 1994), 1–16; 
Carpenter, “Political and Constitutional History: Before and After McFarlane”; Watts, Henry VI and the 
Politics of Kingship. On this more generally, see: Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship, 4–6. Cf. AJ 
Pollard, “Review: John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship,” The American Historical Review 
103, no. 3 (1998): 869–870. 
205 Cosgrove, “Culture of Academic Legal History,” see esp. 23 and 34. 
206  For the purposes of jurisprudence, psychology is incredibly important, for, as Calnan has said: 
“Psychology, or the study of human mind and behavior, is the natural bridge between the natural and social 
sciences”. Alan Calnan, “Beyond Jurisprudence,” Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal 27, 
no. 1 (2017): 44. 
207 That is, the history of ideas. 
208 As Loughlin has commented, in the context of John Millar: “Any theory of government and law must 
be rooted in a theory of society.” Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory, 12. This is undoubtedly 
correct and it is for this reason that I have had great recourse to subjects like sociology, anthropology, social 
psychology, social network analysis, etc. Government and laws concern social agents; without some 
understanding of social agents and social groups, it would be impossible to understand government, laws, 
etc. properly. 
209 This approach has much in sympathy with that which the biologist and Harvard professor emeritus, EO 
Wilson, has (following the nineteenth-century polymath, William Whewell), called ‘consilience’ – an 
attempt to develop a unified system of knowledge: Edward O Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge 
(Thorndike Press, 1998). 
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laws is really an attempt to understand the complexity of social life, which endeavour 
requires the “breakdown of boundaries between existing intellectual disciplines”, as well 
as a “systematic denial of the [their] autonomy”.210 
It would be wrong to blame the Victorian Constitutional Historians entirely for the decline 
of constitutional history; they were products of their time. The blame must rather lie on 
those who have failed to reform the field in line with modern standards. This thesis 
intends to address this failure. 
 
                                               
210 Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 1992), 5-6 and, further, 

























2 – The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity 
2.1 Introduction 
The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity, in its simplest form, is this:  
Wherever there are social agents, there are constitutions.  
This applies regardless as to time, place, or, indeed, species. All groups of social animals 
have constitutions;1 they are facts inextricably linked with social life.2 It would be 
impossible for us to imagine a group of social agents without also imagining some kind 
of constitution for them. Constitutions are ubiquitous.3 
However, it does not follow that the idea of constitutions is likewise ubiquitous. It cannot 
be imagined for a moment that eusocial insects,4 for example, can conceptualize 
constitutions – that they have the self and social awareness necessary to conceive of 
themselves as individuals amongst other individuals. This does not matter. Eusocial 
insects need not know how or why movement happens, or even what movement is, in 
order to move. Likewise, they need not know what a constitution is in order to be part of 
one. In such cases, constitutions are better understood as analytical frameworks that we, 
as observers, use to understand the workings of social groups; to make sense of their 
members’ behaviours.  
                                                    
1 This includes both human and non-human animals, which latter would include, for example, ‘eusocial’ 
insects (e.g. ants, bees, wasps, etc.) and most mammals (e.g. bears, dolphins, elephants, chimpanzees, etc.). 
Cf. “Humans, like most mammals, are intensely social.”: RIM Dunbar, “The Social Brain Hypothesis and 
Its Relevance to Social Psychology,” in Evolution and the Social Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and 
Social Cognition, ed. Joseph P Forgas, Martie G Haselton, and William von Hippel (Psychology Press, 
2007), 21. 
2 This is not entirely dissimilar to what Loughlin said when he said that “The formation of governing 
arrangements is a ubiquitous feature of group life. Whatever the type of governing arrangement established, 
an iron law of necessity holds sway.” Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 
2003), 5. 
3 Cf. Georges Renard: “Constitution, institution, these two terms are complementary: one expresses the 
generating act and the other the being that is engendered. // Every institution has its charters, which gives 
it being while determining its manner of being and consequently of behaving: this is its constitution, written 
on parchment or immanent, like customary law, in its structure, its internal development, and its external 
activity – it matters little! This institutional charter does not merely provide for a system of mutual 
obligations among its members; it effects a mutual integrations. // It follows that constitutional law is not 
just a branch of public law and a fortiori, within public law itself the object of constitutional law is not 
limited to the organization, operation, and relationships of powers in the state.” Renard, from La 
philosophie de l’institution, in Albert Broderick, ed., The French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, 
Georges Renard, Joseph T Delos, trans. Mary Welling (Harvard University Press, 1970), 290.  The French 
institutionalists – Hauriou, Renard, and Delos – were certainly en route to the Theory of Constitutional 
Ubiquity as presented here. However, exactly what they meant by the term ‘institution’ remained vague 
until the end and, furthermore, they were fully committed to the identification of objective phenomena. See 
further, infra, 3.2, 4.11 (n. 104), 4.18, and 4.19. 
4 See supra, n. 1. 
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This is an important point – not only for anthropologists and sociologists, but also for 
constitutional historians. It means that we can explicate the constitutions of past societies 
even if they did not do so themselves.5 Indeed, a disinterested outsider might even be able 
to do so with greater accuracy and objectivity,6 although the further removed in space and 
time the observer is, the greater the likelihood for misunderstanding and error.  
The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity makes a further claim: all humans possessed of 
normal cognitive function have, in the very least, some ideas concerning the constitutions 
of the groups to which they belong; most likely, too, ideas about the constitutions of other 
groups. All human social groups have constitutions of which their members are at least 
dimly cognizant. This is because the ability and propensity to conceptualize constitutions 
is ubiquitous among humans; almost all of us possess the requisite personal and social 
awareness to be able to think in complex terms regarding both social groups and 
individuals’ places within them. It is a product of our neurobiology and there is no reason 
to suspect that this has not been true of all humans since humans first evolved.  
Again, for the constitutional historian, this is important. It means we can study the 
constitutions of human social groups not only as emergent properties. We can study them 
as lived realities; we can study them as they were understood by those who lived by them. 
Indeed, if we are properly to understand them, we must do this.7 Otherwise, much 
behaviour will remain puzzling and inexplicable, because we will not know the 
motivations and assumptions underlying it. Furthermore, it means that constitutions are 
not distinctively modern phenomena. There is no time or place beyond the reach of 
constitutional history; the only limiting factor is the availability of reliable evidence.  
Complete proof of this would be impossible here. Instead, the present aim is more modest. 
It is to show that, contrary to the beliefs of some, mediaeval England was possessed of a 
                                                    
5 Cf. Linton: “Every culture includes a series of patterns for what behaviour individuals or classes of 
individuals should be.” Further: “The sum total of the ideal patterns which control the reciprocal behavior 
between individuals and between the individual and society constitute the social system under which the 
particular society lives.” Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 
1936), 103, 105. Thus, in Linton’s view, to discover the ‘ideal patterns’ is to discover the ‘social system’ 
(i.e. the constitution); this is a descriptive enterprise and might be undertaken by anybody.  
6 Cf. “Not only does the average individual fail to apprehend the patterns which govern the life of his society 
as a social system, but he is rarely if ever familiar with all the patterns themselves. He has to know a certain 
number of them if he is to do his part as a member of society, but there is no necessity for him to know all 
of them.” Linton, The Study of Man, 261 and, further, 272–75.  
7 Cf. Franz Boaz in his introduction to Benedict: “We must understand the individual as living in his [or 
her] culture; and the culture as lived by individuals.” Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1989), xx. 
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constitution. It could not have been otherwise. It was not necessarily like any modern 
constitution, but there was a constitution nevertheless.8  
2.2 Breadth of Definition 
It is undoubtedly apparent that, if constitutions are to be considered ubiquitous, the 
definition of ‘constitution’ will have to be widely drawn.  
To draw a narrower definition would result in a lack of explanatory power and engender 
greater conceptual complexity than necessary. It would require the search for, and 
imposition of, unnecessary, arbitrary, and artificial distinctions and thresholds; it would 
entail an unwarranted proliferation of words, which might easily lead us ‘into a labyrinth 
in which even the greatest geniuses might lose themselves’.9  
Moreover, it would require the search for some critical moment in which societies 
suddenly switch from states of no-constitution to has-constitution. There are, it is true, 
many identifiable ‘constitutional moments’. Many of these resulted in countries’ first 
written and codified constitutions. However, these merely mark dramatic or, at least, 
noteworthy constitutional changes – not the sudden and miraculous advent of a 
constitution de novo or ex nihilo. Every constitutional moment is preceded and succeeded 
by a constitution of some description. The moment, such as it is, marks only a transition. 
No society has ever existed in a pre- or proto-constitutional state.10 
There might be well-meant arguments in favour of narrower definitions, e.g. to avoid 
anachronism, anatopism, or even anthropomorphism.11 If we are to understand things 
                                                    
8 As Watts has said, “the notion of an entirely unprincipled and unconstitutional society demands 
suspicion”: John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 4. 
9 This is adapted from Helvétius, who wrote, concerning abuses of words, that “the abuse of words, and the 
ignorance of their true import, is a labyrinth in which the greatest geniuses have lost themselves”. Following 
Descartes, Helvétius argued that there were many who ‘entrenched themselves behind the obscurity of 
words’; it is like a blind person seeking to gain the advantage over their clear-sighted rival by ‘drawing 
them into a dark cavern’. Claude Adrien Helvétius, De L’Esprit: Or Essays on the Mind, and Its Several 
Faculties, trans. William Mudford (M. Jones, 1807), 26-27 (1.4). 
10 Habermas, for example, speaks of an “international proto-constitution”, which he contrasts with “a 
republican constitution”; with “a constitution in the strict sense”; with “a ‘politically’ constituted 
community”. Habermas very much seems to view the “international community” – as bound together in a 
common observance of international law, rather than, perhaps, subjection to a common governmental 
authority – as being in some state of existence just prior to a constitutional state. There has been some 
process of ‘constitutionalization’ and there are elements of a constitution, but, as yet, there is only a ‘weakly 
constituted community’. In short, as Habermas himself says, he believes that “Classical international law 
is already a kind of constitution” (emphasis added). This kind of talk is misguided. What Habermas really 
means is that the international community is lacking a formal and consolidated constitution; it does, 
however, have a constitution. For Habermas, see: Jürgen Habermas, The Divided West (Polity Press, 2006), 
133. 
11 I.e. misattributing feelings, ideas, beliefs, behaviours, objects, etc. to times, places, or non-human animals 
where they do not rightfully belong. 
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properly, it is important that we avoid such things. However, many have been overzealous 
in prosecuting these, such that they rather end up demonstrating ethnocentrism, 
anthropocentricism, and a lack of understanding of the societies in which we live. That is 
to say, they wrongly believe that certain feelings, ideas, behaviours, etc. must be exclusive 
to certain populations or species. A generous interpretation would have this as a lack of 
insight; a false belief that things outward differences signify actual and essential 
differences. A less generous interpretation would have it as supremacism, shot through 
with ideas of exceptionalism and elitism.  
It is therefore necessary to adopt a broad but nuanced and careful approach to the concept 
of constitutions – recognizing not only the ways in which all constitutions are the same, 
but also the ways in which they differ.  
2.3 Problems with Current Definitions 
Most people have some general sense of what a constitution is; the word is part of 
common parlance.12 Yet, when it comes to the matter of definition, there seems to be a 
great deal of difficulty and confusion. One is reminded of Augustine’s musings on time,13 
or Walter Map’s like musings on the mediaeval court:14 so long as we are not pressed for 
a definition, we seem to know what constitutions are. McBain noted this problem, saying 
that “a constitution, generally conceived, does not lend itself to ready definition”.15 One 
can certainly agree with him that “it is easier to puncture [definitions] with criticism than 
it is to improve upon them”.16 However, his conclusion that “[w]e may…advantageously 
                                                    
12 We might think here of what John Locke said regarding the abuses of words: “Men having been 
accustomed from their cradles to learn words which are easily got and retained, before they knew or had 
framed the complex ideas to which they were annexed, or which were to be found in the things they were 
thought to stand for, they usually continue to do so all their lives; and without taking the pains necessary to 
settle in their minds determined ideas, they use their words for such unsteady and confused notions as they 
have, contenting themselves with the same words other people use; as if their very sound necessarily carried 
with it constantly the same meaning. […].Men take the words they find in use amongst their neighbours; 
and that they may not seem ignorant what they stand for, use them confidently, without much troubling 
their heads about a certain fixed meaning; whereby, besides the ease of it, they obtain this advantage, that, 
as in such discourses they seldom are in the right, so they are as seldom to be convinced that they are in the 
wrong; it being all one to go about to draw those men out of their mistakes who have no settled notions, as 
to dispossess a vagrant of his habitation who has no settled abode.” John Locke, “An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding [1690],” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding with the Second Treatise 
of Government (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2014), 474-475 (3.10). 
13 “What then is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not…”: 
Augustine of Hippo, “The Confessions,” in Augustine, trans. Edward Bouverie Pusey, vol. 18, Great Books 
of the Western World (Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc., 1952), 93 [11.14]. 
14 “In like spirit of perplexity [to Augustine] I may say that in court I exist and of the court I speak, and 
what the court is, God knows, I know not.” Walter Map, Du Nugis Curialium (Courtiers’ Trifles), ed. MR 
James, CNL Brooke, and RAB Mynors (Oxford University Press, 1983), 3. 
15 Howard Lee McBain, The Living Constitution: A Consideration of the Realities and Legends of Our 
Fundamental Law (The Macmillan Company, 1941), 9. 
16 McBain, The Living Constitution, 9. 
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abandon any attempt to define constitutions in general” because “everybody knows in a 
general way what a constitution is” lacks rigour.17 
In spite of these difficulties, there have been many attempts to define constitutions. Most 
definitions tend to run along the following lines: 
(1) The fundamental, highest, or most important (2) values, principles, 
practices, customs, conventions, usages, rules, laws, norms, etc. (3) that are to 
some degree written and (4) to a greater or lesser extent codified (5) that 
pertain to the organisation, ordering, systematisation, governance, 
administration, etc. (6) of public life or political power (7) of a 
partially/wholly independent, autonomous, self-governing, self-determining, 
sovereign (8) people, state, nation, country, province, organization, 
community, etc. and (9) the branches, divisions, organs, institutions, offices, 
etc. thereof, (10) often prescribing the fusion or separation of those things and 
relationships therebetween, (11)(a) through or after the tacit or explicit assent, 
consent, agreement of the body concerned as a whole,18 or (b) a tacit or explicit 
agreement or pact between some subsets of that body,19 or (c) given by some 
authority, such as some god(s), suzerain(s), lawgiver(s),20 etc., or (d) 
according to Custom, Reason, Justice, Necessity, Propriety, etc.,21 and (12) 
persists as long as that basis persists or for a term certain and (13) are 
                                                    
17 McBain, The Living Constitution, 10–11. Indeed, it undermines his argument that “[e]very country in the 
world is governed under something that may be called a constitution” – without a definition, this statement 
is unverifiable: McBain, The Living Constitution, 7. 
18 Whether a constitution emanated from the People or from a State was considered in one of the earlier 
decisions of the US Supreme Court in McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819), in which the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court, John Marshall, held firmly that constitutions were ultimately acts of the People: 402-
405. 
19 For example, between the people, on the one hand, and the monarch, elite, or aristocracy on the other. 
20 After the manner of Solon (the lawgiver of Athens) or Lycurgus (the legendary lawgiver of Sparta), 
perhaps.  
21 In other words, constitutions are not the product of acts by some agent or agents, but, rather, are 
determined according to either (abstract) principle – even wisdom, perhaps – or situation. Thus, for 
example, Bolingbroke defined a constitution as: “that Assemblage of Laws, Institutions and Customs, 
derived from certain fix'd Principles of Reason…that compose the general System, according to which the 
Community hath agreed to be govern'd.” Henry Bolingbroke, “Letter X (The Craftsman: 26 January 1734),” 
in Bolingbroke: Political Writings, ed. David Armitage (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 88 (emph. 
added). It is noteworthy that the idea of consent or agreement is here also intermixed. Alternatively, 
Montesquieu, as summarized by Hume, believed that the laws of a country – within which we can include 
constitutional laws – ought to have a ‘constant reference’ to “the manners, the climate, the religion, the 
commerce, the situation of each society.” David Hume, The Essential Philosophical Works (Wordsworth 
Editions Limited, 2011), 731 [Enq. Con. Princ. Morals, para. 158]. Cf. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 
trans. Anne M Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller, and Harold Samuel Stone (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
Bks. 14-21. Regarding the idea that law emanated from reason, we might think of Hobbes’s repost to Coke 
to see a contrary view: “it is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law.” Thomas Hobbes, A Dialogue 
between a Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England, quoted in Martin Loughlin, Sword 
and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Hart Publishing, 2000), 134. 
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antecedent to the state, government, etc. and branches, etc. thereof in (a) time 
and/or (b) priority,22 and which (14) control, limit, or restrict the abilities or 
powers thereof (explicitly or impliedly), (15) introduce certain mechanisms, 
safeguards, checks-and-balances, etc. and (16) embody certain doctrines, 
dogmas, ideologies, etc., e.g. ‘liberal democracy’, (17) making anything not 
in accordance with it null-and-void, illegal, etc. and (18) exist for the general 
utility and benefit of the people, nation, subjects, citizens, etc., (19) providing 
them with, or giving force to, certain fundamental rights; (20) those who 
breach these principles, etc., or rights, can be held responsible and 
accountable, e.g. in a court of law; and (21) these principles, rights, etc. are 
elevated or entrenched such that they can only be amended or revoked 
consciously by a special and more strenuous procedure than that of ‘ordinary’ 
law,23 i.e. ‘not casually or carelessly or by subterfuge or implication’24. 
As such, there is normally some claim to fundamentality and special status; something 
about the nature and directive force of its tenets or provisions; something about the 
format, e.g. written or unwritten, codified or uncodified; something about its being the 
structuration of some universe (normally defined according to some territory or group); 
something about the conditions under which it originated, subsists, and will cease to 
exist, often turning about some relationship between constituent and constituted powers, 
as well as ascending and descending theories of government;25 something about its 
purpose, which is usually construed in terms of limiting powers, providing and protecting 
rights, and providing for the general utility of all; something about its enforceability; and 
something about the possibility and processes by which it can be changed or amended. 
These are all important considerations. Nevertheless, any definition focusing on these 
misses the fundamental nature of constitutions. Indeed, they tend to suffer from a number 
of fallacies, some of which will now be outlined.  
Firstly, there is often an obsession with the idea that constitutions impose limitations on 
government. There is here a confusion between definition and restriction. This can be 
                                                    
22 This element was most famously argued for by Paine in the fourth chapter of his Rights of Man (1792) 
entitled "Of Constitutions": Thomas Paine, “Rights of Man (1792),” in Rights of Man, Common Sense and 
Other Political Writings, ed. Mark Philp (Oxford University Press, 1995), 238, 244–45. 
23 Cf. Chief Justice John Marshall’s statement that constitutions – in particular, the US Constitution – can 
only sensibly be regarded as “a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means”: Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) at 177. 
24 Kenneth Clinton Wheare, Modern Constitutions (Oxford University Press, 1951), 10. 
25 Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Methuen & Co. 
Ltd., 1974), Intro. 
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termed the restriction fallacy. To explain: When one defines something, one naturally 
draws a line around it, thereby differentiating it from other things. In a sense, by 
recognizing the extent of something, one also recognizes its limitations. However, there 
is a difference between recognizing the limitations of something and purposefully limiting 
it, i.e. making it as small as possible. Thus, a constitution might define the powers of a 
government without markedly restricting them. Constitutions can equally provide for 
omnipotent – even tyrannical – rulers as for so-called ‘constitutional governments’. This 
is no contradiction in terms. A constitution can equally say that “all power resides with 
the monarch” (a power defined but not restricted) as it can “all powers are to be exercised 
only subject to certain checks and restraints” (a power both defined and restricted). 
In large part, this fallacy arises from another: confusing constitutions and good 
constitutions. This can be called the evaluative fallacy. Certainly, providing against 
concentrations of power seems sensible and laudable.26 However, even though such views 
are prevalent today, this was not always the case. Indeed, many mediaeval publicists 
argued – not entirely unreasonably – that power ought to be concentrated rather than 
dispersed.27 This concentration produces strength; strength produces order and stability. 
To believe that such systems are less deserving of the appellation ‘constitution’, simply 
because they diverge from modern tastes, is wrong. It confuses identification with 
evaluation. A table need not necessarily be a good table in order to be a table; a 
constitution need not necessarily be a ‘good’ one in order to be a constitution. A 
constitution is such, regardless as to whether we think it good or bad.  
There is also an obsession with the idea of fundamentality – that constitutions represent 
the most ‘important’ or ‘fundamental’ principles.28 This can be called the fundamentality 
fallacy. Again, it is as understandable as it is misguided.  
                                                    
26 One might invoke many instances from modern history to explain this view. For example, one might turn 
to the events of the French Revolution; to the experiences under the fascist regimes of Nazi Germany, 
Mussolini’s Italy, Franco’s Spain; to the experiences under the communist regimes in Russia, particularly 
that of Stalin. One might also point out that technological developments have meant that modern-day tyrants 
can do much more damage than their predecessors ever could. Furthermore, one might identify the wide 
availability of comprehensive education today as obviating the need to exclusively concentrate power in 
the hands of a few. 
27 This was particularly the case for defenders of monarchy, on the one hand, or theocracy, particularly as 
achieved through papal supremacy, on the other. As will be discussed in Chap. 7, there were many reasons 
why mediaeval people thought that society ought to be structured in such a way, but one of the most 
important was the belief that, if there were a person set above everybody else who might be impartial, then 
they can best stop squabbling and dispense justice.  
28 For McBain, fundamentality was perhaps the most important quality: “Whatever else a constitution is it 
is fundamental”. However, Schmitt correctly noted that the notion of fundamentality, with regard to 
constitutions, “remains mostly unclear”. Cf. McBain, The Living Constitution, 9–10; Carl Schmitt, 
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To a great extent, this idea of fundamentality is derived from associations with codified 
constitutions.29 Their provisions appear to be fundamental because they were selected for 
inclusion, given the limited availability of time, space, and attention. To some extent this 
is true: they are often most needful of overt mention and explicit agreement. However, to 
think that something must (not) be fundamental simply because it is (not) included is 
wrong. After all, some provisions might be included simply because they were 
uncontentious or at the drafters’ whim; others might be omitted due to oversight, their 
contentiousness, or a desire to keep ‘fundamental questions of political authority in a state 
of irresolution’.30 As such, a provision’s inclusion or exclusion often reflects the 
circumstances in which the document was made or the shortcomings of the human mind, 
rather than any supposed fundamentality. Furthermore, it must be remembered that 
fundamentality is a relative concept – what appears fundamental to some might not 
necessarily appear so to others.31 Indeed, this is reinforced by the inherent vagueness of 
the term ‘fundamental’. It often boils down to an inability to imagine something without 
a particular feature(s); opinions will differ as to these. 
When writing constitutions, it makes sense to focus on those things that appear to be of 
the greatest consequence, but to think that constitutions must be limited only to these is a 
grave error; it mistakes practicality, convenience, and chance for essence. Naturally, some 
constitutional ideas are more important than others.32 However, to say that constitutions 
consist only or primarily of these things is fallacious.  
Besides these fallacies, there is also the pervasive issue of pathological terminological 
vagueness, especially when it comes to ostensibly important terms like ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘statehood’. Indeed, these particular terms are problematic, not only because of their 
vagueness, but also due to their associations with modernity. The result is that we have a 
sense that constitutions must be a modern phenomenon, though we remain unsure as to 
what exactly that phenomenon is. We can return to the idea of exceptionalism – the idea 
                                                    
Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Duke University Press, 2008), 59. See also: Charles Howard 
McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern, 2nd ed. (Cornell University Press, 1947), 20–21. 
29 Especially those after the manner of the comparatively short US Constitution. For the American 
contribution to ‘constitutionalist’ thought more generally, see, e.g.: Friedrich August Hayek, The 
Constitution of Liberty (Routledge Classics, 2006), chap. 12. 
30 This is Foley’s phrase, quoted in Loughlin: Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, 50.  
31 Turpin and Tomkins, for example, have recognized that, in the UK, there is perhaps “a lack of certainty 
about what truly is fundamental to our constitutional order”. They continue: “We may wish to claim that 
trial by jury, the right to silence or habeas corpus are fundamental values inherent in the constitutional 
order, but on what basis can such a claim actually be grounded, beyond one’s own desire?” Indeed, as they 
ask, is there anything that is truly ‘sacred’? Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government and the 
Constitution: Text and Materials, 7th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 9. 
32 Infra, 2.17.1. 
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that we advanced moderns have something that cannot be found in more ‘primitive’ 
societies. This leaves us in something of a quandary as to how to describe what they did 
have.  
What is needed, therefore, is something that helps us to explain all societies with equal 
validity and force. Of course, words being what they are, it would be perfectly possible 
for us to define constitution in such a way that confines it to modern, advanced societies.33 
However, as has already been argued, this would be inadvisable.34 
There is no suitable definition of constitution currently available. Most definitions are 
overcomplicated and, indeed, distinctly unhelpful. One also gets the impression that many 
have been plucked as though magically from the air, based on a feeling that constitutions 
must be something-like-this – revealing more about the education, assumptions, etc. of 
their authors than constitutions. It is time for a more suitable definition.  
2.4 ‘Constitution’ 
As has already been said, most definitions of ‘constitution’ seem to fall within the 
precincts of the definition provided above, which definitions have their limitations and 
drawbacks. However, before proceeding, it would be worthwhile considering the 
definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary and utility thereof. It is there defined 
as follows:  
                                                    
33 By this, it is meant that words are signifiers and, as such, any given combination of letters and sounds 
can be given any meaning that we like; we can attach any idea thereto. Thus, the signifier “constitution” 
might signify a kind of animal or plant, a type of action, or anything else that we might label. We can agree 
with what Williams has said: “Every one is entitled for his own part to use words in any meaning he pleases; 
there is no such thing as an intrinsically ‘proper’ or ‘improper’ meaning of a word. The nearest approach 
to the ‘proper’ meaning is the ‘usual’ meaning; and certainly it is generally desirable to keep to usual 
meanings, and a person who uses a word in an unusual meaning must state clearly the meaning in which 
he is using it, on pain of being misunderstood if he does not.” Glanville L Williams, “International Law 
and the Controversy Concerning the Word ‘Law,’” British Year Book of International Law 22 (1945): 148. 
My contention here is that the ‘usual’ meaning of ‘constitution’, insofar as it can be said to have one, is not 
necessarily the most helpful; whilst it might suffice in many situations, there is, I think, a better definition 
available, which grasps the essence of the ‘usual’ meaning, but is more useful and versatile – especially to 
the constitutional historian, anthropologist, sociologist, etc. In this context, we can also very much agree 
with the words of Maine: “Nobody is at liberty to censure men or communities of men for using words in 
any sense they please, or with as many meanings as they please, but the duty of the scientific enquirer is to 
distinguish the meanings of an important word from one another, to select the meanings appropriate to his 
own purposes, and consistently to employ the word during his investigations in this sense and no other.” 
Henry Sumner Maine, Lectures on the Early History of Institutions, 7th ed. (John Murray, 1905), 374. The 
investigations of a constitutional historian are, naturally, historical in nature. It is therefore important to see 
if there is a definition of ‘constitution’ that takes as little for granted as possible, whilst having the greatest 
possible explanatory power. Because of the scope of constitutional history, which stretches across all places 
and all times, there needs to be a sense in which the term adopted, if it is possible to adopt one (which, 
naturally, I think it is), is universally applicable.  
34 Supra, 2.2. 
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“1. A body of principles according to which a state or organization is 
governed. 2. The composition or formation of something. 3. A person’s 
physical or mental state.”35 
The second sense would seem to be the general sense; the first applies this general sense 
to certain human groupings and the third (with which we are not presently concerned) 
applies it to individuals. Ostensibly, the first sense touches most closely on the present 
endeavour. Yet, whilst it has its merits and might serve well for everyday usage, there is, 
I think, a definition better suited to the industries of the constitutional theorist and 
historian, which definition better delimits the subject-matter of study. In order to move 
towards this definition, we can begin with the second – and general – sense.  
What is the ‘something’ with which the constitutional theorist and historian is concerned? 
We might say, in line with the first sense, that it concerns either (a) human groupings or 
(b) particular and definite kinds thereof. However, the former is too anthropocentric; the 
latter too restrictive and liable to cause trouble to the constitutional historian – especially 
if the only types of group supposed capable of having constitutions have strong 
associations with modernity (viz., ‘the State’).36 It is argued, therefore, that this element 
                                                    
35 Catherine Soanes and Sara Hawker, eds., Compact Oxford English Dictionary of Current English, 3rd 
ed. (Oxford University Press, 2005), 208 [“constitution”]. 
36 There are some, such as Schmitt, who have argued that the definition of ‘constitution’ ought to be 
restricted to describing the State: “A proper understanding requires that the meaning of the term 
‘constitution’ be limited to the constitution of the state, that is to say, the political unity of the people.” (p. 
59, emph. added). Given the fact that Schmitt’s agenda was to defend an absolutist state, and given his 
connections with Nazism and the NSDAP (which go towards making him a somewhat controversial 
theorist), it is perhaps unsurprising that he would be inclined towards trying to maintain that there was 
something special about the State. Indeed, that it possessed something special, i.e. a constitution – one with 
a deep connection to a unitary, if not indeed monistic, group from whom it emanates (through some 
‘fundamental political decision’), and only by whom can it truly and fundamentally be altered. In this 
regard, Schmitt mostly talks of a ‘people’, though the importance that Schmitt lays on the ‘nation’ is 
noteworthy and unsurprising given his nationalist sympathies. (p. 127) It is the focus on ‘unity’, informed 
by ideas of a common and single consciousness and will (both treated as having a very real existence) that 
underpins Schmitt’s rejection of mediaeval constitutions: “Political unity as such as become problematical 
factually and in terms of consciousness. […]. One cannot denote these countless agreements [between the 
higher aristocracy, gentry, etc.] as constitutions of a state, as it is in general mistaken to apply concepts of 
modern public law to such medieval relationships. The actual object of modern constitutions, the type of 
existence and form of existence of the political unity, was not the object of these agreements. In the ‘state’ 
of estates, one may speak neither of a monarchical nor of a dualistic or pluralistic state; at most one may 
speak of a jumble of well-earned rights and privileges.” (p. 97, emph. added). Essentially, Schmitt seems 
to see mediaeval societies as collections of self-interested individuals and groups, rather than as truly 
cohesive bodies, each possessed of a unity of feeling and direction. As will be seen, we need not assume – 
or, indeed, accept – the sorts of connection, levels of concreteness and corporateness, or ideas and 
importance of will and consciousness imagined by Schmitt. The reasons for this will become evident as 
this chapter progresses and especially as we reach the definition offered for ‘social group’. All references 
are to Schmitt are from: Schmitt, Constitutional Theory. For Schmitt’s career, see, e.g.: Volker Neumann 
and Carl Schmitt, “Carl Schmitt,” in Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis, ed. Arthur J. Jacobson and 
Bernhard Schlink (University of California Press, 2000), 280–90. On the State and its relation to the present 
theory, see Appendix I. 
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can be expanded without loss. Indeed, such an expansion would result in a definite gain 
for it would help us to grasp the fundamental sense on which it rests. After all, human 
groupings – of whatever kind, including ‘States’ or ‘organizations’ – are fundamentally 
social groups, or, more accurately, sets of social agents.37 This is the ‘something’ with 
which we are concerned, and it will be the especial concern of the ensuing sections to 
explain just what these terms mean and imply. 
What does it mean, then, to say that a constitution pertains to ‘the composition or 
formation of a social group (or set of social agents)’? Composition and formation, at least 
in this context, primarily concern two things: substance and form. What, then, is the 
‘substance’ of a social group? The substance of any group is its members or membership 
(also called elements), which, in this case, are social agents. And what of ‘form’? This 
has to do with relations between things: in this case, firstly, as between social agents and 
other social agents, and, secondly, as between social agents and the environment. The 
relations captured by the former are here referred to as social influence or, more simply, 
influence; the relations captured by the latter are here referred to as activities. Thus, the 
composition of a social group refers to its membership and the distribution as between 
that membership of social influence and activities. How that distribution comes about and 
how it is regulated, it is argued, is what the “a body of principles according to which…is 
governed” of the first sense is driving towards. This aspect will be treated more fully 
when we come to the Associational Theory of Law.  
With the foregoing in mind, the following definition of ‘constitution’ is suggested, most 
particularly to the constitutional theorist and historian: 
The distribution within a social group, or as between a set of social agents, 
of activities and social influence. 
It can be noted that the ‘membership’ aspect, discussed above, is encapsulated within the 
terms ‘social group’/‘set of social agents’, and therefore does not require explicit mention 
within the definition. It will be the purpose of the rest of this chapter to explain this 
definition.  
2.5 ‘Social Group’  
                                                    
37 For the argument that States are social groups, see Appendix I.  
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In considering the meaning of ‘set of social agents’ or ‘social group’,38 it is first necessary 
to discuss the idea of the social group as it exists in the scholarship. There is some 
diversity of opinion. Some formulations instil the idea of social groups with a sense of 
fatalism and mysticism; they are groups of individuals predestined to be together and, 
moreover, contain members that are essentially one and the same. By contrast, other 
formulations deny their existence altogether; there are merely individuals and social 
behaviours. For the former, the social group is a useful descriptor of naturally defined 
units; for the latter, merely a folk psychology. 
Theories about the formation of social groups, it is suggested, generally fall under four 
headings: (1) Commonality Models; (2) Interaction Models; (3) Identification Models; 
and (4) Cohesion Models. Each will be discussed in turn. 
2.6 Commonality Models: The Group Mind and the Real Personality of Groups 
Commonality models are characterized by an argument that social groups exist where a 
set of social agents have something in common with one another, e.g. traits, experiences, 
history,39 land, purpose, sense of familiarity, destiny or fate, etc.40  At first glance, this 
                                                    
38 The inclusion of ‘set of social agents’ or ‘social group’ in the present definition nicely illustrates the 
dangers of so-called working definitions. Working definitions can make for good hypotheses, but make for 
bad foundations for extended analysis. All too often, they are rashly-given formulae including profoundly 
vague elements. I had originally intended to have ‘political community’ as this element. It is not an 
uncommon phrase and one can certainly grasp something of its meaning intuitively. However, it lacks 
clarity and rigour. The word ‘community’, in particular, is a highly contested term. Further, it is difficult to 
differentiate precisely a political community from any other kind of community – writers tend to try to 
clarify matters by saying that they are, as Finnis did, ‘complete communities’ and suchlike, but this does 
not in reality get us very far. As such, if original impulse had carried the day, the resulting definition would 
perhaps have been passible, but not particularly good. For some discussions of different takes on 
‘community’, see, e.g.: Colin Bell and Howard Newby, Community Studies: An Introduction to the 
Sociology of the Local Community (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1971); Dennis E Poplin, Communities: 
A Survey of Theories and Methods of Research (The Macmillan Company, 1972); Joseph R Gusfield, 
Community: A Critical Response (Basil Blackwell, 1975). For Finnis, see: John Finnis, Natural Law and 
Natural Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. chap. 6. 
39 Historians – professional and amateur alike – have likely played an instrumental part in shaping ideas 
concerning nations in many cases. By providing a singular narrative, they can create a sense of a singular 
identity persisting over time. However, whether ‘nations were made by historians’, as Guenée claims, is 
rather more doubtful. For history to play a role, presumably that history must be found somewhere. 
However, it can as easily be found in oral tradition, etc., as in the works of those who have devoted 
presumably at least some time and energy to historical research. On Guenée, see: Olivier de Laborderie, “A 
New Pattern for English History: The First Genealogical Rolls of the Kings of England,” in Broken Lines: 
Genealogical Literature in Late-Medieval Britain and France, ed. Raluca L Radulescu and Edward Donald 
Kennedy (Brepols, 2008), 45–62. 
40 One might recall in this context Hume’s three principles of association: resemblance, spatio-temporal 
contiguity, and cause-and-effect. Thus, the members of the social group might resemble one another, i.e. 
they might possess certain characteristics that are reminiscent of one another; they might exist or, indeed, 
co-exist in the same time and place, such that we think them to share a common condition; or we might 
thinking of them as being the product of the same set of forces, such that they might share, for example, a 
common origin, ancestor, or history. For Hume’s principles of association, see: David Hume, An Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L Beauchamp, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford 
University Press, 1999), 101-107 (§3). 
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might seem reasonable. It is, however, flawed. The reasons for this will be discussed 
further down, but, for the moment, it is important to focus on two ideas, which are 
founded in Commonality Models and which have had a considerable impact on 
constitutional theory and history: the Group Mind and the Real Personality of Groups. 
The central idea of the Group Mind is that social groups emerge from psychological 
homogeneity – they are groups in which members share a way of feeling, thinking, or 
acting. This might be transitory, as with crowds; it might be deeper-rooted and longer-
lasting, such that the group’s members are thought to share a common character and 
personality – perhaps even a common self and will. This might persist when the members 
are apart, but is likely to be especially prominent when they are assembled together. Thus, 
one might say, Englishmen are quintessentially English; one might take an Englishman 
out of England, but one cannot take England out of the Englishman. Moreover, one might 
say that a group of Englishmen will feel, think, and act characteristically and differently, 
as compared to a group of, say, French, Italians, etc.  
In some versions, psychological homogeneity is said to be the product of some 
metaphysical shared consciousness, which “exists over and above all individuals 
comprised in the group and that might continue to exist though all the individual members 
ceased to be.”41 Other versions, which are more naturalistic, think it the result of 
determinism. For social determinists, homogeneity is the result of individuals 
internalizing the ideas, beliefs, and behaviours of their peers such that they come to 
resemble one another. For biological determinists, homogeneity is the result of one’s 
genetic make-up, which is inherited from one’s ancestors and makes one similar to others 
descended from those same ancestors. Whatever the case, Group Mind theories lend 
themselves to the notion that there are naturally occurring definite groups; indeed, 
membership of such groups is practically inescapable.  
The idea of the Real Personality of Groups is founded on the following premises: (1) 
individuals appear to behave differently when in groups; (2) individuals in groups often 
appear to behave in unison with one another, even though they are not being prompted or 
directed; and (3) groups often appear to feel, think, and act as one. One can see the 
connection with the Group Mind in the final premise. The impression of a unity of feeling, 
thinking, and action gives rise to an idea that groups are entities unto themselves; that 
                                                    
41 William McDougall, The Group Mind: A Sketch of the Principles of Collective Psychology with Some 
Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life and Character, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1927), xiii. 
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they have their own very real existence apart from their constituent members. They appear 
to have their own character and personality; their own identity. As the gestalt theory goes, 
the whole is greater (or, at least, other42) than the sum of its parts.  
It is important to note that theories of the Group Mind and Real Personality of Groups 
lead very easily into ideas of races and nations, i.e. biologically-determined groups that 
have not only a shared character, consciousness, and memory, but also corporate identities 
that outlive their individual members and change only very gradually.  
The idea of different races within humankind is not of recent provenance. We find the 
idea, for example, in Plato and Aristotle.43 Such ideas probably existed from very early 
times. After all, it seems something of a natural conclusion when confronted with 
unfamiliar persons whose appearance, language, manner, and, perhaps, intelligence, seem 
so very different to our own. Of course, the trajectory of such ides is that, for better or 
worse, distinct groups of people form who are essentially different. Some have taken this 
to the extreme. For example, Knox argued in his Races of Men that race was the 
                                                    
42 This was the distinction made by Koffka: “It has been said: The whole is more than the sum of its parts. 
It is more correct to say that the whole is something else than the sum of its parts…”: Kurt Koffka, 
Principles of Gestalt Psychology (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1935), 176 (emphasis added). Or, as he 
put it at another time, correcting some nameless questioner: “No, what we mean is that the whole is different 
from the sum of its parts”: Grace M. Heider, “More About Hull and Koffka,” American Psychologist 32, 
no. 5 (1977): 383. 
43 For example, Aristotle thought that ‘better ancestors’ led to ‘better men’, certain peoples were imbued 
with either a spirit of servility or dominion, and, foreshadowing those like Montesquieu, he intimated a 
connection between a people’s character and the climate. Aristotle, The Politics in Aristotle, The Politics 
and The Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. Jonathan Barnes and JM Moore, 2nd ed. 
(Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80 [3.13], 84 [3.14], 90 [3.17], 61 [5.3], 175 [7.7]. On Plato in this 
context, see, e.g.: Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. Volume One - The Spell of Plato 
(Routledge Classics, 2003), esp. 52-55. For Montesquieu: Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, bk. XIV. 
Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (‘Vegetius’, late C.4th CE) also drew such a connection, as did Aquinas 
who drew on both Aristotle and Vegetius, among others, see: Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus, Military 
Institutions of Vegetius, ed. John Clarke (London, 1767), 6-9 (I.3-4); Thomas Aquinas, St Thomas Aquinas: 
Political Writings, ed. and trans. RW Dyson (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 45-46 (De regimine 
principum, 2:1). Likewise, so did Ptolemy of Lucca (c.1236-c.1327), John Buridan (c.1295-1363), and 
Nicole Oresme (c.1323-1382), see: Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 112–13, 143. Bodin, also, did so in his Methodus: “[a] recurrent theme of the 
Methodus is that a state’s destiny is determined by the character of its people. What therefore drives Bodin’s 
comparative method is the search for factors that shape the character of a people, predominantly those of 
climate and geography.”: Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 
57. It is worthwhile adding that such thinking was certainly not entirely ubiquitous. For example, Helvétius 
went to great lengths to combat Montesquieu’s ideas: Helvétius, De L’Esprit, 338ff (3.27). There is also 
the example of Lord Kames, who expounded a form of polygenism – arguing (contra Buffon) that there 
were different races of humankind and, moreover, that environment, etc. could not account for those 
differences, which differences could only be accounted for by acts of separate creation by God: Henry 




inescapable root of ‘individual and national life and character’: “Race is everything: 
literature, science, art, in a word, civilization, depend on it.”44 
Such ideas were reinforced by ideas of evolution, for which Anaximander and, more 
fantastically, Empedocles represent early proponents.45 Over time, the idea of biological 
evolution became more scientific, particularly through the likes of Leclerc,46 Diderot,47 
Erasmus Darwin,48 Lamarck,49 Chambers,50 Wallace,51 and Spencer.52 However, it is, of 
course, with Charles Darwin’s publication of his theory of natural selection that the idea 
came into its own.53 It is from this point especially that scientific racialism gained a lease 
of life.54 
                                                    
44 Robert Knox, Races of Men: A Fragment (Lea & Blanchard, 1850), 7. 
45 Anaximander (c.610-c.546BCE) and Empedocles (c.490-c.430BCE). On these, see: Bertrand Russell, 
History of Western Philosophy (Routledge, 2000), 47, 72, 696. 
46 George-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon (1707-1788). On Buffon’s ideas, see: J.S. Wilkie, “The Idea of 
Evolution in the Writings of Buffon.—I,” Annals of Science 12, no. 1 (1956): 48–62; J.S. Wilkie, “The Idea 
of Evolution in the Writings of Buffon.—II,” Annals of Science 12, no. 3 (1956): 212–27; J.S. Wilkie, “The 
Idea of Evolution in the Writings of Buffon.—III,” Annals of Science 12, no. 4 (1956): 255–66. 
47 Denis Diderot (1713-1784). This was principally in his work Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature, 
for which see: Denis Diderot, Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature: And Other Philosophical Works, 
trans. Lorna Sandler (Clinamen Press, 2000). 
48 Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802). See: Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or, the Laws of Organic Life, vol. 1 (J. 
Johnson, 1794); Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia; or, the Laws of Organic Life, vol. 2 (J. Johnson, 1796). 
49 Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829). See: Jean-Baptiste Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition 
with Regard to the Natural History of Animals, trans. Hugh Elliot (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1914). 
50 Robert Chambers (1802-1871). See: Robert Chambers, Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation, 11th 
ed. (John Churchill, 1860). 
51 Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913). See: Alfred Russel Wallace, Contributions to the Theory of Natural 
Selection: A Series of Essays (Macmillan & Co., 1871); Alfred Russel Wallace, The Malay Archipelago: 
The Land of the Orang-Utan and the Bird of Paradise, 5th ed. (Macmillan & Co., 1874); Alfred Russel 
Wallace, Darwinism: An Exposition of the Theory of Natural Selection with Some of Its Applications 
(Macmillan & Co., 1890). 
52 Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Spencer is noteworthy for his attempts to apply the idea of evolution to 
not only the organisms, but also to the development of the human mind and human society. It was also he 
who coined the term ‘survival of the fittest’, after having read Charles Darwin. See: Herbert Spencer, 
Essays: Scientific, Political, and Speculative, Library Ed (Williams and Norgate, 1891), esp. chap. 1 (“The 
Development Hypothesis” [1852]) and chap. 2 (“Progress: Its Law and Cause” [1857]); Herbert Spencer, 
First Principles, 6th ed. (Williams and Norgate, 1928); Herbert Spencer, The Evolution of Society: 
Selections from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert Leonard Carneiro (The University 
of Chicago Press, 1967).  
53 Charles Darwin (1809-1882). The Origin of Species was first published in 1859: Charles Darwin, The 
Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or, The Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle 
for Life (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998). As Hobhouse has rightly said: “Though Darwin was by no 
means the founder of the theory of biological evolution, he does occupy in the genesis of this theory a 
position not incomparable to that of Newton in the theory of the solar system. For if he did not invent the 
evolutionary hypothesis nor yet prove that hypothesis to be a demonstrable truth, he first, by amassing a 
vast store of material and by illuminating it with clear and simple conceptions drawn directly from 
experience, brought the hypothesis into contact with the facts and consolidated it as a basis for future 
investigation.” Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory (Columbia University 
Press, 1911), 18. 
54 For the evolution, so to speak, of evolutionary thinking, see: Peter J Bowler, Evolution: The History of 
an Idea, 2nd ed. (University of California Press, 1989). 
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In this context, one might think of Darwin’s half-cousin, Galton,55 the patriarch of 
eugenics and social Darwinism, who contended that there were superior races.56 One 
might also call to mind Lombroso,57 a criminologist and physician who argued that crime 
was biologically determined – certain kinds of people were simply more likely to become 
criminals.58 It is a small step to the idea that certain races are inherently more primitive, 
violent, etc. 
As with the idea of racialism, ideas of the Group Mind and the Real Personality of Groups, 
in one form or another, are probably ancient. Yet, given the above context, it is 
unsurprising that they flourished during the nineteenth century. This was a time when 
metaphysicalism, idealism,59 romanticism,60 and nationalism were rife; it was also a time 
of exploration, colonization, imperialism, which only served to polarise and reinforce 
feelings of difference. Perhaps one of the most important reasons why we find their 
apogee in this period, however, is due to the expansion of education and scholarship, and, 
particularly, the desire to create a science of humankind. Thus, although these ideas were 
common and ancient, it is during the nineteenth century that we find their most considered 
expression. 61 That this coincided with the time that the canonical constitutional historians 
were writing is a point to which we will return. 
                                                    
55 Lived 1822-1911. 
56 This easily leads into ideas of racial purification and ethnic cleansing. See: Francis Galton, Inquiries into 
Human Faculty and Its Development (Macmillan & Co., 1883); Francis Galton, Hereditary Genius: An 
Inquiry into Its Laws and Consequences, 2nd ed. (Macmillan & Co., 1892). 
57 Lived 1835-1909. 
58 This was often evidenced by certain physical characteristics, e.g. a sloping forehead and a heavy-set 
brow. See: Cesare Lombroso, Crime, Its Causes and Remedies, trans. Henry P Horton (Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1911). 
59 On Idealism in Victorian/Edwardian Britain, see, e.g.: WJ Mander, British Idealism: A History (Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Sandra M den Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in Late 
Victorian Thought (Oxford University Press, 1996); E Neill, “History of European Ideas Evolutionary 
Theory and British Idealism: The Case of David George Ritchie,” History of European Ideas 29, no. 3 
(2003): 313–38. Further, the chapters by Andrew Vincent, Avital Simhony, and David Boucher in WJ 
Mander, ed., The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford University 
Press, 2014). 
60 For the romantic movement in its philosophical context, see Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 
chap. XVIII. 
61 As Greenwood has said: “The notion that social groups, or societies themselves (or states or nations), 
form emergent supraindividuals or organisms has been popular with social theorists since at least the time 
of Plato and was particularly prominent among idealist social theorists such as Hegel, [Thomas Hill] Green, 
and Bosanquet. The notion of a social ‘mind’ or ‘spirit’ or ‘soul,’ usually but not invariably associated with 
a nation or state, became the common intellectual currency of such idealist thinkers and was imported into 
social scientific disciplines such as history, sociology, and the new German discipline of 
Völkerpsychologie.” John D Greenwood, The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003), 109. 
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The names most closely associated with expounding the idea of the Group Mind are Le 
Bon,62 and McDougall.63 In the following extract from Le Bon, it is evident how the ideas 
of race, the Group Mind, and the Real Personality of Groups connect with constitutions 
and constitutional history:  
“A nation does not choose its institutions at will any more than it chooses the 
colour of its hair or its eyes. Institutions and governments are the product of 
the race. […]. Centuries are required to form a political system and centuries 
needed to change it. […]. 
Moreover, it is in no way in the power of a people to really change its 
institutions.”64 
Indeed: 
“A people is an organism created by the past, and, like every other organism, 
it can only be modified by slow hereditary accumulations.”65 
These ideas – complemented by Hegelian idealism66 – have influenced legal and 
constitutional scholarship.67 One might think of the German Historical School with its 
emphasis on Volk (people) and Geist (spirit): laws and constitutions arise out of Peoples, 
conceived of as almost – if not actually – metaphysical entities. They might be seen as 
the products of some Volkswille (people’s will),68 which is not dissimilar to Rousseau’s 
volunté générale (general will),69 although the latter implies rather more contingency. As 
                                                    
62 Gustave Le Bon (1841-1931). See: Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (The 
Macmillan Company, 1896); Gustave Le Bon, The Psychology of Peoples (The Macmillan Company, 
1898). On something of Le Bon’s approach and methods, see: Leonard A Ostlund, “Tarde, Le Bon, and 
Bagehot: Early Group-Interaction Theorists,” Social Science 32, no. 3 (1957): 166–71. 
63 William McDougall (1871-1938). See esp.: William McDougall, The Group Mind: A Sketch of the 
Principles of Collective Psychology with Some Attempt to Apply Them to the Interpretation of National Life 
and Character, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1927). On McDougall’s thought, see inter alia: Lewis 
Rockow, Contemporary Political Thought in England (Leonard Parsons, 1925), chap. 1. 
64 Le Bon, The Crowd, 79. 
65 Le Bon, The Crowd, 74. 
66 On the reception of Hegelianism in Britain, and its relation to British Idealism (which school of thought 
is mostly associated with the latter part of the nineteenth century), see: den Otter, British Idealism and 
Social Explanation, esp. chap. 1. 
67 On this, see esp.: Léon Duguit, “The Law and the State,” Harvard Law Review 31 (1917): 1–185. 
68 For example, we might look at the ideas of Hegel: “A constitution only develops from the national spirit 
identically with that spirit’s own development, and runs through at the same time with it the grades of 
formation and the alterations required by its concept. It is the indwelling spirit and the history of the nation 
(and, be it added, the history is only that spirit’s history) by which constitutions have been and are made.” 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace (Oxford University 
Press, 1894), 137 [§540]. The fact that Hegel thought of nations as organisms should not be surprising. See: 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Stephen Houlgate, trans. TM Knox 
(Oxford University Press, 2008), e.g. 242 [§269], 255-256 [§271], et passim. 
69 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (Penguin Books, 2004), passim. 
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seen in the extract from Le Bon, however, choice did not always enter into it. Kantorowicz 
put it neatly:  
“The historical school teaches that the contents of the law are necessarily 
determined by the whole past of the nation, and therefore cannot be 
changed arbitrarily. Thus, like the language, the manners, and the 
constitution of a nation, all law is exclusively determined by the nation's 
peculiar character… Like language, manners and constitution, law has no 
separate existence, but is a simple function or facet of the [unceasing] 
whole life of the nation.”70 
The names associated with the German Historical School include Savigny, Puchta, and 
Gierke.71 
Besides the historicists, one might also think of the early twentieth century pluralists, such 
as Figgis, and, before their disenchantment, Cole and Laski.72 Like Gierke,73 pluralism is 
particularly associated with the idea of the Real Personality of Groups. However, whereas 
the State for the historicists tended to represent the ultimate social body (as an 
embodiment of Nation and Volksgeist), for the pluralists it was but one of many social 
bodies – and perhaps neither the source of those others nor the most important.74 Yet, 
even though the historicists advocated something approaching, if not actually, a form of 
(political) monism, and the pluralists advocated (political) pluralism,75 their underlying 
                                                    
70 Hermann Kantorowicz, “Savigny and the Historical School of Law,” Law Quarterly Review 53 (1937): 
332. The notion of unceasing national life, which we have here added, can be seen directly in Savigny when 
he says: “the aggregate existence of the community, which it does not cease to be”. Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, trans. Abraham Hayward 
(Littlewood & Co., 1831), 28. For a criticism of Historical Schools of Law, see, e.g.: Nicholas Sergeyevitch 
Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law (Harvard University Press, 1939), esp. 118, 311. 
71 Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861); Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846); Otto von Gierke (1841-
1921). See, esp.: Savigny, Vocation of Our Age; Otto Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. 
Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge University Press, 1922). On the historical school, in Germany and 
elsewhere, see: Raymond G Gettell, History of Political Thought (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1923), 
389–98. 
72 John Neville Figgis (1866-1919); George Douglas Howard Cole (1889-1959); Harold Laski (1893-1950). 
For a collection of relevant sections of their works, see: Paul Q Hirst, ed., The Pluralist Theory of the State: 
Selected Writings of GDH Cole, JN Figgis, and HJ Laski (Routledge, 1993). And see further: David 
Nicholls, The Pluralist State (The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1975); Stanislaw Ehrlich, Pluralism: On and Off 
Course (Pergamon Press, 1982); David Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State (Cambridge 
University Press, 1997). For Laski, see, e.g.: Harold J Laski, Authority in the Modern State (Yale University 
Press, 1919); Harold J Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1921). 
73 Figgis’ acknowledged ‘debt’ to Gierke is noteworthy: John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State 
(Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), x, 55–56. 
74 See esp. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State; GDH Cole, Social Theory, 3rd ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1923). 
75 See further: Ellen Deborah Ellis, “The Pluralistic State,” The American Political Science Review 14, no. 
3 (1920): 393–407. 
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assumption was much the same: groups were generally seen as having distinctive 
characteristics, and a reality above and beyond their members.76 As will become evident, 
even though we can agree with the pluralists insofar as the multiplicity of social groups,77  
– which are not necessarily prior or superior to, or reliant upon, one another,78 – we cannot 
agree with their taking these to be real and objective entities.79 Moreover, whilst pluralism 
seems to move between employing commonality, identification, and cohesion models, 
there is a common thread of its positing the existence of discrete, identifiable, and largely 
independent groups, which, admittedly, might in certain ways join together and work 
relatively harmoniously with one another in a ‘community of communities’, but 
                                                    
76 For example: “No ideal of ‘the great State’ will ultimately succeed in doing the good anticipated if its 
founders ignore the fundamental facts of the reality of small societies.” Figgis, Churches in the Modern 
State, ix [emph. added]. This theme is developed further throughout the aforementioned text. Such ideas 
also underlie, for instance, Laski’s article, representing his earlier thought, on the personality of 
associations: Harold J Laski, “The Personality of Associations,” Harvard Law Review 29, no. 4 (1916): 
404–26. On Laski in this context, see: Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State, 187–89. More 
generally, see further: Nicholls, The Pluralist State, chap. 4; Hirst, The Pluralist Theory of the State, 16–
22. The fact, however, that the Real Personality of Groups might as easily support an absolutist State (i.e. 
the historicist conception) as pluralism was noted by Barker in his introduction to Gierke: Otto Gierke, 
Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800, trans. Ernest Barker, vol. 1 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1934), lxxxiv–lxxxvii. 
77 There is also a strong strain of secularist thought and arguments for toleration in pluralist writings, which 
appears laudable, though whether this is a necessary consequence of positing the existence of a multiplicity 
of groups is uncertain. Nevertheless, on this, see, e.g.: Nicholls, The Pluralist State, chap. 7. 
78 Pluralism is often taken to be anti-statist or, indeed, taken to assert that the state, in the words of Coker, 
is but “one among a number of equal or coordinate associations”. There is some truth to this in the sense 
that they: gainsay statist absolutism and assertions that the state has a necessarily “superior [and anterior] 
claim to the individual's [sole and undivided] allegiance”; argue that sovereignty is limitable if not actually 
limited; and, in real terms, if not also in legal terms, argue against the fiction and concession theories of 
corporations (i.e. against the idea that corporations are necessarily creations of the State). However, 
pluralists were not necessarily against the State. As Coker said: “They recognize the distinctive function 
and superior authority of the state as an agency of coordination and adjustment.” Indeed, there is a strong 
argument that: “Such views should be characterized as doctrines of political federalism rather than of 
political pluralism. But the influence of such views upon the ideas of the pluralists is unmistakable, and the 
connection is insisted upon by the pluralists.” For these quotes, see: Francis W Coker, “The Technique of 
the Pluralistic State,” The American Political Science Review 15, no. 2 (1921): 188, 190. 
79 Cole is an exception here. Indeed, he moves some way towards adopting a social constructionist 
approach, for not only is he strong on the difference between persons and associations (p. 15), but he also 
views social groups – or, at least, communities – as being ultimately subjective and whose reality “consists 
in the consciousness of it among its members” (p. 25-26), which has the result that such communities might 
not always be terribly clear (p. 27). Indeed, he denies that we can speak with absolute propriety of a State, 
community, or Church ‘willing’ or ‘aiming at’ anything “without realizing clearly that the only wills that 
really exist are the wills of the individual human beings who have become members of these bodies” (p. 
22). In fact, his basing of social theory in ‘associative will and action’ (p. 7-8) bears a passing resemblance, 
to John Searle’s ‘collective/we intentionality’, and this opens the way, much as will be argued in the 
Generational Theory of Law, for social groups to vary across time and place (p. 64-65), though Cole strays 
when he talks of social forms “in the prime of life” or “beginning to assume true social shape of their 
maturity” (p. 199). Indeed, Cole focuses overmuch on notions of purpose and function being central to 
associations, and, moreover, his definitions of ‘community’, ‘society’, ‘association’, and ‘institution’, on 
which his analysis rests, are not necessarily the best available (chaps. 2-3). All quotes for Cole are from: 
Cole, Social Theory. For Searle: John R Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (Penguin Books, 1995); 




nevertheless maintain their discreteness.80 This has something of a neatness to it, but, 
especially in an increasingly globalized and cosmopolitan world, that neatness has an air 
of unreality.81  
2.6.1 Commonality Models and the Victorian Constitutional Historians 
Theories of Group Mind and Real Personality of Groups – in one form or another – 
permeate the writings of the Victorian constitutional historians, particularly as they regard 
the ‘nation’ or the ‘race’. One of the main reasons why the field of constitutional history 
developed such a bad reputation was because it became associated with this brand of 
Victoriana, which later historians found to be distasteful – with, it might be added, good 
reason.  
The Victorian Constitutional Historians had few qualms in finding the origins of the 
modern constitution in earlier times, even if partially qualifying it by talking of 
‘formative’ periods. Even if the parts had changed, the whole had remained the same. 
How could that be? Their answer appears to rely on an ever-present essence. Wherefrom 
came that essence? From the race.  
Embedded in the approach of the Victorian Constitutional Historians was a theory of the 
Group Mind. In their eyes, there were particular qualities belonging to the English nation; 
especially, a spirit of liberty derived from the Anglo-Saxons. Individual Englishmen 
might perish, but Englishness and the English nation never dies.82 This is apparent in 
Freeman’s Growth of the English Constitution: 
“…England is England and…Englishmen are Englishmen. I will assume that 
we are not Romans or Welshmen, but that we are the descendants of the 
Angles, Saxons, and Jutes who came hither in the fifth and sixth centuries, of 
the Danes and Northmen who came hither in the ninth. I will assume that we 
are a people, not indeed of unmixed Teutonic blood…but a people whose 
                                                    
80 Cf. “Figgis's idealised communitas communitatum presupposes that men are certain about the associations 
to which they belong, and that they only belong to one such association. It also presupposes that the life 
pursued by any one association has no bearing on the life pursued by any other. Here, again, Figgis's case 
rests on his sectarianism. In allowing that the state is entitled to regulate groups when they come into 
conflict with one another, Figgis is assuming that groups will not conflict very often. This is because he 
assumes that groups will on the whole concern themselves with ends which are theirs alone, and which 
impose demands on their members alone.” Runciman, Pluralism and the Personality of the State, 145. 
81 On pluralism, see further, infra, 4.23. 
82 Cosgrove has also noted that the “racial assumptions” that underpinned the constitutional historians’ 
“national narrative” was one of the contributing factors towards the field’s decline: Richard A Cosgrove, 
“The Culture of Academic Legal History: Lawyers’ History and Historians’ Law 1870-1930,” Cambrian 
Law Review 33 (2002): 24–25. 
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blood is not more mixed than that of any other nation… I will assume that 
what is Teutonic in us is not merely one element among others, but that it is 
the very life and essence of our national being… I assume that, as we have 
had one national name, one national speech, from the beginning, we may be 
fairly held to have an unbroken national being.”83 
According to Freeman, the superiority of the English constitution stemmed from a 
superior character.84 It is worth bearing in mind Freeman’s general views on race. He was 
clearly anti-Semitic and, furthermore, during a tour of America, commented: “This would 
be a great land if only every Irishman would kill a negro, and be hanged for it”.85  
Even for more “subtle and cautious writers” like Stubbs,86 the superiority and continuity 
of the English race was clearly an important factor. At the start of his Constitutional 
History, Stubbs lists ‘national character’ as the first of the three forces driving the 
development of the English constitution.87 He went so far as to say that “it is not until a 
nation has arrived at a consciousness of its own identity that it can be said to have any 
constitutional existence”.88 Momentous events like the Danish and Norman invasions of 
the eleventh century could not destroy this deep consciousness but only affected “the 
upper ranges of the fabric,” leaving “the lower, in which we trace the greatest tenacity of 
primitive institutions, and on which the permanent continuity of the modern with the 
ancient English life depends for evidence, comparatively untouched”.89 One might also 
consider the following lines from Stubbs’s preface to the first edition of his Select 
Charters: 
                                                    
83 Edward Augustus Freeman, The Growth of the English Constitution from the Earliest Times, 3rd ed. 
(Macmillan & Co., 1894), 22–23. 
84 France suffered, for example, not for a “lack of great men” or “noble purposes” but because of the 
“differences in inborn character”: Freeman, The Growth of the English Constitution from the Earliest Times, 
67. 
85 Frank Barlow, “Freeman, Edward Augustus (1823-1892),” Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 
(Oxford University Press, 2004), http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/10146. 
86 These are the words of Chrimes: Stanley Bertram Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth 
Century (Cambridge University Press, 1936), xvii. 
87 Barker’s definition of ‘nation’, from which comes its ‘national character’, as “a material basis with a 
spiritual superstructure” can be noted. In terms of material factors, Barker lists: race; environment; and 
population. For spiritual factors: the political factor (law and government); the religious factor; language, 
literature, and thought; and ideas and systems of education. Ernest Barker, National Character and the 
Factors in Its Formation, 4th ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1948), quote at 2.   
88 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Development, 6th ed., vol. 1 
(Clarendon Press, 1903), 1. The other two forces that he noted were ‘the external history’ and ‘the 
institutions of the people’. Whilst ostensibly seeming like a social identification theory, this idea of 
‘consciousness’ speaks to the singularity and Gestalt fallacies of the Group Mind.  
89 Stubbs, Constitutional History, 1:74–75. 
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“The study of Constitutional History is essentially a tracing of causes and 
consequences; the examination of a distinct growth from a well-defined germ 
to full maturity; a growth, the particular direction and shaping of which are 
due to a diversity of causes, but whose life and developing power lies deep in 
the very nature of people. […]. 
[I]t is not credible to us as an educated people that while our students are well 
acquainted with the state machinery of Athens and Rome, they should be 
ignorant of the corresponding institutions of our own forefathers: institutions 
that possess a living interest for every nation that realizes its identity, and have 
exercised on the wellbeing of the civilized world an influence not inferior 
certainly to that of the Classical nations.”90 
With all of this talk of germs,91 soil, and planting, I am reminded of the line from Now, 
Voyager in which Mrs Vale asks: “Are we getting into botany, Doctor? Are we flowers?” 
2.7 Commonality Models’ Shortcomings 
At the start of the twentieth century, there was a reaction against, to use Greenwood’s 
words, “[t]he notion that social groups, or societies themselves (or states or nations), form 
emergent supraindividuals or organisms”,92 i.e. against ideas of Group Mind and Real 
Personality of Groups. To best understand the shortcomings of the Commonality Models, 
one can profitably begin with the shortcomings of these ideas, especially as identified by 
their two most important critics: psychologist FH Allport,93 and legal philosopher MR 
                                                    
90 William Stubbs, Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History from the 
Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the First, ed. HWC Davis, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1913), 
xv-xvi [emph. added]. This can be compared with a similar sentiment expressed at the end of the first 
volume of Stubbs’ Constitutional History: “We have now, however imperfectly, traced the process of 
events by which the English nation had reached that point of conscious unity and identity which made it 
necessary for it to act as a self-governing and political body, a self-reliant and self-sustained nation… […]. 
Yet the continuity of life, and the continuity of national purpose, never fails: even the great struggle of all, 
the long labour that extends from the Reformation to the Revolution, leaves the organisation, the origin of 
which we have been tracing, unbroken in its conscious identity, stronger in the strength in which it has 
preserved, and grown mightier through trial.” Stubbs, Constitutional History, 1:681–82. 
91 Stubbs and those sharing his predilections in this regard are sometimes referred to as being proponents 
of a ‘germ theory of constitutional development’ in which England developed out of a ‘German parent’: 
Michael Bentley, Modernizing England’s Past: English Historiography in the Age of Modernism, 1870-
1970 (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 26. 
92 See: Greenwood, The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology, 4ff, quote at 109. 
93 Floyd Henry Allport, Social Psychology (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924). The similarities to Weber, 
whose Economy and Society was published two years earlier, have been noted by Greenwood: Greenwood, 
The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology, chap. 5. 
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Cohen.94 Though they wrote contemporaneously and their object was much the same, it 
is noteworthy that neither appears to have been aware of the other.95 
Allport argued that Group Mind theories commit three fallacies, which we will call the 
singularity, gestalt, and continuity fallacies.  
The singularity fallacy is treating a social group as though it were an organism with a 
single consciousness. It is as erroneous to think of groups of individuals as organisms (as 
Le Bon or Lord Hoffmann96 did) as it is to think of a group of individuals as having a 
collective consciousness. Consciousness requires neural pathways, which groups – unlike 
individuals – do not possess. Indeed, if one takes consciousness to mean attentiveness or 
awareness, then it is difficult to see how groups can exist in such a state – individuals 
might be attentive or aware, but groups cannot be. Mental states – thoughts, feelings, 
emotions, attitudes, etc. – cannot be attributed to groups. Groups cannot be agitated, 
excited, angry, etc.97 Thus, Barber’s argument that we can speak of the ‘character’ of 
                                                    
94 Morris Raphael Cohen, “Communal Ghosts and Other Perils in Social Philosophy,” The Journal of 
Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 16, no. 25 (1919): 673–90. 
95 It is worthwhile also mentioning the work of Léon Duguit, who also wrote about the same time as Allport 
and Cohen. He wrote extensively on notions of the State and was distinguished by his denial of corporate 
personality, which he saw as reflecting metaphysical – and, therefore, badly founded and unjustifiable – 
modes of thought. See esp.: Léon Duguit, Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida Laski and Harold Laski 
(BW Huebsch, 1919); Duguit, “The Law and the State.” 
96 Lord Hoffmann’s use belies the fact that such ideas remain common: “What is meant by ‘threatening the 
life of the nation’ [this is the wording of ECHR, Art. 15]? The ‘nation’ is a social organism, living in its 
territory…under its own form of government and subject to a system of laws which expresses its own 
political and moral values. When one speaks of a threat to the ‘life’ of the nation, the word is being used in 
a metaphorical sense. The life of the nation is not coterminous with the lives of its people. The nation, its 
institutions and values, endure through generations. In many important respects, England is the same nation 
as it was at the time of the first Elizabeth or the Glorious Revolution. The Armada threatened to destroy the 
life of the nation, not by loss of life in battle, but by subjecting English institutions to the rule of Spain and 
the Inquisition. The same was true of the threat posed to the United Kingdom by Nazi Germany in the 
Second World War. This country, more than any other in the world, has an unbroken history of living for 
centuries under institutions and in accordance with values which show a recognisable continuity.” Lord 
Hoffmann went on to argue: “This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived 
physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of 
terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do not threaten the life of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler 
hung in the balance, but there is no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The Spanish people have not said 
that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime as it was, threatened the life of their nation. Their legendary 
pride would not allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of government 
or our existence as a civil community.” A & Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
UKHL 56 at paras. 91 and 96. It has to be admitted that the wording of the ECHR, Art. 15, with respect to 
the words ‘life of the nation’, is unfortunate. Whilst still ambiguous, ‘political community’ or Lord 
Hoffmann’s phrase ‘civil community’, or some such term, would have been better; ‘social group’ would 
have been best. Lord Hoffmann was in this case the dissenting opinion; his fellow judges, as well as the 
ECtHR subsequently (A v United Kingdom (2009) 49 EHRR 29), concluded that the interpretation of the 
phrase ‘threat to the life of the nation’ was to be interpreted by each of the governments of the contracting 
states. 
97 There is a nice quote by William Paley: “[A]lthough we speak of communities as of sentient beings; 
although we ascribe to them happiness and misery, desire, interests, and passions; nothing really exists or 
feels but individuals. The happiness of people is made up of the happiness of single persons; and the 
quantity of happiness can only be augmented by increasing the number of the percipients, or pleasure of 
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States, suggesting that they might be bellicose, indecisive, neurotic, etc. is misguided;98 
what one really means is the constituents and representatives thereof – or some portion – 
present such characteristics.99 As Maitland once said: “[A state] is capable of proprietary 
rights; but it is incapable of knowing, intending, willing, acting… [It] does no act, speaks 
no word, thinks no thought, appoints no agent.”100 These can only be done by actual 
individuals, even if in the name of the group.101 
The gestalt fallacy occurs when one elevates this singularity above the group as though 
the group itself were something other than its members,102 “a separate entity participated 
in by all”.103 For Allport, this was fallacious: “Collective consciousness and behavior are 
simply the aggregation of those states and reactions of individuals which, owing to 
similarities of constitution, training, and common stimulations, are possessed of a similar 
character.”104 Social groups are the sum of individuals – nothing more, nothing less. 
The singularity and gestalt fallacies arise out of metaphysical ideas, i.e. ideas that there 
is more than meets the eye. They are particularly associated with the idea of a spirit or 
soul. There is a significant problem with metaphysical ideas: they are meaningless.105 
After all, there is no way to test them in order to say whether they are true or false; whether 
                                                    
their perceptions.” William Paley, The Works of William Paley: With Illustrative Notes and a Life of the 
Author (William Smith, 1838), 681. 
98 Nick W Barber, The Constitutional State (Oxford University Press, 2010), 116–23. 
99 As Laski noted in his introduction to Duguit, summarizing Duguit’s argument: “The action of the state 
means, in cold fact, simply that certain officials have carried out the order of a minister; there is nothing in 
that which gives use to any personality differing from that of those concerned in the conception and 
performance of the order.” Duguit, Law in the Modern State, xix. 
100 FW Maitland wrote this in the context of his discussion on Savigny’s ideas in his Translator’s 
Introduction to Gierke: Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, xx–xxi. Further, there is an interesting 
quote in the words of Lord Lindley, speaking on behalf of the court in Citizens Life Assurance Company v 
Brown [1904] AC 423, at 426: “To talk about imputing malice to corporations appears to their Lordships 
to introduce metaphysical subtleties which are needless and fallacious.” After all, much as Greer LJ said, 
corporations have “no soul to be saved or body to be kicked”: Stepney Corporation v Osofsky [1937] 3 All 
ER 289 at 291. 
101 We can profitably quote Weber here: “For still other cognitive purposes – for instance, juristic ones – or 
for practical ends, it may on the other hand be convenient or even indispensable to treat social collectivities, 
such as states, associations, business corporations, foundations, as if they were individual persons. Thus 
they may be treated as the subject of rights and duties or as the performers of legally significant actions. 
But for the subjective interpretation of action in sociological work these collectivities must be treated as 
solely the resultants and modes of organization of the particular acts of individual persons, since these alone 
can be treated as agents in a course of subjectively understandable action. Nevertheless, the sociologist 
cannot for his purposes afford to ignore these collective concepts derived from other disciplines.” Max 
Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 
vol. 1 (University of California Press, 2013), 13.  
102 Durkheim, for example, appears to have committed this fallacy, although there is perhaps an extent to 
which he has been misunderstood. See: Greenwood, The Disappearance of the Social in American Social 
Psychology, chap. 3, esp. at 68; cf. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory 
with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers, 2nd ed. (Free Press, 1949), 350–68.  
103 Allport, Social Psychology, 5. 
104 Allport, Social Psychology, 6.  
105 I am here following Ayer. See esp.: Alfred J Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (Penguin Books, 1946). 
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they represent something that does or does not exist. There is no way of isolating this 
supposed consciousness and observing it. The point that Allport makes is that we only 
see individuals; there is little reason to infer anything more. To do so would be to rely on 
faith – a most unscientific approach. We can say, then, that both the singularity and gestalt 
fallacies are examples of an overarching metaphysical fallacy.106 
Beyond these fallacies, there is the continuity fallacy: the notion that this consciousness 
acquires a character and existence of its own such that “[i]ndividuals may come and go; 
but this organized mental life goes on indefinitely”.107 Individuals die, but nations 
continue forever. This is precisely the fallacy committed by the great majority of 
constitutional historians who supported a continuity thesis; they saw the nation and its 
constitution as everlasting entities, distinct from those who happened to be alive at any 
particular time. It is worth quoting Allport at length:  
“In order to answer the question where this mental structure of the group 
exists, we must refer again to the individual. Nationality, Free-Masonry, 
Catholicism, and the like are not group minds expressed in the individual 
members of these bodies; they are sets  of ideals, thoughts, and habits repeated 
in each individual mind and existing only in those minds. They are not 
absorbed in some mysterious way from the group life, nor are they inherited. 
They are learned by each individual from the specific language and behavior 
of other individuals. Where such continuity of social contact ceases the 
organized life of the group disappears. Were all the individuals in a group to 
perish at one time, the so-called ‘group mind’ would be abolished forever. It 
is not necessary to have the same personnel for continuity of group structure; 
but there must be some personnel.”108 
                                                    
106 For a discussion of something of the history of metaphysical notions of the State, as well as the 
contrasting ‘realist’ notions, see: Duguit, “The Law and the State,” 6ff. 
107 Allport, Social Psychology, 8. 
108 Allport, Social Psychology, 9. [Emphasis in the second and fourth sentences added]. This can be 
compared with a similar sentiment, which was expressed by Hobhouse a little over a decade earlier, 
although Hobhouse is a more ambiguous and problematic thinker in this context: “Society exists in 
individuals. When all the generations through which its unity subsists are counted in, its life is their life, 
and nothing outside their life. The individuals themselves, indeed, are profoundly modified by the fact that 
they form a society, for it is through the social relation that they realize the greater part of their own 
achievements. Each man is, so to say, the meeting point of a great number of social relations. Each such 
relation depends on him, on his qualities, on his actions, and also affects him and modifies his qualities and 
his actions. The whole complex of such relations constitutes the life of society. It follows that social 
development is also in the end personal or individual development.” Further: “To speak of society as if it 
were a physical organism is a piece of mysticism, if indeed it is not quite meaningless.” Hobhouse, Social 
Evolution and Political Theory, 85, 87. 
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The processes by which such learning is passed on will be discussed in the Associational 
Theory of Law. What is important here is that any talk of a national feeling, character, or 
experience is nonsensical. If individuals happen to resemble one another, it is not because 
they are embodied with the same spirit, or because they participate in some ethereal group 
consciousness or other mystical phenomenon existing beyond the members of the group; 
there is simply some process either of transmission and assimilation, or convergence. It 
would be wrong to say that Allport completely denied the existence of social groups,109 
but he stressed that groups need to be studied from the perspective of the individuals 
comprising them;110 indeed, he went so far as to say that “if we take care of the 
individuals…the groups will be found to take care of themselves”.111 
Whereas Allport’s critique focused on combatting the Group Mind, Cohen’s focused on 
the Real Personality of Groups, which is permeated by ideas of ‘communal ghosts’.112 
Coming from a legal perspective, Cohen was particularly interested in ideas of 
corporations. Nevertheless, the fundamental reasoning was the same: although there 
might be the impression of some anima or spirit when looking at corporations, on closer 
inspection this disappears. A metaphysical fallacy has been committed; scientifically, it 
is insupportable. This does not mean we necessarily have to stop speaking of groups, 
corporations, etc. We merely have to remember that they are not metaphysical entities; 
rather, we are speaking metaphorically and in shorthand.  
Aside from the problems suffered by the Group Mind and Real Personality theories, there 
is one particular failing to which most Commonality Models succumb. This will be 
treated further down.  
2.8 Interaction Models 
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the ideas associated with Commonality Models, 
whilst retaining popular appeal, have held increasingly less sway amongst scholars. In 
particular, the idea that there are naturally-occurring groups of which one is inevitably 
and inescapably a part now holds less traction. Most theories now accept that individuals 
have some choice as to which social groups they belong. However, considerable 
                                                    
109 John C Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Basil Blackwell, 
1987), 10. This was also implied by Nick Barber: Barber, The Constitutional State, 106. If this were true, 
Allport would not have defined the social group, as he did: Allport, Social Psychology, 10, 260. 
110 Allport, Social Psychology, 10. 
111 Allport, Social Psychology, 9. 
112 This bears a striking similarity to Ryle’s later idea of the ‘ghost in the machine’, although Ryle’s idea 
was in the context of mind and souls, rather than social groups. See: Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind 
(Peregrine Books, 1963), 17ff et passim. 
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disagreement remains as to how exactly social group membership is determined. There 
are principally three kinds of model, which operate on something of a spectrum. On the 
one side, there are Interaction Models; on the other side, Identification Models; and, 
somewhere in between, Cohesion Models. We begin with the former.113  
Interaction Models are predicated on the intuitive idea that social groups must in some 
sense actually be social,114 i.e. there must be social agents exhibiting social behaviours. 
After all, it would be odd to suggest that there could be a social group without an actual 
social element, i.e. without some interaction between its members. To identify groups, 
Interaction Models look for grouping behaviours, i.e. repeated and patterned 
interactions between individuals, accompanied by some differentiation and 
discrimination as between in-group and out-group members. The higher the level of 
repeated and patterned behaviours discriminating thusly, the more group-like a given set 
of individuals will appear.115  
An entire field is devoted to the study of interactions: social network analysis. The fact 
that it is called ‘network’, not ‘group’, analysis is noteworthy; it is indicative of the 
problems with Interaction Models. Social network analysts avoid the use of the word 
‘group’ not only because it is constraining, but also because of the conceptual difficulties 
it presents, i.e.:116  
(1) Boundary Specification Problem: how does one decide whether a particular 
individual is an in-group or out-group member?117 For those seemingly at the 
centre of the ‘group’, this is unlikely to be an issue. However, as one moves 
towards the periphery, where individuals have as many connections within as 
outside of the ‘group’, it becomes difficult, without further information, to place 
                                                    
113 For examples of this model, see, e.g.: George Casper Homans, The Human Group (Routledge & Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1951), esp. 84-85; Frederick L Bates, “A Conceptual Analysis of Group Structure,” Social Forces 
36, no. 2 (1957): 103–11. One might also be tempted to include Bell and Newby on the basis of their 
definition of community as “on-going systems of interaction, usually within a locality, that have some 
degree of permanence”: Bell and Newby, Community Studies, 55. More generally, see: Linton C Freeman, 
“The Development of Social Network Analysis - with an Emphasis on Recent Events,” in The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Network Analysis, ed. John Scott and Peter J Carrington (SAGE Publications, 2011), 
26–39; George J McCall, “Interactionist Perspectives in Social Psychology,” in Handbook of Social 
Psychology, ed. John DeLamater and Amanda Ward (Springer, 2013), 3–30.  
114 Although, this is not to say that it should necessarily be sociable or highly social; merely that there 
should be some social aspect to it. 
115 If one plotted these interactions on a graph, one would expect social groups to show as clusters in which 
the nodes (i.e. individuals) interact more with one another than others, and that this difference is statistically 
significant. 
116 See: Alexandra Marin and Barry Wellman, “Social Network Analysis: An Introduction,” in The SAGE 
Handbook of Social Network Analysis, ed. John Scott and Peter J Carrington (SAGE Publications, 2011), 
13–14. 
117 Cf. Marin and Wellman, “Social Network Analysis: An Introduction,” 12. 
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them.118 Indeed, even if there are boundaries, there is every possibility of their 
being highly fluid and, therefore, difficult to determine with precision and 
accuracy.119  
(2) Large Network Problem: in large networks, where individuals cannot possibly 
all interact directly with one another, the idea of interaction being the defining 
feature becomes less tenable.  
(3) Concordance Problem: whilst individuals tend to associate with those whom 
they already know, this does not guarantee that individuals will feel themselves 
to be a part of the same group as those with whom they interact.120 
(4) Threshold Problem: it remains unclear as to what level of interaction is sufficient 
to bring about a social group; casual, infrequent interactions would seem 
insufficient.  
In truth, there are probably few that would support the interaction model in its purest 
form. It does, however, exert considerable force on people’s preconceptions of social 
groups. 
2.9 Identification Models 
Identification Models are most closely associated with the Bristol School; especially, 
Tajfel, Turner, and Reicher.121 Whilst interactions between individuals are deemed 
important, for these the crucial factor is whether the members concurrently believe 
themselves to be a part of the same group. This overcomes some of the problems with 
Interaction Models. Boundary specification is no longer an issue – the groups to which 
individuals belong are those with which they most identify (irrespective of those with 
which they most interact). Likewise, larger groups are more easily explicable as the 
impracticality of requiring everybody to interact – even if only very indirectly – is 
                                                    
118 “In so far as frequency of interaction is one such criterion [of membership in a group], we must recognize 
that the boundaries between groups are anything but sharply drawn. Rather, ‘members’ of given groups are 
variously connected with other groups of which they are not conventionally regarded as members, though 
the sociologist might have ample basis for including them in these latter groups, by virtue of their frequent 
social interaction with its conventional membership.” Robert King Merton, Social Theory and Social 
Structure, 3rd ed. (The Free Press, 1968), 287, 339. 
119 Cf. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 318, 339, 340–42. 
120 For example, mediaeval Christians and Jews might have conducted much business together, and 
therefore interacted frequently, but it seems unlikely that they would have been considered – or considered 
themselves – to be members of the same group. As such, there is a lack of concordance between their own 
identification and the identification that we would attribute to them based on their interactions alone. 
121 See, e.g.: Henri Tajfel, ed., Social Identity and Intergroup Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1982); 
Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group. One might also consider Gusfield as falling within this 
category, see: Gusfield, Community: A Critical Response, esp. 34-35. 
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removed; its members need only believe that they are part of the same group. However, 
Identification Models also raise problems: 
(1) Awareness Problem: it assumes relatively developed cognitive faculties, i.e. 
faculties capable of conceiving of oneself as an individual with a particular 
identity and as a member of particular groups with other particular individuals. 
This assumption is vindicated in most adults, but seems to exclude both infants 
and those whose cognitive faculties have been impaired. Are these then deprived 
of social membership and identity? Furthermore, it would appear to exclude most, 
if not all, non-human social animals,122 as they also lack the cognitive functions 
necessary to make the kinds of identifications envisaged by the model. 
(2) Intersubjective Agreement Problem: to what extent do individuals’ conceptions 
of their social identity need to match before one can confidently say that they 
belong to the same social group? Furthermore, to what extent do individuals need 
to be able to agree as to who is in the group for that group to be said to exist? And 
how should one handle cases of so-called ‘false consciousness’?123  
Identification Models also leave something to be desired. 
2.10 Cohesion Models 
Finally, there are Cohesion Models, which are difficult to define owing to the notorious 
difficulties in defining ‘cohesion’.124 Their underlying premise appears to be that social 
groups are defined by a sense of closeness, nearness, or unity; a sense of we-ness; perhaps 
by an esprit de corps,125 shared commitments or convictions,126 or even a willingness on 
the part of a group’s members to work for, defend, or fight for the group.127 Cohesion 
                                                    
122 See: Hans Kummer, Primate Societies: Group Techniques of Ecological Adaptation (Aldine Atherton 
Inc., 1971), 39–40. It can be noted that Kummer, for the purposes of primatology, adopts an interactionist 
model. 
123 These are cases where people “identify themselves with classes ‘to which they do not belong’”: Merton, 
Social Theory and Social Structure, 333. 
124 On social cohesion see, e.g.: David W McMillan and David M Chavis, “Sense of Community: A 
Definition and Theory,” Journal of Community Psychology 14, no. 1 (1986): 6–23; P. E. Mudrack, 
“Defining Group Cohesiveness: A Legacy of Confusion?,” Small Group Research 20, no. 1 (1989): 37–49; 
James Moody and Douglas R White, “Structural Cohesion and Embeddedness: A Hierarchical Concept of 
Social Groups,” American Sociological Review 68, no. 1 (2003): 103–27; John Bruhn, The Group Effect: 
Social Cohesion and Health Outcomes (Springer, 2009), esp. ch. 2. Hiller might also be placed in this 
category: E. T. Hiller, “The Community as a Social Group,” American Sociological Review 6, no. 2 (1941): 
189–202. 
125 E.g. Linton, The Study of Man, 92, 271. 
126 On this, see: Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 1992), 
99–102. 
127 This idea that cohesion is produced, in addition to mutual identification, by members’ willingness to 
defend the group has been argued, for example, by Peter Turchin, building on earlier ideas. See: Alex 
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Models can be thought of as sitting in between the other models. This is in the sense that 
having things in common, frequently interacting, and sharing identifications can all foster 
a sense of closeness, etc. The weighting given to each varies. In some cases, having some 
important trait in common might be seen as the primary driver of cohesiveness; in other 
cases, it might be regular interactions; in other cases still, it might be a widespread belief.  
A prime example of a Cohesion Model is to be found in Finnis, who argued that a 
community or association was “an ongoing state of affairs, a sharing of life or of action 
or of interests, an associating or coming-together. Community in this sense is a matter of 
relationship and interaction.”128 He concluded: “Whatever else it is, community is a form 
of unifying relationship between human beings.”129 Here can plainly be seen elements of 
commonality, interaction, and cohesion; one cannot imagine identification being far 
away. It should be added that, insofar as commonality went, Finnis did not shy away from 
arguing for a biological, genetic link, or that the family constitutes a special case.130 He 
went on to stress ‘cultural unity’ (i.e. sharing a given language, etc.) and the importance 
of ‘common action’;131 Finnis appears to have believed that, in the main, it was 
commonality that produces cohesiveness. This, in turn, produces social groups (or, at 
least, his communities and associations).  
Drawing, as they do, on the bases of the other models, Cohesion Models are susceptible 
to their respective flaws. However, their greatest downfall is their pathological fuzziness: 
What does closeness or nearness really mean? Indeed, there is, once again, a threshold 
problem: How ‘cohesive’ do groups need to be in order to be groups? 
2.11 Models Concluded 
Commonality Models focus on shared characteristics; Interaction Models on behaviours 
(i.e. grouping behaviours, especially interpersonal interactions); Identification Models on 
beliefs (i.e. about identity); and Cohesion models on feelings (i.e. feelings of closeness, 
nearness, etc.). One might also say that, whereas Commonality and Interaction Models 
focus on external aspects and are more quantitative in approach, Identification and 
Cohesion Models focus on internal aspects and are more qualitative in approach. 
                                                    
Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the 
Social Sciences (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 128. 
128 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 135. 
129 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 136. 
130 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 136. 
131 Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, 137–38. 
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Whatever their basis, the greatest failing of all these models is that they believe in the 
existence of objectively identifiable groups. We can call this the objective phenomenon 
fallacy. Even Identification Models, which are the most subjective, look at individuals’ 
beliefs in order to determine if they match; if so, they conclude that there is an extant 
social group. This gives a scientific aura to social groups; they can be identified, 
categorized, and measured. However, it misses the fundamental point about social groups: 
they are fictions. In order to understand this and properly to understand social groups, we 
must turn to mathematics and set theory.  
2.12 Groups as Cognitive Constructs 
In order to understand social groups, it is important to know what ‘group’ means. For 
this, we can turn to Cantor,132 set theory’s founder. He defined a group or, more formally, 
set, as follows: a collection of discrete objects (‘elements’ or ‘members’) that are together 
understood to form a whole.133  
A mere collection or aggregation of objects is insufficient. There must be some 
connection or association made between them such that, as Cantor identified, they are 
understood or considered together. Otherwise, there would merely be a coincidence of 
objects. What transforms coincidences of objects into groups is our considering them to 
be such. If things are not considered together, they are not a group; they are just a number 
of things that happen to exist. It is only when we think of things being together that there 
is said to be a group.  
In some cases, we do this because the things in question occur together in our perceptions 
or impressions, i.e. the sense-data we receive from them are interpreted by the brain 
within a relatively short time-frame, such that the brain considers them to be related. In 
this context, the brain’s adeptness at identifying and isolating patterns is important, 
because many groups are really just that: patterns. Alternatively, we might think of things 
being together on a more reflective basis, though they are not immediately before our 
senses – rather than connecting immediate sense-data, the mind connects ideas. To do 
this, the mind utilizes some principle of association.  
Hume divided the principles of association into three,134 but we can divide them more 
usefully into two. First, there is spatio-temporal proximity, i.e. nearness in time or 
                                                    
132 Georg Cantor (1845-1918). 
133 Georg Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers, trans. Philip EB 
Jourdain (Dover Publications, Inc., 1915), 85. 
134 Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 101ff (§3). 
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space. This might be due to what can be called coincidental proximity, where the things 
occur closely together in time or space without necessarily affecting one another. 
Alternatively,135 it might be based on some inference of causation, in which things occur 
together in time or space precisely because one brings about the other. Second, there is 
resemblance, i.e. there is some characteristic or property that they appear to have in 
common, such that the mind is carried from one to the other.  
When the mind perceives or imagines things together, they have a certain unity in our 
experience. This is what creates the sense of their being a group. This is because the brain 
not only remembers individual things, but also the fact of experiencing them together. 
This experience is treated by the brain almost as a thing apart; it is something that can be 
given its own label.136 It is in this way that we come by a sense of a group identity. It is 
this that gives us the feeling that groups and their members can be different things. This 
is, however, an illusion created by the way our minds work. 
We believe in some groups more strongly than others. Again, this is a product of the ways 
in which our minds work. Firstly, it is due to the forcefulness of the group-idea. There are 
some connections that seem irresistible. In large part, this is due to repetition: when one 
repeatedly perceives or imagines things together, or repeatedly calls to mind the group-
idea, one reinforces these in one’s mind, thereby strengthening them. It does not matter 
whether it reflects reality. Secondly, it is also due to the significance that the mind attaches 
                                                    
135 This is what Hume separated into a third heading. 
136 It is important, however, that no process of reification or hypostatization hereby takes place. As Locke 
warned: “Another great abuse of words, is the taking them for things. This, though it in some degree 
concerns all names in general, yet more particularly affects those of substances. To this abuse those men 
are most subject who most confine their thoughts to anyone system, and give themselves up into a firm 
belief of the perfection of any received hypothesis: whereby they come to be persuaded that the terms of 
that sect are so suited to the nature of things, that they perfectly correspond with their real existence. Who 
is there that has been bred up in the Peripatetick philosophy, who does not think the Ten Names, under 
which are ranked the Ten Predicaments, to be exactly conformable to the nature of things? Who is there of 
that school that is not persuaded that substantial forms, vegetative souls, abhorrence of a vacuum, 
intentional species, &c., are something real? These words men have learned from their very entrance upon 
knowledge, and have found their masters and systems lay great stress upon them: and therefore they cannot 
quit the opinion, that they are conformable to nature, and are the representations of something that really 
exists. The Platonists have their soul of the world, and the Epicureans their endeavour towards motion in 
their atoms when at rest. There is scarce any sect in philosophy has not a distinct set of terms that others 
understand not. But yet this gibberish, which, in the weakness of human understanding, serves so well to 
palliate men's ignorance, and cover their errors, comes, by familiar use amongst those of the same tribe, to 
seem the most important part of language, and of all other the terms the most significant: and should aerial 
and aetherial vehicles come once, by the prevalency of that doctrine, to be generally received anywhere, no 
doubt those terms would make impressions on men's minds, so as to establish them in the persuasion of the 
reality of such things, as much as Peripatetick forms and intentional species have heretofore done.” Locke, 
“Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” 479-480 (3.10). 
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to the group-idea.137 As social animals, it is only natural for us to tend to have strong ideas 
about the groups to which we feel we belong.  
Let us take an example. We can imagine a number of trees standing closely together in 
an otherwise unoccupied field. These, because of their spatio-temporal proximity, 
resemblance,138 and remoteness, produce a forceful and almost irresistible impression in 
our minds that they are a group. To give them their proper group-name, we might call 
them a ‘copse’ or ‘grove’.139 However, without an agent to notice them and to think of 
them being together, they are merely a coincidence of objects; the trees themselves are 
quite indifferent to, and unaware of, their neighbours.  
That it is not obvious that these trees should be a group can be illustrated by modifying 
the example. Let us suppose that the trees have remained in place, but, rather than being 
in a barren field, they are surrounded by many other trees. The trees themselves have not 
changed, but the idea of their being a group is now less appealing. We can still consider 
them as a group, because we can still imagine them being together. However, the presence 
of other trees interferes with our previous unity of experience. They no longer seem so 
obviously connected in a distinguishable way. Instead, they are subsumed within a newer 
and larger group (i.e. a woodland or forest).  
Thus far, we have focused on the idea that groups arise from experiential unity, which 
mean that group-ideas must postdate the relevant perceptions or imaginings. However, it 
is obviously true that most adults are able to have group-ideas not arising from any 
corresponding perceptions or imaginings. For example, one might decide to make a set 
of all persons wearing a hat on a given day. This does not mean that one has seen or 
imagined a specific group of persons wearing hats; one is merely priming oneself to 
recognize a pattern. As such, the group-idea does not originally arise from an experiential 
unity but, rather, from a decision to henceforward connect certain things together.  
From an evolutionary perspective, it would seem beneficial for our group-ideas to bear 
some relation to external reality. However, there is absolutely no necessity that our group-
                                                    
137 For example, the mind is likely to attribute great significance to mere ‘social categories’, i.e. aggregates 
formed according to some certain status or characteristic, such as age, sex, marital status, income, etc., 
where it is not presumed that the persons identified have much else in common besides these things, 
meaningful interactions with one another, or indeed, any especial awareness of one another. See Merton, 
Social Theory and Social Structure, 353–54. (Merton, it should be said, largely adopts an interaction model 
of social groups).  
138 That is, they resemble another in the sense that they have the features characteristic of trees (i.e. trunks, 
branches, leaves, etc.). This resemblance would be amplified if they were all of the same type of tree.  
139 In linguistics, these are known as collective nouns. 
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ideas be logical, rational, or, indeed, concordant with reality. Thus, one might believe in 
fairies and survive, even though there would not appear to be any individuals 
corresponding to such a group.140 Even where our group-ideas seem reasonable, 
justifiable, and representative of reality, there remains the fact that they are nevertheless 
subjective. Group-ideas are formed in individual minds; they are the product of 
individuals’ experiences, perspectives, and inclinations. They arise from our attempts to 
impose order on the world. Some element of arbitrariness is almost inevitable.  
This does not mean that groups are so completely subjective as to be meaningless. Human 
brains are typically organized and function in the same ways; across individuals, the same 
stimuli will activate the same brain regions. Though education and upbringing have an 
impact, people are likely to come to similar – if not the same – conclusions when 
presented with the same sense-data. We can also communicate and compare our group-
ideas, such that we can assimilate others’ ideas. Indeed, we can agree rules to determine 
what is, and what is not, to be included in any particular group, which helps to harmonize 
individuals’ conceptions.  
Nevertheless, we must not mistake intersubjective agreement for objective reality. The 
fact remains that groups are essentially mental phenomena. They are constructs, creations, 
or creatures of the mind. They are subject to the idiosyncrasies, biases, prejudices, 
predilections, etc. of those who hold them. They are often somewhat arbitrary and vague. 
They are not things-in-the-world; rather, they are just a way in which our minds attempt 
to understand it.141  
2.13 Group Properties 
We have denied mental states – and attributions thereof – to groups.142 However, might 
one speak of the ‘properties’ of groups? It is practically self-evident that it is possible. 
For example, we can speak of ‘small’ and ‘large’ groups, ‘homogeneous’ and 
                                                    
140 Indeed, we might suppose even more serious causes for what might be called unrepresented groups, viz. 
some delusion or psychosis. A person might genuinely think that they are perceiving groups, even though 
they are uncorroborated by others. 
141 Cf. Whitehead and Russell: “Thus classes, so far as we introduce them, are merely symbolic or linguistic 
conveniences, not genuine objects as their members are if they are individuals.” But: “It is not necessary 
for our purposes, however, to assert dogmatically that there are no such things as classes.” Alfred North 
Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, Principia Mathematica, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 
1963), 72. Having referenced these passages in the Principia, Eaton then went on to say: “The unity of a 
class is very loose indeed, but certainly a class has a unity and is an object for thought, as are the other 
entities with which logic deals; though not an empirical object like the particular things which might be its 
members”. Ralph M Eaton, General Logic: An Introductory Survey (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1959), 258 
[emph. added]. 
142 Supra, 2.7. 
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‘heterogeneous’ groups, ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ groups, etc. These are clearly 
not properties of the constituent individuals themselves, but of the individuals taken 
together.  
What has to be remembered is that all ‘group’ properties are emergent properties – they 
arise out of, and are a product of, individuals’ characteristics and behaviours, though they 
remain tied directly to them. It must always be possible to identify how specific sets of 
individuals give rise to specific emergent properties. Often, when one starts investigating 
this, one finds that the picture is more complex than one at first imagined; that there is 
significant variation as between the members. This is usually a corrective to the 
generalizations that we are prone to making. 
One must not confuse characteristics of individuals with the perceived characteristics of 
the groups to which they belong. We have to be incredibly cautious when imputing the 
supposed properties of groups to the individuals therein; likewise, when imputing the 
characteristics, properties, attitudes, etc. of individuals to groups. This would be a failure 
to see and appreciate individuals as themselves.  
This is perhaps what Vermeule was driving at when he talked about the fallacies of 
composition (assuming that, if certain individuals have a property, the group must also 
have that property), and division (assuming that, if the group has a certain property, the 
individuals therein must also have that property).143 These are certainly fallacies, albeit 
really two sides of the same coin. Nevertheless, we have to be cautious when claiming, 
for example, that the properties of groups and their constituents can be opposites and 
contradictory. One example Vermeule gives to demonstrate the fallacy of division is 
assuming “that unbiased groups must have unbiased members”; he argues that each 
member of a judicial panel might be biased, yet, because these biases cancel one another 
out, the judicial panel as a whole is unbiased.144 This is not true. The panel is patently 
biased; however, it is also, in a sense, balanced. Whether this supposed balance 
compensates for the individuals’ biases will depend largely on the nature of the biases 
represented and whether one can get a fair trial in spite of them. The best security for a 
fair trial is unbiased judges. A better example would be ‘institutional bias’; the individuals 
working for an institution might not be especially biased, but their systems of working 
might produce that effect.   
                                                    
143 See: Adrian Vermeule, The System of the Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2012), chap. 1 (these 
are also defined on p. 9). 
144 Vermeule, The System of the Constitution, 21–22, 59. 
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We must be discerning and perceptive; we have to use language appropriately. We have 
to remember that groups are constructs. Sometimes we have to draw back the veil to 
appreciate things properly. It is not always easy, but it is important.  
2.14 Individuals as Constructs? 
A group of trees, independently of observation, might only be a coincidence of objects, 
but would it be a violence on language to suggest that each individual tree is also merely 
a coincidence of branches, leaves, etc. independently of observation? Are individuals 
merely constructed groups?  
To a great extent, individuals are constructed groups. Most things that we regard as single 
individuals are, in fact, compounds or composites. The human body, for example, has a 
much reduced sense of coherence and unity when one knows something of molecular and 
cellular biology, as well as something of microbes and symbiosis. Nevertheless, things 
like animal and plant bodies, as well as other objects, appear to have a greater sense of 
objective reality than social groups. Why? 
There is a distinction to be drawn between what might be called integrated physical 
structures and systems, on the one hand, and constructed groups, on the other. 
Integrated physical structures are characterized by: (1) the presence of physical binding 
agents or forces, which give them their coherence; and (2) the discreteness of the 
materials that make up the structure from the surrounding environment (i.e. they are 
bound to one another in a way that they are not bound to other things). Integrated physical 
systems, moreover, also tend to be characterized by: (3) the interconnectedness and 
interdependence of their parts; and (4) oftentimes permeating physical subsystems, e.g. 
in the human body one finds the circulatory system, nervous system, etc.  
Constructed groups, especially social groups, lack these in the ways that integrated 
physical structures and systems possess them – particularly the presence of physical 
binding agents and forces.145 Mutual feelings of affection, friendship, etc. are very 
                                                    
145 Hobhouse once drew a comparison between leaves strewn on a lawn, on the one hand, and the leaves 
themselves, on the other. Any act on any individual leaf (e.g. being picked up, the wind carrying it away, 
etc.) had no effect whatsoever on the other leaves lying about, except insofar as they are affected by the 
same force. The leaves, taken together, form a ‘numerical whole’, which represents “their arithmetical sum, 
no more and no less”. However, actions on any part of any individual leaf is likely to have a knock-on 
effect on the other parts: “The leaf acts as a whole. If the wind catches a part of it, that part carries the rest 
along with it”. For Hobhouse, the leaf “is a structure which is in every respect as real and significant as the 
elements which compose it. What we call the onesided analytical tendency is the tendency to deny this, to 
think the cells something more real than the leaf, which is thus conceived only as a certain arrangement of 
cells”, etc. This Hobhouse carried by analogy to society. There are, of course, “many fortuitous 
aggregations, producing slight contact between individuals”, e.g. people walking along a street at a given 
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different to, say, electromagnetic forces or chemical bonds. Indeed, when talking about 
integrated physical structures and systems, we tend to use the language of physics, 
chemistry, and biology; such language would be inappropriate with constructed groups 
except insofar as it is analogical or metaphorical.146 
Perhaps the greatest difference, however, is contingency. Constructed groups are far 
more contingent than integrated physical systems on observers’ perceptions and 
ideations. Without these, they have but little reality. To demonstrate, we can consider 
social groups. If there were a sudden bout of global retrograde amnesia and all records 
disappeared, there can be little doubt that the political map of the future would look rather 
different to that of today. Old divisions and identities would disappear; new ones would 
form. Social groups are contingent upon continued ideas of, and beliefs in, their 
existence.147  
2.15 Nature of Social Groups 
Social groups are constructed groups; they are cognitive constructs, rather than objective 
phenomena. This means that the aim of the four models to find some method by which 
we canidentify groups in the world, almost scientifically, is misguided. However, 
although we have come to some understanding as to what a group is, the question still 
remains as to what exactly a social group is.  
                                                    
time. But there are groups with “deeper and more stable associations”; these “are of the organic type”. 
Much as with the leaf, what makes these such is the fact that affecting some part affects other parts; their 
existence is intertwined, however directly or indirectly, to a greater or lesser extent, in a web of ‘mutual 
determination’. Thus, a family bereavement might leave the other family members’ lives “tragically 
altered”. However: “The true organic theory is that the whole is just what is constituted by the co-operation 
of the parts, neither more nor less, not more real nor less real, not of higher nor of inferior value”. The 
central problem with this is that Hobhouse got the analogy the wrong way around. Each leaf is what I would 
call an integrated physical structure (or, indeed, system, if it were alive); the group of leaves, a constructed 
group. Social groups are not like individual leaves; they are like the scattered leaves, albeit ones that are 
moving around and bumping into one another – it is in this way that they affect one another. It is not as 
individuals are connected together by fibrous strands, the pulling or tugging of which at one end produces 
an effect at the other. For Hobhouse’s arguments, see: Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, The Metaphysical 
Theory of the State: A Criticism (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1918), 126–33. 
146 Much as Spencer wrote in the Fortnightly Review in 1871: “analogies between the phenomena presented 
in a physically coherent aggregate forming an individual, and the phenomena presented in a physically 
incoherent aggregate of individuals [forming a society]…cannot be analogies of a visible or sensible kind; 
but can only be analogies between systems, or methods, of organization.” Quoted in: Spencer, The 
Evolution of Society: Selections from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, xli. He thereafter went on 
to stress the importance of the interdependency – by which he seems to mean mutual reliance, but might 
merely mean mutual interactions – of parts as the chief point of commonality in ‘individual organisms’ and 
‘social organisms’.  
147 We can recall Allport’s words, quoted supra at 2.7. 
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It is suggested that social groups are, quite simply, groups of social agents, i.e. groups of 
individuals capable of expressing social behaviours.148 This means that they have to be 
animals of some kind.149 Of course, for us to consider these agents as a group, we need to 
form some connection between them. It might be because they happen to be collected 
together before us, such that we perceive them together. However, a random assortment 
of individuals collected together in such a way for only a short period of time is unlikely 
to have an especially strong impact on our minds. We are more likely to have a more 
forceful and lasting impression if, for some reason, we think there to be some connection 
between the members of the group even when they are not physically assembled 
                                                    
148 As a social group consists of some number of individuals, there is the question as to whether that number 
might be zero or one. In other words, might a social group be comprised of an empty or single member set? 
And might such a group have a constitution? The answer to these would seem to be in the affirmative. In 
the case of a single member set, the distribution of such activities and influence will naturally be 
concentrated – the totality will likely be invested in that single individual. This could, in theory, be carried 
to an extreme in thinking that a person could be both a criminal and their own judge, jury, and executioner. 
It is instructive to think about single member sets that have come about through a process of depopulation, 
which is not an uncommon phenomenon. It is possible, for example, that an individual was once part of a 
large and thriving social group. However, whether by reason of abandonment or death, this group might 
over time have become increasingly smaller, with fewer and fewer people undertaking the activities and 
influence associated with that group. Eventually, there is only one – a last Mohican. Even though that wider 
social group no longer seems to have an objective existence, it might still remain a frame of reference for 
that individual. To understand how empty sets can have constitutions, it has to be recognized that, whilst 
every social group must have a constitution of some kind, the converse is not true. It is not the case that 
every constitution has an actual social group to which it pertains. It is possible to draw up constitutions for 
hypothetical groups. For example, one might write a constitution for Atlantis, as Plato did in Timaeus and 
Critias, or, indeed, for an ideal community, as Plato did in the Republic. The fact that such groups might 
one day become populated makes the development of constitutions for them tenable. However, for the most 
part, the constitutions of empty and single member sets can be set aside as curiosities. For an interesting 
discussion as to why some groups fail and ‘collapse’, see: Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose 
to Fail or Survive (Penguin Books, 2005). For Plato’s accounts of Atlantis, see: Plato, Timaeus. Critias. 
Cleitophon. Menexenus. Epistles, trans. RG Bury (Harvard University Press, 1929), 3, 41, 256, 265, 279ff. 
And for his Republic: Plato, The Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford University Press, 1993). 
149 Somewhat following Ellwood, it can be said that there is a difference between “[a] clump of grasses, a 
forest of trees, a colony of bacteria, or a group of protozoa” (all of which are groups of living things existing 
in close proximity) and social groups. This is because the “relations between their units [such as they are] 
seem to be purely physical or physiological”, whereas social groups require some ‘mental’ or neurological 
element, i.e. some degree of “mental interstimulation and response”. See: Charles A Ellwood, “The 
Relations of Sociology and Social Psychology,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 19 (1924): 
esp. at 4. In effect, each individual is not acting and reacting merely with reference to its environment 
without discrimination, but specifically with reference to other animals – whether consciously or 
unconsciously. For the definition of ‘social behaviour’, we can adopt Allport’s definition: “Social behavior 
comprises the stimulations and reactions arising between an individual and the social portion of his 
environment…” Allport, Social Psychology, 3.  
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together;150 indeed, when we think the group-idea to be in some sense meaningful, 
whether consciously or not, for its purported members and stakeholders.151  
We can return to the fact that our associations are principally founded upon spatio-
temporal proximity and resemblance. We might, for example, imagine a number of 
individuals who seem similar in appearance, manner, or speech – who resemble one 
another in some way. Similarly, one might imagine a group of people who live in the 
same area, i.e. they share a space and time. Here is the basis of Commonality Models. 
Likewise, we might imagine a number of individuals who are frequently found together, 
i.e. in space and time; who affect one another. Here is the basis of Interaction Models. 
Alternatively, we might imagine a number of people who appear to have the idea that 
they are part of the same group; their beliefs resemble one another. Here is the basis of 
Identification Models. Similarly, we might imagine a number of individuals who seem to 
have a similar feeling of closeness to those around them, i.e. their feelings resemble one 
another. Here is one basis of Cohesion Models. 
Any of the four models can give rise to ideas of social groups. Indeed, they are somewhat 
complementary. A number of individuals who seem to have much in common, are often 
found together, seem to identify with one another, and seem to have an emotional 
connection with one another would seem very strongly to us to be a social group. The 
more connections there seem to be, the stronger the impression will be that there is a 
social group. Nevertheless, social groups remain in the eye of the beholder; our perception 
is our reality. 
As has been intimated, there seem to be many different kinds of social group. Some seem 
more transitory, whilst others seem more enduring;152 some seem smaller, others larger; 
                                                    
150 It is worthwhile considering the distinction that Durkheim drew, in which he was followed by Theodore 
Newcomb and Solomon Asch, between ‘genuine social groups’ and ‘aggregate or category groups’. 
Aggregate or category groups are those which, in the words of Greenwood, “merely have some property or 
properties in common, such as the populations of persons with a mole on their left shoulder, who were in 
the park yesterday between 3.00 p.m. and 3.15 p.m., who are female, who are unemployed, who employ 
images in abstract thinking, who are afraid of spiders, or who walk with a skip in their step.” These are in 
contrast to genuine social groups, which, according to the theory, require something more. However, I 
would argue that these category groups are still social groups, but only in a very weak sense, because, on 
the information given, the individuals seem largely unrelated and unconnected to one another. In other 
words, the connection that has been drawn does not appear to be especially meaningful or consequential – 
that is, unless it is made to be, in which case there would emerge a social group in a stronger sense. On 
Durkheim, Newcomb, and Asch, see: Greenwood, The Disappearance of the Social in American Social 
Psychology, 77–80, quote at 78. 
151 Cf. Weber’s discussion of social relationships: Weber, Economy and Society, 1:26–28. It can be noted 
that Weber’s theory of social groups was largely founded in an Identification Model, see: Weber, Economy 
and Society, 1:40ff, 387–93. 
152 Cf. “Groups, especially spontaneously formed ones, are not fixed, immutable entities. Almost constantly 
factors from within the group (such as friction between members over status, the lack of fulfillment [sic] of 
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some independent, others merely subgroups of larger supergroups; some more formal, 
others more informal. The members might be real individuals; they might be merely 
posited or imagined. Thus, a casual meeting of friends could be seen to constitute a social 
group, just as their wider friendship circle could be considered one. Businesses are social 
groups; departments, universities, etc. are social groups;153 communities are social 
groups; towns, counties, countries, authorities, and states are social groups; even the 
entire global human population could be considered a social group.154 Though these differ 
in many ways, they are all essentially the same in that they consist of a number of people 
(i.e. social agents) whom we can imagine together in some way.  
Here is the important point: Every one of these social groups, without fail, has a 
constitution.  
2.16 Social Groups, Purpose, and Rules 
Before moving to the other parts of the definition of a constitution, some treatment ought 
to be given to the idea that social groups must, by definition, exist for a purpose,155 or 
have a set of rules. These are common ideas, but, as hopefully can already be seen, they 
are misguided. Many social groups are formed of individuals working towards some 
common purpose and, in order to be peaceable, often have rules. However, neither 
purpose nor rules are intrinsic to the idea of social groups.  
With regard to purpose, part of the problem is a confusion between things existing as a 
result of or because of other things and things existing in order to bring about the 
fulfilment of some intention or design; a confusion between causes and ends. Many 
                                                    
expectations especially on the part of those who are in higher positions, dominance of individual motives 
over groups norms, etc.) and from without (e.g., the impact of other groups and of society at large) tend to 
break down the grouping.” Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1948), 132–33. 
153 It is perhaps worthwhile quickly remarking on the so-called ‘concession theory’ of corporations, 
wherein, as Maitland put it: “The corporation is, and must be, the creature of the State. Into its nostrils the 
State must breathe the breath of a fictitious life, for otherwise it would be no animated body but 
individualistic dust.” Not only does this presuppose the existence of States, but it also presupposes that they 
will concern themselves with expressly setting out what kinds of corporation are possible and in what ways 
they might be brought about. Of course, States can involve themselves in such matters and it makes sense 
for them to do so. However, there is no reason to suppose that a business could not be a business without 
the State’s approval, or that a university could not be such without like approval. In sum, the kinds of social 
group possible in a given area and their nature might be determined by the State, but this is not a necessary 
precondition of their existence. It is whether we perceive a social group that ultimately matters; what we 
call it, of course, will depend upon the best use of language. For the quote by Maitland: Gierke, Political 
Theories of the Middle Age, xxx [Translator’s Introduction]. 
154 Cf. Hobhouse: “Humanity becomes the supreme society, and all smaller social groupings may be 
conceived as constituent elements of this supreme whole.” Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political 
Theory, 88. 
155 See, e.g.: Hiller, “The Community as a Social Group,” 189; Barber, The Constitutional State, 26, 36. 
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grouping behaviours occur not because individuals decide to come together in order to, 
say, protect themselves from predation or maximise their food yields; rather, they occur 
simply because of such strategies prevailing and succeeding in the past, thereby making 
them an evolutionary stable strategy. Flocks of birds do not form so much for the purpose 
of protection as they do because they have found it a viable mode of living. Oftentimes, 
function follows form, rather than vice-versa; it exists not by design, but, rather, past 
success. 
Many have also suggested that social groups must have rules. Barber makes this central 
to his definition of the social group, which he defined as a group “connected in a special 
way”, i.e. consisting “of people, who are bound together by rules”. In particular, he 
suggests rules identifying membership and regulating conduct as between those 
members.156 Certainly, for social groups to be functional and cohesive, rules are sensible. 
However, we can equally well imagine dysfunctional and chaotic social groups as 
functional and ordered ones; it is the perception or imagining together of social agents 
that makes social groups, not rules.  
2.17 ‘Distribution of Activities and Influence’ 
Having discussed the idea of the social group, it is time to turn to the other part of the 
definition of constitutions: the distribution of activities and influence.  
Activities refers to individuals’ ability to influence the environment. They are what an 
individual does (or does not), can (not), should (not) do, etc. We might substitute the word 
‘activities’ for others like ‘functions’, ‘tasks’, ‘responsibilities’, ‘powers’, etc. We might 
also use terms like ‘jobs’, ‘roles’, ‘offices’, and ‘employment’. Thus, we might say, a 
constitution is, in this respect, about how functions, etc. are distributed among a social 
group. It defines who is responsible for food production, tax collection, waging war, 
building and maintaining infrastructure, etc. The term ‘activities’ might seem awkward 
compared with these other words, but it is to be preferred because it is more neutral.   
Social influence or, simply, influence, refers to individuals’ ability to effect or prevent 
change in other social agents; to affect how others think and behave. For ‘influence’, we 
                                                    
156 Barber, The Constitutional State, 25. 
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might substitute words like ‘authority’ or ‘power’. Thus, a constitution is also about who 
can compel or command others, and who cannot; who leads and who follows.157  
An important distinction to be made here is between symmetrical and asymmetrical 
relationships. In symmetrical relationships, the agents have roughly the same 
responsibilities, duties, etc. to(wards) one another. They might do different things (i.e. 
have different sets of activities), but they have no especial power over one another. By 
contrast, in asymmetrical relationships, the responsibilities, etc. that each has towards the 
other are different and, indeed, often place one ‘above’ the other, such that the one ‘above’ 
can make claims on the one ‘below’ that cannot be made in return. It is this idea of 
asymmetrical relationships, and differentiated and unequal social influence more 
generally, that leads into ideas of structure and hierarchy.  
There is an argument that social groups do not merely feature asymmetrical relationships, 
but that they are characterized by them, such that there is – usually, if not always – a 
fundamental division between those who are dominant (‘rulers’, ‘governors’, etc.) and 
those who are submissive (‘subjects’, etc., or those who are ‘ruled’, ‘governed’, etc.).158  
It can certainly be said that humans appear to be hierarchical animals and, moreover, 
that there does exist material inequalities – both in terms of physical characteristics (e.g. 
strength, speed, etc.), and in terms of the resources to which individuals have access and 
over which they have some measure of control (e.g. fertile land, livestock, tools, weapons, 
etc.). There are also intellectual inequalities, viz. differences in experience, knowledge, 
and mental capacity.159 Furthermore, there are the problems of decision-making and 
coordinating action, which things are often associated with particular individuals, 
because – for better or worse – this tends to result in singular and clear solutions. Within 
                                                    
157 Cf. Weber’s famous argument that legitimate authority or ‘domination’ (i.e. influence) can be divided 
into three kinds: rational, traditional, and charismatic, which can be thought of as being founded in reason, 
habit, and feeling respectively. Weber, Economy and Society, 1:215ff. 
158 Thus, there is Timasheff’s argument that, in humans and non-humans alike, groups have a tendency 
towards polarization, i.e. the group will become arranged such that there are those who are dominant 
(‘dominators’ or ‘rulers’) and those who are submissive (‘subjects’ or ‘ruled’): Timasheff, An Introduction 
to the Sociology of Law, esp. 172-177, 223ff. Similarly, Loughlin: “As a general phenomenon, the activity 
of governing exists whenever people are drawn into association with one another, whether in families, 
firms, schools, or clubs. In order to maintain themselves, and certainly to be able to develop and flourish, 
such groups must establish some set of governing arrangements, however rudimentary. The formation of 
governing arrangements is a ubiquitous feature of group life. Whatever the type of governing arrangement 
established, an iron law of necessity holds sway. Since it is simply not possible for associations of any 
significant scale and degree of permanence to be capable of governing themselves, the business of 
governing invariably requires the drawing of a distinction…: the division between rulers and ruled, between 
a governing authority and its subjects.” Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, 5. 
159 Thus, for example, there is often thought to be an inequality between younger and older persons (e.g. 
children and parents, general population and ‘elders’, etc.), the outcome of which is that the former should 
defer to the latter’s greater experience and knowledge. 
90 
 
this, too, is the problem of providing and maintaining public goods (e.g. public roads, 
bridges,160 drains,161 security, etc.), which are in everybody’s interest to have, but not 
necessarily in anybody’s private interest to provide and maintain without some guarantee 
that others will make their contribution also.  
All of these things – hierarchical tendencies, material and intellectual inequalities, and 
problems of decision-making and coordination – tend to create situations in which there 
are differentiated types and levels of influence within social groups, in which ‘leaders’ 
and, by implication, ‘followers’ emerge.  This is especially true in large and complex 
enterprises/endeavours. However, a few points can be noted.  
First, even if there is differentiated and unequal influence, it does not follow that there 
must necessarily be some individual(s) with a plenitude of power or influence (plenitudo 
potestatis), such that they are the acknowledged superior of all. Second, we can 
differentiate between influence taking the form of suggestion as opposed to compulsion. 
In other words, people can cause others to act in certain ways, not because of some 
fundamentally asymmetrical relationship extant between them in which one is subservient 
to the other, but, rather, because the one thinks it wise and prudent to accept and follow 
the advice of the other. Third, even though it is often time-consuming and not cost 
effective, and even though it is sometimes unproductive or, indeed, counter-productive, 
there remains the possibility of all-inclusive collective decision-making, in which each 
contributor has a parity with their peers – one voice, one vote.  
In all of these cases, it is unlikely that there will be a clear distinction between ruler and 
ruled. Certainly, anarchists would argue that there is no necessity – or, indeed, 
justification – for there being such a distinction. Whether this is overly idealistic is a 
question for political philosophers. For the present, it need merely be said that, for the 
purposes of description and analysis, such a clear distinction need not be assumed or taken 
                                                    
160 In Anglo-Saxon England (and, indeed, afterwards), the construction and maintenance of bridges was 
one of a number of obligations often imposed upon landholders and communities, even if their land was 
largely free from other burdens. This duty – the brycg bot or brycg geweorc – was often imposed alongside 
two other duties: army-service and the repair of fortifications. These three are often collectively referred to 
as the trimoda necessitas. These things were regarded of such great importance to collective welfare that 
their provision was considered a burden on the land, which burden had to be shouldered by those who lived 
there. See: Frederic William Maitland, Domesday Book and Beyond: Three Essays in the Early History of 
England (Cambridge University Press, 1921), 270–74; FM Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England, 3rd ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 1971), 289–92; WH Stevenson, “Trinoda Necessitas,” The English Historical Review 29, 
no. 116 (1914): 689–703. 
161 There is a charming line from the third of Joyce Grenfell’s sketches entitled ‘Eng. Lit.’: “Mark you, I 
think anarchy in the abstract has a certain drawing power; and then I stop and I think, ‘yes, but who is going 
to be responsible for the drains?’ [To her invisible interlocutor:] Well, I think you should think about that, 
Mervin. Plumbing is central to the better life.”  
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for granted – even if it is often realized in practice. It is also well to remember that, 
inasmuch as social groups are characterized by ‘vertical’ relationships, they are also 
characterized by ‘horizontal’ ones, and there is a danger in focusing overmuch on the 
question ‘who governs whom?’ and forgetting the more basic question ‘who does what?’ 
It is on this point that we can turn to the term ‘distribution’.   
As with ‘activities’ and ‘influence’, ‘distribution’ is preferred because it is relatively 
neutral. In many cases, one might use words like ‘allocation’ or ‘division’, although these 
have their drawbacks.162 Distribution merely means the way in which things have fallen 
– whether by chance or design.163 
Thus, activities have to do with how social agents act; influence with how they interact; 
and distribution with who so acts or interacts without any assumptions as to why or how 
that came to be so.  
Naturally, there must be some subjects of this distribution, which leads to a fundamentally 
important question: Who is or might be included in that distribution? Who is, or is not, 
part of the social group? This goes right to the heart of a constitution, because the ‘what’ 
of distribution only makes sense in the light of the ‘to or concerning whom’. This means 
that the nature of the social group – the set of social agents – is a fundamental 
constitutional matter; nothing can make sense unless this is understood.  
In the most straightforward terms possible, then, constitutions have to do with who is (to 
be) included in a group and, of those individuals, who does what and who might cause 
others to act or think in certain ways. 
2.17.1 Fundamentality Fallacy Revisited 
We can revisit the fundamentality fallacy – the idea that constitutions pertain to those 
things most fundamental to societies.164 
In any reasonably-sized social group, there will be many different kinds of activities and 
levels of influence capable of being exercised. Furthermore, there are countless ways in 
which these could be combined, such that each individual might easily have their own 
unique set of activities and influence proper to them. To reduce all of these permeations 
                                                    
162 ‘Allocation’ implies some sort of agency and intention behind the distribution; that somebody has sat 
down and considered who should have what. Similarly, ‘division’ implies again something of a rational 
agency, as well as that activities and influence have been neatly separated. 
163 See, further, infra, 4.24, which concerns taxis (made order) and cosmos (spontaneous order). 
164 This was introduced, supra, at 2.3. 
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and nuances to writing would be immeasurably difficult – especially when one considers 
that such things change over time. Indeed, when writing constitutions, to attempt to 
include everything that is, as it were, constitutional, would be ill-advised.  
Consequently, it makes sense to focus on those activities and influence seemingly of the 
greatest consequence or, perhaps, in greatest need of clarification. However, their 
capturing our attention does not make them categorically different. Rather than saying, 
therefore, that some things are constitutional whereas others are not, it would be better to 
say that there are major and minor constitutional matters; written constitutions tend to 
focus on the former. 
The types of, and priorities accorded to, activities and influence will vary depending upon 
the type of social group in question, as well as the environmental and historical context. 
A landlocked country without large inland water bodies, for example, is unlikely to have 
much concern for providing for aquatic-related activities, e.g. fishing, guarding the 
coastline, etc.; countries with extensive coastlines, conversely, are much more likely to 
have activities related to this area and, moreover, to treat them as major constitutional 
matters.165 Similarly, secular groups are unlikely to have activities relating to sacerdotal 
activities, whereas religious groups are much more likely to have positions, offices, etc. 
associated therewith.  
2.18 Basic Considerations 
With regard to the distribution of activities and influence within a social group, there are 
five intimately connected considerations. Without these, one cannot understand 
constitutions:  
(1) Nature: the content or substance of the activities and influence, and distribution 
thereof. 
(2) Agency: the person(s) or type(s) of person associated with performing the 
aforementioned activities or influence.  
                                                    
165 For example, one finds specific mention “fish”, either in the context of the fishing industry itself, the 
ownership of marine resources, or of the need to protect marine resources in the constitutions of: the 
Bahamas (1973 rev. 2002, s. 27(3)); Brazil (1988 rev. 2015, s. 97(3)); Cambodia (1993 rev. 2008, s. 59); 
Maldives (2008, s. 248(a)); Palau (1981 rev. 1992, s. 2); Papua New Guinea (1975 rev. 2014, s. 4(3)); 
Philippines (Art. XII, s. 2); and Switzerland (1999 rev. 2014, Art. 79). The majority of these are islands or 
situated on islands (i.e. Bahamas, Maldives, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and the Philippines), or have large 
coastlines (i.e. Brazil, in which the Amazon River also probably plays no small role); in Cambodia there is 
the large freshwater lake the Tonlé Sap and the Mekong River, as well as some coastline; in Switzerland 
there are a number of lakes, including Neuchâtel and Zürichsee, as well as Léman and the Bodensee which 
it shares with other countries.  
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(3) Attendant Conditions: the conditions under which such activities and influence 
are, can, or should be performed. There are four attendant conditions of import: 
a. Commencement Conditions: from which point they might be exercised? 
b. Execution Conditions: when exactly are they to be exercised?166  
c. Adjustment Conditions: when might they be modified? 
d. Termination Conditions: when are they no longer to be exercised?167 
(4) Qualifications: any restrictions or limitations upon, or exceptions to,168 the 
performance of such activities or influence.  
(5) Purpose: the reason(s) such activities are undertaken, influence exercised, etc. 
These five considerations pertain to the fundamental questions of what, by whom, when, 
how, and why?  
Let us imagine a social group agrees to pool some money and decides that this will be 
best achieved by a regular collection; they call this a ‘tax’. In order to make this collection, 
they appoint some person as ‘tax collector’. This person has the activity of collecting 
taxes due. This is the nature of their activity. In so doing, they will inevitably have to 
interact with others. As such, they are allowed to influence others by requesting, or, 
perhaps even compelling, them to pay their taxes. These activities and this influence are 
unique to the tax collector. Were some other person to attempt to perform them, 
individuals would not be obligated to pay over their money; the matter is quite otherwise 
when the tax collector asks. This, then, is the matter of agency: the activities and influence 
are attached only to particular persons, i.e. the tax collector.  
Let us proceed to the attendant conditions. It might be decided, for example, that the 
collection of the tax should begin on a particular day and, thereafter, be collected weekly, 
monthly, or annually. Likewise, it might be decided that, after a particular date, taxes 
should be collected as and when they arise, e.g. when goods pass through a town, when a 
stall is set up in a marketplace, when goods are taken across a bridge, when goods are 
traded at a border or port, or when the goods are manufactured, etc.169 Alternatively, it 
might be decided that the tax collector can decide for themselves when to collect. 
                                                    
166 It can be noted that commencement and execution conditions are in many cases practically one and the 
same thing. 
167 These attendant conditions are particularly important in the context of emergency powers, i.e. when do 
such powers begin, for how long do they last, might they be modified in any way during their term, and 
when do they end? 
168 We might also say ‘derogations from’, which is often the terminology used in legal contexts – especially 
in the context of the employment of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Art. 15. 
169 Historically, these instances corresponded respectively with the payments of passage, stallage, pontage, 
customs, and excise. In each case, there would have been persons appointed to collect such payments.  
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Whatever the case, the fact is that the activity of tax collection – and any attendant 
influence – is limited to these times. A tax cannot be collected when it is not due; a tax 
collector cannot enter somebody’s property qua tax collector except to collect taxes. Here 
we have focused on commencement and execution conditions; adjustment and termination 
conditions can be readily imagined.  
We come to qualifications. For example, a tax collector might only be able to collect 
taxes of a particular kind in a particular area. Furthermore, they might be able to accept 
payment in kind rather than coin. In some cases, they might be able to assess the level of 
tax themselves; in other cases, that assessment might have to be undertaken by somebody 
else. In effect, these are all refinements to the original ideas. 
Finally, we come to the matter of purpose, which is a matter in which we have to be most 
careful – not every activity or influence exists or is undertaken for a specific purpose.170 
In the case of the activity of tax collection, however, there is a quite specific purpose: the 
pooling of money. This, in itself, might be undertaken for some reason, e.g. to finance 
war, the repayment of debts, the maintenance and extension of infrastructure, etc. 
Whilst this is a simplistic example, it hopefully provides some sense as to how these 
things might be applied.  
2.19 Constitutional Complexity 
It is obvious that the constitutions of small tribal villages and modern nation-states are 
quite different. However, this is not a difference in fundamental type; it is rather a 
difference of degree than kind. They are both social groups within which there is a 
distribution of activities and social influence. What makes them appear different is the 
particular associations that we have with each and, moreover, differences in their scale 
and complexity. There are a number of ways in which social groups can change in this 
regard. 
Firstly, there are what might be called primary changes, which alter the group’s basic 
structure. For instance, increases or decreases in population will undoubtedly affect the 
distribution of activities and influence. Larger groups tend to have greater liberty to allow 
                                                    
170 Naturally, if one is designing a constitution and wishes to do so sensibly, then it makes sense to think 
carefully about what it is that one wishes to achieve and how it might be achieved, i.e. to allocate each 
activity and degree of influence according to the specific ends it is to serve, preferably with a view to how 
those will serve some wider end. This will mean that each position allocated will have greater utility and 




their members to divide labour and specialise, whereas the breadth of activities and 
influence found in smaller groups is likely, of necessity, to be broader. After all, there are 
fewer people to perform them. Furthermore, in larger groups there is more likely to be a 
greater diversity of activities performed and more levels of influence. As such, in larger 
groups there is greater potential for differentiation, specialization, segmentation, and 
stratification; for sub-groups and levels to form. Aside from changes in population size, 
there is also the effect of changing demographics, e.g. a changing age-profile. Similarly, 
there might be changes concerning the things in which a population is occupied. Pre-
industrial (i.e. hunter-gatherer, pastoral, agrarian, etc.) societies are likely to have large 
proportions of their populations heavily involved in the collection or production of food; 
they are little able to do other activities. By contrast, in societies with larger surplus food 
yields, members have greater opportunity to undertake different tasks and to specialise.  
Secondly, there are what might be called secondary changes, which are changes 
regarding the cognizance of the constitution of the group. These changes will probably 
introduce secondary rules of Hart’s description, foremost among which will be rules of 
recognition.171 This will probably lead to a process of elucidation and formalization – 
even ritualization. They will also become habitualized and there will be a presumption in 
favour of their preservation, which is to say that they will become to some degree elevated 
or entrenched.172 Finally, to give them added force, a system of sanctions will probably 
be introduced. There need not be any changes to the material composition of the group or 
the sorts of things with which the group concerns itself.  
Finally, there are tertiary changes, which one might regard as a reorganization of the 
constitution of the group. The constitution will become increasingly abstract, i.e. one will 
think rather of abstract roles within the group rather than activities and influence held by 
specific, named individuals. This abstraction will lead to processes of institutionalization 
and professionalization, which in a sense is the social group at large creating subsidiary 
                                                    
171 See, infra, 3.15 and 4.20. 
172 As Gough noted, this idea of elevation or entrenchment – i.e. making it such that it “cannot be altered 
or repealed by ordinary legislative procedure” – has played a central role in the idea of ‘fundamental law’. 
It becomes, in a sense, extraordinary law. As discussed earlier, however, it is important to remember that 
anything set aside in this manner is neither the be-all nor end-all of a constitution. Gough also later noted 
that certain principles might come to be regarded as fundamental “not so much because they could not 
legally be assailed as because it was assumed that no legal authority would wish to assail them”. This is an 
important point to mark. Certain provisions might become, as it were, informally elevated or entrenched: 
ostensibly, they are like any other law, except there is such prevalent and potent positive regard in their 
favour that there is unlikely to be appetite to change them. Indeed, there is likely to be fierce resistance if 
the suggestion is made to change them. There is an argument to be made that this is the essential position 
of the modern-day UK constitution. For Gough, see: JW Gough, Fundamental Law in English 
Constitutional History (Oxford University Press, 1955), 2, 23. 
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social groups with particular sets of activities and influence. One might also include here 
the further elucidation of the constitution by its reduction to writing and codification and, 
to a degree, the harmonization of its particulars. It might also become more legalized in 
the sense that it becomes positivistic and secular.  
Generally speaking, tertiary changes follow after secondary changes; secondary after 
primary. However, this is not always the case; they are not preconditions of one another. 
In this light, Vermeule’s contention that “any complex constitutional order…is best 
understood as a system of systems” can be seen to contain some truth.173 Complex 
constitutional orders tend to occur in larger societies, which are divided into numerous, 
overlapping sub-groups and often include sub-groups with specific tasks (i.e. 
institutions); these are subsystems building into a larger system. 
2.20 Context, Salience, and Frames of Reference 
Most individuals, particularly in modern societies, are members of many different groups. 
There are family, friendship, interest, local community, entrepreneurial groups, etc. Some 
of these groups are largely independent; others merely subgroups of even larger – and 
often more diverse – groups. For individuals, this can present problems as to what 
activities they should be doing at any given time or what influence they might expect to 
exert. For observers, it presents problems as to what activities and influence fall within 
the constitution of one group rather than another.  
In both cases, the matter is decided according to social context and salience of social 
identity. These prime us to think and behave in certain ways. With regard to social 
context, one performs certain activities and influence, say, when with family members as 
opposed to when in a professional context. Historically, a father might have expected to 
predominate at home (as paterfamilias), though he be a lowly clerk at work. From the 
social context, particularly from those with whom an individual is interacting at a given 
time, we gain a sense of which social group is relevant at that time.  
This leads us into the notion of salience, which is similar. A set of activities and influence 
is relevant when a particular social identity pertains, i.e. when that identity is salient. 
Thus, we know we are thinking about the family social group when a person is acting as 
                                                    
173 Vermeule, The System of the Constitution, 3. Vermeule’s book draws heavily on systems theory, which 
is both refreshing and laudable; it is a step in the right direction. Systems theory certainly has its problems, 
but it attempts to take a more holistic approach. His theories, however, would have benefited greatly from 
also having taken into consideration set theory and theories of social groups.  
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a member of the family group. Likewise, we know we are thinking about an 
entrepreneurial group when a person is thinking of themselves as a member of some 
enterprise (e.g. as an employee or employer). The difference between social context and 
salience is really only that we assume salience where there is social context, but social 
identity might still be salient even though there are no others of that social group around.  
We know which constitution is pertinent by knowing which social group is relevant at a 
given time; we know this from the social context and salience of social identity. For 
individuals, the social group provides a frame of reference, i.e. it primes them for a 
particular universe – to think, act, and respond in particular ways.174 They know that there 
are certain activities and influence that pertain in a given social context or where a given 
social identity is salient.175 
Oftentimes, there will be more than one frame of reference pertinent at a given time. 
Sometimes these will work together more or less harmoniously; other times, there will be 
conflict. As such, we often find that many smaller groups’ constitutions are determined 
by, and are subject to, the constitutions of larger groups of which they are a part. They 
are, in part, derivative of the overarching constitution and are circumscribed thereby. The 
subgroup might only do those things permissible within the supergroup and, moreover, 
those things deemed permissible specifically for that subgroup. Where the subgroup and 
supergroup are in conflict, the ability of each to claim the loyalty and support of its 
members, to the exclusion of the other, is supremely important. This situation becomes 
particularly interesting where groups are not nested neatly within one another but, rather, 
intersect and overlap, or where the supergroup asserts its dominance more forcefully 
against an unwilling subgroup. Social life is complex.  
2.21 Distribution of Resources 
Besides activities and influence, it is arguable that the distribution of resources should 
have a place in a constitution. After all, the possession of certain resources – especially 
the so-called ‘factors of production’ – can dramatically affect the ways in which activities 
                                                    
174 Cf. “That men act in a social frame of reference yielded by the groups of which they are a part is a notion 
undoubtedly ancient and probably sound.” Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 288 and, further, 
336–37. 
175 Frames of reference can be said to be positive or negative, as Merton has said (albeit in the context of 
‘reference groups’): “The positive type involves motivated assimilation of the norms of the group or the 
standards of the group as a basis for self-appraisal; the negative type involves motivated rejection, i.e. not 
merely non-acceptance of norms but the formation of counter-norms [even to the point of active rebellion].” 
Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 354. As such, frames of reference can motivate conformist and 
compliant behaviour, as much as they can non-conformist and deviant behaviour.  
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and influence are distributed.176 Indeed, it can affect not only their distribution but also 
their execution – for if one does not have the wherewithal or tools to undertake certain 
activities, there seems little chance of their being successfully completed.  
In this context, we might relate the ideas of constitutional competence and institutional 
competence. Constitutional competence seems to mean what activities and influence are 
recognized as belonging to or are associated with a particular body.177 Institutional 
competence, by contrast, seems to mean those activities and influence that it is actually 
capable of executing or accomplishing; it has sufficient means to do so.178 Thus, the 
former represents a theoretical power and the latter a practical power. For bodies to act 
legitimately and effectively, these should be concordant. 
Even though resources – whether tangible or intangible – play a prominent part in shaping 
the constitution, it would incorrect to say that they are intrinsically a constitutional matter. 
This is because we can think of the distribution of activities and influence without having 
too great a regard to the distribution of resources. This does not mean that resources are 
unimportant; they are just not intrinsic to the idea of a constitution.  
2.22 Conclusions 
The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity argues that all social groups have constitutions; 
that constitutions can be defined as the distribution of activities and social influence 
within social groups. It is simply impossible for us to imagine social groups without also 
imagining some distribution of activities and influence as between their members – or 
what that distribution would look like should the members ever have dealings with one 
another.  
The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity, as set forth here, can be considered as being 
within the sociological tradition of ‘methodological individualism’.179 This is not in itself 
                                                    
176 See supra, 2.17. 
177 In terms of decision-making, one might say that these are the matters cognizable by them, i.e. they are 
matters within their jurisdiction and, for that reason, capable of being decided by them. In terms of goals 
and direction, constitutional competence sets out both the ends to which the body may – or, indeed, must – 
work, as well as the means by which it might do so. The importance of the fact that there is here an 
association will become apparent when we come onto discussing the Associational Theory of Law. 
178 These means might come in many forms, but especially: physical, financial, or human capital. There 
must also not be insurmountable barriers or opposition preventing it from carrying out its activities or 
influence.  
179 This counts among its adherents the likes of Weber, Allport, Menger, Popper, and Hayek. The term 
‘methodological individualism’ is due to Weber’s student, Schumpeter, although the underlying idea 
stretches back to Weber himself and beyond. Schumpeter first used the phrase in German (methodologische 
Individualismus) in his book Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie and 
then, a year later, used the English equivalent in his article ‘On the Concept of Social Value’: Joseph 
Schumpeter, Das Wesen Und Der Hauptinhalt Der Theoretischen Nationalökonomie (Duncker & Humblot, 
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a claim about the value of individuals or individual freedom. It merely holds that social 
phenomena can only be properly understood through social agents, i.e. through the 
thoughts and behaviours of individuals.180 It, therefore, fits within the wider scientific 
idea of methodological reductionism and, indeed, marries well with the social 
constructionist approach.181 Thus, whilst we might conceptualize social groups, 
institutions, etc. in the abstract, and even regard them in some respects as if they were 
real individuals (e.g. in juristic/legal terms), when we come to study them we must do so 
through the individuals that supposedly comprise (or comprised) them. They have no true 
existence beyond these individuals. It has been my endeavour to show here how this 
relates to, and informs, constitutional theory and, more particularly, constitutional history. 
It has been argued that social groups are not objective phenomena; they are constructs of 
the mind. Their sense of objective reality is produced by the ways in which our minds 
work. Our perceptions, it is true, are not entirely capricious. However, we must not 
mistake our understanding of reality with reality itself. Our perceptions might become 
our reality,182 but that does not mean that they are anything more than that.  
Nevertheless, these perceptions profoundly affect how we navigate the world and social 
life. As social creatures, it is through these ideas that we understand our place in the world. 
We know what we can and cannot do; what we are expected to do and what we are 
expected not to do. We know who we are to follow, whose advice and instructions we are 
to heed, and who we must obey; who is to follow, listen to, and obey us. We know to 
whom we are to defer and give way; who is to defer and give way to us. We know with 
whom we can mate and with whom we cannot. We know with whom we might interact, 
treat amicably, and embrace in friendship; we know who we ought to avoid and who we 
                                                    
1908), see esp. I.VI; Joseph Schumpeter, “On the Concept of Social Value,” The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 23, no. 2 (1909): 231. For a discussion on Weber in this context and particularly his relation to 
Durkheim’s thought, see: Greenwood, The Disappearance of the Social in American Social Psychology, 
chap. 3, esp. 80ff. For something of the ‘ancestry’ of methodological individualism, albeit part of a not 
entirely sympathetic analysis, see: Steven Lukes, “Methodological Individualism,” The British Journal of 
Sociology 19, no. 2 (1968): 119–29. For Hayek in this context, see esp.: Friedrich August Hayek, The 
Counter-Revolution of Science (The Free Press, 1955); Friedrich August Hayek, Individualism and 
Economic Order (The University of Chicago Press, 1948), chap. 3. 
180 On methodological individualism, see e.g.: JWN Watkins, “Ideal Types and Historical Explanation,” 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3, no. 9 (1952): 22–43; JWN Watkins, “Historical 
Explanation in the Social Sciences,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8, no. 30 (1957): 
104–17. 
181 See, supra, 1.4. 
182 As Novalis (Georg Philipp Friedrich von Hardenburg, 1772-1801) once wrote: „Die Welt wird Traum, 
der Traum wird Welt“. This might be translated in a couple of ways. Firstly, “The world becomes (a) dream, 
the dream becomes (the) world”: Novalis, Heinrich von Ofterdingen, ed. Julian Schmidt (FU Brodhaus, 
1876), 127. However, a looser translation might be: “the world becomes a dream, and the dream becomes 
reality”: Jostein Gaarder, Sophie’s World: A Novel About the History of Philosophy (20th Anniversary 
Edition), trans. Paulette Møller (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2015), 288. 
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ought to treat with hostility. We know with whom we can share certain resources and 
information, and with whom we cannot. This is as true for other social animals – 
especially highly gregarious mammalian species – as it is for us,183 even if on a different 
level.184 
Constitutions neither precede nor postdate the advent of social groups;185 they arise, 
change, and expire together. There are at least as many constitutions as there are social 
groups. They vary widely in type, scope, scale, and complexity.186 Superficially, they 
might appear different. However, we should not let appearances deceive us. Ultimately, 
they always have to do with social groups, activities, and influence. Sometimes resources, 
too, are important, but not always. 
Constitutions can have areas of uncertainty, ambiguity, and controversy, and nevertheless 
remain generally workable and effective. As long as these problems are not insuperable 
or deleterious, group life, as it were, can continue with semblances of organization and 
regularity. The existence of areas in which there is a lack of clarity does not indicate the 
lack of a constitution; so long as groups are considered as such, they will have 
constitutions.  
There is no reason for us to avoid the word ‘constitution’ when it is properly understood; 
it does not necessarily lead to anachronism. We use the word ‘democracy’ to describe 
both modern systems and the ancient Athenian system without fear of conflating them. 
                                                    
183 Cf., e.g.: Mark F Grady and Michael T McGuire, “A Theory of the Origin of Natural Law,” Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 8 (1997): 87–130; Mark F Grady and Michael T McGuire, “The Nature of 
Constitutions,” Journal of Bioeconomics 1 (1999): 227–40. 
184 This is undoubtedly due to the comparatively large neocortex in human brains, which is considerably 
larger than most other animals (particularly the frontal and parietal lobes), including other primates: Bruce 
E Wexler, Brain and Culture: Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change (The MIT Press, 2006), 30–33. 
On the functions of these areas: “The frontal lobe is largely concerned with short-term memory and 
planning future actions and with control of movement; the parietal lobe with somatic sensation, with 
forming a body image and relating it to extrapersonal space…” Eric R Kandel et al., eds., Principles of 
Neural Science, 5th ed. (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2013), 10. 
185 In constitutional theory, Fassbender has identified “two conflicting views as to the relationship between 
community and constitution”. On the one hand, there are what might be called enactive theories, in which 
communities must first exist such that there is somebody both to create a constitution and for whom to 
create it. On the other hand, there are what might be called constitutive theories, in which communities are 
created by constitutions; until the creation of a constitution, they have no real form or existence; there must 
first be an act of ‘constitution-making’ before there can be said to be a constitution. See: Bardo Fassbender, 
“The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community,” Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 36 (1998): 561ff. Neither are correct; they arise simultaneously.  
186 For a discussion of how the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity relates to ideas of the State, for example, 
see Appendix I.  
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Though there are recognized differences,187 there is nevertheless a common core, which 
is sufficient justification for employing the same word.  
For constitutional historians, the real problem is not whether there is an object to be 
studied, but, rather, from which perspective it is to be studied and which aspects are 
worthy of study. In terms of perspective, there are fundamentally two questions we can 
ask of the past: (1) how did people at the time understand what was happening and (2) 
how can we understand what happened? As such, there is the internal perspective as 
participants and the external perspective as observers. One of the criticisms levelled 
against the constitutional historians is that they had greater regard for the second question 
than the first.  
Certainly, constitutional historians ought always to strive to access and understand the 
internal perspective insofar as possible, i.e. to attempt to understand how the social agents 
themselves conceptualized and imagined their social groups and the constitutions thereof. 
After all, it is by understanding this that we can best understand and explain their 
behaviours. However, three points can be made.  
First, we can never really escape our own perspective. When we are asking how historical 
persons saw things, we are really asking: how can we understand how they saw things? 
In effect, we are attempting to reconstruct their constructions in our minds. Second, the 
internal perspective is not always entirely accessible; the evidence is either unreliable, 
biased, or non-existent. In effect, we have to use our judgement, which means employing 
our perspective. Constitutional historians ought always to identify where this is the case, 
provide justification, and never take liberties. Oftentimes, it is better simply to recognize 
the limits of our knowledge. Third, the internal perspective is not necessarily the most 
accurate, given that it varies depending on which social agents are being examined; 
indeed, sometimes social agents grossly misunderstood the constitutions of their social 
groups. Thus, the external perspective might act as something of a corrective. After all, 
disinterested outside observers can sometimes see things in ways that participants cannot.  
Nevertheless, the external perspective ought to complement, rather than replace, the 
internal perspective. Moreover, constitutional historians ought to strive to understand the 
                                                    
187 Most notably, in terms of suffrage, institutions, the nature and frequency of participation, and 
representation. Some of these differences are captured in the distinction between direct and indirect (or 
representative) democracy. In other words, they are distinguished by way of qualification, not segregation.  
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internal perspective insofar as it can be understood. The more we have to rely on our 
perspective alone, the weaker our understanding is likely to be. 188 
                                                    
188 Cf. HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Penelope A Bulloch and Joseph Raz, 2nd ed. (Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 89–91. 
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3 – The Associational Theory of Law (I): Structure  
3.1 Introduction 
We have discussed the meaning of ‘constitution’; we have yet to understand what might 
be meant by constitutional law. In order so to understand, we must know what is meant 
by ‘law’.  
There is no shortage of discussion concerning this. 1  People have been arguing for 
millennia as to: what law is;2 wherefrom it comes and who makes it; where and to whom 
it applies; when it applies and for how long; how it works and how it differs from similar 
concepts; and why we have it in the first place. Some answers have been more convincing 
than others; on the whole, they remain unsatisfactory.3   
In this and the next two chapters, therefore, I develop a theory of law, which is at once 
structural, psychological, and dynamic.   
3.2 Some Common Fallacies 
Many theories of law are unsatisfactory because they commit, in one respect or another, 
a number of different, albeit common, fallacies.4  
                                               
1 “Few questions concerning human society have been asked with such persistence and answered by serious 
thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and even paradoxical ways as the question ‘What is law?’”: HLA 
Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Penelope A Bulloch and Joseph Raz, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 
1994), 1. Others have expressed a similar sentiment, e.g. “[W]hat is Law? This is a question upon which 
whole libraries have been written, and written, as their very existence shows, without definite results being 
attained”: Hermann Kantorowicz, The Definition of Law, ed. AH Campbell (Cambridge University Press, 
1958), 1. Also, “The amount of printed matter on the meaning of the word ‘law’ is enormous. Thurman 
Arnold rightly says that any attempt to define this word leads us into a maze of metaphysical literature, 
perhaps larger than has ever surrounded any other symbol in the history of the world”: Glanville L Williams, 
“International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word ‘Law,’” British Year Book of International 
Law 22 (1945): 146. 
2  The question “Law – in our view, what is it?” is how the Minos – one of the earliest surviving 
jurisprudential works – begins. This work has been attributed to Plato and was so attributed in antiquity, 
though his authorship has been doubted. Minos (trans. Michael Schofield) in Plato, Complete Works, ed. 
John M Cooper (Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997), 1308. On this dialogue and for an alternative 
translation, see: Huntington Cairns, “What Is Law?,” Washington and Lee Law Review 27, no. 2 (1970): 
199ff. Also: William S Cobb, “Plato’s Minos,” Ancient Philosophy 8 (1988): 187–207; V Bradley Lewis, 
“Plato’s ‘Minos’: The Political and Philosophical Context of the Problem of Natural Right,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 60, no. 1 (2006): 17–53. 
3 In no small part, this is because the problem of defining law has proved to be a particularly difficult one, 
even in spite of – or, indeed, perhaps even due to – its frequency of use in common parlance. Cf.: “Almost 
everyone of ordinary information understands very well what is meant by the word ‘law’, but even the most 
learned jurists, when called upon to given an accurate definition of the term, find themselves at a loss.” 
John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law, ed. Charles J Reid Jr, 2nd ed. (Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998), 1. 
4 It is perhaps worthwhile stating clearly that these are all fallacies that I have identified independently.  
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The first of these can be called the synonymic fallacy, i.e. using words that are very much 
like ‘law’ to define ‘law’, especially ‘rules’ and ‘norms’. This tends not to be terribly 
enlightening,5 and often involves something of a sophistry.6  
More developed theories tend to say that laws are norms and that norms are ought-
statements. As such, laws express what one ought to do or how things ought to be. This 
is the normative fallacy.7 It is attractive until one considers laws like ‘murder is the 
unauthorized and intentional killing of another’. This does not mean that murder ought to 
be unauthorized and intentional killing or, even, that one ought not to kill;8 it simply 
means that murder is defined in a certain way. Some try to manipulate these into ought-
statements, e.g. by saying that such statements are directed at law enforcers and judges, 
telling them how they ought to view and treat certain situations. This is not only strained, 
but also leaves us in a quandary as to what to think where there are no such professionals 
– do such societies therefore lack law? This can be called the directive fallacy: the false 
notion that laws are directions to officials.9 
There is then the voluntarism fallacy: the idea that all law must be traceable to some act 
of will and intention – whether human or divine, of some sovereign individual or body,10 
                                               
5 For example, Clark defined a law as: “a rule of conduct obtaining among a class of human beings and 
sanctioned by human displeasure” [Edwin Charles Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on Austin 
(Cambridge University Press, 1883), 134.]. Certainly, this definition is not without its merits, but the phrase 
‘rule of conduct’ is none too enlightening; it really only gives us another way of speaking, rather than telling 
us what a law actually is.  
6 For example, it is common to say that ‘laws’ are different from ‘rules’, though both are ‘norms’. If one 
remembers that the word ‘norm’ comes from the Latin norma, meaning a kind of rule, then to say that 
‘rules’ are ‘norms’ is to say that ‘rules’ are ‘rules’, albeit effectively in two different languages. To say laws 
are distinct from rules therefore becomes unsustainable. This is demonstrable with simple commutative 
logic. If laws are norms and norms are rules, then laws must therefore be rules, because if A = B and B = 
C, then A = C.  
7 This idea was central to Kelsen’s philosophy: “By ‘norm’ we mean that something ought to be or ought 
to happen, especially that a human being ought to behave in a specific way.” Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of 
Law, trans. Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967), 4; see also Hans Kelsen, General Theory of 
Norms, trans. Michael Hartney (Oxford University Press, 1991), 2. For another example, see MacCormick: 
“What are rules, conventions, standards, principles? How formal or informal can they or need they be? Let 
us start by saying that, in the sense relevant to the present purpose, they are all normative. That is, they 
enter essentially into judgment of what it is right or wrong to do, what ought or ought not to be done.” Neil 
MacCormick, “Norms, Institutions, and Institutional Facts,” Law and Philosophy 17 (1998): 303. 
8 Of course, to draw such an ought from a declarative statement would be to commit the is-ought fallacy. 
For the principal expression of this problem, see: David Hume, “A Treatise of Human Nature [1739-40],” 
in The Essential Works (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2011), 409 (3.1.1). 
9 This, again, appears in the ideas of Kelsen. As GLF put it: “Kelsen proposed that all law must be recast 
into norms stipulating sanctions. These norms, however, are not prescriptive norms; they are norms that 
grant authority. Their norm- subjects are not the ordinary members of society but are the officials of the 
system who are authorized to apply a sanction in the event of a transgression.” GLF, “The Distinction 
between the Normative and Formal Functions of Law in HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law,” Virginia Law 
Review 65, no. 7 (1979): 1366, n. 48. For Kelsen in his own words, see: Hans Kelsen, General Theory of 
Law and State, trans. Anders Wedberg (Harvard University Press, 1945), 58ff (1.4). 
10 This would presumably be some subset of the wider social group or, potentially, some external agent, 
who might constitute what Austin referred to as ‘political superiors’. These would posit laws for their 
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or some Volkswille/volunté générale.11  Where it is said that laws are commands of 
sovereign individuals (i.e. positivism),12 there is a problem when it comes to customary 
law.13 The idea that customary laws are valid insofar as they are accepted by some 
sovereign individual is unconvincing.14 Furthermore, it raises the question as to who 
makes the sovereign and whether there are any laws beyond their remit – the implication 
being that not all laws are their commands. The idea of the Volkswille handles the idea of 
customary law more readily, but runs into the problem as to how one determines the ‘will 
of the people’. More damningly, such ideas approach very closely the ideas of the Group 
Mind and the Real Personality of Groups, which have been demonstrated to be badly 
founded. The Historical Schools of Law tend to suffer in this regard. Like the normative 
fallacy, there is some truth to the voluntarism fallacy, for it is obvious that many laws are 
given or made by, for example, individuals or groups with whom we associate the activity 
of generating law. It is not, however, essential to the idea of law. 
Next, there is the coercive fallacy. This is the idea that laws are such because they are 
backed by punitive measures (i.e. sanctions) for non-compliance, particularly legitimated 
uses of force;15 if not respecting every law in the system, then at least respecting some, 
which, supposedly, gives the system its integrity.16 As will be seen, it is a law’s structure 
                                               
‘political inferiors’ – as well as for themselves, presumably. In Austin’s thought, there are two kinds of 
political superior: God and other people. For there are: “Laws set by God to his human creatures, and laws 
set by men to men”. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of 
Jurisprudence (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), 9–10. 
11 Volkswille = will of the people; volunté générale = general will. 
12 See especially Austin, who said that “Every law or rule…is a command. Or, rather, laws or rules, properly 
so called, are a species of commands”: Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence, 13, 133–34, et passim. 
13  International law, “which exists despite the absence of an international sovereign”, and, perhaps, 
ecclesiastical law, “which has its origin and sanction in tradition and in the inner order of the church”, are 
other problematic areas: Harold J Berman, William R Greiner, and Samir N Saliba, The Nature and 
Functions of Law, 5th ed. (The Foundation Press, Inc., 1996), 21. 
14 This idea concerning customary laws’ validity was argued by Austin, for example. See: Austin, The 
Province of Jurisprudence, 30–32, 163–64. 
15 This fallacy can be seen, for example, in Austin, who thought that laws were commands: “A command 
is distinguished from other significations of desire, not by the style in which the desire is signified, but by 
the power and the purpose of the party commanding to inflict an evil or pain in case the desire be 
disregarded.” Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence, 14. Indeed, for Kelsen, legal systems’ coercive nature 
is what distinguishes them from other social orders; the decisive element, he thought, was force – resistance 
against which was ‘ordinarily hopeless’: Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 34, 37. Duguit, also, appears to fall 
foul of the coercive fallacy somewhat, except that the source of coercion in his case appears rather to be 
the social group at large, rather than any person or body therein. For Duguit, it is the “profound group 
reaction” to the violation of any principle that causes that principle to become “socially organized”; this 
can cause it to be transformed from a moral principle (la règle morale) into a ‘jural principle’ or rule of law 
(un règle de droit). In effect, laws, for Duguit, appear to be defined by the fact that non-compliance 
therewith will be attended by a concerted and organized negative reaction from other members of the social 
group; the presence of this coercive element transforms morality into law: Léon Duguit, “The Law and the 
State,” Harvard Law Review 31 (1917): 4–5. Duguit was not far-removed from Weber in this regard, see: 
Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, vol. 1 (University of California Press, 2013), 34–35, 316–17. 
16 See, e.g. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 50–51. 
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and basis that matter, not whether there are consequences for non-compliance.17 In view 
of the voluntarism and coercive fallacies, it will be evident that a purely positivistic 
conception of law cannot here be accepted.  
There are also what can be termed the reification and the objective category fallacies. 
Such ideas treat laws as though they were, or become, facts with an independent 
existence; that they form an objective category, which is concrete and fully enumerable.18 
Laws, in this sense, are often treated as being discoverable – whether through observation 
or reason. Related to these fallacies are the universalistic fallacy (i.e. the idea that laws 
are the same everywhere), the naturalistic fallacy (i.e. the idea that at least some laws 
are inherent in nature and are, in a sense, inescapable and immutable),19 and the inherent 
goodness fallacy (i.e. the idea that certain laws are inherently Good or Right, and that 
such things as fail to meet these criteria cannot be laws).20 
The Natural (or Philosophical)21 and Historical Schools of Law are particularly prone to 
these fallacies. 22  The former, in particular, tends to confuse what seems 
good/right/sensible with actual phenomena. In other words, it confuses personal opinion 
with objective reality. Historical Schools of Law tend to allow for a greater degree of 
relativism than Natural Schools, but they are not much better. They are largely founded 
on pseudoscience intermixed with romanticism and fatalism. It is worth adding that many 
lawyers – not necessarily of either the Natural or Historical Schools – also succumb to 
one or more of these fallacies. Indeed, many lawyers have been so indoctrinated in “the 
law” (especially constitutional law) that they fail to realize its contingency.  
                                               
17 See further, infra, 3.18.1. 
18 See further, infra, 4.18. 
19 It is important to remember, as Hayek pointed out, that rejecting the idea of “rules of just conduct as 
natural in the sense that they are part of an external and eternal order of things, or permanently implanted 
in an unalterable nature of man, or even in the sense that man’s mind is so fashioned once and for all that 
he must adopt those particular rule of conduct” does not mean embracing legal positivism; it does not mean 
that all laws must necessarily stem from some official and deliberate acts of some person or persons. 
Friedrich August Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of 
Justice and Political Economy (Routledge Classics, 2013), 222–24, quote at 223.  
20 Indeed, as MacCormick has argued, there are very good reasons for ensuring that morality is not made a 
precondition for the validity of law – not least because lending a ‘moral aura’ to certain persons, bodies, 
and acts; in and under the name of justice, a great deal of injustice might be done: Neil MacCormick, “A 
Moralistic Case for A-Moralistic Law,” Valparaiso University Law Review 20, no. 1 (1985): 1–41.  
21 “The philosophical jurist studies the philosophical and ethical bases of law, legal systems, and particular 
doctrines and institutions, and criticizes them with respect to such bases.” Roscoe Pound, “The Scope and 
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence. I.,” Harvard Law Review 24, no. 8 (1911): 604. 
22  On the point of discoverability: “In opposition to the analytical jurist, the historical jurist and the 
philosophical jurist agree that law is found, not made, differing only with respect to what it is that is found.” 
Pound, “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence. I.,” 599. 
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Related to the previous group of fallacies are the emergence and the agentive fallacies. 
Emergence fallacies are based on ideas of emergentism, which are themselves closely 
associated with Gestalt, epiphenomenalist, and other metaphysical ideas (e.g. vitalism, 
idealism, dualism, etc.), i.e. ideas that new and distinctive properties arise from the 
interactions and operations of certain phenomena, which properties have fundamentally 
different qualities or characteristics from those phenomena, are irreducible to those 
phenomena, and, moreover, are often believed to be able to causally affect those 
phenomena (so-called ‘downward causation’). This is a layered view, in which higher-
level (i.e. emergent) properties supervene upon lower-level (i.e. componential) 
properties.23  
Thus, there is the idea of treating legal systems as though they were emergent properties 
of societies.24 They are not only produced by societies, but, once produced, take on a 
character and existence of their own, which can then go on to affect the society that 
produced it. The fundamental problem with this is that it thoroughly idealizes legal 
systems. Indeed, it builds into the agentive fallacy – treating, and speaking of, law as 
though it were an active and autonomous agent or force, which thinks, moves, acts, reacts, 
interacts, observes, evolves,25 etc. almost as if it were a machine or, indeed, an organism, 
and which as of necessity must have some sense of coherence, discreteness, and reality – 
whether physical or metaphysical. 
In many respects, it is along these lines that Luhmann’s and Teubner’s conceptions of law 
as social systems of communication (or as ‘discursive systems’) – which are ‘cognitively 
open but normatively closed’ and ‘autopoietic’ (i.e. self-regulating, if not also self-
contained, self-referential, and self-perpetuating), 26  as if they were living systems – 
                                               
23  On emergentism, see esp.: O'Connor, Timothy and Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = 
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/properties-emergent/>. See also for an overview of, 
and sympathetic take on, emergentism: R Keith Sawyer, Social Emergence: Societies as Complex Systems 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
24 A point should be noted: it has been said above that constitutions (supra 2.1), as well as group-ideas 
(supra 2.13), can be seen as ‘emergent properties’ of social life. It needs to be stressed that this is meant 
only in an experiential and epistemological sense: they are ways in which we experience and understand 
social life. However, these properties, insofar as they can be called ‘emergent’, are always reducible to 
individual phenomena and interactions therebetween. They do not assume a life of their own. 
25 “[L]aw has evolved by itself and…society as its environment has provided accidental impulses, which 
have caused variations and occasional innovative selections…” Niklas Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 
ed. Fatima Kastner et al., trans. Alex Ziegert (Oxford University Press, 2004), 262.  
26 On  autopoiesis, see, e.g.:  FG Varela, HR Maturana, and R Uribe, “Autopoiesis: The Organization of 
Living Systems, Its Characterization and a Model.,” Currents in Modern Biology 5, no. 4 (1974): 187–96; 
Michael King, “The ‘Truth’ about Autopoiesis,” Journal of Law and Society 20, no. 2 (1993): 218–36. 
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suffer.27 Certainly, there are systems of law(s), but these are constructs, and, as such, 
cannot do anything except that which we make or have them do; indeed, they only have 
as much coherence, discreteness, and reality as we give to them, and, whilst ‘operational’ 
(if not ‘causal’) closure of the system might be a worthy aspiration from a logical and 
practical viewpoint, the idea that there is, and must be, a clear delineation between the 
‘legal system’ and its ‘environment’ is misguided – particularly where humans are 
thought to constitute part of a legal system’s environment, as if the legal system existed 
apart from them (and, perhaps, in spite of them).28 
A similar problem to systems theories of law is encountered by institutional theories of 
law,29 such as those of Hauriou and Romano.30 These, to use the latter’s words, treat law 
as a “complete and unified order” or, as he terms it, an “institution”, which “means that 
the law, before it is norm, before it concerns a simple relationship or set of social 
relationships, is an organization, a structure, a position of the very society in which it 
develops and that this very law constitutes a unity, as an entity in its own right.”31 Indeed: 
“law is composed of norms, which are detached from the consciousness of those who 
                                               
27 See, esp. Niklas Luhmann, “Law as a Social System,” Northwestern University Law Review 63, no. 1&2 
(1989): 136–50; Niklas Luhmann, Social Systems, trans. John Bednarz Jn. and Dirk Baecker (Stanford 
University Press, 1995); Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 2004; Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, 
trans. Rhodes Barrett, vol. 1 (Stanford University Press, 2012); Niklas Luhmann, Theory of Society, trans. 
Rhodes Barrett, vol. 2 (Stanford University Press, 2013). On Luhmann and Teubner, see, e.g.: Roger 
Cotterrell, Law’s Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Oxford University Press, 1997), 
chap. 5; Brian Z Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,” Journal of Law and Society 
27, no. 2 (2000): 296–321. Further on Luhmann: Nico Stehr, “The Evolution of Meaning Systems: An 
Interview with Niklas Luhmann,” Theory, Culture & Society 1, no. 1 (1982): 33–48; Daniel Lee, “The 
Society of Society: The Grand Finale of Niklas Luhmann,” Sociological Theory 18, no. 2 (2000): 320–30; 
Ana Lourenço, “Autopoetic Social Systems Theory: The Co-Evolution of Law and the Economy,” Centre 
for Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No. 409, 2010; Guilherme Vasconcelos 
Vilaça, “From Hayek’s Spontaneous Orders to Luhmann’s Autopoietic Systems,” Studies in Emergent 
Order 3 (2010): 50–81. Luhmann’s systems theories were part of what Sawyer has termed the ‘second 
wave’ of systems theories, on which, see: Sawyer, Social Emergence, esp. 14-21. Sawyer places himself in 
the ‘third wave’, which, in his view, “is more appropriate for explaining complex social phenomena” (p. 
21) and is based on developments in computer science since the 1990s. As he sets himself against 
methodological individualism (pp. 4, 7, et passim), his approach differs from the present one. Luhmann and 
Teubner were notably followed by MacCormick in setting out his theories: Neil MacCormick, Questioning 
Sovereignty: Law, State, and Practical Reasoning (Oxford University Press, 1999), 6–11. 
28 Indeed, autopoietic theories, as King said, reject “the kind of analysis that starts from the premise ‘'it's 
all down to people’…” Instead, “individuals are reconstructed or interpreted as epistemic subjects within 
different social meaning systems and also, simultaneously, as psychic systems. It is as psychic systems that 
individuals give coherence to and make sense of differentiated meaning systems of the social world.” King, 
“The ‘Truth’ about Autopoiesis,” 228.  
29  Institutional theories share features with legal pluralism, which flourished around the same time. 
Pluralism was discussed, supra, at 2.6. For pluralism in the writings of institutional theorists, see esp. Santi 
Romano, The Legal Order, trans. Mariano Croce (Routledge, 2017), chap. 2. 
30 Maurice Hauriou (1856-1929) and Santi Romano (1875-1947). See esp.: Albert Broderick, ed., The 
French Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T Delos, trans. Mary Welling (Harvard 
University Press, 1970); Romano, The Legal Order. 
31 Romano, The Legal Order, 13 [§10, emph. added]. 
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ought to comply with them, and have acquired their own autonomous existence.”32 This 
dualistic approach,33 if not idealism of the highest order, is a metaphor taken too far,34 
and, as has and will be seen, simply cannot be sustained.35 Laws and legal systems come 
                                               
32 It continues: “This is not to deny that law is deeply rooted in that conscience, that it is projected in its 
intimate core and it is not a shining reflection of it; but the law transcends, exceeds and conflicts with it.” 
Romano, The Legal Order, 8 [§7, emph. added]. Alternatively, as Delos, one of the French institutionalists, 
put it: “This current of thought [institutionalism] cannot be properly understood unless one first accepts a 
resolutely objective point of departure. Positive law should be considered as a fact, a reality, an object, 
offered to our observation.” Joseph T Delos, ‘The Evolution of the Institutional Conception of Positive Law 
– A Backward Glance’ in Broderick, The French Institutionalists, 35. Cf. Hauriou: “[W]hile individual 
ideas, perhaps, may not be objective facts, currents of thought are objective social facts. Fouillée has 
contributed much to this progress by his striking formula of idea-forces. A current of ideas, that is, an idea 
that animates a party, a people, a succession of generations, any collectivity whatsoever, very obviously 
becomes a social force. […]. The history of public law shows how currents of ideas influence legislation, 
and this is surely an objective social fact.” Hauriou, ‘The Two Realisms’ in Broderick, The French 
Institutionalists, 49–50. And further: “But, in social groups, collective forces are unleashed that are so brutal 
that they escape the control of the minds of individuals…unless by a prodigious effort of organization the 
collective forces are themselves arranged after the fashion of a mind. […]. // There you have the whole 
secret of the personification of social institutions: it is an application of the maxim similia similibus. You 
will protest that this is anthropomorphism, but the result is good since it is to humanize social institutions, 
which are for men.” Hauriou, from ‘Principes de droit public’ in Broderick, The French Institutionalists, 
60. 
33 Hauriou was explicit about the dualism inherent in institutionalism, viz. that of the individual and society. 
Even though society owes something to individuals and vice versa, there were, for Hauriou, qualities 
attributable to the one not attributable to the other: “This opposition itself can exist only if, on the one hand, 
the individual possesses an autonomy that does not owe everything to society, and, on the other hand, the 
social organization is the product of a necessity of things that does not owe everything to individuals. […]. 
It suffices for us to know that there are at issue a power proper to the individual and a power proper to 
society and that the problem is to justify the transformation of these two proper powers into rights.” Hauriou, 
from ‘Principes de droit public’ in Broderick, The French Institutionalists, 62 [emph. added]. Indeed, 
“[I]nstitutions undergo a phenomenon of incorporation… This incorporation leads to personification. It 
leads there all the more easily because in reality the corpus that results…is itself a very spiritualized body; 
the group members are absorbed in the idea of the work, the organs are absorbed in a power of realization, 
the manifestations of communion are psychical manifestations. Since all these elements are more spiritual 
than material, this body is of a psycho-physical nature.” Hauriou, ‘The Theory of the Institution and the 
Foundation’ in Broderick, The French Institutionalists, 101 [emph. added].  
34 See infra 4.11, esp. at n. 104. 
35 Besides equating ‘institution’ and ‘legal order’, Romano also equates ‘institution’ with what seems to 
approximate to ‘social group’: “By institution I mean any entity or social body” [§12]; “I believe that the 
concept of institution and the concept of a legal order, considered as a unity and as a whole, are absolutely 
identical” [§11]; “[I]n order for an institution to arise, the existence of persons connected to each other 
through simple relationships is not enough, as there must be a closer and more organic bond. The formation 
of a social super-structure is required upon which not only their distinct relationships, but also their own 
generic position depends, or that sway them” [§18]. An institution, therefore, would seem to be some socio-
legal entity with its own very real existence, which existence is irreducible (“[T]he institution can never be 
reduced to one or more specific legal relationships… It implies relationships but cannot be reduced to them” 
[§18]). This theory is metaphysical (“The entity I am talking about must possess an objective and concrete 
existence, and its individuality, however immaterial, must be outward and visible” [§12.1, emph. added]) 
and, with its talk of unity, wholeness, completeness, etc., seems to strive for an artificial neatness, which 
might be reflected in juristic abstractions, but which is not – and cannot be – reflected in the real world. 
Moreover, it seems to be somewhat chimerical by suggesting that institution, social group, and constitution 
(“The truth is that the law is first and foremost an arrangement, an organization of a social entity” [§16]) 
are all one and the same thing. They are not, though they are related. Institutions are a type of social group, 
but only a type. As a social group, they are constructs; they are not real (albeit perhaps intangible) things, 
as Romano believes. They have constitutions, which is to say that they can be described in terms of their 
membership and the distribution therebetween of activities and influence. But, as will be seen, whilst law 
plays an important role in all of this, it would be wrong to say that they are a unity. It is akin to saying that 
books are paper. That there is a connection between them is correct, but the relationship is misconceived. 
Books are not paper as much as paper is not books. The main constituent of books is paper, though they 
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from, and reside in, people; they are only as ‘complete and unified’ as those people make 
them. 36  This means, contra Hauriou and Romano, 37  that laws, legal systems, 
constitutions, etc. change as people change;38 this will be argued further in Chapters 4 
and 5. 
There is also the teleological fallacy. This is the idea that laws must exist for a purpose 
or, in Aristotelian language, have a ‘final cause’. It is true that many laws are made in 
order to achieve a particular end; to address a particular ‘mischief’. However, it is equally 
true that many laws exist not so much in order to do anything, but exist only because 
there were certain things that brought them about – certain antecedents that occurred 
without any concrete or specific goal in mind. Indeed, even though many such laws – 
which are usually implicitly held – are the product of the “countless different purposes of 
different individuals”,39 it would be a non sequitur to argue that these resultant laws 
themselves have a purpose. We might rationalise their existence and identify any utility 
that they might have; we might even adhere to them precisely because of these things. 
But the point is that a purpose is found for them or they are found to serve a purpose, not 
that they are brought into existence for a purpose as if created by a rational and prodigious 
mind; to assume that they are, or must be, is fallacious. 
                                               
might be made from other things (e.g. papyrus, vellum, parchment, etc.), and there is also the binding and 
ink to consider; similarly, paper is often used for books, though it is often also used for other things. In 
other words, whilst they might together contribute to a certain idea, even to a certain identity, they are not 
identical with one another. See: Romano, The Legal Order, 16, 17, 25, 32.  
36 Indeed, whilst completeness and unity remain admirable aspirations, their achievement, for reasons we 
will see, remains doubtful. It is notable that Romano himself seems to have qualified his requirement of 
completeness, when he reworked his formulation a little while after the previous quotations: “the institution 
is a legal order, a self-standing, more or less complete sphere of law.” Romano, The Legal Order, 20 [§13, 
emph. added]. 
37 Hauriou: “In law, as in history, institutions stand for duration, continuity, and reality…” Hauriou, ‘The 
Theory of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism’ in Broderick, The French 
Institutionalists, 93. Romano: “The institution is a firm and permanent unity. In other words, its identity 
does not get lost, at least always and necessarily, as its distinct elements vary, as well as its members, 
patrimony, means, interests, addressees, norms, and so on. It can regenerate itself but continue to be itself 
without losing its own individuality. Here lies the possibility of considering it as a self-standing body, so 
as not to identify it with that which might be necessary to give it life but, at the same time, by giving it life, 
merges with it.” Furthermore: “The law does not simply consecrate the principle of the coexistence of 
individuals, but above all takes it upon itself to overcome the weakness and limitedness of their forces, to 
exceed their feebleness, to perpetuate particular goals beyond their natural life, by creating social entities 
that are more powerful and durable than individuals. Such entities establish a synthesis, a syncretism in 
which the individual gets caught.” Romano, The Legal Order, 19 [§12.4], 20-21 [§13, emph. added]. 
38 This is because it is not the case, as Romano asserts, that “the law is the vital principle of any institution, 
that which animates and holds together the various elements that compose it, which determines, fixes and 
preserves the structure of immaterial entities”. Rather than social groups – or ‘institutions’ – being tied to 
laws, which supposedly have an autonomous and enduring existence, they are tied to social agents, i.e. 
individuals. Romano, The Legal Order, 22 [§15]. 
39 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 107. 
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Relatedly, there is the functionalist fallacy: the idea that laws are primarily defined, not 
by their basis, substance, or form, but by their function – the thing(s) that they do, role(s) 
that they play, or purpose(s) that they serve, particularly vis-à-vis some wider system.40 
Functionalism – especially when informed by aetiology rather than teleology – is 
attractive in that it appears to explain why certain forms have come to exist (i.e. why they 
have been selected), and the part that they play in maintaining and perpetuating a system 
(especially in terms of their eufunctionality or dysfunctionality, and manifest or latent 
functions41).  
However, functionalist explanations tend to presuppose that: (1) some, if not all,42 things 
have functions; (2) they have the function(s) we deduce for, and ascribe to, them; (3) these 
are intrinsic to the things in question; (4) the performance of these functions is somehow 
necessary or vital, which often involves value judgements;43 and, indeed, (5) there are 
some phenomena to analyse, which might be defined by their function(s). These cannot 
always be assumed. Furthermore, there is also the problem that many supposed 
‘functions’ are incidental to the things in question and so identifying them tells us very 
little except what a thing has been used for or could be used for.44 However, the most 
fundamental problem is that functionalist definitions leave us largely in the dark as to 
what the thing actually is that is being described (i.e. its basis, substance, form, etc.); they 
are, therefore, incomplete. Functionalism is too often informed by holism and, moreover, 
                                               
40 Almeida, for example, following Luhmann, appears to present such a theory of law: Fábio Portela Lopes 
de Almeida, “Constitution: The Evolution of a Societal Structure (PhD Thesis)” (Universidade de Brasília, 
2016), esp. 239ff. 
41 Thus, it might be said, for example, that the manifest function (i.e. its main function) of law is to create 
order or that it is a method of social control. Similarly, it might be said that a latent function (essentially a 
by-product) of law is the promotion of a shared social identity and social cohesion, or the maintenance of 
cooperation and reduction of variation. Cf. Almeida, “Constitution: The Evolution of a Societal Structure 
(PhD Thesis),” chap. 4. 
42 The idea that everything – at least, “all standardized social or cultural forms” – has or, indeed, must have, 
a (positive and adaptive) function is known as the ‘postulate of universal functionalism’. See: Robert King 
Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 3rd ed. (The Free Press, 1968), 84–86, quote at 84. This 
postulate is often connected with two others – the postulates of the functional unity of society and 
indispensability. Together, these hold “first, that standardized social activities or cultural items are 
functional for the entire social or cultural system; second, that all such social and cultural items fulfill [sic] 
sociological functions; and third, that these items are consequently indispensable.” Merton, Social Theory 
and Social Structure, 79–91, quote at 79. 
43 This is the postulate of indispensability – see Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 86–90.  
44 Thus, it would be wrong to define trees by their 'function' of being stores of carbon and oxygen pumps 
(the "Earth's lungs", even). These are certainly things that trees do, are good at doing, and, indeed, from the 
viewpoint of the biosphere, it is important that they continue to do them, but these 'functions' are not specific 
to trees (other plants, of course, do these things as well) and tells us next to nothing about trees' substance 
and form. Similarly, it would be wrong to define rivers by their 'function' of carrying water to lakes, seas, 
and oceans. This is what rivers tend to do, but, again, something that happens or tends to happen helps us 




too often slips into teleological thinking. There is also a looming danger of 
anthropocentrism – assuming that the function of the thing in question is somehow to be 
of benefit to us as humans.45 
Thus, a purely functionalist explanation of law might tell us what law does, can do, or, 
indeed, what it might be good at doing; it might tell us what its effects are, and might even 
suggest why we have and continue to use law. Yet, it nevertheless fails to explain what 
law is. By focusing on function and functionality, it misses the point. Consequently, 
whilst we might employ law ‘manifestly’ as a ‘tool’ to create social order or as a ‘method’ 
of social control, and whilst law might ‘latently’ promote social identity and social 
cohesion (e.g. through promoting cooperation and homogenization), this still does not tell 
us what law is at its core – neither does it quite explain what it is about law that enables 
it to perform such functions.46 
Finally, there is the analytic fallacy – the idea that the nature of law (or laws) can be 
ascertained through conceptual and logical analysis, through abstract reasoning and 
introspection. Of course, some of the chief merits of analytical jurisprudence and the 
analytical approach have been the separation of law from historicism and some supposed 
objective morality.47 The danger, however, is that such analysis also becomes divorced 
from the human and social world, i.e. from reality. After all, “abstractions exist in order 
to be applied, and they are both meaningless and valueless unless they are capable of 
being translated into the terms of real life”,48 – to which we can add that they are likewise 
meaningless if they have no basis in empirical observation. It would not be fair to say that 
analytical jurisprudence, on the whole, has fallen foul of the analytical fallacy,49 but the 
danger of getting carried away with inferences and deductions remains. 
                                               
45 For example, thinking that the function of trees is to provide firewood or timber, or that the function of 
rivers is for washing or swimming. We can plant forests specifically intended to be used for firewood or 
timber, and we can specifically designate rivers for washing or swimming, but these are not intrinsic to the 
things themselves. 
46 See further on the subject of functionalism and critiques thereof: Carl G Hempel, Aspects of Scientific 
Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (The Free Press, 1965); Melvin Tumin, “The 
Functionalist Approach to Social Problems,” Social Problema 12, no. 4 (1965): 379–88; Merton, Social 
Theory and Social Structure, chap. 3; Joan Smith, “The Failure of Functionalism,” Phil. Soc. Sci., 1975, 
33–42. 
47 This (at least, in relation to morality) is the so-called ‘separability thesis’ of legal positivism. Its thrust 
was couched nicely by Austin: “The existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another. Whether 
it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different 
enquiry.” John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
157. Cf. Carleton Kemp Allen, Legal Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press, 
1931), 14–15. 
48 Allen, Legal Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence, 24. 
49 After all, it is doubtful whether there ever could be a purely analytic theory of law: Cf. Allen, Legal 
Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence, 13. 
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There are, then, numerous fallacies often committed when defining law. Some 
explanation has already been given as to why these are fallacies, but the best way of 
demonstrating this is by understanding properly what is meant by ‘law’. However, it 
should be reiterated that there is some sense to many of these fallacies – for example, 
many laws are expressly formulated, issued by a central authority (viz. the State),50 
directed at interpretative authorities, designed with specific purposes in mind, and used 
to perform or facilitate certain functions. The fallacy is making these essential to the idea 
of law. 
It is also worth stressing the fact that, whilst many theories feature one or other of the 
fallacies listed above, it does not mean that the theories are wholly without value. For 
example, the institutionalists – alongside the pluralists and, to a lesser extent, historicists 
– were correct to argue that there might be a multiplicity of laws and legal systems. 
Alternatively, Luhmann was entirely correct, at least in his earlier work, to stress the 
importance of ‘expectations’. 51  However, it is vital that these are placed on a solid 
foundation.  
3.3 The Present Theory 
The theory of law proposed here is neither a historicist, positivist, nor rationalist/naturalist 
one; neither is it a functionalist nor analytic theory.52 Instead, it is most closely allied to 
the group of theories known as sociological theories of law,53 – at least insofar as it argues 
that laws are to be viewed and understood in their social context. Thus, even though 
jurists, legislators, etc. can construct formally defined and theoretically closed systems of 
law, which appear analytically distinct (and which, for the purposes of lawyers, legal 
practitioners, etc., can largely be treated as such), the present theory shares with 
sociological theories of law the belief that any such systems of law cannot be fully 
                                               
50 Cf. “A conception [of law] abstracted from state law is persuasive to many theorists because state law 
has become a dominant form of law.” Brian Z Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 42 [emph. added]. 
51 Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, ed. Martin Albrow, trans. Elizabeth King and Martin 
Albrow (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), esp. chap. 2. Cf. also: Max Weber, Economy and Society: An 
Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 2 (University of California 
Press, 2013), 754. 
52 There is value in all of these approaches and it is important to recognize this; identifying their respective 
flaws is not to dismiss or belittle them or their proponents. Indeed, as Berman et al. argued, there is an 
extent to which the course which jurisprudence ought to take is an integrative one – not to abandon all of 
the older theories, but to synthesize them by taking from each that which is good and insightful. (Though, 
we can disagree with Berman et al. that functionalism is the best way in which to approach law). Berman, 
Greiner, and Saliba, The Nature and Functions of Law, 24. 
53  There is an argument to be made that ‘social legal theories’ are nowadays largely neglected in 
jurisprudence. See: Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law, esp. chap. 1. 
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understood and appreciated except in their social – or, indeed, wider – context.54 Laws 
are not inherent in the universe, discoverable by a priori reasoning, etc.; they do not have 
an ideal, pure, and abstract existence (and, as such, might operate as an ‘autonomous 
force’55). They come from social agents and can only be understood through those agents. 
However, the present theory differs from most sociological theories of law in two 
respects. Firstly, it differs in that it argues that laws are not primarily sociological but, 
rather, psychological phenomena – even if their formulation, propagation, interpretation, 
coordination, implementation, enforcement, etc. quickly become sociological problems, 
and even if the individuals themselves cannot be properly understood apart from their 
social context. Secondly, it differs from such theories in the sense that it does not believe 
that laws are to be found in what are thought to be more or less concrete and objectively 
identifiable ‘social facts’ (i.e. they are not to be found in ‘in social relations and 
structures’,56 or, indeed, processes), but in the individuals themselves.  
It has been said that laws are psychological phenomena, which appears to be a point that 
has been little appreciated. There are certainly many books that discuss law in the context 
of psychology and neuroscience. However, these typically concern, not the nature of law, 
but rather the impact of psychological and neurological discoveries on legal principles 
and legal practice, e.g. on capacity, consent, responsibility, theories of crime and 
punishment, testimony, etc., and even exploring issues connected with transhumanism.57 
Their primary concern is people as subjects of law; the idea that law is a product of the 
mind is curiously absent.  
There are some notable exceptions – e.g. Leon Petrażycki (1867-1931), 58  and Axel 
Hägerström (1868-1939) – but these theorists, to adapt Redmount’s words, ‘had much to 
                                               
54 Cf. Cotterrell: “[L]aw itself needs to be understood not merely in terms of lawyers’ categories, but in the 
light of a theoretical understanding of the nature of the societies within which legal systems exist…in terms 
of social theory”. Cotterrell, Law’s Community, 77. 
55 “Law is an aspect of society, not an autonomous force acting on it”: Cotterrell, Law’s Community, 8. 
56 In its context: “Sociologically, law is to be seen as an aspect of social life, implicated in social relations 
and structures in connection with which ‘the legal’ refers only to a certain facet or field of experience, 
variously identified.” Cotterrell, Law’s Community, 95 [emph. added]. 
57 For example, the possibilities of cognitive enhancement. See, e.g. Roger D Masters and Michael T 
McGuire, eds., The Neurotransmitter Revolution: Serotonin, Social Behavior, and the Law (Southern 
Illinois University Press, 1994); Terrence Chorvat and Kevin McCabe, “The Brain and the Law,” 
Philosophical Transactions: Biological Sciences 359, no. 1451 (2004): 1727–36; Michael S Pardo and 
Dennis Patterson, Minds, Brains, and Law: The Conceptual Foundations of Law and Neuroscience (Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Owen D Jones, Jeffrey D Schall, and Francis X Shen, Law and Neuroscience 
(Wolters Kluwer, 2014); Luigi Cominelli, Cognition of the Law: Toward a Cognitive Sociology of Law and 
Behavior (Springer, 2018). 
58 Petrażycki’s main work, in English translation: Leon Petrażycki, Law and Morality, trans. Hugh Webster 
Babb (Harvard University Press, 1955). On Petrażycki, see: Michalina Clifford-Vaughan and Margaret 
Scotford-Norton, “Legal Norms and Social Order: Petrazycki, Pareto, Durkheim,” The British Journal of 
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say and still more to answer’, and, in any case, their works are now dated.59 Indeed, even 
though some theories sound very promising as psychological explanations of the nature 
of law, that promise is little realized.60 This lack of a solid theory of law as a psychological 
phenomenon is all the more surprising given the fact that it seems to be almost implicit 
in a number of theories of law – especially the few memetic theories of law that exist.61 
Luhmann, in his focus on expectations, certainly approached a psychological theory of 
law, but does not seem to have quite identified wherefrom those expectations stemmed 
and got too caught up in abstractions. Thus, even though it would seem that laws can be 
described in psychological and, indeed, neurological terms, this does not appear to have 
been adequately developed anywhere. To do this will form part of the present endeavour.  
With all of the foregoing in mind, we turn to the theory itself.  
3.4 Associational Theory of Law 
The theory can be stated as follows: 
A law is a fixed set, or pattern, of ideas associated together in the mind. 
This gives one a strong and compelling feeling that certain things either 
do or do not go together; the connection seems almost irresistible. In 
                                               
Sociology 18 (1967): 269–77; Jan Gorecki, ed., Sociology and Jurisprudence of Leon Petrażycki 
(University of Illinois Press, 1975); Krzystof Motyka, “Law and Sociology: The Petrażyckian Perspective,” 
in Law and Sociology, ed. Michael Freeman (Oxford University Press, 2006); Roger Cotterrell, “Leon 
Petrazycki and Contemporary Socio-Legal Studies,” International Journal of Law in Context 11 (2015): 1–
16; Edoardo Fittipaldi, “Leon Petrażycki’s Theory of Law,” in A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General 
Jurisprudence, ed. Enrico Pattaro and Corrado Roversi, vol. 12, 2016, 443–504; Andrzej Dąbrowski, 
“Genesis and Nature of Moral and Legal Norms. Leon Petrażycki’s Naturalistic Solution,” Studia Humana 
7, no. 3 (2018): 39–52. 
59  Redmount provides a useful overview of the limited extent to which psychology has featured in 
jurisprudential theories: Robert S Redmount, “Psychological Views in Jurisprudential Theories,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 107, no. 4 (1959): 472–513. The quote was originally about 
Hägerström and is at 489. 
60 For example, Ranyard West put forward a ‘psychological theory of law’ – but, by ‘law’, he meant ‘the 
effective regulation of conduct’, and, consequently, this theory is really about how the ‘social instinct’ 
overcomes the ‘self-assertive instinct’; it is not an enquiry into the nature of law itself. Ranyard West, 
International Law and Psychology. Two Studies: The Intrusion of Order. Conscience and Society. (Oceana 
Publications Inc., 1974), II:57, II:159-160. See further: Ranyard West, “Law and Psychology,” Ethics 54, 
no. 2 (1944): 146–48; Redmount, “Psychological Views in Jurisprudential Theories,” 500–501. Similarly, 
Robert S Redmount’s promising ‘law as a psychological phenomenon’ fails to address the question of the 
nature of law. It is rather concerned with law’s ‘functional attributes’, i.e. with its effects on individuals on 
a psychological level and with ‘legal experience’; given that the definition that Redmount adopted for law 
is a functionalist one, this approach is perhaps unsurprising: Robert S Redmount, “Law as a Psychological 
Phenomenon,” The American Journal of Jurisprudence 18 (1973): 80–104. Earlier than West or Redmount, 
we also find the work of Sherif, whose Psychology of Social Norms, again, sounds promising, but this is a 
study of social norms, rather than norms per se, and, therefore, is rather concerned with their effects than 
their basis: Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1936); 
Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1948), pt. 2. 
61 See infra, 4.3. 
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other words, there is – in the mind, at least – an established relationship 
or connection between these things; often, this felt to be exclusive.  
The mind does this naturally; it helps it to understand how the world 
works and make predictions, thereby helping individuals to navigate life 
successfully. The mind is adept at such pattern-recognition; it craves 
regularity. Our minds constantly re-evaluate and refine the mental models 
created by these associations, comparing our experiences with our pre-
existing associations. Our associations are not purely reached through 
disinterested reflection; they are heavily influenced by our desires and 
interests, our notions of good and bad.  
Where the mind feels there to be a fixed pattern, there arises 
corresponding expectations – ideas that the pattern will hold and be 
repeated. Where expectation and reality seemingly align, there is 
concordance; our expectations have been fulfilled, which normally 
reinforces those expectations. Where expectation and reality do not 
seemingly align, there is a disparity; our expectations have been 
frustrated. The psychological impact of frustration cannot be 
underestimated: we feel disappointed, confused, upset, and even angry; 
the world seems to be at odds to ourselves. From these associations and 
expectations, we derive our sense of justice and morality – our sense of 
right and wrong. 
The expectation element of law is of supreme importance; it is in accordance with our 
expectations that we both act in and judge the world.  
3.5 Etymology of Law and Fixedness 
At the heart of the Associational Theory is the idea of fixedness, which idea underpins the 
idea of law.62 This can readily be seen in the etymology of various words for law.  
Some words for law draw on ideas of stable position and inertia. For example, the English 
law comes from the Old Norse lagu, meaning ‘that which is laid down’.63 Likewise, the 
                                               
62 When Hart said that “the most prominent general feature of law” was its obligatory nature, this is, I think, 
what he was driving towards: Hart, The Concept of Law, 6. Indeed, it seems to underlie all of those theories 
that connect law with the idea of ‘order’. For an overview of a number of these, and, indeed, a defence of 
this idea, see: Iredell Jenkins, Social Order and the Limits of Law (Princeton University Press, 1980). 
63  This is related to modern words like legen (German), lægge (Danish), lägge (Swedish), legge 
(Norwegian), and lay (English), all of which mean to lay, set, place, or put. These are ultimately derived 
from the Proto-Indo-European *legh, which root meant to lie, recline, or set down: Linguistics Research 
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Old English word for law, dōm,64 probably comes from the Proto-Indo-European root 
*dhē-, meaning to put, place, set, or do.65 The classical Greek themis (θέμις)66 probably 
comes from the same root, through the verb tithemi (τίθημι).67 A thing which is lying 
down or has been laid down remains where it is, and as it is, unless something else acts 
upon it. As such, that which is lying or laid down becomes fixed in place and form, at 
least for a time; it neither moves nor changes, especially if it is somehow entrenched (e.g. 
by engraving in stone or setting ink on paper).68 It is possible that the act of writing – i.e. 
setting or laying letters and words on some surface – was influential in the development 
of these terms. Similarly, the German Gesetz comes from an idea of ‘sitting’ (setzen) and 
the Latin statuere (from which we get words like ‘statute’ and ‘constitution’) has the idea 
of ‘standing’ (cf. ‘status’). If something is sitting or standing somewhere (often having 
been placed there), the implication is that it is in a fixed location – at least, for the time-
being. In all of the foregoing, there is an idea of a fixed and stable state of affairs.  
A slightly different metaphor is to be found in the etymology of the words rule (from the 
Latin regula, meaning ‘measuring rod’) and ‘norm’ (from the Latin norma, meaning a 
carpenter’s square). These draw on the idea of there being a series of points (generally 
                                               
Centre of The University of Texas at Austin, Indo-European Lexicon: Pokorny Etymon: 2. legh- Retrieved 
01 January 2019: https://lrc.la.utexas.edu/lex/master/1132. It is possible that the Latin lex (law) comes from 
the same root, although prevailing opinion favours PIE *leg-, which meant to collect or gather. See: Elwira 
Kaczyńska, “The Indo-European Origin of Latin Lex,” HABIS 44 (2013): 7–14. Interestingly, Aquinas 
thought that lex was related to the word ligando, which meant ‘binding’. Whilst it is unlikely this is the 
correct derivation, it is revealing that Aquinas gravitated towards it, seeing as how it has a tenor of fixedness 
to it – that which is bound together is fixed together. Summa Theologiae (IaIIae 90) in Thomas Aquinas, St 
Thomas Aquinas: Political Writings, ed. and trans. RW Dyson (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 77. 
Returning to the etymology of lagu, cf. Clark’s argument that “Lagu is that which lies or rests, not that 
which has been laid or set”: Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on Austin, 68. 
64 This is often translated with judgment or sentence, as did Sweet, and Mitchell and Robinson, though we 
might also suggest determination, decision, or pronouncement as alternative translations. See, e.g.: Henry 
Sweet and Norman Davis, Sweet’s Anglo-Saxon Primer, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1980), 111; 
Bruce Mitchell and Fred C Robinson, A Guide to Old English, 5th ed. (Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 55, 
314. 
65 Linguistics Research Centre of The University of Texas at Austin, Indo-European Lexicon: Pokorny 
Etymon: 2. dhē-. Retrieved 20 October 2018: https://lrc.la.utexas.edu/lex/master/0376  
66 Themis not only meant law but, as a proper noun, also represented its embodiment in the goddess of law, 
order, and justice. See: “ΘΕΜΙΣ”, A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon 
(Oxford University Press, 1891), 314. 
67 This connection between the bases to place, set down, etc. and law in various languages was recognized 
by the compilers of the Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology: “law1”, CT Onions, GWS Friedrichsen, 
and RW Burchfield, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford University Press, 1966), 
518. 
68 It is interesting to note that Empress Matilda expressed displeasure in 1164 that the Constitutions of 
Clarendon had been put into writing. She thought that, in Baker’s words, “in cases of difficulty it was better 
not to use writing” – the act of writing only serves to establish and reinforce the fixedness of an idea. It 
might provide some degree of certainty, but it also might set a bad precedent and bolster fixed associations 
for which one might not necessarily care a great deal. As such, the act of writing can be something of a 
double-edged sword. For Matilda’s displeasure, see: John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 
5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019), 216. 
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along a straight line) that have a fixed relation to one another;69 there is a fixed or set path 
connecting them, from which there is no deviation.70 
Underlying all of these is the idea that there is some pattern that holds and does not 
change; the elements of the pattern, and their relations to one another, are fixed. This is 
not to say that it will never change, but, for the time-being at least, it appears stable.71  
3.6 Basis of Associations: Nervous Systems; Learning; Memory 
Associations and their sense of fixedness are products of the architecture of the nervous 
system.  
Nervous systems, like most physical systems, are essentially networks. Networks have 
two basic features in that they consist of: (1) nodes/vortices, which can be plotted on 
graphs as either points or dots; and (2) edges, which can be represented using lines 
connecting the nodes. Some networks – like nervous systems – have a third feature: (3) 
terminals/interfaces, which are the places where nodes and edges meet.  
In the brain – the most important part of the nervous system – the nodes are called neurons 
or nerve cells, the edges are called neurites, and the terminals are called synapses. 
Neurons are the information processing and storage centres; neurites are the channels 
along which information is carried in the form of signals; synapses are the places where 
information is moved between neurons and neurites. Synapses normally feature a small 
                                               
69 Cf. Clark’s argument that the various words for ‘right’ – “the Latin rectus, the Gothic raihts, the Saxon 
riht, modern German recht [sic] and English right” – were all attached to “meanings of physical 
straightness, truth, and moral rectitude”. He continued: “As to the metaphor, which I think can shew to be 
involved in these words, it may be that the straightness predicated of human conduct indicates its being 
regular or uniform.” By ‘regular or uniform’, we can understand occurring according to some fixed pattern 
or patterns. Indeed, he thought physical straightness to be these words’ “first meaning”; it was only later 
that they acquired the more abstract meanings. In consequence of all of this (and contrary to Austin’s ideas), 
“Right does not mean that which is directed or regulated, any more than it means that which is commanded, 
although the words expressive of direction and regulation do often come from the same root as that of right, 
or from right itself.” See: Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on Austin, 79–82, 85–86.  
70 Just as ‘right’ arises from ideas of fixedness and regularity, Clark has argued that ‘wrong’ is associated 
with ideas of ‘crookedness’ and appears to derive from a root meaning ‘to bend or twist’. This is very much 
the metaphorical antithesis to ‘right’, because that which bends or twists appears to happen in a way that 
is less predictable. Of course, with modern scientific understanding, we know that there are reasons why, 
say, a river bends or a plant winds, which are to a greater or lesser extent predictable, and occur according 
to certain mathematical principles and physical laws. But these are not necessarily immediately obvious 
and, consequently, they often seem more variable and arbitrary, i.e. not occurring according to a fixed 
pattern or patterns. For Clark, see: Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on Austin, 84–85, 85–86. 
71 Cf. Clark’s conclusions on the ‘pervading idea of law’: Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on 
Austin, 90–93. In principle, Clark’s conclusions do not differ markedly from my own, except that he did 




gap, called a synaptic cleft; information travels across this gap either by a chemical signal 
(neurotransmitter) or, sometimes, an electrical signal.72 
The neural network has three other important structural features. The first is dynamic 
polarization: signals travel only in one direction along the neurites.73 The second is 
connection specificity: each neuron is only connected to, and communicates with, 
specific other neurons.74 The third is specialization. Whilst we have much still to learn 
about the brain, it seems to be the case that specific neurons and specific neural pathways 
encode for specific things. Indeed, these tend to be grouped together such that the brain 
can roughly be divided into regions, each of which responds to different types of stimuli 
or controls different types of thing.75 
Whether or not particular neurons or neural pathways are activated depends upon their 
being roused from their resting state. Generally speaking, the process is as follows: For a 
neuron to become active, it needs to be moved from the resting membrane potential.76 
This happens if the electrical charge around the axon hillock within the cell body (soma) 
of the neuron exceeds a given threshold. If exceeded, an action potential is generated and 
the neuron ‘fires’. A depolarizing current travels to the synapse where a chemical or 
electrical signal is generated to cross the synaptic cleft. From there, a signal travels along 
the neurite to another neuron. This might have one of two effects. Some neurons create 
an excitatory postsynaptic potential, which means that their interlocutors are moved 
towards the firing threshold and thus more likely to fire. Others create an inhibitory 
postsynaptic potential, which means that their interlocutors are moved away from the 
firing threshold and thus less likely to fire. The weighing of these inputs is known as a 
cell’s integrative function.77 
                                               
72 It is worth noting that there are two kinds of neurite: axons and dendrites. Axons typically carry signals 
away from a pre-synaptic cell, whereas dendrites – on the other side of the synaptic cleft – typically carry 
them towards the post-synaptic cell; in other words, axons transmit and dendrites receive. See: Eric R 
Kandel et al., eds., Principles of Neural Science, 5th ed. (The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2013), 22–
23, 71. 
73 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 24. 29-30. 
74 “[A] given neuron will communicate only with specific cells and not with others”. Given the large 
number of neurons in that coexist in a limited space, the fact that signals can only travel in one direction 
along neurites, and the fact that each connection costs both energy and nutrients, the fact that “neurons do 
not form connections indiscriminately” is unsurprising: Eric R Kandel, In Search of Memory: The 
Emergence of a New Science of Mind (W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), 64, 65. See further: Kandel et 
al., Principles of Neural Science, 24. 
75 See: Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, chaps. 1 and 2. 
76 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 30. 
77 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 31–33. 
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Whether or not a given neuron will fire is largely a product of two things: (1) its sensitivity 
or excitability, i.e. the height of the threshold;78 and (2) the summation of changes to the 
resting membrane potential, i.e. whether or not the sum of the incoming signals falls 
above or below the firing threshold. It is worth noting that action potentials are generated 
on an all-or-nothing, as well as something of an egalitarian, principle: “Stimuli below the 
threshold do not produce a signal, but stimuli above the threshold all produce the signals 
of the same amplitude”; it is their number and frequency that determines their force.79  
The upshot of all of this is that information travels along set pathways within the brain; 
these are specific, separate, and non-random. When certain neurons are activated, certain 
other neurons will probably also be activated or not; when certain pathways are activated, 
certain other pathways will likely be activated or not.80 It should already be becoming 
clear as to how associations are produced by the brain and how they come to have a sense 
of fixedness.  
With all of this in mind, we can turn to memory and learning. Memory, as Tulving once 
put it, is “the capacity of nervous systems to benefit from experience”.81 Learning, as 
distinct from memory, would seem to mean the formation of connections between things 
– between stimuli and responses, perceptions and ideas, or ideas and other ideas. These 
things together mean that individuals’ “responses [might be] determined by something 
else besides the immediately preceding sensory stimulation…”82 It produces changes in 
thought and behaviour. Indeed, if we were to agree with Wolpert that the single reason 
why living things have brains is to “produce adaptable and complex movements,”83 being 
able to do so whilst taking into consideration more than the immediate situation would 
seem hugely beneficial.  
Memory and learning appear to require material changes within the brain. If we are to 
remember or learn anything new, the brain needs to change somehow – especially if it is 
                                               
78 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 30–31. 
79 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 33, 35. 
80 It can be added that there are often several pathways that simultaneously work towards the same end; this 
is called parallel processing. As Kandel et al. have said, this means that “[t]he malfunction of a single 
pathway affects the information carried by it but need not disrupt the entire system. The remaining parts of 
the system can modify their performance to accommodate the breakdown of one pathway.” Kandel et al., 
Principles of Neural Science, 17 and 37, quote at 17. 
81 Endel Tulving, “Introduction to Memory,” in The New Cognitive Neurosciences, ed. MS Gazzaniga, 2nd 
ed. (MIT Press, 2000), 727. 
82 DO Hebb, The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949), 
5. 
83  Daniel Wolpert, “The Real Reason for Brains,” TED Talks, 2011, 




to be retained in the long-term. The idea of neuroplasticity is particularly important in this 
regard.84 Consequently, each time we remember and learn something, as when we forget 
something, there is a physical legacy in the brain. All later learning is influenced by earlier 
learning (and forgetting).85 The brain must always adapt, or work around, those structures 
previously developed; those associations previously formed. New associations must also, 
to an extent, compete against these for supremacy, which process can take time.  
There is some way to go before we fully understand how memory and learning work. 
Indeed, we do not yet fully understand how information is stored within the brain. For 
example, we do not know whether individual neurons encode for complete ideas, or 
whether ideas are divided into their constituent parts and encoded in different neurons 
along a neural pathway. Thus, for example, do we have cat or dog neurons, which encode 
the ideas of cat and dog respectively, or, rather, do we have neurons that encode for shape, 
size, colour, etc. which, when fired in sequence, bring to mind the idea of a cat or dog 
depending on which neural pathways are activated? As things stand, the weight of 
evidence would appear to favour the latter,86 based on ideas of multicellular functional 
units, integrated action, cell assemblies, and synaptic chains. 87  In neuroscience, the 
theory behind this view is called connectionism.88 However, it has to be said that, whilst 
the science behind this view is relatively new, the underlying idea is really a continuation 
and refinement of the philosophical school known as associationism, of which Locke and 
Hume are the foremost examples. 
3.7 Developing Associations 
Many patterns of associations seem almost second-nature. However, we tend to forget 
that these were only formed with much difficulty and after many mistakes. Indeed, we 
tend to forget that even simple patterns are “slowly and painfully learned”,89 especially 
early in our development and maturation.90 Experiments have shown, time and again, 
that, in animals and humans alike, even “the perception of simple diagrams as distinctive 
                                               
84 One particularly important theory concerning neuroplasticity is known as Hebbian Learning, which holds 
that ‘neurons that fire together, wire together’, i.e. when particular neural pathways consistently fire in 
sequence, the brain reconfigures itself to connect them. Subsequently, if one fires, the other will also. See: 
Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola, “Hebbian Learning and Predictive Mirror Neurons for Actions, 
Sensations and Emotions,” in Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci., 2014, 369:20130175. 
85 Hebb, Organization of Behavior, 109. 
86 Kandel et al., Principles of Neural Science, 17–18, 35. 
87 Bruce E Wexler, Brain and Culture: Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change (The MIT Press, 2006), 
chaps, 1 and 2. 
88 See: Sebastian Seung, Connectome: How the Brain’s Wiring Makes Us Who We Are (Allen Lane, 2012). 
89 Hebb, Organization of Behavior, 77. 
90 See: Hebb, Organization of Behavior, chap. 6. 
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wholes is not immediately given but slowly acquired through learning.”91 That we tend 
to take these for granted is perhaps not unsurprising given the fact that we lose many of 
our earlier memories as we grow older – particularly as we pass through adolescence. As 
our brains become more powerful and adept, we forget that there was a time when this 
was not so – when learning was slow and laborious. As such, even though things might 
seem obvious, this does not mean that they actually are. We take many fixed associations 
for granted; we think them self-evident when they are anything but self-evident. It is 
important to bear this in mind.  
3.8 Strength of Associations  
The fixedness of an association is founded in the fact that specific neurons and neural 
pathways are attached to, or connected with, specific others. The extent to which we feel 
this fixedness is a function of the (relative) strength of that association. The strength of 
an association is itself a function of memory and learning, but we can posit two particular 
ways in which associations can be formed and strengthened.  
First, there is repetition or reinforcement – the more the brain experiences the 
impression of an association, the firmer that association is likely to become. In some 
cases, this will make us more sensitized to instances of that association, producing within 
us a more powerful reaction; in other cases, it will make us desensitized to instances of 
that association, producing within us a weaker reaction.  
There are three main principles that can be suggested as contributing towards the 
reinforcement of associations: frequency, constancy, and uniformity. If we experience 
something many times (frequency), in the same ways (constancy), and without 
remarkable exception (uniformity), then we are likely to develop a sense of connection. 
The same neurons and neural pathways will be activated and, as a result, they will become 
strengthened. Likewise, where there is a lack of frequency, constancy, and uniformity, 
one-time associations are likely to atrophy and weaken – after all, there would no longer 
appear to be a pattern. 
Second, there is significance or impact – the more important an association seems, 
regardless of how many times it is experienced, the stronger it is likely to be. This is 
particularly true of associations that we develop in the course of traumatic events, but it 
is also true of negative experiences in general; this is the psychological phenomenon 
                                               
91 Hebb, Organization of Behavior, 35. 
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known as the negativity bias. This idea of significance very much underpins the use of 
extreme sanctions for certain behaviours in many legal systems. There is an attempt to 
strengthen certain associations by attaching to them a significant negative association. 
That this is not always an effective strategy is readily apparent from the frequency of their 
employment.  
There is one other thing that serves to make an association appear strong and this is what 
might be called exclusivity. This all has to do with the fact that strength is relative. After 
all, if there is an association for which there are no competing associations, then this will 
appear relatively strong, as compared, for example, with associations that have such 
competition. They appear strong simply because we cannot comprehend or imagine an 
alternative. Often, this fact of exclusivity will be a product of repetition and impact, 
though we little realize it. There are many fixed associations – many laws – that we take 
for granted; they appear to be almost undeniable largely because we have never stopped 
for a moment to consider either why we have them or whether there are alternatives.  
It is worthwhile adding that there is nothing in the brain categorically to prevent the 
development of strong associations that are at odds with one another. 92  This is the 
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance – the holding of contrary and conflicting ideas.93 
Insofar as possible and in order to function properly, it is necessary for us to reduce 
cognitive dissonance to a minimum, but that does not mean that it is never present.94  
The brain is also prone to the development of false associations, i.e. associating things 
for which there is little rational and objective basis. The brain is adept at pattern-
recognition, but it is also prone to seeing patterns that are not really there. For example, 
humans – and animals in general – are bad at understanding coincidences or, rather, 
understanding them as such.95 After all, if we experience a correlation multiple times, or 
if some correlation appears to us to have some level of significance, then the brain will 
store it as an association and begin to strengthen it. We have here the basis of 
                                               
92 As Linton colourfully put it: “All individuals possess a happy capacity for thinking or believing one thing 
and doing another.” Indeed: “One school of anthropologists have devoted much time and erudition to 
proving that uncivilized peoples do not think logically. This is essentially correct, the only error being that 
neither do civilized ones.” Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction (Appleton-Century-Crofts, 
Inc., 1936), 361, 362.  
93 The classic example is having the idea that it is acceptable to eat meat whilst maintaining that animals 
have rights (e.g. not to be killed and eaten).  
94 Cf. JBS Haldane: “If my opinions are the result of chemical processes going on in my brain, they are 
determined by the laws of chemistry, not logic.” Quoted in: Karl Popper, The Open Universe: An Argument 
for Indeterminism (Rowman and Littlefield, 1982), 82. 
95  Cf. Skinner’s experiments on operant conditioning, especially those with pigeons: BF Skinner, 
“‘Superstition’ in the Pigeon,” Journal of Experimental Psychology 38, no. 2 (1948): 168–172. 
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superstitions, which are often underpinned by some notion of cosmic laws, as well as 
notions of cosmic reward and retribution. This is particularly reinforced by the human 
tendency to see agency and design in nature – especially agency and design somehow 
directed at, or made around, us. When these things are understood, ideas of natural law 
seem far less appealing.  
3.9 Expectations 
An expectation is a state of readiness in which the brain makes guesses as to possible 
futures. This gives rise to a state of belief that some event is possible, probable, or certain. 
In a more neutral and detached sense, it is a state of anticipation or prediction; in a more 
involved sense, it is a feeling that something ought to be, which feeling is often clouded 
by our evaluative associations – by what we desire to be true. These guesses are based on 
past information and experience; on learning and memory. The evolutionary benefits of 
an ability to develop expectations are self-evident: it enables organisms to prepare 
themselves for given – potentially life-threatening – eventualities, as well as to respond 
both more promptly and appropriately to unfolding events; it enables organisms to 
develop strategies to survive and thrive. It does not take much to engage these 
expectations. As soon as the brain begins to detect familiar patterns, it becomes primed 
to remember patterns associated therewith; it begins to assess the likelihood that these 
latter will be realized. The brain does this constantly and without our always realizing it. 
The brain is remarkably flexible, but also markedly rigid. After all, it is a physical system, 
which requires resources and energy to alter. As a consequence, it craves constancy and 
consistency, regularity and conformity; it also craves, insofar as possible, simplicity. It 
wants to be in an optimal state, in which the world is understood; a state in which things 
appear concordant with our expectations. If this is the case, then the brain can help the 
body to respond appropriately in order to maintain homeostasis. If it is unable to do this, 
there is a problem; there is a potential threat to the system. Consequently, the system will 
enter into a state of stress – sometimes mild, other times more extreme – in order to 
attempt to cope with this state of uncertainty. It becomes more sensitive and more 
responsive, and utilizes environmental feedback to make revisions and refinements to its 
associations and emergent expectations. Its aim is always to bring the system into that 
optimal state. 
The mind prefers to treat similar things similarly; it would rather not develop new rules 
and principles where it can avoid doing so. Likewise, the mind prefers to utilize or refine 
125 
 
old strategies, rather than develop entirely new ones. We might call this the transfer 
principle and one can see how it underlies the law of precedent: the desire to apply the 
same ideas, etc. to situations that appear similar. It is also part of the reason why one often 
sees crossovers between different areas of law. For example, the crossovers between the 
laws of inheritance and royal succession; each tends to reflect the other. This does not 
mean that these areas do not have their differences, but people tend to feel a sense of 
compulsion to adopt a similar approach, as well as to feel uncomfortable when markedly 
different approaches are adopted.  
It is important to differentiate between loose expectations and fixed expectations. Loose 
expectations arise from the general associations that we have regarding the thing or 
situation in question, as well as from our desires. They lead us to hope – if not believe – 
that things will or will not turn out a certain way, but we recognize that the opposite might 
be true, and, furthermore, that we are not necessarily in a position that to demand that 
they happen as we expect. By contrast, fixed expectations, which arise from fixed 
associations, give rise to a feeling that things should or should not turn out a certain way 
and, moreover, that we can demand this in practice – that our expectations be fulfilled.96 
However, it must not be supposed that these are distinct categories; they exist on a 
spectrum, such that there are very loose expectations, on the one side, and very much 
fixed expectations, on the other. 
This leads us into the subject of tolerance. Obviously, our tolerance levels are much 
lower with fixed, as opposed to looser, expectations; we are less prepared to accept, and 
do so with good grace, those things that deviate from that which we expect. However, 
given the complexity of the real world, there normally remains a level of tolerance even 
with fixed expectations. This is because we rely very much upon approximations: How 
well do the facts fit some fixed pattern(s) we recognize? The answer to this will depend 
upon the principles determining the strength of the associations – in a word, bias.97  
                                               
96 Loose and fixed expectations are roughly equivalent to what Luhmann called ‘cognitive’ and ‘normative’ 
expectations respectively. Luhmann’s terms are not especially helpful, and the example that he draws to 
elucidate them shortly after their introduction is somewhat dated, but it is worth noting them nevertheless. 
See: Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, esp. 32ff. 
97 Cf. supra, 3.8. It can be added that our judgements and levels of tolerance often vary across time – 
whether because of our mood, immediate environment, the relationships we have and trust we have in 
individuals, etc.; we are also often prone to making exceptions. This means that, even when people have an 
acknowledged fixed expectation, they are sometimes found to act inconsistently with it. Thus, they might 
contravene it themselves or overlook somebody else’s doing so. Naturally, the stronger and more specific 
the expectation is, and the lower the bar of tolerance is set, the lower the probability of this being the case. 
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Of course, where these fixed expectations relate to the behaviour of the physical world, it 
would be futile to maintain those that have been consistently frustrated for very long, as 
they were obviously badly founded. However, where they relate to other social agents’ 
behaviours, we need not necessarily adjust our expectations simply because they have 
been frustrated.98  Their being broken does not mean that they were badly founded; 
merely, that some other person has chosen to act in a non-conforming manner.99 This 
leads into the topics of compliance and coercion, which are treated further down.100 
3.10 Structure of Associations 
Fundamentally, associations are the result of either some conjunction (something and 
something else) or disjunction (something or something else). The relation between the 
‘somethings’ might seem so strong that we feel that the truth-value of one determines the 
truth-value of the other(s), such that when one is true or false, we feel that the other(s) 
must also be true or false. For example, we might associate together the ideas of certain 
actions and tax liability; when the former is true, the latter is true also.  
Disjunctions have two forms: (1) exclusive disjunctions, whereby the existence of one 
denies the other; and (2) inclusive disjunctions, whereby each might coexist with the 
other. An example of an exclusive disjunction might be being told that one might hold 
one office or another but not both; the holding of the one denies the holding of the other.101 
However, if one were told that one might hold each office separately or both offices 
simultaneously, then this would be an inclusive disjunction; the holding of one does not 
deny the holding of the other.102  
                                               
98  It was for this reason that Luhmann defined norms as “counterfactually stabilised behavioural 
expectations”, i.e. even if they have been frustrated in specific cases, we might continue to hold them 
nevertheless: Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 33. 
99 Cf. “Therein, then, lies a method of attributing blame for the discrepancy. It is not the expectant person 
who has mistakenly expected, but it is the actor who has wrongly, or at least unusually, acted; it is not a 
misconception that has to be explained, but behaviour that becomes the subject of investigation.” Luhmann, 
A Sociological Theory of Law, 42. 
100 Infra, 3.18. 
101 We might take, for example, US Const., Art. 1, §6(2), which states that: “No Senator or Representative 
shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the 
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during 
such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House 
during his Continuance in Office.” 
102 For example, in the UK at the present time, it is perfectly possible for a person to be an elected member 
of multiple local authorities simultaneously. Thus, for example, one might be either a parish/town/city 
councillor or a county councillor, or both simultaneously. It should perhaps be added that individuals are 
barred from being elected in multiple electoral divisions of the same local authority. Thus, one is not 
permitted to represent more than one ward or division for a given local authority; one cannot hold more 
than one seat on any given council. Cf. Local Government Act 1972, ss. 79-81. 
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It is worth remarking that it is often ambiguous as to whether disjunctions are exclusive 
or inclusive. Whatever the case, they involve options or choices. 
3.11 Types of Association 
There are, it is suggested, five categories of fixed association:  
(1) Qualitative;  
(2) Equivalence;  
(3) Categorical;  
(4) Sequential; and  
(5) Evaluative.  
The first three have to do with identity; the fourth has to do with relations between non-
identical things; and the fifth has to do with our attitude towards things. Each will be 
treated in turn.103   
3.11.1 Qualitative Associations 
Qualitative associations are associations between things and particular qualities, 
properties, or characteristics. In some cases, we might say that these qualities, etc. are a 
universal property of the thing in question, such that every instantiation of that kind of 
thing has those qualities, etc.104 In other cases, we might say that only some instantiations 
of that kind of thing have those qualities, etc.105 There might be many qualities, etc. that 
are associated therewith; there might be few or even only one. They might be 
                                               
103 In so doing, some recourse will be made to the language of first-order logic and set theory. This is for 
the simple reason that these languages tend to admit of less ambiguity than natural languages like English. 
In terms of logic, what follows is principally based on what I have learned from: Alfred Tarski, Introduction 
to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, ed. Jan Tarski, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 
1994); Graeme Forbes, Modern Logic: A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic (Oxford University Press, 
1994). With regard to set theory: Tony Barnard and Hugh Neill, Mathematical Groups (Teach Yourself, 
1996). In all cases, however, they represent a common mode of discourse.  
104 In the language of logic, we would employ the universal quantifier in these cases, which is represented 
by the symbol “∀”.This is an upside-down A, which stands for “all”; it can also stand for phrases like ‘(for) 
every’ and ‘any’. For example, one might say “All birds have feathers”, in which case we are saying that 
every instance of things called ‘birds’ has feathers; all have this property. To write this sentence in sentential 
logic, we need to rephrase it: “For every x that is a bird, x has feathers. This can be represented as follows: 
∀x(bird(x)→feathers(x)). 
105 In the language of logic, we would employ the existential quantifier in these cases, which is represented 
by the symbol “∃” (this is an inverted E, standing for “exists”). For example, one might say “Some birds 
are flightless” or, in the language of sentential logic, “There exists some x, such that x is both a bird and 
flightless”. This can be written as follows: ∃𝑥 𝑏𝑖𝑟𝑑(𝑥) ∧ 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑥) . 
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complementary; they might be exclusive. Indeed, the association might even be that 
certain things do not have particular qualities, etc.106 
In a constitutional context, qualitative associations are particularly important in defining 
individuals’ activities and influence. Let us take the example of an official whom we will 
call “sheriff”. They have two functions (i.e. activities): (a) assessing tax liability and (b) 
collecting tax duly assessed. We will assume that this is a closed set, i.e. they have only 
these activities. We will also assume that these are universal properties, i.e. all sheriffs 
have these two functions. By principle of implied exclusion, we can also assume that 
sheriffs are only allowed to undertake these activities. Consequently, if we were to find a 
‘sheriff’ performing activities other than these two, our qualitative expectations would be 
frustrated.  
3.11.2 Equivalence Associations  
Equivalence associations are where we think a number of things to be exactly the same 
as one another; they share all of the same properties; they are equal, equivalent, identical, 
or synonymous.  
For example, saying that a bachelor is an unmarried man is to say the same thing as saying 
that an unmarried man is a bachelor.107 In this example, there are two ideas that are being 
mutually associated: (a) the idea of being a bachelor and (b) the idea of being an 
unmarried man. We can equally say that ‘a bachelor is an unmarried man’ as we can ‘an 
unmarried man is a bachelor’. There is no bachelor who is not an unmarried man and 
there is no unmarried man who is not a bachelor. They are precisely the same thing.108  
These statements are the converse of one another and, because they are both equally true, 
                                               
106 In logic, we would express these using the negative versions of the logical quantifiers: ¬∀𝑥(… ) and 
¬∃𝑥(… ). These might be written as “not all” and “there is no/there are none”, etc. respectively. 
107 We can express this relationship formally. In order to do so, we can recognize that “unmarried man” is, 
in fact, a compound of the ideas of being unmarried and being a man. Thus, a person is a bachelor if they 
are unmarried and a man; likewise, a person who is unmarried and a man is a bachelor: ∀𝑥(𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑥) →
𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑(𝑥) ∧ 𝑚𝑎𝑛(𝑥)) and ∀𝑥(𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑(𝑥) ∧ 𝑚𝑎𝑛(𝑥) → 𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑥)) . As these are the 
converse of one another, we can represent this relationship using a biconditional. In ordinary language, this 
is normally expressed with the phrase “if and only if”, although it is sometimes written “iff”. Thus, a person 
is a bachelor if and only if they are an unmarried man. This same thing can be represented symbolically 
with a double-headed arrow (↔): ∀𝑥(𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑(𝑥) ∧ 𝑚𝑎𝑛(𝑥)). More simply, though 
less properly: 𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 ↔ 𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑛. Indeed, as they are precisely the same as one another, which 
is to say that they are exactly equivalent, we can also think in terms of its being an equation in which the 
two ideas are equal to one another. Thus: 𝑏𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑟 = 𝑢𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑎𝑛. 
108 “Unmarried man” is, in fact, a compound idea made out of two ideas, i.e. (a) the idea of being a man 
and (b) the idea that they are not currently in a valid bond of marriage or, more shortly, they are not married.  
129 
 
we know that we are dealing with an equivalence: the order in which we write the terms 
does not matter; it will be true either way. As such, they have the property of symmetry.  
Equivalence associations have an important feature. If any side of the association is held 
to be true, then the rest must also be true – to think otherwise would be illogical. Thus, if 
either “bachelor” or “unmarried man” is true, one would expect the other to be true also. 
Indeed, associations such as this give rise to very firm expectations in this regard; for one 
part to be true and another part false would be to completely frustrate our expectations.  
In a legal context, equivalence expectations are most prominently found in legal 
definitions. For example, we might define murder as the unauthorized and intentional 
killing of another.109 In other words, murder and the unauthorized and intentional killing 
of another are precisely the same; they are equivalent:  
𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑, 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙)110 
This naturally gives rise to the expectation that if either side of this equivalence is true, 
the other side must also be true. If somebody has been killed intentionally and without 
authorization, then we would consider this murder. If it were not described or treated as 
such, our expectations would be frustrated. In all likelihood, we would have a strong sense 
of injustice, because that which should follow from ‘murder’ probably will not.  
It is qualitative and equivalence associations that put paid to the idea that laws are ‘norms’ 
or ought-statements; they illustrate the normative fallacy. Many laws are based on 
qualitative and equivalence associations. They do not state that things ought to be a certain 
way; they say that they are that way. Whether that is right and good, and whether people 
ought to heed it, are different matters entirely. 
3.11.3 Categorical Associations 
The third type of association suggested is categorical associations. Rather than 
associating a thing with various properties (cf. qualitative associations) or associating 
things as though they are the same (cf. equivalence associations), categorical associations 
have to do with associating things with a number of other distinct things, such that they 
                                               
109 Cf. Sir James Stephens’ definition of murder in his Digest of Criminal Law, Art. 233, where he defines 
it as unlawful homicide with malice aforethought. See: Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1923), 51ff. 
110 This could be represented in a number of different ways. Other ways include:  
∀𝑥(𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝑥) ↔ 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑥) ∧ 𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑(𝑥) ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙(𝑥)) 
or  
𝑚𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 = 𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∧ 𝑢𝑛𝑎𝑢𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 ∧ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 
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have some shared identity. They have to do with situating things within a wider category 
or class; the thing in question is a member or element of a group or set.111 As with the 
previous types of association, categorical associations are mostly found – in a legal 
context – in legal definitions. 
As with the other forms of association, one of the most important effects of having 
categorical associations is the priming effect. Hearing the category primes us to expect 
the appearance of some elements of that category; hearing a number of elements of a 
category primes us to think in terms of that category. Thus, to bring this within a legal 
context, if somebody mentions to us “criminal offences”, we are immediately primed to 
think of things like murder, assault, theft, fraud, etc.112 Likewise, if somebody mentions 
to us that a murder has been committed, then, because we know this to be a part of the 
category of criminal offences,113 we would conclude that a criminal offence has been 
committed. To be told otherwise would frustrate our expectations. 
An important thing that differentiates categorical (and, indeed, qualitative) associations 
from equivalence associations is their asymmetry. If one part of an equivalence 
association is true, then the other parts must necessarily be true. However, just because it 
is true, for example, that a criminal offence has been committed, it does not mean that a 
murder has necessarily been committed. Murder is but one element or subset of criminal 
offences; there might have been a theft, etc. This has profound implications when it comes 
to our expectations, because it means that, if we are presented with the one, then we would 
expect the other, but not necessarily vice versa.  
We can transfer these ideas into a constitutional context and return to our example of the 
sheriff who only assesses and collects taxes. In this case, both assessing tax and collecting 
tax form subsets of the sheriff’s responsibilities.114 If they were to attempt, for example, 
to punish those who have not paid their taxes, this would frustrate our expectations; it 
would not conform to the pattern of associations that we have fixed in our minds around 
the idea of the sheriff. It is not an activity we associate with them; it does not fall within 
their remit. If they frustrate our expectations in this way, we would probably say that they 
                                               
111 In set theory, the idea of being an element of is represented by the sign ∈. Thus, we might say that 
“Wensleydale is a type of cheese”, which is to say that “Wensleydale is an element of the set of all cheeses” 
or, using set theory notation, Wensleydale ∈ cheese. 
112  We might write the set of criminal offences, using set theory notation, as 
follows: 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠 = {𝑀𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟, 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑢𝑙𝑡, 𝑇ℎ𝑒𝑓𝑡, 𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑, 𝑒𝑡𝑐. }. 
113  The idea that murder is an element or subset of the set of criminal offences, we might write as 
follows: 𝑀𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟 ⊂ 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠. 
114 We might say: 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑇𝑎𝑥 ⊂ 𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 and 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑇𝑎𝑥 ⊂ 𝑆ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑠 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 
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have acted unlawfully or illegally; they have acted ultra vires; they have frustrated our 
fixed categorical expectations.  
3.11.4 Sequential Associations 
We now come to sequential expectations, which express the idea that things follow after 
one another. This relationship is often one of causation, such that the former is the cause 
and the latter the effect, result, or consequence. These are often expressed using 
conditional sentences, such that: If A, then afterwards B.115  A is the antecedent or 
condition; B is the consequent. Besides causation, the other principal type of sequential 
association is logical implication, whereby the antecedent logically entails the 
consequent. 
In order to understand the dynamics of sequential associations, we need to understand 
something of necessity and sufficiency. Necessity is the idea that consequent is only ever 
true when the antecedent is also true, i.e. without the antecedent, the consequent is not 
possible.116 Sufficiency, on the other hand, is the idea that if the antecedent is true, then 
the consequent will also be true, i.e. when the antecedent occurs, the consequent will 
always occur.117 Not everything is either necessary or sufficient; some things are both. 
Necessity and sufficiency are fundamentally important to the idea of fixed associations 
and, consequently, law. After all, if a thing is deemed necessary, then there is a strongly 
fixed association between that thing and the thing reliant thereon. Similarly, if a thing is 
sufficient to bring about another thing, then there is a fixed association between that thing 
and the thing to which it leads.118  
With this in mind, we can suggest three basic forms of sequential association. The first 
we can call implication, i.e. the occurrence of the antecedent implies the occurrence of 
the consequent.119 The second we can call exclusion, i.e. the occurrence of the antecedent 
excludes the occurrence of the consequent.120 The third we can call toleration, i.e. the 
occurrence of the antecedent tolerates either the occurrence or non-occurrence of the 
consequent. 121  In legalistic terminology, these give rise to what might be called 
                                               
115 In logical notation: A  B. 
116 This might be expressed thus: ¬𝑃 → ¬𝑄 or □𝑃 → 𝑄. 
117 This is usually expressed simply as: 𝑃  𝑄. 
118 For the most part, it should be said, sequential associations assume that the antecedent is sufficient, 
although it might have to be composed of numerous parts in order to have enough cumulative power to 
give rise to the consequent. 
119 𝑃 → 𝑄. 
120 𝑃 → ¬𝑄. 
121 𝑃 → [𝑄 ∨ ¬𝑄]. 
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respectively obligation, prohibition, and permission, i.e. something must or should be 
the case,122 something must not or should not be the case,123 and something may or may 
not be the case respectively.124 
Let us return to the legal context. We have already established, at least for the purposes 
of example, that murder is the intentional and unauthorized killing of another 
(equivalence association). Likewise, we have established that it is a criminal offence 
(categorical association). The idea that one ought not to murder other people (i.e. 
intentionally kill them without authorization) is a sequential association, more 
specifically it is an exclusion or prohibition. In other words, if we are presented with 
another person, we must not intentionally kill them unless we have authorization. If this 
prohibition is not followed, then, because it is a criminal offence, we would expect – by 
implication – some punishment (assuming, of course, a sequential association between 
the commission of criminal offences and punishment).  
It is worthwhile remarking that ancient law codes typically consisted predominantly of 
statements of sequential associations.125 These were presented in a straightforward if-then 
(i.e. conditional) form. 126  They prescribed consequences for actions or events, e.g. 
                                               
122 We can take as an example II Cnut, c. 40: “If an attempt is made to deprive in any wise a man in orders 
or a stranger of either his goods or his life, the king shall act as his kinsman and protector, unless he has 
some other.” In other words, if a person is either a churchman or a foreigner, then the king must protect 
them. It thus imposes as duty upon the king to act. See: AJ Robertson, ed., The Laws of the Kings of England 
from Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge University Press, 1925), 197. 
123 We can take as an example Henry I’s Coronation Charter, c. 3: “And if any of my barons or my other 
vassals wishes to bestow in marriage his daughter or his sister or his niece or any [other] female relative he 
shall consult me on the matter, but I shall not take anything from him in return for my permission, nor shall 
I forbid him to bestow her in marriage, unless he desires to marry her to an enemy of mine.” The first thing 
to notice is the obligation imposed upon Henry’s barons: they must consult him if they wish to bestow a 
female relative in marriage. However, it also imposes some prohibitions or restrictions on Henry. He must 
not (1) charge for his permission or (2) withhold his permission (except in cases of marriage to an enemy 
of his). See: Robertson, The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I, 276–79. 
124 An example of a permission is to be found in the Hittite Laws (ca. 1650-1500BCE), ¶192: “If a man’s 
wife dies, [he may take her] sister [as his wife]. It is not an offense.” In other words, if a man is widowed, 
then the widower may or may not marry the sister of his deceased spouse, i.e. his sister-in-law; there is the 
possibility that this might happen. We might also note the categorical association attached at the end: the 
act of marrying one’s sister-in-law is not a part of the category of (punishable) offences. See: Martha T 
Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, ed. Piotr Michalowski (Scholars Press, 1995), 
236. 
125 As Stephen noted, certainly with regard to the early English laws in a criminal context, ancient law codes 
did not tend to concern themselves with definitions and categorizations, i.e. with stating equivalence, 
qualitative, or categorical associations. These were taken for granted. See: James Fitzjames Stephen, A 
History of the Criminal Law of England, vol. 1 (Macmillan & Co., 1883), 53. 
126 For example, the world’s oldest extant law code, attributed to Ur-Namma (ca. 2100BCE), though it might 
be the work of his son, Shulgi, consists entirely of provisions (at least, those that survive) couched in 
conditional terms. Each and every provision is introduced by the Sumerian tukum-bi, which means “if”. 
For a discussion and translation of these, see: Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 
13–22. The same is true of most of the ancient Sumerian laws. See: Roth, Law Collections from 
Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 13–56. A like thing is found in most of the Babylonian laws, where 
provisions are introduced with šumma, again meaning “if”, or equivalent phrases (e.g. awīlum ša, “a man 
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methods for determining guilt/innocence,127 punishments,128 fines,129 compensation,130 
etc.   
                                               
who…”). See: Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 57–152. A similar pattern is seen 
in the earliest extant English law code, issued by Æthelbehrt of Kent in the early seventh century CE. The 
great majority of the 90 provisions begin with gif, which again means “if”. For these in their original and 
translation, see: FL Attenborough, ed., The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (Cambridge University 
Press, 1922), 4–17. 
127 For example, ¶¶13 and 14 of the Code of Ur-Namma, do something of this where they say that if there 
has been some accusation, which accusation has been cleared by the divine River Ordeal, then the accuser 
must pay some compensation: Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 18. Within these, 
there is an implication that the proper way for determining whether an accusation is true or false, in the 
absence of other evidence, is to conduct the River Ordeal. “In the Mesopotamian materials, a primary 
function of id, the (divine) River, was, as is well known, to serve as judge in certain legal cases. Trial by 
river ordeal was a widespread phenomenon, in which the accused was plunged into the river, where his 
success in withstanding the rushing waters was supposed to determine his guilt or innocence”: P Kyle 
McCarter, “The River Ordeal in Israelite Literature,” The Harvard Theological Review 66, no. 4 (1973): 
403. In early mediaeval England, methods for determining guilt or innocence included, most notably: 
compurgation or wagers of law, i.e. the swearing of oaths on behalf of the accused by so-called oath-helpers 
(see, e.g. Alfred and Guthrum, c. 2); and trials by ordeal, i.e. the truth of the matter would be discovered 
by subjecting the accused to some ordeal (by fire, water, or, later, combat), by which their guilt or innocence 
would be determined through divine intervention (see, e.g.: Ine, c. 37). For an outline of early mediaeval 
proof and procedure in criminal cases, see: Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History 
of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Cambridge University Press, 
1968), 598–674; William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1922), 302–12. On trial by ordeal specifically, see: Attenborough, The Laws of the Earliest 
English Kings, 187–89; Margaret H Kerr, Richard D Forsyth, and Michael J Plyley, “Cold Water and Hot 
Iron: Trial by Ordeal in England,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 22, no. 4 (1992): 573–95. 
128 Many ancient law codes, especially that of Hammurabi (ca. 1750BCE, Babylon), are permeated by ideas 
of lex talionis – or, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. In some cases, this was in the form of mirror 
punishments, i.e. the perpetrator of some wrong will be forced to suffer the same wrong as their victim. For 
example, Hammurabi, ¶¶196, 197, and 200, which all prescribe that if a person either blinded, broke the 
bone, or knocked out the tooth of another of their own rank, then they were to be blinded, have their bone 
broken, or tooth knocked out themselves. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, 121. 
Whilst this form of retributive justice might in some ways seem harsh and primitive by modern standards, 
it is in many ways an attempt to ensure that justice is proportional: the perpetrator will receive that which 
their victim received, in the same way – no more and no less. Indeed, there is a sense in which these laws 
are an attempt to restrict retribution: only an eye shall be taken and no more: W.Gunther Plaut, The Torah: 
A Modern Commentary (Union of Hebrew Congregations, 1981), 571ff. Lex talionis did not always mean 
that there ought to be a mirror punishment; merely, that the punishment ought to be commensurate with the 
crime. Thus, the Code of Hammurabi, whilst providing that equals should be liable to the eyes, bones, teeth, 
etc. of their victims, also provided that the upper echelons of society would only be liable for money 
payments if they blinded, etc. commoners (¶¶198, 199, and 201): Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia 
and Asia Minor, 121. 
129 In the old English law codes, there were principally three kinds of fine: wer, i.e. a person’s value, which 
was set according to their social station and was payable to their relatives if they had been killed; bot, i.e. 
the compensation payable to the victim of a crime (see n. below), which might be at a fixed rate (angild) or 
at the market-rate of the loss (ceaf-gild); and wite, i.e. a payment due to the lord or king, usually for reason 
of having broken their peace (frith or grith) or protection (mund-bryce). On these, see: Stephen, History of 
the Criminal Law, 1:57. One of the most famous fines was the murdrum fine, which was levied on a 
community if the identity of a murdered victim was unknown; it is possible that, in Cnut’s time, the victim 
was assumed to be Danish, but hard evidence of this is lacking; after the Conquest, the victim was assumed 
to be Norman. The murdrum fine might be countered with the presentment of Englishry, i.e. proof that the 
victim was English. See: Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law 
Before the Time of Edward I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1968), 89; 
Frederick Coyne Hamil, “Presentment of Englishry and the Murder Fine,” Speculum 12, no. 3 (1937): 285–
98. 
130 It is often said that the Old English laws are principally schemes of compensation, behind which claim 
there is a great deal of truth. Rather than prescribing corporeal punishments, for example, the early English 
law codes tended to commute wrongs to money payments. Thus, for seizing a man by the hair, one would 
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Turning to a constitutional example, we might take the example of some person, whom 
we might call monarch or president, one of whose associated activities is discretionary 
clemency, i.e. they may or may not choose to grant a pardon to some person. In such a 
case, they would have permission to grant a pardon, but neither an obligation nor a 
prohibition compelling them either way. Having a power of pardon does not determine 
the outcome, but it makes certain outcomes possible; it is for this reason that it falls within 
the precincts of a fixed association. After all, if one does not have the power of pardon, 
one cannot choose whether or not to grant it. As such, there is a fixed association between 
having and exercising the power, regardless as to whether one actually exercises it. 
Permission is closely related to discretion, which seems to mean some element of choice 
or liberty.131 As this idea is particularly important in public law, it would be worthwhile 
quickly to say a few more things about it. We can begin by saying that discretion might 
be either restricted or unrestricted. Restricted discretion is where there is freedom to 
choose only between a given number of options, i.e. within a closed set. Unrestricted 
discretion is much the same, except that it works on the basis of an open set – the choice 
is non-limited. Truly unrestricted discretion is rare. After all, most sets are, at any given 
time, in practice closed. They might be very large and, consequently, appear unrestricted, 
but, ultimately, there will only be a finite number of options. In any case, discretion will 
almost certainly be limited within a domain, meaning that even if, once again, the choice 
is very broad, it will still be limited.  
In public law, the most important application of the idea of unrestricted discretion is to 
the idea of sovereignty. As can already be seen, to maintain that sovereignty is universal 
and absolute is to carry the concept too far. In the very least, it will be limited within a 
certain domain. It will also be limited by what is physically possible and actually 
achievable, particularly in terms of gaining support and achieving compliance, and in 
                                               
have to pay 50 sceattas (Æthelbehrt, c. 33); for striking off an ear, 12 shillings (Æthelbehrt, c. 40); for 
slaying another, the ordinary wergild was 100 shillings (Æthelbehrt, c. 21). Attenborough, The Laws of the 
Earliest English Kings, 8–9, 6–7. 
131 We can recall in this context the idea of disjunctions and how they tend to create options or choices (see, 
supra, 3.9). The disjunction forms an important part of permissive associations.  
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terms of having the material and economic means;132  by what is logically sound;133 
arguably, too, by the lengths to which the ‘sovereign’ power is willing to go, the measures 
they are willing to take, and the ends that they are able and willing to conceive.134 Thus, 
there are practical, political, logical, and intellectual limits to sovereignty, as there are to 
any form of discretion.  
These are all, of course, limits on the exercise of sovereignty, but the question as to 
whether sovereignty must, 135  or can, be legally unlimited requires further 
consideration;136 perhaps more to the point, whether legal limitation is consistent with the 
idea of sovereignty.  It can be conceded that we can set our expectations such that we 
associate some person or persons with the ability to do whatever they please; that we can 
say that this is their right, and that there is consequently a duty created in each and every 
other person to respect and obey this power.  Thus, sovereignty might be said to be legally 
unlimited; it might be said to be universal and absolute. However, this would be, in 
Laski’s words, a “fiction of logic”;137 it could never be a reality. Indeed, if sovereignty is 
actually limited, it would not be inconsistent to say that it might be legally limited also. 
                                               
132 Cf. Duguit: “We no longer believe in the dogma of national sovereignty any more than in the dogma of 
divine right. The rulers are those who actually have the power of compulsion in their hands. […]. The broad 
fact remains that in any given country there is a man or group of men who can impose on others material 
constraint. It therefore follows from this that power is not a right but simply an ability to act.” Léon Duguit, 
Law in the Modern State, trans. Frida Laski and Harold Laski (BW Huebsch, 1919), 40. The implication of 
this, of course, is that the ‘sovereign power’ is limited to the extent to which that influential group has an 
ability to act; they might imagine it extending further and aspire to extending it, but the fact remains that, 
at any given point in time, there will be a finite limit to the extent of their power.  
133 This sentiment was captured by Lolme in his infamous statement that “Parliament can do everything, 
except making a woman a man, or a man a woman”: Jean-Louis De Lolme, The Constitution of England; 
or, An Account of the English Government, ed. David Lieberman (Liberty Fund, Inc., 2007), 101. Of course, 
there is an extent to which this statement is now dated considering modern views, especially those on 
gender. However, the principle remains that the sovereign cannot make a thing into something that it is not 
nor could never be. By like token, a sovereign cannot declare a thing to exist that does not exist and that 
cannot be brought into existence in any meaningful sense by mere declaration alone; neither cannot it 
declare a thing not to exist, which cannot be destroyed by mere declaration. Thus, if there is a God (at least, 
after the manner of Christian theology), no earthly sovereign could declare there not to be; likewise, if there 
is no God, no earthly sovereign could create one. These are logically impossible. An omnipotent and 
omniscient being could neither be created nor destroyed by human agency, except in the imagination.  
134 Dicey suggested that, besides external limits to the exercise of sovereignty, there were also internal 
limits: “Even a despot exercises his powers in accordance with his character, which is itself moulded by 
the circumstances under which he lives, including under that head the moral feelings of the time and the 
society to which he belongs. The Sultan could not if he would change the religion of the Mahommedan 
world, but if he could do so it is in the very highest degree improbable that the head of Mahommedanism 
should wish to overthrow the religion of Mahomet…” Albert Venn Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the 
Law of the Constitution, 8th ed. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1915), 77 [emph. added]. 
135  Cf. Austin’s argument for example, that the ‘sovereign or supreme power is incapable of legal 
limitation’, that it is ‘legally absolute’: Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence, 223. 
136 Indeed, this was how Dicey understood the term in the context of Parliament, taking it to mean “simply 
the power of law-making unrestricted by any legal limit”. See: Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law 
of the Constitution, 69–82, quote at 70. 
137 Harold J Laski, The Foundations of Sovereignty (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1921), 236. 
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After all, this would merely align the position at law with reality. There are arguments 
that to make these align would be entirely sensible and rational.  
Whether or not there is or ought to be a sovereign power, and, if so, where that power is 
or ought to be located, are questions for another time. However, the fact that sovereignty 
might be legally limitable and the fact that it is in actual practice limited are not 
necessarily reasons for dispensing with the concept, so long as it is taken to mean only 
the greatest and most wide-ranging power within a given domain; that the ‘sovereign’ is 
taken to mean the person or body with the widest and strongest influence, and with the 
greatest degree of discretion. Even though we speak in superlatives (i.e. greatest, most 
wide-ranging, widest, strongest), these do not imply absolutes for they are measured 
relative to other things. Naturally, the wider, greater, and stronger the influence and 
discretion of person or persons appear to be, and the more unrivalled they are, the greater 
will be the impression of something approaching an absolute power. But to recognize 
practical and theoretical limits is not to diminish the import or consequence of 
sovereignty; insofar as everybody within their jurisdiction is concerned, the sovereign 
remains the ultimate and supreme power.  
More generally, one of the greatest constitutional concerns is defining the discretion held 
by particular individuals and bodies. Great effort is often made to clarify both the domain 
and extent of discretion. Indeed, besides ensuring that individuals and bodies undertake 
only those activities and influence allotted to them in a manner concordant with the basic 
considerations,138 ensuring that discretion is exercised properly and sensibly is one of the 
fundamental pillars of judicial review. Whether judges are always best-placed to make 
such determinations is debateable. 
3.11.5 Evaluative Associations 
Evaluative associations are, in a sense, meta-associations; they are things that we 
associate with other associations. There are three kinds.  
First, there are correspondence or veracity associations. These have to do with whether 
we think associations true or false.139 Do they correspond with one’s experiences, i.e. 
one’s impressions and ideas? Is it a fact or not? 
                                               
138 See, supra, 2.18. 
139  Where a thing is true, it can be represented symbolically by T. Where a thing is false, it can be 
represented symbolically either by F or ⊥. 
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Second, there are validity associations. These have to do with whether we think 
associations valid or invalid, whether we think them: (1) well-made, i.e. created and 
expressed in the right way; (2) well-formed, i.e. logically – and, perhaps, rationally – 
sound;140 (3) current, i.e. still applicable; and (4) undefeated, i.e. not invalidated by some 
other well-made and well-formed association.141 
Third, there are affective associations, which are rooted in ideas of desirability and 
significance. Is an idea or belief desirable (i.e. good) or undesirable (i.e. bad, evil, etc.); 
important or unimportant? There is an attraction towards those things regarded as good 
and an aversion to those regarded as bad or evil. The former produces in us a positive 
reaction, oftentimes pleasure; the latter produces in us a negative reaction, oftentimes 
pain. We are placed in a heightened state where we regard things as important; in a 
subdued state where we regard things as unimportant. If we find something neither 
desirable, undesirable, nor significant, we are likely to treat it with indifference. 
Evaluative associations are closely linked with our emotions, as well as our 
predispositions and inclinations; in a word, feelings. They build into ideas of merit and 
demerit, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. They underlie our sense of ethics or 
morality. 
Let us take the idea that a certain form of punishment, such as the death penalty, is either 
permitted or proscribed in a certain place. Firstly, there is the factual question: Is this 
thing allowed or not in that place? Here, there are correspondence associations. Thus, we 
have the idea that, at the present time, the death penalty is permitted in Alabama;142 that 
it is not in the UK.143 Correspondence associations are often heavily affected by validity 
                                               
140 Kelsen has said that “A norm, however, cannot be either true or untrue, but only valid or not valid.” This 
is not strictly true. For example, whether or not there is an association between ‘murder’ and ‘unauthorized, 
intentional killing’ can be either true or false. In some places, it might be true that this is considered to be 
the case; in other places, it might not be considered to be the case (e.g. murder might just be thought to be 
intentional killing). Whether or not we think the association to be true or false – whether or not we think 
there actually to be an association – naturally will rely heavily on whether or not we think it valid or invalid, 
i.e. whether we think it was made in the right way and whether we think it logically sound. For Kelsen, see: 
Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 19. 
141 As Raz noted, there is a close connection between the ideas of validity and bindingness: those fixed 
associations that are valid ought to be binding because they are well-made and well-formed, those that are 
binding ought to be valid if they are to bind us. As such, ‘legally valid’ might be used interchangeably with 
‘legally binding’. See: Joseph Raz, “Legal Validity,” ARSP: Archiv Für Rechts- Und 
Sozialphilosophie/Archives for Philosophy of Law 63, no. 3 (1977): 342.  
142 Code of Alabama 1975, §13A-5-39(1) 
143 The use of the death penalty was restricted, suspended, and abolished over the course of several stages 
in the UK. The Children Act 1908, and Children and Young Persons Act 1933, abolished the death penalty 
with respect to persons under the age of 16 and 18 respectively. The Homicide Act 1957 created the 
distinction between capital and non-capital murders: only the former thereafter attracted the death penalty, 
the latter mandatory life imprisonment. The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, s. 1(1) then 
abolished the death penalty in cases of murder, though the death penalty remained available respecting 
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associations. Thus, for example, whether or not we think the death penalty available will 
depend heavily on whether we think the formal provisions either prescribing or 
proscribing it well-made, etc. For positivists, validity will be a matter entirely determined 
by positive law, which may or may not respect certain principles of morality; for others, 
there might be some further requirement that, in order to be valid, any provision must be 
concordant with, for example, some natural law. 144  Finally, there are affective 
associations. The death penalty often evokes strong emotions – both from those that 
endorse and those that condone it. To a great extent, our affective associations are distinct 
from our correspondence and validity associations. Thus, we might – albeit grudgingly – 
accept that the death penalty is validly permitted in a given place. Whether or not it should 
be such is determined by our affective associations, which might be formed as much 
according to feeling as reason. However, oftentimes our affective associations can affect 
our correspondence and validity associations. Thus, if one believes the death penalty to 
be profoundly immoral, one might refuse to accept any positive law allowing it to be valid 
and, therefore, a true statement of the law.   
It is worthwhile adding that evaluative associations are often situation-specific, i.e. held 
in some situations but not others.145   
3.12 Principle of Implied Exclusion 
Some associations are more open-ended and more easily permit additions; others not so. 
In the latter case, anything not expressly part of the association is by implication excluded; 
in the former case, it is more indeterminate. This is the principle of implied exclusion: 
                                               
some other crimes, e.g. high treason, violent piracy, arson in royal dockyards, and military offences. The 
Criminal Damage Act 1971 abolished the death penalty respecting arson in royal dockyards; the Crime and 
Disorder Act 1998, s. 36 abolished it respecting treason and piracy. The death penalty respecting military 
offences was first abolished by the Human Rights Act 1998, s. 21(5). The Human Rights Act 1998 
(Amendment) Order 2004 amended the Human Rights Act, s. 1(1)(c) to incorporate ECHR, Protocol 13 
abolishing the death penalty in the UK in all circumstances. Consequently, the proposition “the death 
penalty is legal in the UK” (which is an association either between the death penalty and the quality of 
illegality in the UK or the death penalty and the category of illegal things in the UK) would have the 
correspondence association of false; it is not true. On the history of the abolition of the death penalty, see: 
Julian B Knowles, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in the United Kingdom: How It Happened and Why 
It Still Matters (The Death Penalty Project, 2015). 
144 For example, the biblical commandment ‘thou shalt not murder’ might be invoked to support arguments 
that the death penalty might never be permissible – no law allowing it could ever be valid, howsoever made. 
145 Again, we can consider the death penalty, which, as seen above, has been considered a true statement of 
valid law with respect to some circumstances (e.g. murder, treason, etc.), but not others (e.g. petty theft). 
However, in recent times, there has been a movement towards the idea that the death penalty is never 
permissible; it is not situation-specific. Many see this as a natural consequent of the right to life as 
enshrined, for example, in the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR, 1948), Art. 
3. Protocol 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR, 1953) requires that the death penalty 
only be used during times of war. All of the Council of Europe have signed and ratified Protocol 6, except 
Russia which has signed but not yet ratified it. 
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anything not expressly included in an association is thereby impliedly, though not 
necessarily, excluded.146 Whether or not a thing is actually excluded is largely dependent 
upon the strength of the pre-existing association; if that association is very strong, the 
thing in question is likely to be actually excluded; if it is weaker, then the matter is more 
likely to be open to discussion.  
It is important to note that we often take implied exclusions for granted. For example, a 
chicken is impliedly excluded from holding the presidency of a modern nation-state, not 
because people have a fixed association between presidency and not-chickens, but, rather, 
because we associate the post with human beings, thereby excluding all other animals – 
including chickens. They are excluded by implication, which fact we take for granted.   
Sometimes implied exclusion arises very much by design – the association is designed to 
be restricted. Other times, it is less a result of design as habit or the limitations of human 
imagination. We might be used to things a certain way or fail to see how they could be 
different. It would not be unusual to experience resistance to adopting an updated 
association to include these things – not because people really strongly feel that the 
association is absolutely fixed and exclusive, but simply because it engenders a change 
and change requires new learning and adaptation. 
3.13 Laws: Physical and Human 
It is at this point that we can distinguish the laws of physics and human laws. There are 
some fixed associations that the brain has the impression of being universal, inviolable, 
immutable, eternal, and independent of human agency. They apply everywhere, all of the 
time; they do not change and can never be broken. These fixed associations we believe to 
represent and reflect fixed relationships between phenomena, which relationships exist 
independently of ourselves.147 These are the laws of physics. By contrast, there are some 
fixed associations that the brain has the impression of being spatio-temporally specific, 
violable, mutable, transient, and dependent on human agency. They apply in certain 
places at certain times; they can be changed and broken; they are human constructions. 
These are human laws.  
                                               
146 We might think here of the Latin maxim, sometimes discussed in the context of statutory interpretation: 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or, alternatively, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius – the expression 
or inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another. For its legal context, see, e.g.: James Holland and 
Julian Webb, Learning Legal Rules, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006), 241. 
147 Cf. Pollock: “What we call a law of nature is an expression of the uniform manner in which some 
particular portion or combination of the physical forces of the universe produces its effects.” Frederick 
Pollock, “Law and Command,” Law Magazine and Review 1, no. 3 (1872): 205 [emph. added].  
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We use the laws of physics to develop expectations about how the physical world will 
behave; human laws to develop expectations about how (other) people will behave 
(within the confines, of course, of physical possibility).148 These two categories have 
often been confused. It is such confusion that has given rise to notions of Natural Law, 
i.e. the idea that there are some universal principles that are immutable, eternal, and 
independent of human agency, though they are violable. This confusion, as we have 
already intimated, arises largely from a disproportionate influence being exerted by one’s 
affective associations – by one’s ideas of desirability and significance. These, in turn, will 
largely be a product of one’s experiences and education. However, the fact is that the laws 
of physics determine how we do and can behave, but they say nothing as to how we should 
behave. That is for us to determine, as best we can.  
3.14 Propriety and Justice 
It is from our fixed associations and corresponding expectations that we get our sense of 
propriety, i.e. our sense of correctness and rightness. We develop clear expectations as 
to what we feel will (not) or should (not) be the case.  
It is also from our expectations that we derive our sense of justice and fairness. Justice 
is where we think people have or receive in accordance with our expectations; injustice 
where they have or receive contrary to our expectations.149 Our sense of injustice will be 
particularly strong where some inexplicable or insupportable discrimination seems 
apparent, i.e. there seems to be no (good or logical) reason why some people have, or 
have received, something that others have not – or vice versa. Justice in the first instance, 
we call distributive justice;150 justice in the second instance, where our expectations 
                                               
148 Cf. “The behaviour of [another] person cannot be expected to be a determinable fact; there is a need to 
see it in terms of his selectivity, as a choice between various possibilities. This selectivity is, however, 
dependent upon others’ structures of expectation.” Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 26. In other 
words, every action that a person takes is a conscious or unconscious choice between different possible 
courses of action. In order to understand the courses of action that a person has taken, and in order to predict 
the courses of action that they are likely to take, it is necessary to consider (a) what that person thinks will 
be the probable consequences of any course of action and (b) which courses of action are possible or 
permissible.  
149 Much as the Institutes said: “Justitia est constans et perpertua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuens” – 
“Justice is the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due”. Thomas Collett Sanders, trans., 
The Institutes of Justinian, with English Introduction, Translation, and Notes (Longmans, Green and Co., 
1952), 5 [1.1]. This wish to give each their due was identified by the Institutes as one of the three central 
maxims of law: “Juris præcepta sunt hæc: honeste vivere; alterum non lædere; suum cuique tribuere” – 
“The maxims of law are these: to live honestly; to hurt no one; to give everyone their due.” Sanders, 
Institutes, 6 (1.1.3). 
150 Distributive justice has to do with apportionment and has regard to a number of things: the nature of the 
thing being apportioned, the availability thereof, the number of individuals between whom it is being 
apportioned, and the nature of those individuals. In some cases, it might be felt that some individuals 
warrant more, whereas others warrant less; in other cases, it might be felt that all ought to receive precisely 
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have initially been frustrated, but in some way things have been amended, we call 
corrective justice.151 To be concordant with our sense of justice, it is important that 
people have and receive both the right things and the right amount;152 this latter underlies 
the importance of proportionality.153 
Our senses of propriety and justice are heavily influenced by our affective associations. 
In terms of desires, our senses of propriety and justice are particularly influenced by our 
sense of self-importance and our self-involvement, i.e. by selfish motives. After all, we 
are more likely to overlook injustice and unfairness if we stand to benefit. Our positive 
attitude towards ill-gotten gains can easily override any sense of frustration that might 
otherwise been had concerning their procurement; we are prone to rationalization, 
selective interpretations, and wilful ignorance. It is an important part of the ongoing 
process of socialization that people – especially children – learn to control such selfish 
desires, such that they do what others expect rather than what they desire.  
Feelings of justice/injustice and propriety/impropriety often evoke an emotional response 
from us. Where our expectations – our sense of propriety and justice – have been fulfilled, 
we are likely to feel a sense of satisfaction, even elation. Where they have been frustrated, 
we are likely to feel angry, cheated, confused, or disappointed. The stronger the 
associations, the greater the concordance or disparity therewith, and the greater the sense 
of desirability and significance, the greater our emotional response is likely to be.  
With all of the foregoing in mind, we can discuss the distinction drawn between social 
and legal justice.154 Social justice pertains to that which we think people ought to have 
and receive – particularly in terms of wealth, opportunities, rights, and privileges – as a 
member of a social group or, indeed, as a human being. Legal justice, by contrast, is 
                                               
the same, for there are no relevant and compelling grounds upon which to differentiate them. For things 
that are scarce, there are more compelling arguments that they might have to be apportioned or divided 
unequally. For things that are abundant, including more abstract things such as certain rights and freedoms, 
arguments that they ought to be apportioned unequally are much less convincing; certainly, there is little 
by way of justification to be found in economics.  
151 As Zane put it, corrective justice has to do with “the enforcement of rights”, in cases where they have 
not initially been realized, and “the redress of wrongs”: Zane, The Story of Law, 111. 
152 Thus, injustice might arise because a person has had or received the wrong thing; they might have had 
or received too little or too much of the right thing. 
153 Where corrective justice is involved, it is commonly thought that the severity of the breach ought to be 
reflected by the severity with which the offending party is treated; that in criminal cases the punishment 
ought to be condign. What this punishment ought to be, and whether some additional punishment ought to 
be added as a deterrent, are questions for debate – as is whether leniency or clemency ought to be shown 
and, if so, when. 
154 It can be noted that whether social justice and legal justice present a true dichotomy has been questioned, 




narrower: it is what we think people ought to have and receive in accordance with law, 
formally defined – normally conceived of as being secured by certain procedural 
safeguards and as of being immune to moral considerations. Such justice might even fly 
in the face of what we think to be social justice. That said, to a greater or lesser extent, 
laws can be used to seek to achieve social justice, although, at least insofar as the 
distribution of wealth and material resources are concerned, there is an argument that 
perfect social justice is unachievable outside of communist or socialist political systems. 
Of course, whether social justice is an end worth pursuing and, if so, in what form, to 
what extent, and how achieved, are questions for another place.155   
3.15 Systematization 
Lawyers qua lawyers are rarely interested in the totality of fixed associations extant at 
any given time. Rather, they are interested in particular sets of fixed associations, which 
comprise the so-called legal system or legal order.  
Systematization is primarily achieved in four ways. First, by having some criteria for 
membership, i.e. fixed associations concerning what is – and what is not – to be 
considered a member of the set of valid laws. These can be called by Hart’s appellation: 
rules of recognition.156 In customary legal systems, the basic systematising rule is: do as 
has previously been done. This source of law might be called custom. Ascertaining what 
this is exactly, however, is notoriously difficult and, prima facie, would appear to make 
such a system resistant to change.157 Another straightforward rule is: do as a certain 
person or group directs. This might be some legislator; it might be members of the 
judiciary. Whatever the case, this source of law might be called proclamation; it is the 
most important feature of positive and command theories of law. Custom and 
                                               
155 For a discussion of social justice, see, e.g.: David Miller, Social Justice (Oxford University Press, 1979). 
See also: Jenkins, Social Order and the Limits of Law, chap. 18. 
156 Hart, The Concept of Law, 94–95. Hart’s ‘rules of recognition’ play much the same role as Kelsen’s 
‘authorizing norms’. Hart’s terminology is preferable for a couple of reasons. Firstly, the term ‘authorize’ 
rather implies some author, i.e. some individual or body that has determined or willed that things will be 
so. This approaches a voluntaristic fallacy. Kelsen does acknowledge that norms can be created by custom 
and so appears initially to avoid a voluntaristic fallacy, though he does speak of custom bringing about a 
‘collective will’. Secondly, the term ‘norm’ is also suspect and wont to mislead, particularly if it is 
interpreted, as Kelsen would have us interpret it, as being founded in ought-statements. Hart’s terminology 
is more neutral and, for that reason, better. For Kelsen, see: Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 8–9. 
157 It is worth mentioning another source of law in this connection, which might be called negative custom, 
i.e. avoid doing whatever was done, presumably with negative consequences, in the past. Such a system 
would probably prove unworkable and deleterious.  
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proclamation are possible rules and constitute possible sources, but neither is the be-all 
and end-all of law.158  
Second, systematisation is achieved by what might be called rules of ordering or rules 
of arrangement and priority, i.e. laws concerning which associations ought to take 
precedence in any given situation, particularly where there is potentiality for conflict.159 
In legal systems that recognize both customary and positive sources of law, these rules 
can prove a bone of contention: Can customary law defeat positive law? Can the Common 
Law defeat parliamentary or prerogative legislation?160 
Third, there are, as Hart suggested, rules of change,161 which are rules concerning how 
and in what ways the system might be altered; how fixed associations might be added, 
subtracted, or modified; how their form, interpretation, and impact might be changed.  
Fourth, there are what might be called rules of decision, which are not dissimilar to Hart’s 
rules of adjudication.162  These have to do with (a) who can decide whether or not 
particular fixed associations are valid within the system, and what their content and 
                                               
158 Kelsen argued that a legal order is “a system of norms whose unity is constituted by the fact that they 
all have the same reason for the validity; and the reason for the validity of a normative order is a basic 
norm…from which the validity of all norms of the order are derived”. In other words, legal orders are 
defined by reference to some basic norm or Grundnorm, which is the fountainhead, as it were, of the legal 
order. However, there is no reason why a legal system might not rest on multiple foundations, so long as 
those foundations are sufficiently compatible and coherent. There might be multiple rules of recognition. 
If this is the case, rules of ordering are especially important. For Kelsen’s discussion on this point, see: 
Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 31, 193–217. (Quote at 31) 
159 As Kelsen identified, conflicts might be partial or total, although the rest of his analysis presupposes his 
definition of norms, which we have not adopted. We can perhaps distinguish between fundamentally two 
kinds of conflict. Firstly, there are contradictions in terms, whereby certain associations are semantically 
incompatible; they do not make rational or logical sense together. For example, if one association said “theft 
is actively and intentionally depriving another of their property” and another association said “theft is the 
taking of another’s property, whether intentionally or unintentionally”, then there would be an 
incompatibility. Without some rule of ordering, it would be difficult to know which to apply in any given 
situation. Secondly, there is directive incompatibility, whereby certain associations direct different and 
mutually incompatible courses of action. This is particularly true where the directed behaviours are polar 
opposites. For example, if one association (notably, a sequential association) prescribes a certain behaviour 
and another proscribes it. Again, without some rules of ordering, and perhaps some additional qualifying 
associations, it would be difficult to know what one is expected to do in any given situation. For Kelsen, 
see: Kelsen, General Theory of Norms, 123.  
160 There have been many arguments, made through the centuries, that the Common Law is anterior to, and 
therefore superior to, others sources of law (making it a higher-order law), which theory, if accepted, would 
naturally give the Courts – and the judges therein – a great deal of power. These arguments are sometimes 
called forms of common law constitutionalism. For some recent critical discussions on this, see, e.g.: 
Thomas Poole, “Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism,” Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 23, no. 3 (2003): 435–54; Thomas Poole, “Questioning Common Law 
Constitutionalism,” Legal Studies 25, no. 1 (2005): 142–63; Adrian Vermeule, “Common Law 
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Reason,” Columbia Law Review 183 (2007): 1–36; Thomas Poole, 
“Constitutional Exceptionalism and the Common Law,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 7, no. 
2 (March 16, 2009): 247–74. 
161 Hart, The Concept of Law, 95–96. 
162 Hart, The Concept of Law, 96–97. 
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interpretation is to be; and (b) who can make determinations in individual cases. The 
former we might call the power of declaration;163 the latter, the power of adjudication. 
These help to give systems clarity, coherence, and integrity; further, their reality and 
strength. Rules of decision are, naturally, of great constitutional importance; they 
determine who are the interpreters and guarantors of the system.  
All of these mean that people can know what to expect at any given time; more 
specifically, they can have some sense as to whether those expectations are likely to be 
realized and, indeed, enforced.  
The legal system is, of course, but a subset of all of the extant fixed associations. There 
are some important consequences of this. The first is that some expectations regarding 
thought and behaviour will not be protected by the legal system; their fulfilment will have 
to be sought, if not guaranteed, by other means. The second is that, much as Hayek 
identified, in a changing society the legal system is likely only ever to be able to protect 
some expectations, but not all.164 Third, again building on Hayek, there is the fact that, in 
social groups with competing ideas as to what the laws ought to be, there will almost 
certainly be some number of people whose expectations are frustrated (perhaps, we might 
even say, systematically so); it must fall to the lot of judges and legislators to be the 
sources of this disappointment.165 
3.16 Species of Law 
Whilst the basic structure of law is always the same (i.e. it is a fixed association), there 
might be said to be a number of different species of law, existing on something of a 
spectrum. These we tend to distinguish in a number of ways, for example according to 
their: (1) gravity and solemnity; (2) consequences attendant to (non-)compliance; (3) 
investment of time, energy, and resources in their production, promulgation, and 
enforcement; etc.  
Those fixed associations whose frustration is rather considered a minor inconvenience, 
or that we do not feel ought necessarily to be strictly enforced, we tend to designate with 
words like “rules”, “conventions”, etc. They tend to be construed as more advisory than 
                                               
163  Declarative powers are, naturally, closely related to, and heavily reliant upon, the active rules of 
recognition.  
164 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 97. 
165 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 98. It should be added that whether or not they are successful in 
disappointing those expectations will remain to be seen; such disappointment is, of course, contingent on 
some sufficient number of people heeding what the judge or legislator has declared, which cannot be taken 
for granted.  
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compulsory; encouraged rather than exacted. We tend to reserve ‘law’ for those at the 
higher end of the spectrum – particularly for those fixed associations that have been 
carefully elucidated, enunciated, and systematized. 
It can sometimes be extraordinarily difficult to distinguish the different species of law – 
particularly in societies less reliant on formalized and ordered systems of written law. It 
can be problematic even in highly literate societies. For example, British constitutional 
lawyers are familiar with the problem of trying to distinguish so-called constitutional 
conventions from constitutional laws. 
There are two points to be made. Firstly, connotations, rather than essential structure, 
determine which word we use. It is better, for example, to speak of the rules of etiquette 
than the laws of etiquette, because the former has greater connotations of informality and 
triviality. Nevertheless, one might say the laws of etiquette and be perfectly well 
understood. Both rely on fixed associations. Secondly, the word we choose is a function 
of both the social group in question, and the time and place in question; it is relative. 
Different societies might develop different categories of law.166 Nevertheless, the precise 
connotations in particular social groups ought not to distract us from the fact that, 
ultimately, what is important is the psychological basis and impact; the fact that, beneath 
everything, is a fixed association. 
It is largely because I do not want to give the impression that laws are somehow special 
or exclusive to ‘developed’ or ‘advanced’ societies that I have called this theory the 
Associational Theory of Law, rather than, say, Rules. I want to make clear that laws are 
not special or exclusive to ‘developed’ or ‘advanced’ societies. As constitutional 
historians, and, indeed, as comparative lawyers, we need to judge each society according 
to its own idiom, yet never to allow superficial differences to distract us from the 
fundamental social and psychological principles at work.  
3.17 Substantive and Procedural Law 
A distinction is often drawn between substantive and procedural law, 167  which is 
roughly, though not exactly, equivalent to Hart’s distinction between primary and 
                                               
166 In this respect, then, we can agree with the conventionalist approach to law: “Law is whatever people 
identify and treat through their social practices as ‘law’ (or recht, or droit, etc.)”: Brian Z Tamanaha, A 
General Jurisprudence of Law and Society (Oxford University Press, 2001), 194. See further: Tamanaha, 
A Realistic Theory of Law, 73–77. 
167 These are sometimes referred to using the German terms of materielles Recht and formelles Recht. 
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secondary law.168 Procedural laws have to do more with the manner and sequence in 
which things are done; they have to do with process. They set out the steps by which 
certain outcomes are to be (properly and validly) achieved. Substantive laws, by contrast, 
are more orientated towards the nature, etc. of the persons, things, or actions they 
concern.169  
3.18 Coercion and Morality 
Hart asked the following two questions: (1) what distinguishes law from ostensibly non-
authoritative coercive orders; and (2) what distinguishes law from morality?170 These 
topics – of coercion and morality – can be addressed here.  
3.18.1 Coercion 
There is a sense in which there is no distinction between ‘law’, on the one hand, and ‘non-
authoritative coercive orders’ on the other, insofar as they are founded on fixed 
associations and give rise to fixed expectations. The difference is that we think the former 
to be legitimate and the latter to be illegitimate, i.e. the coercive orders are ‘non-
authoritative’ precisely because they are not recognized as being valid according to the 
rules of recognition that we accept. As such, the difference, insofar as there is one, is that, 
in the case of orders backed by threats given without authority, there is no fixed 
association between (a) receiving and (b) following such orders. It might be in one’s best 
interests to do so, but there is no general expectation, ceteris paribus, that one will do 
so.171 Of course, when there is some level of ‘general habitual obedience’,172 then the 
association between receiving and following will probably begin to solidify. 
In the case of non-authoritative coercive orders, there is obviously an incentive to comply 
or obey, lest the threat behind them be realized. The point is, of course, to make us feel 
as though we do not really have a choice – at least, not if we value certain things, e.g. our 
                                               
168 Hart, The Concept of Law, chap. 5. 
169 This idea that the subjects of law – the subjects of our fixed associations – are either persons, things, or 
actions can be found in the Institutes of Justinian: “Omne autem jus, quo utimur, vel ad personas pertinet 
vel ad res vel ad actiones” – All law pertains either to persons, things, or actions. See: Sanders, Institutes, 
13 (1.2.12). 
170 Hart, The Concept of Law, 13. 
171  In Kelsen’s terminology, this is because orders backed by threats given without authority (e.g. 
commands given by robbers or highwaymen) lack “objective meaning”; it is not recognized as an 
“objectively valid norm” of the legal system. It would be better to say, as we have said, that there is no 
shared expectation – for whatever reason – that such instructions ought to be followed; there is no fixed 
association between the receiving and following of those instructions. Indeed, there will likely often be 
fixed associations to the contrary, particularly if they are instructing one to undertake ‘illegal’ acts. For 
Kelsen, see: Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 44–45, 47, 50–51. 
172 See: Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence, 193–94; Hart, The Concept of Law, 23–24. 
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physical well-being, reputation, relationships, liberty, property, income, etc. The same 
technique – threatening or attacking things that we value – is not only a feature of non-
authoritative coercive orders, but also authoritative orders. Indeed, this technique – i.e. 
coercion – is often associated with law as a general phenomenon and, therefore, we need 
to think carefully about how they relate to one another. We have already said that there is 
a coercive fallacy – i.e. taking coercion, especially in the form of physical violence, to be 
essential to law – and this is the place to demonstrate this more fully.173   
We can begin by returning to the idea of expectations. If our fixed social expectations 
have been, or look as though they are going to be, frustrated, we often make this known.174 
We do this through ‘glances, gestures, words, or actions’,175 which are often imbued with 
a quality of aggressiveness. These we tend to direct towards those whom we believe to 
have transgressed, or to be in danger of transgressing, our expectations – or, if not towards 
them directly, then towards things that they value. This is done, if not merely to vent our 
emotions and display our disapproval, to encourage, if not enforce, what we deem to be 
within the realms of acceptable behaviour. If it has already passed that stage, then it is to 
encourage or enforce some remedial action or sign of contrition on the part of the offender 
(or those whom we take to be responsible in some way for them).176  
Much of the time, this aggression exists only as a potentiality. The fact that the things we 
value might be threatened or attacked might be enough to make us think and behave as 
some person(s) expects. If this potentiality is not enough, then it might become a threat. 
If this, again, is not enough, then some action might be taken. This might be to enforce 
the performance of the expectation; it might be to confiscate, damage, or otherwise 
adversely affect the things that we value – at least, for so long as we fail to fulfil the 
relevant expectations. This might be done subtly or blatantly, gently or violently. 
Whatever the case, the point is to make us feel, in some sense and to some degree, 
insecure. This is generally recognized to be an unpleasant experience and is something 
that most people wish to avoid. There can be little doubt, therefore, that coercion, which 
                                               
173 Supra, 3.2. 
174 Whether we feel ourselves to be in a position to demand compliance, in accordance with our fixed 
associations, depends on a number of things. For example, whether we think our expectations to be 
reasonable and their realization beneficial. However, it also depends upon whether or not we think we will 
be successful in obtaining it. Where the disagreeable action in question was undertaken by one’s superior, 
particularly one possessed of strength and power, it might be deemed prudent, if not also appropriate, to 
hold one’s tongue – for risk, perhaps, of losing it. Whether this is a calculation that should need to be made 
in a civilized society is a question for another time.  Cf. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 53–54. 
175 Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 46. 
176 Cf. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 46. 
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is based in aggression, can be an effective tool for compelling people to act in accordance 
with a particular set of expectations – for what we will later refer to as ‘potency’.177  
However, we must differentiate the methods used to give fulfilment to our expectations 
from the expectations themselves. Coercion is but one method. Explication, persuasion 
through argumentation, and education are three others.178 Which of these is the most 
effective, and which the most legitimate, are questions for another time. What can be said 
for the moment is that even though coercion is perhaps the most primal method, even 
though it can be singularly effective in some situations, and even though for many intents 
and purposes our actions are guided by coercion in some guise, these only serve to 
strengthen fixed associations. It does not transform them; it merely means that they are 
less easy to ignore and that we might refer to them as being ‘guaranteed’. 179  What 
ultimately defines them is their structure, even if the seriousness with which we regard 
them is determined by other things.180   
3.18.2 Morality 
Morality has the same essential structure as law; it is based on fixed associations. The 
thing that characterizes moral propositions is our firmly attaching to them certain 
affective associations, as well as often imbuing them with a sense of universality and 
invariability; they might also be characterized by certain modes of enforcement.181 The 
                                               
177 Infra, 4.11. 
178 In other words, people might be brought to fulfil certain fixed expectations, not because they are fearful 
of some negative consequences attending their non-conformity, but, rather, because they have been 
intellectually persuaded that it is how they should act or because it is simply how they have been taught to 
act. 
179  Cf. Weber: “The term ‘guaranteed law’ shall be understood to mean that there exists a ‘coercive 
apparatus’…, that is, that there are one or more persons whose special task it is to hold themselves ready to 
apply specially provided means of coercion (legal coercion) for the purpose of norm enforcement.” Weber, 
Economy and Society, 2013, 1:313. In other words, in Weber’s view, a law is ‘guaranteed’ if there is some 
person within the group’s constitution who has the activity of ensuring compliance with the laws of the 
group.  
180 Cf. Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 83–90. 
181 Hayek held that law and morality do not necessarily differ in their point of origin; it is not that law is 
‘deliberately made’, as legal positivists might have it, whereas morality is ‘spontaneously grown’. Rather, 
they differ in terms of the expectations as to how – and, more importantly, by whom – they are to be 
enforced. The enforcement of laws we associate with particular sets of people, whereas the enforcement of 
morality we associate with everyone. See: Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 222. As already 
recognized, there is an extent to which it is true that morality and law can be differentiated on the basis of 
their modes of enforcement, but this argument can be pushed too far. In many societies, there is little 
difference between law and morality; the former embodies the latter and, even if they are not thought to be 
the same thing, they are often thought to be complementary. Instead of being the special task of some 
persons to enforce the one and not their other, in their official capacity, it is the task of everybody to enforce 
both, albeit the especial task of some people (e.g. chief, elders, etc.) to ensure that they are both enforced. 
The difference between them arises when we begin to view ‘laws’ more dispassionately and without making 
their goodness/badness (in our estimation) a criterion of their validity; the difference becomes starker when 
we furthermore entrust the enforcement of ‘laws’ to some select groups of people, which may or may not 
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question remains, however, as to the extent to which our affective associations ought to 
be allowed to determine what we consider to be law.  
One of the tenets of legal positivism is the so-called separability thesis – the idea that 
there is no necessary connection between law and morality.182 The truth of this thesis can 
be understood in the distinction between validity and affective associations, which can 
exist and operate independently of one another, though they can equally be made 
dependent on one another. Thus, validity could be assessed purely in a logical and 
detached manner, probably according to certain procedural tests. Likewise, it could be 
made subject to some test of compatibility with our affective associations; morality might 
be made a precondition of legality.  
Whilst legality and morality are certainly separable, whether they should be kept separate 
is a more difficult question.183 The problem with morality, of course, is that it is largely 
subjective and opinion-based; to make legality subject to morality is to run the risk of 
making legality subject to the particular convictions of particular individuals or groups, 
which convictions may or may not be formed altruistically, and which might be to the 
detriment of some number of people. It is arguable, therefore, that, whilst morality might 
inform what substance we give to laws, and whilst it might inform our decisions as to 
whether or not we follow the law to the letter, morality ought not to be the basis and 
measure of legal validity. For the constitutional historian, the principal point to recognize 
is that, whilst law and morality are not necessarily connected, they often have been.   
3.19 Conclusions 
Laws are psychological phenomena. They are fixed associations, i.e. strongly held – often 
exclusive – associations between two or more things. These ‘things’ can be anything of 
which the mind can conceive – objects, actions, events, ideas, etc. Such associations 
might have to do with qualities, equivalences, categories, sequences, or evaluations. In 
all cases, they arise from the associational architecture of the brain and reflect the physical 
                                               
be in keeping with our moral sentiments, and the enforcement of ‘morality’ to social approbation and 
reproof. 
182 There are some positivists – ‘soft’ or ‘inclusive’ positivists, or ‘incorporationists’ – who allow that 
“morality can be a condition of legality: that the legality of norms can sometimes depend on their 
substantive (moral) merits, not just their pedigree or social source”. Further: “Incorporationism is the claim 
that positivism allows or permits substantive or content tests; it is not the view that positivism advocates, 
endorses, or requires such tests.” Jules L Coleman, “Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical 
Difference Thesis,” in Hart’s Postscript: Essays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of Law’ (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 100, 128. 
183 Cf. Leslie Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals,” New York University Law 
Review 83 (2008): 1035–36. 
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structure of the neural network. After all, the brain is really just a set of interconnected 
neurons; that this gives rise to interconnected ideas should not sound far-fetched. As these 
associations are often very strong, there arises a strong feeling that they will – or, at least, 
should – hold wherever they are relevant; that they should be followed and obeyed by 
everyone and everything, insofar as they are applicable and for so long as they are valid.184 
Our fixed associations follow from processes of (conscious or unconscious) learning, 
remembering, and forgetting; they are not static, but change and adapt over time. Such 
change, however, can be difficult, especially if previous associations are strongly held. 
Furthermore, even in spite of this ability to change, it remains nevertheless true that, at 
any given time, we will hold a number of fixed associations; this is our working model.  
These associations give rise to corresponding expectations about how that world will 
behave, which, as we have seen, is in no small part informed by how we want it to behave. 
We dislike it when things do not make sense to us, when there is dissonance between the 
‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds,185 – especially when our strongly held associations appear to 
have been frustrated.186 This sense of frustration is amplified when we feel that things 
could have easily been otherwise; when we feel that we have in some way been betrayed 
by those upon whom we rely or trust.187 We are social creatures and find it upsetting when 
                                               
184 There is an interesting metaphor of law as a master and commander, which is found in a passage in 
Herodotus. In this passage, a Greek defector, Demaratus, and the Persian king, Xerxes, are discussing the 
immanent Persian invasion of Greece. Xerxes is astonished that, given the enormous size of his army, 
Demaratus believes the Greeks will resist him. Demaratus replies as follows: “They are free – yes – but not 
entirely free; for they have a master, and that master is Law, which they fear much more than your subjects 
fear you. Whatever this master commands, they do; and his command never varies: it is never to retreat in 
battle, however great the odds, but always to stand firm, and to conquer or die.” For the Greeks, so thought 
Demaratus, there was no other way; their course of action was fixed. See: Herodotus, The Histories, ed. 
John Marincola, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt, 4th ed. (Penguin Books Ltd, 2003), 450 (7.104)[emph. added].   
185 Cf. Wexler, Brain and Culture, 155–82. 
186 Duguit, as noted earlier, made this sense of frustration – repeated across the social group to such a level 
as to produce action – central to his idea of law. He discussed this in the context of his discussion of the 
problem of the subordination of the State to law. His aim was to show that the State was not above the law, 
but rather subject to it, because law was a principle of social organization. If the State frustrated people’s 
expectations, regardless as to whether those expectations had been written or not, then the State might be 
held to account; there might be a concerted and organized reaction, coercing the State – or, rather, those 
acting in its name – to behave as it should and enforcing sanctions for deviations therefrom. It should be 
said that ‘frustration’ was not a word employed by Duguit. See: Duguit, “The Law and the State,” 3–5.  
187 As Stoicism and Buddhism both recognize, the strength of our reactions is largely a function of the 
number of expectations that we have and the level at which we set them. If we have a great many high 
expectations, then we leave ourselves open to greater and deeper disappointment more often. This is only 
compounded if our expectations are groundless or unreasonable in the first place. However, if our 
expectations are low and few, then we are more likely to accept things as they are and that things happen 
as they do. Moreover, if the expectations that we do have are carefully curated, then we will find that the 
opportunity for disappointment will be less. As many of our expectations relate to how other people behave, 
it is important, therefore, to understand what their expectations are if we are to set ours correctly in relation 
to them. This ability to better predict how people will behave not only means that we can better protect 
ourselves from conflict and harm, but also that we have a more solid grounding for cooperation. Indeed, if 
these expectations can be set mutually, whether implicitly or explicitly, then a great deal of time and energy 
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our social relations appear to mean less to others than they do to us – if the relationship 
had meant enough to them, surely they would not have decided to act in a way that would 
upset us. It is easy to see how our fixed associations and expectations feed into our sense 
of propriety, justice, and fairness.  
Our minds crave regularity, conformity, and simplicity. It means that the body does not 
have to be on high alert all of the time in case of possible threats; there is a feeling of 
comfort and security. This does not mean that there is necessarily a sense of complacency 
– there are still possible unknowns and threats, but, so long as the world generally appears 
to make sense, we can get by reasonably well. As will be argued in Appendix II, it is this 
craving for regularity, etc. that underpins the idea of the rule of law. However, we first 
need to understand more about how people come to hold particular associations. This is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
                                               
can be saved. This is perhaps what Luhmann was driving towards when he wrote: “The person who can 
anticipate others’ expectations…can enjoy an environment that is richer in possibilities and still live freer 
of disappointment. […]. He does not need to express or establish himself verbally,… he saves time… He 
can reserve the time-consuming and delicate communication processes…for the few important moments of 
conflict… // Unspoken agreements of this kind are part of the fundamental matter-of-factness in everyday 
social interaction.” Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, 26–27. 
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4 – The Associational Theory of Law (II): Transmission 
4.1 Introduction 
How do we come to have specific fixed associations? Why do we associate some things 
and not others? Moreover, if associations are psychological phenomena, how do such 
things appear to exist in multiple minds? How can different individuals come to hold the 
same associations? These questions will now be addressed. 
4.2 Innate or Instinctive Associations? 
There are arguments that some associations and laws are known innately or instinctively; 
they are pre-programmed.1 If true, greater credence might be given to Natural Law 
theories. These arguments, however, are problematic.  
We can begin by saying that there is no such thing as ‘innate knowledge’. It is a 
contradiction in terms. Knowledge only exists a posteriori, i.e. after experience. 
Everything theretofore is, at best, merely belief; it is not knowledge, because it has not 
been verified.2 However, might there be innate ideas? Possibly, but there is reason for 
scepticism – principally because it is practically impossible to identify any such ideas.3 
Instinct is a more difficult case. Many animals appear to perform complex behaviours 
instinctively. These are often said to form part of their so-called extended phenotype.4 
When it is remembered that humans developed out of earlier forms of life, there is reason 
to suppose that early Homo, and perhaps even early Homo sapiens, law was at least driven 
– if not determined – by instinct.5 However, instinct has a greater degree of contingency 
and variability than often supposed. Even though genes seemingly code for many 
                                                    
1 Innate applies to ideas or knowledge; instinctive applies to behaviours. These are often thought to be 
hardwired into the brain and independent of experience. 
2 This is a form of verificationism, which is the doctrine – closely associated with logical positivism – that 
only statements that have been or, at least, can be verified are meaningful. In other words, statements 
regarding the world and phenomena therein that cannot be said definitively to be either true or false are 
meaningless. For one of the classical expositions of verificationism, see: Alfred J Ayer, Language, Truth 
and Logic (Penguin Books, 1946). 
3 In the first place, many ideas that seem innate probably stem from early – perhaps even pre-natal – 
experiences. In the second place, everything that we can imagine appears to be composed of elements drawn 
from experience. It is impossible to imagine something not corresponding to our previous impressions 
whether in whole or fine, – regardless as to whether we can remember the specific instances from which 
those impressions came. Consequently, there is little evidence for any such ideas. On the origin of our ideas, 
see David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L Beauchamp, Oxford 
Philosophical Texts (Oxford University Press, 1999), §2. 
4 On this, see: Richard Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene, 2nd ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
5 This argument, concerning the role of instinct in early law, was made, for example, by Zane in the 1920s: 
John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law, ed. Charles J Reid Jr, 2nd ed. (Liberty Fund, Inc., 1998), chaps. 1–2. 
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behaviours, these often only produce predispositions and tendencies; their expression, 
and precise manner thereof, depend upon prevailing environmental conditions, as well as, 
often, processes of learning. Indeed, through epigenetic changes, the environment can 
control whether certain genes are activated or deactivated; this is sometimes heritable. As 
such, instinct tells us less about ‘fundamental laws’ and more about the conditions in 
which animals live and have lived; they reveal, rather, what has been theretofore an 
evolutionarily stable strategy.  
There is no guarantee that anything supposedly innate or instinctive is at all useful. 
Indeed, instinct might equip us with pre-programmed responses to certain kinds of 
stimuli, but there is nothing to say that they are the best or right responses. Moreover, if 
there are any innate or instinctive associations, they must assuredly be in the minority. 
The content of most – if not all – associations has to do with things in the world; these 
can only be known after experience. Thus, we might not be born entirely tabula rasa,6 
but in a very practical sense we are. The vast majority of our fixed associations are – and 
must be – developed through experience. Indeed, even if there were some element of 
innateness or instinct involved, this would fail miserably to explain the sheer number and 
diversity of human modes of thought and action, or, indeed, the details thereof.7 These 
must be gained by some other means. 
4.3 Memetics: The Background 
If an association is not innate or instinctive, then it must in some way have been learned. 
Learning can take place in many ways. For example, through observation or interaction 
with feedback (the latter often in the form of trial-and-error). Many of our fixed 
associations are thus developed – particularly concerning the behaviour of the natural 
world, i.e. our sense of forces, motion, physical properties, etc. Even concerning these, 
                                                    
6 Cf. Locke’s argument that the mind, which is as “white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas”; 
it is furnished with content by experience. It is upon experience that “all our knowledge is founded, and 
from it ultimately derives itself”. Locke’s is a form of radical empiricism. See: John Locke, “An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding [1690],” in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding with the 
Second Treatise of Government (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 2014), 94 (2.1.2). 
7 Ruth Benedict put the point quite categorically: “Not one item of [man’s] tribal social organization, of his 
language, of his local religion, is carried in the germ-cell”. To illustrate her point, she took the example of 
feral children, abandoned in their infancy, who – independent of social contact – do not develop as other 
children do who grow up amongst others; indeed, they seem distinctly un-human. She also takes the 
example of children from one part of the world who are brought up in another; their beliefs, actions, etc., 
and especially their language, seem to be determined by their place of upbringing – and, we might add, 
those people bringing them up – rather than by any supposed genetic cause. For Benedict, humans are 
marked by ‘plasticity’ and there is little foundation for ideas of ‘racial purism’: “[H]eredity is an affair of 
family lines. Beyond that it is mythology.” Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1989), 12–16, 23–24, quotes at 12 and 15. 
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however, we often have need to learn directly from others, especially when it comes to 
the details, which are not immediately obvious, and which often require special 
equipment and technology to understand (e.g. atomic theory, electromagnetism, etc.). In 
other words, there needs must be some process of teaching. In this context, this is, 
naturally, the purpose of science education.  
Whilst we might, to a certain extent, learn about the physical world independently, most 
everything else is learned exclusively from others; it is acquired through social learning 
– often through symbolic communication.8 This includes all culture and human law. To 
understand how this learning process takes place and how this learning is passed on, we 
need to turn to the field of memetics. Before proceeding, however, it would be worthwhile 
explaining a little of the origin of the field and the nature of the present contribution. 
Memetics is the study of memes,9 which idea began in Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene, first 
published in 1976. The central purpose of this book was to advocate a gene-centric view 
of evolution, but Dawkins, in a chapter entitled “Memes: The New Replicators”, noted 
some of the similarities between ‘genetic’ and ‘cultural’ transmission.10 Naturally, these 
ideas were heavily informed by ideas from biology and zoology,11 and, as genetic 
transmission has the ‘gene’ as its unit, Dawkins coined the term ‘meme’ to stand as the 
unit of cultural transmission.12 
                                                    
8 Cf. Mark V Flinn, “Culture and the Evolution of Social Learning,” Evolution and Human Behaviour 18 
(1997): 25. 
9 Or, as Heylighen put it, building on Moritz: “Memetics can then be defined as the theoretical and empirical 
science that studies the replication, spread and evolution of memes”. Francis Heylighen, “What Makes a 
Meme Successful? Selection Criteria for Cultural Evolution,” in Proc. 15th Int. Congress on Cybernetics, 
1998, 418. 
10 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2006), chap. 11. See further: 
Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, chap. 6. 
11 Maitland showed great foresight when he said that “I am also very far from denying that every advance 
of biological science, but more especially any popularization of its results, will supply the historian and the 
political theorist with new thoughts, and with new phrases which will make old thoughts truer. I can 
conceive that a century hence political events will be currently described in a language which I could not 
understand so full will it be of terms borrowed from biology, or, for this also is possible, from some science 
of which no one has yet laid the first stone.” Frederic William Maitland, “The Body Politic,” in The 
Collected Papers of Frederic William Maitland, ed. Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, vol. 3 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1911), 289. 
12 “We need a name for the new replicator, a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of transmission, or a unit 
of imitation. ‘Mimeme’ comes from a suitable Greek root, but I want a monosyllable that sounds a bit like 
‘gene’. I hope my classicist friends will forgive me if I abbreviate mimeme to meme. If it is any consolation, 
it could alternatively be thought of as being related to ‘memory’, or to the French word même. It should be 
pronounced to rhyme with ‘cream’.” Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 192. It can be noted that a similar term, 
mneme (after Mneme, the muse of memory in Greek mythology), was employed by Richard Semon (1859-
1918) at the start of the twentieth century, which term was similarly connected with brains and evolution – 
but there the comparison ends. Semon argued that memory – i.e. learning – leaves a physical legacy on the 
brain, which, insofar as it goes, seems to be correct, but he then continued to argue that such a physical 
legacy might be inherited (in Lemarckian fashion). See: Richard Semon, Die Mneme: Als Erhaltendes 
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As Dawkins himself noted,13 he was by no means the first to notice the analogy between 
genetic and cultural transmission, to offer an explanation for socio-cultural ‘evolution’. 
Indeed, there has been a long history of attempts to apply evolutionary ideas – whether 
consciously or unconsciously, in those terms or not – outside the realm of biology, i.e. to 
social, technological, legal, and cultural change. Some of these (e.g. Jones,14 Comte,15 
Savigny16) wrote before the publication of Darwin’s seminal work on evolution; others 
(e.g. Spencer,17 Maine,18 Tylor,19 Morgan,20 Hobhouse21) wrote or, at least, published in 
its wake,22 even if these new ideas drawn from biology were not always fully incorporated 
                                                    
Prinzip Im Wechsel Des Organischen Geschehens (Wilhelm Engelmann, 1904); Richard Semon, The 
Mneme, trans. Louis Simon (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1921). 
13 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 190. 
14 The philologist, Sir William Jones (1746-94), was among the early proponents – and one of the most 
influential, though by no means the first – of the theory that Sanskrit, Greek, and Latin, and possibly other 
languages besides, all shared a common root, which he called ‘Indo-European’. These other languages, 
therefore, by certain degrees, had evolved out of Indo-European and diverged from one another. Mesoudi 
has suggested that this philological connection had an influence on Darwin, not only because it had already 
gained some traction by the 1830s, but also because Darwin’s cousin and brother-in-law, Hensleigh 
Wedgwood, was a prominent philologist – in fact, founder of the Philological Society of London. Indeed, 
Darwin himself noted the similarities in his The Descent of Man. See: Alex Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution: 
How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences (University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 112–13. 
15 Auguste Comte (1798-1857) is noteworthy for his belief that there was a ‘law of three stages’, which 
held that scientific disciplines, and societies in general, must and do pass through the theological, then the 
metaphysical, then the positive stage: Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, ed. 
Harriet Martineau, vol. 1 (George Bell & Sons, 1896). 
16 Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779-1861), part of the historicist school (see, supra, 2.6) argued that laws 
– and, we might add by extension, constitutions – develop concurrently with nations or peoples; as they 
become more developed, so do their laws and constitutions. See: Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Of the 
Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, trans. Abraham Hayward (Littlewood & Co., 
1831). 
17 Herbert Spencer (1820-1903). Spencer began propounding evolutionary ideas before Darwin’s Origin 
was published, but he became a staunch defender of Darwinian evolution. See, esp.: Herbert Spencer, The 
Evolution of Society: Selections from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert Leonard 
Carneiro (The University of Chicago Press, 1967). 
18 Henry Sumner Maine (1822-88). Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early 
History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, ed. Frederick Pollock, 10th ed. (John Murray, 1909). 
Maine’s Ancient Law was first published in 1861, although, as Burrow noted, much of it was based on 
material from perhaps even as early as the early 1840s onwards, meaning that it would be wrong to assume 
that it was largely derivative of Darwin’s ideas: John Wyon Burrow, Evolution and Society: A Study in 
Victorian Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1966), 139–40. 
19 Edward Burnett Tylor (1832-1917). Edward Burnett Tylor, Primitive Culture: Researches into the 
Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom, 6th ed., vol. I & II (John 
Murray, 1920). See also his earlier work: Edward Burnett Tylor, Researches into the Early History of 
Mankind and the Development of Civilization, 2nd ed. (John Murray, 1870). 
20 Lewis Henry Morgan (1818-81). Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society, or Researches in the Lines of 
Human Progress from Savagery through Barbarism to Civilization (Henry Holt and Company, 1877). 
21 Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse (1864-1929). See, esp.: Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, Morals in 
Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics, 5th ed. (Henry Holt and Company, 1925); Leonard Trelawney 
Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory (Columbia University Press, 1911); Leonard Trelawney 
Hobhouse, Social Development: Its Nature and Conditions (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1924). 
22 For the wider context, see: Henry Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (Penguin 
Books, 1994), esp. chap. 3. 
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(e.g. Tarde).23 However, even after Darwin, biological evolution and its exact 
mechanisms were still poorly understood and, in many respects, these works – largely of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – were products of their time. They often 
argued some form of sociobiology (or, indeed, scientific racism) and were ethnological 
in character;24 rested on notions of development, which were linear (perhaps, even, 
unilinear or rectilinear), sequential,25 stadial,26 and progressive (i.e. from simple to 
complex, from primitive to advanced, etc.),27 – even orthogenetic; conceived of social 
groups and their cultures as organisms or ‘organic wholes’, which have an existence or 
reality apart from that of their members, in some cases even denying those members a 
true and meaningful existence outside of these social organic wholes;28 and often relied 
                                                    
23 Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) argued that social change was driven by a “logical duel” between imitation 
and innovation. On the relationship between his thought and “the laws of heredity”, he had the following 
to say in the preface to the second edition: “The laws of heredity that have been so well studied by naturalists 
do not contradict in any respect the ‘laws of imitation’. On the other hand, they complete them, and there 
is no concrete sociology that could separate these two orders of consideration. If I separate them here, it is, 
I repeat, because the proper subject of this work is sociology pure and abstract. Besides, I do not fail to 
point out what their place is in the biological considerations which I am purposefully ignoring because I 
am leaving them to more competent hands.” Gabriel Tarde, The Laws of Imitation, trans. Elsie Clews 
Parsons (Henry Holt and Company, 1903), quote at xxi-xxii. 
24 In the legal context, see, e.g.: Roscoe Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (The Macmillan Company, 
1923), chap. 4 ("Ethnological and Biological Interpretations"). 
25 E.g., Spencer: “As between infancy and maturity there is no shortcut by which there may be avoided the 
tedious process of growth and development through insensible increments; so there is no way from the 
lower forms of social life to the higher, but one passing through small successive modifications.” Herbert 
Spencer, The Study of Sociology (Henry S. King and Co., 1873), 402. 
26 The idea of stages of human history is very old. The idea can be seen, for example, in Hesiod’s Five Ages 
of Man in his Works and Days, in which humankind passed successively through a Golden Age, Silver 
Age, Bronze Age, Heroic Age, and, finally, an Iron Age. Unlike the Victorians and Edwardians who saw 
successive stages representing progress, Hesiod was inclined to see them as representing, on the whole, a 
process of degeneration and deterioration, ‘the gradual increase of evil’. See: Hugh G Evelyn-White, ed., 
Hesiod, The Homeric Hymns, and Homerica, trans. Hugh G Evelyn-White (William Heinemann, 1914), 
xviii,10-17. There are, of course, parallels here to the idea in Christian theology of the perfection of the 
‘state of nature’, as it existed in the Garden of Eden prior to the Fall of Man, i.e. of a superior age followed 
by an inferior one; a view of history profoundly nostalgic in tone. However, it can be said that the Fall 
perhaps represented a momentous downgrading rather than a trend of general decline – though, for some, 
certainly, there was the idea of the ‘noble savage’ and the idea that ‘civilization’ did not necessarily improve 
Man, but instead fuelled his vice and decadence, such that, as with Hesiod, change did not necessarily 
herald improvement.  
27 Spencer, at least, can perhaps be exempted from some of these charges: Spencer, The Evolution of 
Society: Selections from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, xlii–xliii. Insofar as evolution is 
deemed to be progressive, it would seem that Parsons cannot be exempted from these older modes of 
thought, see: Talcott Parsons, The Evolution of Society, ed. Jackson Toby (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977). It is 
worth noting here the work of Schwartz and Millar, who argued that the evolution of legal systems could 
be measured according to a Guttman scale of counsel, mediation, and police; that there was an ‘evolutionary 
sequence’ in the ‘development of legal institutions’: Richard D Schwartz and James C Miller, “Legal 
Evolution and Societal Complexity,” American Journal of Sociology 70, no. 2 (1964): 159–69. 
28 This latter was particularly a feature of idealist thought. For example, TH Green stated that “in saying 
that the human spirit can only realise itself, that the divine idea of man can only be fulfilled, in and through 
persons, we are not denying but affirming that the realisation and fulfilment can only take place in and 
through society. Without society, no persons…” Similarly, Ritchie wrote that the individual “apart [from 
his social surroundings] is a mere abstraction – a logical ghost, a metaphysical spectre, which haunts the 
habitations of those who have derided metaphysics. The individual, apart from all relations to a community, 
is a negation.” Thomas Hill Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. AC Bradley, 4th ed. (Oxford University 
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on ideas of ontogenesis (i.e. organic growth, from conception and birth through to 
maturity and senescence) rather than descent with modification (and, therefore, were not 
true evolutionary theories in the Darwinian sense).29 
As the twentieth century progressed, and as the fields of anthropology, zoology, etc. 
developed, these evolutionary theories were replaced by ones that were imbued with a 
greater sense of indeterminacy, contingency, individualism, and relativism. An excellent, 
though perhaps underappreciated, example of a work along these lines is Linton’s The 
Study of Man, published in 1936.30 However, on the whole, there remained a lack of 
sustained systematic, theoretical, and broadly scientific treatment of the subject – again, 
in no small part due to the fact that the mechanisms of evolution were still being 
discovered.31 This situation began to change in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Around the same time as Dawkins was writing The Selfish Gene, a number of other 
writers were also starting to apply the new biological discoveries outside the realms of 
biology. Perhaps most important here are the works of Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman,32 and 
Boyd and Richerson,33 which attempted to develop (rather technical and ‘modular’34) 
mathematical models to explain and predict cultural evolution, and together form the 
foundations of modern cultural evolutionary theory.35 Naturally, this was a very similar 
endeavour to the growing field of memetics, which expanded Dawkins’ short chapter into 
                                                    
Press, 1899), 225 [emph. added]; David George Ritchie, The Principles of State Interference: Four Essays 
on the Political Philosophy of Mr. Herbert Spencer, J.S. Mill, and T.H. Green, 4th ed. (Swan Sonnenschein 
& Co., 1902), 11. See further: Sandra M den Otter, British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in 
Late Victorian Thought (Oxford University Press, 1996), 156–60; Avital Simhony, “Idealist Organicism: 
Beyond Holism and Individualism,” History of Political Thought 12, no. 3 (1991): 515–35. 
29 It is interesting to note that the ontogenetic approach is largely in keeping with the etymological roots 
and first application of the word ‘evolution’, even if not with the modern idea. ‘Evolution’ comes from the 
Latin evolutio (‘to unroll’) and was first used in the context of developing foetuses in the womb: Peter J 
Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea, 2nd ed. (University of California Press, 1989), 9. 
30 Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction (Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936). See also his 
Tree of Culture, published posthumously in 1955, which followed on from many of the ideas presented in 
The Study of Man: Ralph Linton, The Tree of Culture, ed. Adelin Linton (Alfred A Knopf, 1955). 
31 It is worthwhile marking Linton’s conclusions to his Study of Man: “Those who have read thus far are 
probably disappointed that they have learned so little about the nature of society and culture and their 
processes. We have made a few generalizations but have failed to present any neatly formulated laws. In 
nearly every chapter we have raised more questions than we have been able to answer”. Linton, The Study 
of Man, 488. 
32 See, esp.: LL Cavalli-Sforza and MW Feldman, Cultural Transmission and Evolution: A Quantitative 
Approach (Princeton University Press, 1981). 
33 See, esp.: Robert Boyd and Peter J Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1985); Robert Boyd and Peter J Richerson, The Origin and Evolution of Cultures (Oxford 
University Press, 2005); Robert Boyd and Peter J Richerson, Not By Genes Alone: How Culture 
Transformed Human Evolution (The University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
34 Boyd and Richerson, Orig. Evol. Cult., 106. 
35 One of the most important modern representatives of cultural evolutionary theory is the work of Mesoudi. 
See, esp.: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution. 
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a field, flourishing in the 1990s and early 2000s.36 However, the fields of cultural 
evolutionary theory and memetics have largely run separate courses.37 This is a pity, 
because they are to a great extent complementary:38 cultural evolutionary theories tend to 
be more macro in orientation in that they focus on patterns of patterns, whereas memetics 
tends to be more micro in orientation in that it focuses on individual patterns (though, as 
will be seen, memetic analysis can also be carried to patterns of patterns). Indeed, the 
value of memetics is that it provides the terminology and concepts to describe that micro-
level, more so perhaps than cultural evolutionary theories, and does not presuppose the 
existence of identifiable and delineable overarching patterns of patterns (i.e. ‘cultures’). 
It is true that there have been many works of jurisprudence sympathetic to, or informed 
by, the evolutionary approach.39 However, there are a few points to be made. First, those 
                                                    
36 See, esp. Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (Oxford University Press, 1999); Susan Blackmore, 
“Evolution and Memes: The Human Brain as a Selective Imitation Device,” Cybernetics and Systems: An 
International Journal 32, no. 1–2 (2001): 225–55; Kate Distin, The Selfish Meme (Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). Also: Elan Moritz, “Memetic Science: I - General Introduction,” Journal of Ideas 1, no. 1 
(1990): 3–23; Plotkin, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge; Daniel C Dennett, Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (Penguin Books, 1996); Jack M Balkin, Cultural 
Software: A Theory Of Ideology (Yale University Press, 1998); Robert Aunger, The Electric Meme: A New 
Theory of How We Think (The Free Press, 2002); Daniel C Dennett, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a 
Natural Phenomenon (Penguin Books, 2007); Richard Brodie, Virus of the Mind: The Revolutionary New 
Science of the Meme and How It Can Help You (Hay House, 2009).  
37 This can be seen in the fact that books on the subject of ‘cultural evolution’ tend only to make passing 
and cursory mention of the idea of memes, see e.g.: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Cultural Transmission 
and Evolution, 70; Boyd and Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process, 37; Mesoudi, Cultural 
Evolution, 41–42. By a like token, Boyd and Richerson have accused memeticists – not entirely fairly – of 
being “rather incurious about the existing scholarship on the nature of cultural transmission”: Boyd and 
Richerson, Orig. Evol. Cult., 378. Indeed, Boyd and Richerson, in particular, have been vocal in their doubts 
as to the value of memetics: Robert Boyd and Peter J Richerson, “Memes: Universal Acid or a Better 
Mousetrap?,” in Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science, ed. Robert Aunger (Oxford 
University Press, 2001), 143–61; Boyd and Richerson, Orig. Evol. Cult., 377–78; Boyd and Richerson, Not 
By Genes Alone, 6–7, 81–98. (Although, Boyd and Richerson had adopted the meme in their 1997 paper, 
written with Mulder and Durham, “Are Cultural Phylogenies Possible?”, reprinted in: Boyd and Richerson, 
Orig. Evol. Cult., chap. 16.). These criticisms have been countered by Distin: Distin, The Selfish Meme, 
108–12.  
38 There is an extent to which the fields of cultural evolution and memetics have been united in the person 
– if not the work – of Distin, whose The Selfish Meme was later followed by her Cultural Evolution, 
although she avoided any discussion of memes in this latter book for fear of “distracting readers who are 
used to dismissing memes out of hand” (a decision which she later regretted in her foreword to the Chinese 
edition of The Selfish Meme in 2014). See: Kate Distin, Cultural Evolution (Cambridge University Press, 
2010). The foreword, in English, can be found at Distin’s website: 
https://www.distin.co.uk/kate/pdf/Foreword_Chinese.pdf [Accessed 25 January 2020].   
39 On jurisprudential works in this context, see, infra, 5.2.4. Further, e.g.: MBW Sinclair, “The Use of 
Evolution Theory in Law,” Articles by Maurer Faculty 2271 (1987); AG Keller, “Law in Evolution,” Yale 
Law Journal 28, no. 8 (1919): 769–83; Peter Stein, Legal Evolution: The Story of an Idea (Cambridge 
University Press, 1980); Robert C Clark, “The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution,” Yale Law 
Journal 90 (1981): 1238–74; Margaret Gruter and Paul Bohannan, eds., Law, Biology and Culture: The 
Evolution of Law (Ross-Erikson, Inc., 1983); E Donald Elliott, “The Evolutionary Tradition in 
Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Review 85 (1985): 38–94; Herbert J Hovenkamp, “Evolutionary Models in 
Jurisprudence,” Texas Law Review 64, no. 4 (1985): 645–85; Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law (The 
John Hopkins University Press, 1985); Alan Watson, “The Evolution of Law: Continued,” Law and History 
Review 5, no. 2 (1987): 537–70; W Jethro Brown, “Law and Evolution,” Yale Law Journal 29, no. 4 (1920): 
394–400; MBW Sinclair, “Evolution in Law: Second Thoughts,” University of Detroit Mercy Law Review 
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works written before the latter decades of the twentieth century could not have benefitted 
from the insights of cultural evolutionary theory or memetics, or, indeed, the advances in 
the biosciences upon which those fields are based. Therefore, these earlier theories do not 
represent the best models. Second, of those written since the mid-1970s, few have drawn 
specifically on memetics,40 which means that many have missed out on a very useful 
intellectual point of focus. Third, few jurisprudential works along these lines, whether 
written before or after the mid-1970s, have aspired to be sustained theoretical and 
systematic accounts. Rather, they have typically been content to suggest that there might 
be some benefits to the evolutionary approach and have suggested a number of specific 
applications. As interesting as these might be, they do not in themselves provide a solid 
basis for rebuilding a field such as constitutional history. Indeed, this is compounded by 
the fact that there have been hardly any attempts to apply memetics to constitutional 
theory,41 or constitutional history.  
                                                    
71, no. 1 (1993): 31–58; Owen D Jones, “Law and Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and Opportunities,” 
Journal of Contemporary Health Law & Policy 10, no. 1 (1994): 265–83; Owen D Jones, “Evolutionary 
Analysis in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse,” North Carolina Law Review 75, no. 4 
(1997): 1117–1242; Kingsley R Browne, “An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment: Seeking 
Roots in Biology Rather than Ideology,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 8 (1997): 5–78; Owen D 
Jones and Timothy H Goldsmith, “Law and Behavioral Biology,” Columbia Law Review 105, no. 2 (2005): 
405–502; Mauro Zamboni, “From ‘Evolutionary Theory and Law’ to a ‘Legal Evolutionary Theory,’” 
German Law Journal 9, no. 4 (2008): 515–46; Simon Deakin, “Law as Evolution, Evolution as Social 
Order: Common Law Method Reconsidered,” Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 43, 2015; 
Karrigan S Bork, “An Evolutionary Theory of Administrative Law,” SMU Law Review Article 72, no. 1 
(2019): 81–138. An up-to-date list of selected publications is also currently maintained by The Society for 
Evolutionary Analysis in Law (SEAL) on their website: https://www.vanderbilt.edu/seal/scholarly-
resources/.  
40 See, e.g.: Michael S Fried, “The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective,” Jurimetrics 1, 
no. 3 (1999): 291–316; Jeffrey Evans Stake, “Are We Buyers or Hosts - A Memetic Approach to the First 
Amendment,” Alabama Law Review 52, no. 4 (2001): 1213–68; Jeffrey Evans Stake, “Pushing 
Evolutionary Analysis of Law or Evolving Law: Design without a Designer,” Florida Law Review 53 
(2001): 875–92; Neal A Gordon, “The Implications of Memetics for the Cultural Defense,” Duke Law 
Journal 50, no. 6 (2001): 1809–34; Simon Deakin, “Evolution for Our Time: A Theory of Legal Memetics,” 
Current Legal Problems 55, no. 1 (2002): 1–42. There is a certain extent to which one might also count 
Drout’s work here, who discussed the Rule of St Benedict in the context of memetics: Michael David Craig 
Drout, How Tradition Works: A Meme-Based Cultural Poetics of the Anglo-Saxon Tenth Century (Arizona 
Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2006). 
41 Almeida provides something of an exception here, although the memetic approach is far from being fully 
incorporated here: Fábio Portela Lopes de Almeida, “Constitution: The Evolution of a Societal Structure 
(PhD Thesis)” (Universidade de Brasília, 2016), 38. Almeida’s thesis, it should be said, has to do with the 
emergence and evolution of constitutionalism (see esp. pp. 45 and 60), which he argues is both a modern 
phenomenon and ‘an evolutionary adaptation’ (p. 298 and chap. 5), rather than with the nature of 
constitutions and laws (concerning which Almeida is not terribly clear) as widespread phenomena, and how 
they change over time, which is our present concern. Indeed, he views constitutions, as a phenomenon, as 
‘a gradual product of evolution’ (p. 368), whereas, in the present view, only specific constitutions are – to 
a greater or lesser extent – the products of evolution. Moreover, his thesis seems largely committed to 
proving the value of constitutionalism – its evolutionary fitness, as it were – and its status as a more 
advanced form of social organization. His thesis is also not within the approach of methodological 
reductionism, and, indeed, supports a type of functionalism and group-level selection, which all mark 
significant points of departure from the present thesis, as does his stress upon the ‘radical difference’ 
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The present aim, therefore, is to develop a systematic account, based on cultural 
evolutionary theory and memetics, which sets out a bank of vocabulary and concepts – 
an analytical toolkit, as it were – that can be used. Further, it is to show how all of this 
can be applied to laws and constitutions – indeed, how it can be used to understand not 
only law and constitutions, but also legal and constitutional change as a (natural) process. 
It is also something of a defence of the value and explanatory power of the memetic 
approach, which in the last fifteen years has fallen from favour,42 as well as of 
evolutionary approaches more generally – at least, in the jurisprudential context.43   
4.4 Memes as Replicators 
A meme is a pattern of thought or behaviour, which is capable of being copied through 
some process of (social) learning.44 It is, to borrow from genetics, a replicator – a thing 
                                                    
between pre-modernity and modern times in terms of the types of political organization extant (see esp. pp. 
332 and 385) – they might be different, certainly, but not radically so. 
42 The debate about the memetic approach was epitomized in a collection of essays by prominent proponents 
and critics of the field: Robert Aunger, ed., Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science 
(Oxford University Press, 2001). There have been few works in the field since the mid-2000s, even in spite 
of Gers’ defence in the latter half of the decade: Matt Gers, “The Case for Memes,” Biological Theory 3, 
no. 4 (2008): 305–15.   
43 Hutchinson and Archer, for example, have doubted the value of evolutionary approaches, at least in the 
context of the common law: “Despite its obvious academic allure and apparent intellectual pedigree, 
evolutionary theory has little to offer traditional efforts to understand the development and direction of the 
common law.” Allan C Hutchinson and Simon Archer, “Of Bulldogs and Soapy Sams: The Common Law 
and Evolutionary Theory,” Current Legal Problems 54 (2001): 31 and 58, quote at 31. 
44 For other definitions of ‘meme’, see, e.g.: Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 192; Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea, 143; Blackmore, The Meme Machine, 43; Aunger, Darwinizing Cult. Status Memet. as a Sci., 5–7. 
All definitions agree that memes are replicators and that they are transferred by non-genetic means. 
However, whereas these other definitions tend to place the idea of ‘units’, ‘elements’, or ‘vehicles’ (of 
‘culture’ or ‘cultural information’) at the centre, I have placed the idea of ‘patterns’ at the centre. Whilst 
patterns are identifiable, they do not necessarily make memes seem so neatly defined, discrete, and 
particulate as ‘units’, etc. might suggest, which has been one of the criticisms levelled against memetics: 
“In reality, culture simply does not normally divide up into naturally discernible bits”. (Maurice Bloch, “A 
Well-Disposed Social Anthropologist’s Problems with Memes,” in Darwinizing Culture: The Status of 
Memetics as a Science, ed. Robert Aunger (Oxford University Press, 2001), 194.) The definition suggested 
here does not attempt to divide up culture, but, rather, suggests what might make up culture. This definition 
can be contrasted with the various definitions of ‘culture’ offered by cultural evolutionary theories. The 
similarities are plain, for example, to Boyd and Richerson’s definition: “We define culture as information 
– skills, attitudes, beliefs, values – capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour, which they acquire from 
others by teaching, imitation, and other forms of social learning.” What are here called ‘memes’, Boyd and 
Richerson would call a ‘cultural variant’: Boyd and Richerson, Orig. Evol. Cult., 105. Indeed, there have 
been many different names for ‘parts’ of culture. For example, Linton used the terms ‘item’, ‘trait’, ‘trait 
complex’, and ‘activity’: Linton, The Study of Man, 397–400. Along these lines, we can also contrast a 
slightly different approach to culture from zoology: “Cultures are behavioral variants induced by social 
modification [as opposed to phylogenetic or ecological causes], creating individuals who will in turn 
modify the behavior of others in the same way.” Hans Kummer, Primate Societies: Group Techniques of 
Ecological Adaptation (Aldine Atherton Inc., 1971), 13 [emph. added]. The beauty of the term ‘meme’ is 
not only the fact that it is economical and specific, and that it encompasses thought as well as behaviour, 
but also the fact that, unlike terms like ‘cultural variants’, it does not assume the existence of some wider 
net to which reference must be had; memes might be part of a wider pattern of patterns, but they need not 
be defined thereby. 
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which can be replicated.45 Whether of thought or behaviour, these always resolve down 
to patterns (i.e. associations) in the brain – the place where they are perceived, encoded, 
and whence they are later retrieved; this is their fundamental substrate.46 Let us take the 
idea, for example, that sheriffs collect taxes. Someone who has never heard of sheriffs or 
taxation will never have this idea. Even those with both ideas will not necessarily link 
them together; they might see sheriffs as law-enforcers rather than tax collectors. This 
bundle of associations needs to be learned from others. In other words, in order to have 
this idea, we need to copy or assimilate their associations – if not perfectly then, at least, 
analogously. This passing of a pattern or trait from one to another, where the latter is a 
copy – whether perfectly or imperfectly – of the former and is caused by the former, is 
equivalent to what biologists call heredity.47 
Like other replicators, successful memes have three qualities: longevity, fecundity, and 
copying-fidelity.48 Their lifespan and replication rate will be such that they have greatest 
opportunity to be reproduced accurately and reliably as many times as possible. Lifespan 
and reproductive accuracy are largely a function of memory;49 replication rate a function 
of opportunity, suitability, and urgency. As we know from experience, not all ideas are 
especially memorable, remarkable, or survive the copying process well. Not all memes 
                                                    
45 This is slightly different to Dawkins’ definition of ‘replicator’, which he defined as a thing with the 
“property of being able to create copies of itself”: Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 15. The reason for this 
difference is that Dawkins’ definition implies that the replicator has the intrinsic ability of being able to 
generate copies of itself; that replicators are active. However, all we claim for it is that it is capable of being 
copied; they are, or can be, passive. 
46 As Dawkins has said: “A meme should be regarded as a unit of information residing in the brain… It has 
a definite structure, realized in whatever physical medium the brain uses for storing information. If the brain 
stores information as a pattern of synaptic connections, a meme should in principle be visible under a 
microscope as a definite pattern of synaptic structure. If the brain stores information in a ‘distributed’ form, 
the meme would not be localizable on a microscopic slide, but I would still want to regard it as physically 
residing in the brain.” Dawkins, The Extended Phenotype, 109. Cf. Plotkin who argued, following Kitcher, 
that for there to be any scientific understanding of culture, there must be some ‘psychological’ theory 
underlying it for “culture is, and can only be, a product of human minds”: Henry Plotkin, “Culture and 
Psychological Mechanisms,” in Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science, ed. Robert 
Aunger (Oxford University Press, 2001), 72. Cf. also: Aunger, The Electric Meme, esp. chap. 7; Boyd and 
Richerson, Not By Genes Alone, 61ff.  
47 Cf. Aunger, The Electric Meme, 3. 
48 Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 16–18, 24. 
49 Samuel Johnson once said that “Knowledge is of two kinds. We know a subject ourselves, or we know 
where we can find information upon it.” Likewise, memory of a meme might be of the meme itself, which 
is capable of being reproduced unaided, or it might be a memory of where it might be found. James Boswell, 
Life of Samuel Johnson, LL.D.: Comprehending an Account of His Studies, and Numerous Works, in 




are successful. Those that are successful, it should be said, do not always help their 
carriers or hosts,50 or, indeed, those around them.51 
What does it mean to say that memes have been faithfully copied? The general answer is 
that, so long as instantiations are functionally equivalent (or equifunctional), memes 
can be said to have been faithfully copied, i.e. even though the underlying patterns might 
not be identical, they produce the same or, at least, corresponding thought or behaviour.52 
However, given the fact that our brains appear to encode information remarkably 
similarly, and that our brains have similar regional divisions, there is reason to suppose 
that it might be possible to measure copying-fidelity accurately by observing brain 
activity.53  
However it might be measured, there can be little gainsaying the fact that, at least as 
compared with other animals, humans possess a remarkable capacity for “high-fidelity 
social learning”; indeed, a remarkable propensity, especially among children, to 
“spontaneously and effectively copy others’ actions”.54 In other words, not only are 
humans more predisposed to learn from others, we are also much better at doing so – and 
in a greater variety of ways – as compared with other animals. This means that humans, 
more so than any other animal, are better at assimilating and passing on memes. However, 
in this process of assimilation and transmission, evolution enters the picture. 
4.5 Evolutionary Forces 
Memes, like other replicators, are subject to the evolutionary forces of variation and 
selection.  
                                                    
50 Much as Fried has said, “memes, like genes, will succeed if they are good replicators, whether or not 
they are correct or good for their human carriers.” As will be seen, their qualities as good replicators is only 
partly a determinant of their success. Nevertheless, the fact that they can succeed in spite of their carriers – 
indeed, perhaps even at their expense – is undoubtedly right. See: Fried, “The Evolution of Legal Concepts: 
The Memetic Perspective,” 298. 
51 On this point, see, e.g.: Robert B Edgerton, Sick Societies: Challenging the Myth of Primitive Harmony 
(The Free Press, 1992); Boyd and Richerson, Not By Genes Alone, chap. 5. 
52 Rosaria Conte, “Memes through (Social) Minds,” in Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a 
Science, ed. Robert Aunger (Oxford University Press, 2001), 97; Aunger, The Electric Meme, 152–55, 200–
202. 
53 Cf. Plotkin, “Culture and Psychological Mechanisms,” 76. Further: Dennett: “It is conceivable, but hardly 
likely and certainly not necessary, that we will someday discover a striking identity between brain structures 
storing the same information, allowing us to identify memes syntactically. Even if we encountered such an 
unlikely blessing, however, we should cling to the more abstract and fundamental concept of memes, since 
we already know that meme transmission and storage can proceed indefinitely in noncerebral forms – in 
artefacts of every kind – that do not depend on a shared language of description.” Dennett, Darwin’s 
Dangerous Idea, 354. 
54 Alex Mesoudi, “Cultural Evolution: Integrating Psychology, Evolution and Culture,” Current Opinion 
in Psychology 7 (2016): 17–18. 
163 
 
Variation is always likely to occur because of imperfections in the copying process (i.e. 
copying-infidelity).55 Given time and chance, mutations – whether in the form of 
additions, deletions, recombinations, etc. – are almost inevitable. Even small changes 
might have a large impact, especially cumulatively.56 Indeed, memes are generally much 
more malleable than biological replicators (i.e. genes); they are changed and adapted 
more easily;57 they have a higher degree of variability. Some changes will be intentional 
(so-called guided variation);58 others unintentional. Some will be inconsequential, often 
because of synonymous changes. Others will be markedly consequential and, as such, will 
have beneficial or deleterious effects on the meme’s suitability; they might be adaptive 
or maladaptive. This impacts its chances of survival and replication in its present form.  
We can take again the sheriff example. We might suppose that, either through intentional 
or unintentional changes, sheriffs come to be regarded as tax-gatherers rather than tax-
collectors. This change would probably be inconsequential; the things substituted are 
synonymous. However, to change the sheriff’s activities or modify their level of influence 
would probably be consequential. Extreme or absurd changes could have deleterious 
effects on the sheriff-meme; remedying extremities or absurdities might save it from 
oblivion.59 
It should be noted that variation operates on certain materials and there is a limit to which 
those materials can be transformed – at least, in any given number of steps.60 Thus, much 
                                                    
55 As Distin has said: “Few copying processes are accurate enough to rule out the possibility of error”. 
Indeed, as Mesoudi has said: “[C]ultural transmission appears to exhibit far more copying error [than 
genetic transmission]. People tend to copy ideas, beliefs, skills, and knowledge from other people in a 
rough-and-ready way, often grasping the gist of an idea but filling in the details themselves in ways that 
change the information, akin to mutation.” Distin, The Selfish Meme, 48; Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 62. 
56 One needs only think about the game of Chinese whispers or, more generally, gossip, to see how this 
might work in terms of the passing of associations from one person to another. 
57 There is an argument to be made that, in many respects, so-called ‘cultural evolution’ (i.e. evolution 
involving memes, rather than genes) is ‘Lamarckian’ – not only inherited but also acquired characteristics 
can be passed on. See, e.g.: Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus (WW Norton and Company, 1991), 
65. See further: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 43–44. 
58 On the idea of guided variation, see, e.g.: Boyd and Richerson, Culture and the Evolutionary Process, 9 
and chap. 4.  
59 The pages of constitutional history neatly demonstrate the fact that the associations that people have had 
with the office of sheriff have changed over time: from its origin in the Anglo-Saxon period and its hey-
day in the Norman period, to its decline in the Angevin period and brief resurgence of importance vis-à-vis 
parliamentary elections in the fourteenth century. Not all of this process was by design, but much of it was. 
This can be seen, for example, in the aftermath following Henry II’s Inquest of Sheriffs (1170), Provisions 
of Oxford (1258), Sheriffs Act 1887, and Local Government Act 1972, s. 219 (in which the office was 
renamed High Sheriff). For a brief overview of the changes that attended the office of sheriff, at least to the 
start of the twentieth century, see: Henry St Clair Feilden, W Gray Etheridge, and DHJ Hartley, A Short 
Constitutional History of England, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1911), 249–52. 
60 Cf. “The mathematical genius can only carry on from the point which mathematical knowledge within 
his culture has already reached. Thus if Einstein had been born into a primitive tribe which was unable to 
count beyond three, life-long application to mathematics probably would not have carried him beyond the 
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as biological variation cannot turn a lion into a gazelle, memetic variation cannot easily 
turn a meme into something bearing no resemblance at all to its original form – at least, 
not in a single step.     
The second evolutionary force – selection, which relates to the differential survival rates 
of certain memes – is also practically inevitable. Selection is principally driven in two 
ways.  
Firstly, environmental pressures drive selection. Memes flourish better in some 
environments as opposed to others. For example, sheriff-memes better flourish in feudal, 
as opposed to anarchistic, societies. Similarly, individuals become more ‘susceptible’ to 
‘new formulations’ in some situations – particularly in prolonged ‘critical situations’ (e.g. 
deprivation, insecurity, or other crisis or upheaval), which prompt, if not force, an 
increased openness and suggestibility to new memes, naturally accompanied by a 
devaluation, if not the rejection, of older memes, at least for a time.61 Selection in these 
cases is largely a function of suitability and adaptability, whether perceived or proven;62 
a function of fitness.63 This is the analogue of natural selection in zoology.64  
                                                    
development of a decimal system based on fingers and toes. Again, reformers who attempt to devise new 
systems for society or new religions can only build with the elements with which their culture has made 
them familiar.” Indeed: “The culture not only provides the inventor with the tools which he must use in 
invention but also controls, to a very large extent, the direction of his interest.” Linton, The Study of Man, 
319, 320. 
61 On this theme, see, e.g.: Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 
1948), chap. 16. 
62 Suitability has to do with whether or not the environment is conducive to the meme, whether or not it 
fits. Adaptability, on the other hand, has to do with whether or not the meme can adapt or change to become 
more suitable.  
63 Cf. Vilfredo Pareto when he said that evolution does not mean that “the institutions of a society are 
always those best adapted to the circumstances in which it [the society] is placed,” for evolution “does not 
determine the form of institutions; it determines only certain limits which they cannot exceed.” Or, to put 
it as Parsons did when summarizing Pareto: “The conditions of the environment do not completely 
determine social forms but only set limits to variations in them which are capable of survival.” Of course, 
evolutionary forces do, to an extent, determine what forms and strategies exist, but Pareto was entirely 
correct in arguing that evolution produces neither perfection nor perfect adaptation to the environment, but, 
insofar as certain forms and strategies are successful, it produces forms and strategies that are stable, i.e. 
ones that can survive and replicate within the given environment(s). Each environment can normally 
support numerous forms and strategies (though not necessarily all of them simultaneously). Just because 
one happens to exist does not mean that it is the only or best form or strategy; it is but one that is possible. 
For Pareto and Parsons, see: Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action: A Study in Social Theory with 
Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers, 2nd ed. (Free Press, 1949), 220. 
64 It can be added that memes might easily be ‘appropriated’, as it were, and, having originally served one 
‘function’ or ‘purpose’, it might be found to serve another, which idea is called ‘exaptation’. A perfect 
example of this is the term ‘meme’ itself, which was originally coined by Richard Dawkins to attempt to 
describe socio-cultural evolution, but now is primarily used in the context of humorous images shared on 
the internet and, in particular, across social media. Having started off serving one purpose, it now largely 
serves another. For the origin of the term ‘exaptation’, see: Stephen Jay Gould, “Exaptation: A Crucial Tool 
for an Evolutionary Psychology,” Journal of Social Issues 47, no. 3 (1991). 
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Secondly, appeal and inclination also drive selection. We are more likely to assimilate 
those memes that appeal to us and suit our inclinations than those that do not (cf. 
evaluative associations). Naturally, appeal and inclination are in many respects functions 
of our predilections, biases, prejudices, etc. – not only as regards the form and content of 
the memes themselves, but also their sources. They are also functions of our self-interest 
and self-regard – in what ways and to what extent we think adopting a meme will benefit 
us, especially in terms of how we think others will view us in light of having adopted it 
(i.e. as more or less attractive, intelligent, able, etc.).65 Furthermore, other things like 
novelty or nostalgia, elegance, utility, etc. all affect the ‘attractiveness’ of memes.66 
Appeal and inclination are, self-evidently, relative and, to a large extent, comparative, 
i.e. they vary as between persons, and are often based on contrasts and comparisons.  
Thus, even though sheriff-memes have changed considerably over time, something has 
given them great staying-power; something has made them sufficiently attractive so as to 
have been constantly selected. This is by contrast with many roles and positions that have 
passed out of use, largely because they ceased to be attractive, e.g. the Anglo-Saxon thegn 
and ceorl, or the Norman and Plantagenet justiciar. For one reason or another, these 
suffered as inclinations changed. This is the analogue of sexual selection in zoology.  
An important element in selection is competition. Human attention, memory, and 
lifespan are limited. A person can only copy so many memes – particularly with regard 
to memes that are time- and resource-intensive to copy. This fact of competition is felt 
most acutely among those memes that might be considered as being substitutes or 
alternatives for one another; they are in direct competition. Such memes we might call 
alleles of one another. Those patterns that tend to prevail in such contests we might call 
                                                    
65 Thus, for example, much akin to the idea of assortative mating in biology, we are more likely to seek out 
and assimilate memes from individuals whom we already deem to be similar to ourselves or to whom we 
aspire to be more similar – often, our peers and our friends. Similarly, humans have a strong desire to 
conform and, therefore, are often inclined to copy what they deem already to be the mode or fashion, i.e. 
memes that are already common or seem likely soon to be common. By contrast, there are sometimes cases 
in which the opposite is true; common memes are actively avoided in a desire to be non-conformist, to stand 
out or stand apart. Similarly, there is often a desire to copy certain individuals, who are deemed to be worthy 
copying, whether due to their position, charisma, etc.; in other words, to copy that which would gain for 
oneself some degree of overt or covert prestige. For a discussion of assortative mating and the various kinds 
of biases that affect memetic uptake (albeit not in the memetic tradition), see: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 
62, 64–76. 
66 Cf. Heylighen, “What Makes a Meme Successful? Selection Criteria for Cultural Evolution,” under 
“General Selection Criteria for Memes”; Klaas Chielens and Francis Heylighen, “Operationalization of 
Meme Selection Criteria: Methodologies to Empirically Test Memetic Predictions,” Proceedings of the 
Joint Symposium on Socially Inspired Computing, 2005, §2. 
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dominant; those that yield, recessive. Naturally, dominant alleles are more likely to be 
fecund than recessive alleles.  
By contrast, some memes are not only complementary but, to a greater or lesser degree, 
mutually reliant. Mutually associated memes are, taken together, called memeplexes.67 
In the sheriff example, the memeplex might include ideas about their activities and 
influence, uniform, place of residence, method of remuneration, etc. 
It must be stressed that, whilst evolution is non-random, it is also non-purposeful;68 
evolutionary forces have no ‘pre-ordained goal towards which they inexorably work’.69 
They are not an unrelenting march towards progress and perfection, or, indeed, 
optimality;70 neither does the process, nor the outcome thereof, necessarily embody 
reason or rationality;71 nor is the ‘survival of the fittest’ (whatever that means72) 
guaranteed. Evolutionary forces simply determine whether or not a thing survives, in what 
manner, and in what form. In all of this, the vicissitudes of chance cannot be ignored. A 
meme’s ostensible suitability, adaptability, and appeal does not guarantee its survival. It 
must also not be unfortunate in prevailing environmental conditions and its competition;73 
it must also not be accidentally destroyed.74 Had some cataclysmic event eradicated the 
Anglo-Saxons and their language, we would not likely be speaking now of ‘sheriffs’.  
                                                    
67 This is a shortened version of Dawkins’ “meme-complex”: Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, 197–99. 
68 Jones, “Evolutionary Analysis in Law,” 1136ff. 
69 I am here adapting the words of Fried: Fried, “The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic 
Perspective,” 293. 
70 See: Fried, “The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective,” 294. So long as a meme is 
adequate or good enough, it can survive; in so doing, it might be some considerable distance short of being 
best or optimally suited; of being perfect. Even the ‘survival of the fittest’ does not mean that the result will 
be the best possible thing – only, perhaps, the best given the competition.  
71 Cf. Friedrich August Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles 
of Justice and Political Economy (Routledge Classics, 2013), esp. 498. 
72 There is often a sense, as Ritchie identified, that the phrase is taken to mean “the fittest or best in every 
sense or in the highest sense,” whereas, in a stricter sense, Ritchie held, following Huxley, it really ought 
only to mean “those ‘best fitted to cope with their circumstances’ in order to survive and transmit offspring”; 
those “most capable of surviving”. See: David George Ritchie, Darwinism and Politics, 2nd ed. (Swan 
Sonnenschein & Co., 1891), 12–13, 15. The singular problem with both views, however, is their 
employment of the superlative adjective: ‘fittest’, ‘best’, ‘most’, etc. This is largely a product of the fact 
that both Ritchie and Huxley saw evolution in Malthusian terms: as a struggle for survival, pitting form 
against form (however directly or indirectly). 
73 As Spencer wrote in his Autobiography, bemoaning, to use his editor’s phrase, the ‘meagre reception’ of 
one of the volumes of his Principles of Sociology: “Beliefs, like creatures, must have fit environments 
before they can live and grow…” Quoted in: Spencer, The Evolution of Society: Selections from Herbert 
Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, xxvii.  
74 Cf. Distin: “A meme’s own content may, then, be a fairly arbitrary factor in determining its success: its 
fortune in the struggle for survival will always be relative to context”. Distin, The Selfish Meme, 67. Distin 
also emphasizes the importance of memes capturing our attention, if they are to be successful. To a great 
extent, this is true; patterns of thought or behaviour that capture our attention are more likely to be copied 
or to have efforts made by us to copy them. However, this emphasis implies rather too much that memetic 
transmission is an entirely conscious process. Obviously, for us to copy a meme, we must on some level be 
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If memes disappear, they become extinct.75 However, this does not mean they are forever 
doomed. Memes might be rescued from oblivion if they have in some way been 
externalized; there is some trace of them that might be copied. Further, there is always a 
chance that some analogue of an extinct meme might appear. Naturally, the more 
complex the original meme, the less likely this is.  
4.6 Transmission and Assimilation: Expression and Exposure 
It is a simple, though important, point that memes must be expressed if they are to be 
copied.76 Even if memes are faithfully retained, others have no hope of copying them if 
they are never expressed. It is equally important that there be some other – a recipient – 
who is in some way exposed to a meme that has been expressed. Individuals can only 
copy that with which they have come into contact. As such, there must be both expression 
and exposure for a meme to be transmitted and, subsequently, assimilated. This might 
be called the collision theory of memetic transmission;77 there must be touchpoints for 
there to be any form of transference. Typically, any such transference takes place between 
conspecifics (i.e. members of the same species).  
The basic form of memetic transmission is through imitation, i.e. repeating behaviours 
first observed in others. This can be differentiated from social facilitation,78 and 
emulation.79 Although it seems second nature to us, imitation is rather a complicated 
                                                    
aware of it, but this need not necessarily be on the level of conscious attention; it might equally be 
subconscious. 
75 Cf. “A meme’s physical existence depends on a physical embodiment in some medium; if all such 
physical embodiments are destroyed, that meme is extinguished.” Moreover: “Memes, like genes, are 
potentially immortal, but, like genes, they depend on the existence of a continuous chain of physical 
vehicles, persisting in the face of the Second Law of Thermodynamics.” Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous 
Idea, 348.  
76 Cf. “Culture can be transferred from one individual to another or from one society to another only through 
the medium of its overt expressions. All culture is learned, not biologically inherited, and it is only through 
the medium of behavior that it can be externalized and made available to new individuals for learning.” 
Linton, The Study of Man, 291 [emph. added]. 
77 This is after collision theory, which holds that, for chemical reactions to occur, the reactants must collide 
(i.e. come into contact) with one another.  
78 “Social facilitation synchronizes activities which, as such, could very well be carried out individually and 
at different times”, but “can be observed or expected whenever it is advantageous that every group member 
take up the activity of the majority”, e.g. ‘when young eat more when in company, birds flying off in flocks, 
and humans getting angry or yawning when they see others do so’. Social facilitation provides a cue to 
perform a certain action, but, unlike imitation, that action is not achieved through “close and most probably 
conscious attention”. Kummer, Primate Societies, 56, 57. 
79 Emulation is where, rather than an individual copying another individual’s actions or behaviour, they 
(attempt to) copy the results of their actions or behaviour – without necessarily copying the precise 
movements or methods used to achieve it. Tomasello has argued that this is not true cultural transmission, 
but, rather, a form of opportunism – an individual sees something that they want and realizes that it can be 
achieved, having observed another gaining it, and then works out for themselves how it might be obtained 
(probably, through trial and error). Even still, these can be counted as memes: they are patterns of thought 
or behaviour, which are functionally equivalent and which are a legacy of our interactions with, or, at least, 
observations of, others. See: Michael Tomasello, “Cultural Transmission in the Tool Use and 
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thing. It requires an advanced Theory of Mind,80 i.e. an idea that there are others who are, 
in some respects, like ourselves; we can understand something of their “thoughts, 
feelings, desires and intentions”.81 This ability to imagine things from another’s 
perspective is what provides us with the ability to imitate them in a true sense.  
The most important vehicle for memes is language, i.e. combinations of signs, symbols, 
sounds, etc. (i.e. signifiers) that are associated with some object or meaning (i.e. 
signified). These combinations are themselves memes, but, in conjunction with one 
another, help to convey more complex memes. Just as words are memes, so are phrases, 
witticisms, aphorisms, proverbs, etc.  
There are many kinds of language, which can be conveyed via many kinds of media. The 
type and complexity of the language, as well as the medium through which it is 
transmitted, all have a bearing on the chances that it will be faithfully copied (cf. copying-
fidelity), remembered (cf. longevity), and reproduced (cf. fecundity). A complex 
assortment of random vocal sounds shouted over a long distance is unlikely to be 
faithfully remembered and reproduced. On the other hand, a short, simple, and evocative 
phrase that is written down is much more likely to be faithfully remembered and 
                                                    
Communicatory Signaling of Chimpanzees ?,” in “Language” and Intelligence in Monkeys and Apes: 
Comparative Developmental Perspectives, ed. Sue Taylor Parker and Kathleen Rita Gibson (Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), 284. One of the most interesting case studies in this regard is that of blue tits 
learning from one another, if not how to open milk bottle tops, then that it might be done. See: James Fisher 
and RA Hinde, “The Opening of Milk Bottles by Birds,” British Birds 42 (1949): 347–57; James Fisher 
and RA Hinde, “Further Observations of the Opening of Milk Bottles by Birds,” British Birds 44, no. 12 
(1951): 393–96; Louis Lefebvre, “The Opening of Milk Bottles by Birds: Evidence for Accelerating of 
Cultural Transmission,” Behavioural Processes 34 (1995): 43–54; cf. Blackmore, The Meme Machine, 47–
52; Distin, The Selfish Meme, 100–102, 135–39. See further: Andrew Whiten et al., “Emulation, Imitation, 
Over-Imitation and the Scope of Culture for Child and Chimpanzee,” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 364 (2009): 
2417–28. 
80 It might also require, on a neurological level, a set of so-called ‘mirror neurons’, which fire both when 
an individual performs an action and when they observe others performing it. However, there have been 
doubts as to their role in human cognition and facilitation of social learning. Cf.: Marco Iacoboni and John 
C Mazziotta, “Mirror Neuron System: Basic Findings and Clinical Applications,” Annals of Neurology 62, 
no. 3 (2007): 213–18; Marco Iacoboni, “Imitation, Empathy, and Mirror Neurons,” Annu. Rev. Psychol., 
2009, 653–70; Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola, “Towards a Unifying Neural Theory of Social 
Cognition,” Progress in Brain Research 156 (2006): 379–401; Bruce E Wexler, Brain and Culture: 
Neurobiology, Ideology, and Social Change (The MIT Press, 2006), 114; Gregory Hickok, The Myth of 
Mirror Neurons: The Real Neuroscience of Communication and Cognition (WW Norton and Company, 
2014). 
81 RIM Dunbar, Louise Barrett, and John Lycett, Evolutionary Psychology (Oneworld Publications, 2007), 
206 et passim. This is closely linked with the idea of intentionality, i.e. different levels of belief states that 
animals might have: Dunbar, Barrett, and Lycett, Evolutionary Psychology, 203 et passim; RIM Dunbar, 
“The Social Brain Hypothesis,” Evolutionary Anthropology, 1998, 188. See further: Laureano Castro and 
Miguel a Toro, “The Evolution of Culture: From Primate Social Learning to Human Culture.,” Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 101, no. 27 (2004): 10235–40. For a 
more recent overview of Theory of Mind, see: Alvin I Goldman, “Oxford Handbooks Online Theory of 
Mind,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science, ed. Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels, 
and Stephen P. Stich (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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reproduced – especially as its written form can always provide an aide memoire. 
Variation seems more likely in the former case than the latter; selection is likely to favour 
the latter.  
An important point about media is that it means that we can be exposed to memes, in 
relation to their originators, either directly or indirectly. Indeed, depending upon the 
medium utilized, the person copying the meme might be far-removed from its originator 
in both time and space. This is particularly true for memes that are committed to writing, 
although this presupposes that the recipient understands the language in which the thing 
was written. Similarly, in the case of artefacts and other objects, it is possible that the 
receiver might have to some extent reverse engineer the thoughts or behaviours that must 
have occurred to produce the artefact or object in question; this, again, would be indirect.  
Our genes are inherited from our parents, their parents, and their parents’ parents, etc. 
Excepting the possibility of genetic engineering, genes always move vertically 
downwards and are biparental; this is their pathway. With memes, the situation is quite 
different. They might move vertically downwards – from either one or both parents. They 
might also be said to move obliquely downwards (i.e. from more distantly related or 
unrelated elders), horizontally (i.e. from others within one’s generation), or, indeed, 
vertically or obliquely upwards (i.e. from one’s children or their generation).82 Memes, 
unlike genes, can come from all sides.  
4.7 Memetic Genotype and Phenotype  
Any given individual at any particular time holds a finite number of memes (i.e. ideas, 
etc.) capable of being expressed by them and copied by others. This number might be 
very large and difficult to establish, but is nevertheless finite. This might be called a 
person’s memetic genotype. However, many of these do not have a noticeable effect on 
how we think and behave – particularly those which can only be recalled with great 
difficulty. As such, a large portion of the memetic genotype is relatively unimportant. 
Those memes that are influential and actually find expression at any given time might be 
called a person’s memetic phenotype. Naturally, these are more flexible than their 
genetic parallels.  
4.8 Memetic Similarity and Dissimilarity 
                                                    
82 On the ideas of vertical, oblique, and horizontal transmission, see: Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman, Cultural 
Transmission and Evolution, chaps. 2 and 3; Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 56, 58–61; Boyd and Richerson, 
Culture and the Evolutionary Process, 8, 53–55.  
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Memetic similarity (i.e. where multiple individuals appear to share the same memes or 
memeplexes) can come about in two ways: derivation and convergence.  
In derivation, either one instantiation is derived from another (i.e. they stand in a parent-
child relationship) or both instantiations are derived, by however many degrees of 
remove, from some common ancestor.83 Such instantiations are, therefore, similar 
because they are either directly or indirectly related to one another; they are causally 
related in some way. The greater the number of distinctive or unusual features the memes 
share, and the greater their complexity, the greater the likelihood of derivation being 
involved; their having arisen independently is statistically improbable, even if not strictly 
impossible. The test for derivation is, naturally, the identification of touchpoints, i.e. has 
the individual in question ever been exposed to the meme in question and, therefore, had 
an opportunity to copy it, whether in gross or fine?84  If they have been, then this is at 
least evidence, if not proof, that the one has been copied from the other and is, therefore, 
derived from it.85  
The corollary of derivation is divergence:86 owing to the cumulative effects of variation 
and selection, various memetic lineages are likely to become increasingly dissimilar to 
one another over time. This process is a function of (a) the degrees of remove between 
the lineages in both time and space, and (b) the degree of intermixing, cross-fertilization, 
or cross-pollination as between populations. In other words, the more times a meme is 
copied, and the further removed instantiations are in time and space, the greater the 
likelihood of divergence occurring. 
However, divergence does not always necessarily happen. Where memetic lineages 
remain roughly faithful to their progenitor and, hence, roughly the same as one another, 
                                                    
83 In the case of a parent-child relationship, besides being called a parent and child, the originating 
instantiation might be called the ancestor and its progeny the descendant; they might also be called, to use 
terms from linguistics, the etymon and derivative respectively. In the case of those derived from common 
ancestors, they might be described as siblings or cousins, but they are probably best called, again to borrow 
from linguistics, cognates.  
84 Cf. supra, 4.6. 
85 It should be said that obtaining any such evidence and, moreover, proving conclusively that there has 
been some process of derivation, are notoriously difficult. In part, this is because humans – especially in 
the modern day – are processing houses of vast quantities of information from a huge variety of sources. It 
is also because, whether through accident or design, memes assume new forms inside our minds. Moreover, 
there are often times when even we ourselves are not sure wherefrom – or, indeed, why – we have a 
particular meme. All of these things contribute towards a situation in which, as Dennett put it, the “lines of 
descent are hopelessly muddled, and that phenotypes (the ‘body designs’ of memes) change so fast that 
there’s no keeping track of the natural kinds”: Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 355. See further: 
Aunger, Darwinizing Cult. Status Memet. as a Sci., 3–4. The consequence of this is that, to a greater or 
lesser extent, anything that deals in the history of ideas – of whatever kind – will be speculative, i.e. based 
on conjecture, which is to say, they will consist of opinions formed on the basis of incomplete information.  
86 This is after the idea of divergent evolution. 
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we can assume that there are probably some forces staying the roving hands of variation 
and selection. These we might call maintenance forces,87 e.g. conservative attitudes or 
sustained environmental pressures. On the other hand, where instantiations of memes do 
change over time, yet do so in a similar manner in spite of their isolation from one another, 
we can assume that similar selection pressures are driving the changes in the same 
direction. In zoology, this is called parallel evolution. 
As in biology, the phylogenetic method – the creation of evolutionary trees (stemmata) – 
can be adopted with memes to trace the processes of derivation and divergence, i.e. it can 
be used to understand not only the history of particular memetic lineages, but also to 
understand the relationships between lineages. Of course, memetic phylogenetic trees, as 
compared with their genetic parallels, are more likely to look more like thickets than trees 
– with strands that seem to dive in and out of one another, and weave around in an unruly 
mess. This is because of the high potential for lineage-crossing or anastomosis (i.e. the 
“coming back together” of separated lineages,88 which is far more easily done by memes 
than genes).89 To make matters more complex still, there is every likelihood that the 
‘archaeological record’, as it were, will be far from complete, owing to the fact that a 
great deal of memetic transmission – if not most – leaves no trace. The upshot is that it is 
eminently possible for the memetic historian (of whatever focus) to trace certain memes 
and memeplexes through time – to see where they seem to have originated and how they 
                                                    
87 Drout speaks of practices of ‘memetic hygiene’, i.e. regularly consulting some standard expression – an 
exemplum, if you will – so as to prevent divergences therefrom. His example of this was Benedictine 
monks, a fundamental part of whose lives was “regular and programmed return” to the Rule of St. Benedict; 
monks had to hear it and read it on a regular basis. Behind such practices of memetic hygiene there often 
lies a desire to preserve tradition; this desire can prove a potent maintenance force. For Drout, see: Drout, 
How Tradition Works, chap. 4. 
88 Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, 355. 
89 This point was recognized by Linton almost a century ago: “[Culture] is a continuum existing from the 
beginning of human existence to the present. As a whole, it represents the social heredity of our species. 
Particular cultures are strains of social heredity, corresponding in many respects to the divergent strains of 
biological heredity which constitute different varieties within a species. Like these strains of biological 
heredity, cultures have crossed and recrossed in the course of their development, fused and divided. The 




seem to have changed over time,90 but there can be dangers in drawing overly strong and 
specific conclusions from such researches.91 
Besides derivation, similarity can also be caused by convergence. This is where variation, 
selection, and chance drive memes of different origins towards the same form. 
Instantiations come to bear resemblance to one another not because they are in any way 
related but, rather, because they are probably a response to the same sorts of things.92 
They develop independently of one another and their resemblance is largely 
coincidental.93  
Memetic similarity, then, is the result of either derivation or convergence, although 
divergence is likely to create dissimilarity over time as instantiations become increasingly 
removed from one another and enter different environments. As intellectual property 
lawyers know, it can be difficult to establish whether or not similarity appears because of 
some element of derivation or merely due to coincidental convergence.  
4.9 Resemblance Principle 
                                                    
90 In the historical context, and especially in a mediaeval context, a good example of phylogeny is in 
manuscript evolution – how manuscripts were distributed and altered as they were copied, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally. Understanding this process can help us to understand a great deal about the 
manuscripts themselves and their content – for if we understand where they originated, or who made any 
particular changes and when, then we might better understand any biases or the value of any testimonies 
contained therein. The topic of manuscript evolution was touched upon by Mesoudi: Mesoudi, Cultural 
Evolution, 119–22, 152–54.  
91 After all, as Fracchia and Lewontin have warned, there is a limit to which such methods can cope with 
the “labyrinthine pathways, the contingent complexity, the many nuances, and general messiness of 
history”. Indeed: “Transformational theories of cultural evolution have the virtue that they at least provide 
a framework of generality with which to give human long-term history the semblance of intelligibility. But 
the search for intelligibility should not be confused with the search for actual process. There is no end of 
ways to make history seem orderly.” It is very easy to create stories about the ways in which things have 
developed, which stories might even sound entirely plausible, but yet be gross distortions or reality – if not 
wholly fictitious. Their warning being accepted, Fracchia and Lewontin were too hard on the idea of 
applying evolutionary ideas to culture, etc., and there is little cause to abandon the whole endeavour. For 
Fracchia and Lewontin, see: Joseph Fracchia and RC Lewontin, “Does Culture Evolve?,” History and 
Theory 38, no. 4 (1999): 78. On this point, see also: Robert Boyd et al., “Are Cultural Phylogenies 
Possible?,” in The Origin and Evolution of Cultures, ed. Robert Boyd and Peter J Richerson (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 310–36. 
92 Cf. the words of Darwin: “I am inclined to believe that in nearly the same way as two men have sometimes 
hit upon the very same invention, so natural selection…has sometimes modified in very nearly the same 
manner two parts in two organic beings, which owe but little of their structure in common to inheritance 
from the same ancestor.” Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection or, The 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998), 149. In the 
socio-legal context, this idea can be seen, for an early example, in Hobhouse: “[T]hough we may find 
certain features of similarity in institutional forms, this similarity may point to no close relationship, to no 
filiation, to no real affinity between the two societies compared. It is merely what we call – by way of 
expressing our ignorance – the casual result of a combination of circumstances. […]. The resemblance is 
analogical. Conditions…have produced a result which is in one respect the same…” Hobhouse, Social 
Evolution and Political Theory, 122–23. 
93 On convergence in ‘cultural evolution’, see: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 36–37. 
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With the foregoing in mind, a resemblance principle can be suggested: any given 
individual’s memetic genotype and phenotype is likely to resemble the memetic 
genotypes and phenotypes of those to whom they are most often exposed.94 More simply: 
the memes that we have and express are likely to resemble the memes of those around us. 
This is a consequence of a couple of things. Firstly, there is the fact that expression and 
exposure have limited horizons. If you are not in sufficient proximity to a meme’s 
expression, you are unlikely to be exposed to it and, therefore, to assimilate it.95 Secondly, 
there is the fact that we are more likely to assimilate those memes to which we are 
frequently exposed. Naturally, we are most frequently exposed to the memes of those 
around us. It is well to remember, too, that humans are impressionable, particularly when 
young; the memes to which we are regularly exposed during our formative years are likely 
to have a profound and lasting effect on our memetic composition.96 However, this is far 
from saying that we can never change: we often adapt our thoughts and behaviours to 
match new (social) environments, often through a process of acculturation.  
It is apparent how the resemblance principle explains the development of cultures, i.e. 
sets of shared ideas, beliefs, and behaviours – including shared ideals, values, 
mannerisms, practices, and, crucially, laws. After all, we tend to resemble those around 
us; we consciously and unconsciously adopt and assimilate their ideas, etc. As humans 
tend to live in groups, each member will come to resemble the other members. When 
individuals come together anew, there will usually be a degree of harmonization. We do 
all of this so naturally that these ideas, etc. often seem obvious. It can be difficult to 
imagine how things could be otherwise – especially if we have been little exposed to other 
ways of life and points of view. This is compounded if we are taught not to question. It is 
easy to see how this can lead into absolutism, intolerance, cultural imperialism, etc. We 
assume our way is best because it is our way. 
                                                    
94 Cf. the collision theory of memetic transmission, supra, 4.5. 
95 “An individual’s range of socialization is limited by the range of his receptivity (his perceptual range) as 
determined by his actual contact with persons, objects, and situations”: Sherif, An Outline of Social 
Psychology, 95. 
96 Cf. Benedict: “The life-history of the individual is first and foremost an accommodation to the patterns 
and standards traditionally handed down in his community. From the moment of his birth the customs into 
which he is born shape his experience and behaviour. By the time he can talk, he is a little creature of his 
culture, and by the time he is grown and able to take part in its activities, its habits are his habits, its beliefs 
his beliefs, its impossibilities his impossibilities. Every child that is born into his group will share them 
with him, and no child born into one on the opposite side of the globe can ever achieve the thousandth part.” 
Benedict, Patterns of Culture, 2–3. This was originally written in the 1930s, and it can be noticed that 
Benedict was an anthropologist by training and profession; it was not written in the context of a connected 
and globalized world. Nevertheless, her essential point holds: we are inordinately affected by those around 
us – so much so that the limits of their ideas, etc. to a great extent define the limits of our own.  
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In a sense, modern telecommunications systems and high levels of mobility are eroding 
the resemblance principle. People nowadays are less likely than their forebears to 
resemble those in their immediate physical environment. However, the underlying 
principles remain unaffected. We still resemble those to whom we are most exposed – it 
is just that these persons might be many miles away.  
4.10 Memepools 
As every individual has only a finite number of memes, every collection of individuals 
also possesses between them only a finite number of memes – even if, again, that number 
is large and difficult to establish. The sum total of the memes extant among a set of social 
agents – the summation of their memetic genotypes – is called the memepool.97 This 
consists of all the memes which might be available at any given time for copying. We 
might also term this the memetic environment. 
We can introduce two general principles of the memepool, which are of particular 
importance for constitutional history. The first I call the variation principle. This is the 
idea that, owing to evolutionary forces, the memepool at any given time is likely to be 
different to that at any other time. The second I call the accumulation principle. This is 
the idea that the number of differences accumulate over time, such that the greater the 
intervening period of time, the greater the number of differences. Thus, for example, the 
constitution of a group will probably differ between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, 
yet the constitutions at those times will probably be more similar to one another than to 
that of the nineteenth century. In the absence of strong maintenance forces, this is 
practically inevitable. 
As a memepool changes over time, there is the possibility for what might be called 
phantom memes – i.e. memes that have themselves disappeared, but which affect other 
memes almost as if there were still present. To take an example from Linton: “[T]he 
custom of wearing a sword on the left side was responsible for the custom of mounting 
horses from the left. The sword-wearing has long since disappeared, but the left-side 
                                                    
97 An early theory of the memepool, for example, can be seen in Hobhouse: “[T]hough there is no thought 
except in the mind of the individual thinker, yet the thought of any generation, and indeed of each individual 
in the generation, is a social product. But we must go further than this. The sum of thought in existence at 
any time is something more than any thought that exists in the head of any individual; it is something to 
which many minds contribute, and which yet may be for many purposes a real unity.” Hobhouse, Social 
Evolution and Political Theory, 94–95. Linton said a similar thing a quarter of a century later: 
“Culture…rests on the combined brains of all the individuals who compose a society. While these brains 
individually develop, stabilize, and die, new brains constantly come forward to take their places.” Linton, 
The Study of Man, 293. 
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mounting remains”.98 The application of this to rites, rituals, etc., whose precise origins 
are not always known, is not difficult to see.  
4.11 Measuring the Memetic Environment 
We have already said that memes can be described in terms of longevity, fecundity, and 
copying-fidelity. If memes are to be successful, then it is important that they display all 
of these characteristics. However, these terms do not help us much in describing where 
memes are situated in the memepool. In order to describe this, three further qualities are 
suggested for study. 
The first is prevalence, which is the proportion of a population with a given meme or 
memeplex in their memetic genotype.99 In other words, it concerns how common or 
frequent particular memes or memeplexes are within a given group at a given time. In 
order to be considered prevalent, instantiations must be sufficiently similar to one 
another; variations should, insofar as possible, be considered separately. Where particular 
variations appear to be prevalent, we can say that there is some degree of intersubjective 
agreement or consensus. Prevalence comes about through a process of diffusion,100 and, 
naturally, is largely a function of longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity.  
The second is potency, which is the probability that particular memes or memeplexes 
will find expression in thought or behaviour. In other words, it considers the frequency 
with which given memes or memeplexes are actually expressed. Potency is of two kinds. 
A meme has expressive potency if it is sufficiently potent so as to find expression. It has 
                                                    
98 Linton, The Study of Man, 295. 
99 It ought to be noted that, because assessing individuals’ genotypes in toto is a difficult thing, in practice 
prevalence usually means looking at a combination of  individuals’ memetic phenotypes (i.e. the memes or 
memeplexes that they have actually expressed at one time or another) and the memes and memeplexes to 
which individuals have been exposed. 
100 In other words, memes will begin with an individual or a select group of individuals and, from them, 
spread outwards to others. On this point, we can compare the words of Darwin, made in the context of 
biological evolution: “The process of diffusion may often be very slow, being dependent on climatal and 
geographic changes, or on strange accidents, but in the long run the dominant forms [i.e. those that possess 
some advantage over rival forms] will generally succeed in spreading.” Darwin, The Origin of Species, 246 
[emph. added]. The fact that ‘strange accidents’, as much as anything else, determine whether or not 
particular replicators become prevalent is worth highlighting. As Hull has pointed out, genetic replication 
need not be slow (e.g. in the case of viruses and bacteria) and memetic diffusion need not be quick, but 
memes – particularly in the context of telecommunications systems and mass media – have huge 
potentiality for spreading rapidly and, much like infection or contamination rates, might see their diffusion 
rate increase exponentially. Moreover, again in the context of telecommunications systems and mass media, 
memes have much greater horizons than their genetic counterparts – they can ‘travel’ over much greater 
distances and do so more quickly, and their replication can be almost instantaneous. For Hull, see: David 
L Hull, “Taking Memetics Seriously: Memetics Will Be What We Make It,” in Darwinizing Culture: The 
Status of Memetics as a Science, ed. Robert Aunger (Oxford University Press, 2001), 55; cf. Gould, Bully 
for Brontosaurus, 65; Boyd and Richerson, Not By Genes Alone, 42–44. For a discussion of ‘cultural 
diffusion’, see: Andrew Whiten, Christine A Caldwell, and Alex Mesoudi, “Cultural Diffusion in Humans 
and Other Animals,” Current Opinion in Psychology 8 (2016): 15–21.  
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directive potency if it can affect our decision-making processes and actions. For 
example, ideas of mythical creatures might have expressive potency, but are unlikely to 
have directive potency. We might talk about Medusa, but the Medusa-idea is unlikely to 
affect how we behave. 
Whereas prevalence concerns existence, potency concerns expression. As might be 
expected from the resemblance principle, there is a close relationship between these. After 
all, those memes that are actually expressed (i.e. potent) are most likely to be assimilated 
by others (i.e. become prevalent); likewise, those memes that have been assimilated by a 
greater number of individuals (i.e. prevalent) are more likely to find encouragement and 
support in their expression (i.e. become potent). However, they do not always go hand-
in-hand. Many memes are potent, but not prevalent, e.g. religious fundamentalism in the 
West. Contrariwise, there are many that are prevalent, but not potent, e.g. the idea of a 
Christian God, whose directive potency is diminishing.  
The final quality is persistency, which has to do with how long given memes or 
memeplexes remain in the memepool.101 Obviously, prevalent and potent memes are 
more likely to persist for longer periods of time. However, memes that are neither 
prevalent nor potent can still continue to be expressed and copied sufficiently so as to 
continue to feature in the memepool. We should contrast persistency with longevity. 
Whereas longevity has to do with the length of time that memes and memeplexes reside 
in individuals’ minds, persistency has to do with the length of time that they reside, as it 
were, in the memepool.102 Thus, for example, there was a time in European history when 
there was no idea of a Christian God; it was neither prevalent nor potent. However, since 
the first century, it has remained a consistent feature of the memepool, even if its 
prevalence and potency have changed.  
                                                    
101 Cf. Linton: “Although the ideal patterns are carried in the minds of individuals and can find overt 
expression only through the medium of individuals, the fact that they are shared by many members of the 
society gives them a super-individual character. They persist, while those who share them come and go. 
The death of a particular person may interrupt the exercise of a pattern, but if this exercise is at all necessary 
to the well-being of the group the interruption will only be temporary.” Having said this, Linton then 
proceeded, in a remarkable passage, to anticipate the memetic approach: “All this indicates that the ideal 
patterns by which the behavior of a society’s members is organized are genuine entities. The exact kind of 
reality which they possess can be left to the philosophers to determine. It must be of much the same quality 
as the reality of an often told story. The important thing for us is that the patterns behave like entities, 
influencing individuals and being in turn influenced by them and persisting while individuals come and go. 
They even possess a considerable degree of internal organization and are susceptible to objective study and 
analysis.” Linton, The Study of Man, 102–3. 
102 This is bearing in mind the fact that much the same can be said of memes as genes: “Only the 
characteristics of organisms, not the organisms themselves, can flow smoothly through time…” Jones, 
“Evolutionary Analysis in Law,” 1133. 
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Potency is, in many respects, most important. If memes are potent, they are more likely 
to find expression; if they find expression, they are more likely to be copied and thus 
become prevalent; if they are both potent and prevalent, there is a greater likelihood that 
they will continue to be copied as time passes and, therefore, become persistent.103 But it 
is important to stress that memes, memeplexes, and, indeed, the memepool as a whole 
will only become persistent if they are continuously passed on. If that chain is broken, 
they will break down and disappear.104 
4.12 Memetic Drift 
Whilst evolution is not a drive towards any preordained state or end,105 there might 
nevertheless be certain observable trends in terms of the relative prevalence and potency 
of certain memes and memeplexes within the memepool over time – particularly if there 
are certain sustained selection pressures, for example, which cause a ‘shift in a specific, 
                                                    
103 It would seem that it was prevalence, potency, and persistency, at least within a given social group, was 
what constituted for Hauriou the ‘objective’ nature of institutions: “Directing ideas, which are of a 
comprehensible objectivity since they pass from one mind to another by their own force of attraction 
without losing their identity, are the vital principle of social institutions.” Insofar as this, Hauriou would 
seem to be moving towards a theory based on social constructionism. However, he continues: “They 
communicate to institutions a distinctive life, as separable from that of individuals as ideas themselves are 
separable from our minds and capable of reacting upon them.” The fundamental problem here is that 
Hauriou mistook a metaphor for reality; he should have said, though to do so is misleading, that it seems as 
though or that it were as if institutions have a ‘distinctive life’ proper to them. See: Hauriou, ‘The Theory 
of the Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social Vitalism’ in Albert Broderick, ed., The French 
Institutionalists: Maurice Hauriou, Georges Renard, Joseph T Delos, trans. Mary Welling (Harvard 
University Press, 1970), 123. Cf. supra, 3.2. Hauriou’s supremacist opinion that “certain peoples and races 
are incapable of possessing institutions because they are too insensitive because they are too insensitive to 
ideas” is noteworthy: Hauriou, from Précis de droit constitutionnel, in Broderick, The French 
Institutionalists, 135. The social constructionist tendencies of institutionalism is perhaps clearest in the 
work of Georges Renard: “The institution lives only by the life men lend to it. But among these men, there 
are one or several whose will enchains the will of others for the future and indefinitely, until this institution 
vanishes. The great mystery is that the will of the founder or founders prevails over the wills of the 
successive adherents – the will of the living is chained to the will of the dead. This is the great postulate of 
the institutional theory.” Further: “The institution is below the human person, which is the only true person 
in this world, and below organic life, which is the only true life; but it is higher than brute matter.” Renard, 
‘The Degrees of Institutional Existence’, in Broderick, The French Institutionalists, 179, 181. 
104 Cf. Linton: “[N]o culture can survive either the dissolution of the society which bore it or the interruption 
of its expression in behavior for a longer period than the life-span of the last individual trained to it.” 
Further: “It seems the transmission of culture has somewhat the same quality as the apostolic laying-on of 
hands. Its genuine transfer from individual to individual or from one generation to the next can only be 
accomplished by personal contacts. The material manifestations of any culture may outlast it for thousands 
of years and provide the student with a more or less accurate idea of what certain aspects were like, but a 
culture dies as soon as the direct line of person-to-person transmission is broken. Even the literature of a 
people cannot convey their fundamental ideas and values in such form that they will become an integral 
part of the reader’s personality.” Linton, The Study of Man, 291, 292. Linton was largely correct, because 
that which is preserved will likely only be some portion of the totality of the memepool associated with a 
particular culture and, moreover, that portion will not necessarily represent the diversity of memes that 
were extant – even prevalent – in that culture. Thus, even if some part remains, its fullness will be gone 
forever.  
105 Supra, 4.5.  
178 
 
non-random direction’.106 Thus, just as the proportion of black moths might be seen to 
increase over time as compared with their speckled brethren,107 certain accents or dialects 
might come to be spoken by greater and greater numbers of people as compared with any 
alternatives – such as happened in the case of Received Pronunciation in English, which 
was for a long time lauded and propagated by the education system and the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. The directional changes to the genepool or memepool are what 
we often associate with Darwinian evolution (i.e. evolution by natural selection), 
particularly when these changes become so numerous or dramatic that we think there to 
have been a speciation event, i.e. the changes are so marked that we think a new species 
has come into being. 
However, chance and accident also play their part. Thus, even though there might still 
appear to be certain directions of travel, these might be struck upon for no apparent reason 
except random sampling. It just so happened that some varieties became more frequent – 
perhaps due more to reproductive opportunity than to any intrinsic or extrinsic qualities 
– and, over time, this frequency became compounded, thereby causing a shift in that 
direction. Such a shift is called genetic drift in genetics; in memetics, memetic drift.108 
The evolution of the English language taken as a whole – from Old, through Middle, to 
Modern – perhaps serves as a good example of this.109  
It should be reiterated that any new forms that appear to emerge from the evolutionary 
process are neither necessarily better nor worse than their predecessors; they are merely 
different. 
4.13 Memetic Migration 
                                                    
106 “Both guided variation and the various forms of cultural selection act to shift the frequency of cultural 
traits in a population in a specific, non-random direction…”: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 76. 
107 This was the case with the peppered moth (Biston betularia) during the course of the industrial revolution 
in England. The moths were originally a whitish hue with blackish tinges, but, during the course of the 
industrial revolution, it was noted that they typically lost their whitish colour and became entirely black. 
The theory as to why this was the case, as proposed by James William Tutt (1858-1911), was that during 
the revolution there was an increase in smoke and, in particular, an increase in particulate soot, which 
blackens surfaces upon which it settles; moreover, the pollution also killed off lichens growing on tree bark, 
which the moth relied upon for camouflage. Therefore, upon these blackened, lichen-less surfaces, the black 
variety of the moth was better camouflaged – and, as a result, better protected from predation – than the 
flecked variety. This gave the black variety an advantage and caused a drift over time towards a greater part 
of the population being comprised of black moths. On this, see: Michael EN Majerus, “Industrial Melanism 
in the Peppered Moth, Biston Betularia: An Excellent Teaching Example of Darwinian Evolution in 
Action,” Evolution: Education and Outreach 2 (2009): 63–74. 
108 For a discussion of the analogous idea of ‘cultural drift’, see: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 76–79. 
109 For a discussion of applications of the idea of ‘cultural drift’ to the archaeological record, see: Mesoudi, 
Cultural Evolution, 103ff. For histories of the English language, see e.g.: David Crystal, The Stories of 
English (Allen Lane, 2004); Albert C Baugh and Thomas Cable, A History of the English Language, 3rd 
ed. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978). 
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Just as memes flow within populations, they can also flow between populations.110 In 
other words, memes oftentimes appear anew in populations, which memes have been 
derived from instances in other populations.111 This is analogous to the biological concept 
of ‘gene flow’ or ‘genetic migration’, and can be called memetic migration or meme 
flow.112 For the comparative lawyer, and legal or constitutional historian, the importance 
of mimetic migration is most important in the context of legal transplantations and 
receptions, e.g. of Roman law in mediaeval and early modern Europe.113 
Much as Linton identified, levels of migration are, in many respects, a function of the 
proximity of, and number of contacts between, populations,114 as well as the 
translatability of the memes and the receptiveness of the receiving population.115 
Naturally, certain practices can be adopted to reduce or prevent inwards memetic 
migration, e.g. policies of endogamy or isolationism. The extent to which this can prevent 
memetic change is doubtful, but, to some extent at least, it might slow it down.  
4.14 Directive Potency and Practical Reasoning  
Whether particular memes are potent has a great deal to do with the strength of the 
underlying associations. However, it also has to do with their relative strength as 
compared with other associations that might be competing for expression. Consequently, 
whether particular memes are expressed is often the result of some conscious or 
unconscious computation, which weighs habit, feeling, and reason. Of these, reason – 
in a logical, detached, objective sense – is the weakest. Indeed, reason plays a much lesser 
role in our decision-making than is often supposed; without feelings and inclinations – 
                                                    
110 Linton called this ‘diffusion’ and attributed great importance to it: “The service of diffusion in enriching 
the content of individual cultures has been of the utmost importance. There is probably no culture extant 
to-day [bearing in mind that this was written in the early 1930s] which owes more than 10 per cent of its 
total elements to inventions made by members of its own society.” Linton, The Study of Man, 325. 
111 See, supra, 4.8. 
112 For a discussion of the analogous idea of ‘cultural migration’, see: Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution, 81–82. 
113 See, e.g.: Paul Vinogradoff, Roman Law In Mediaeval Europe (Harper & Brothers, 1909); CC Turpin, 
“The Reception of Roman Law,” Irish Jurist 3, no. 1 (1968): 162–74; Charles Sumner Lobingier, “The 
Reception of the Roman Law in Germany,” Michigan Law Review 14, no. 7 (1916): 562–69; William Searle 
Holdsworth, “The Reception of Roman Law in the Sixteenth Century I,” Law Quarterly Review 27 (1911): 
387–98; William Searle Holdsworth, “The Reception of Roman Law in the Sixteenth Century II,” Law 
Quarterly Review 28 (1912): 39–51; William Searle Holdsworth, “The Reception of Roman Law in the 
Sixteenth Century III,” Law Quarterly Review 28 (1912): 131–47; William Searle Holdsworth, “The 
Reception of Roman Law in the Sixteenth Century IV,” Law Quarterly Review 28 (1912): 236–54; 
Theodore FT Plucknett, “The Relations between Roman Law and English Common Law down to the 
Sixteenth Century: A General Survey,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 3, no. 1 (1939): 24–50. 
114 This was his first principle of ‘diffusion’: “other things being equal, elements of culture will be taken up 
first by societies which are close to their points of origin and later by societies which are more remote or 
which have less [sic] direct contacts”. Linton, The Study of Man, 328–29. 
115 Linton, The Study of Man, 337–39, 340–45. 
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however arbitrary – we are liable to become paralyzed.116 We are far from being entirely 
rational.   
However, reason is still important – even though it might not dictate the outcome, the 
process of reaching that outcome usually includes some form of reasoning. There are 
different kinds of reasoning, but for the present we can focus on the branch called 
practical reasoning. This is the process by which we decide how to act or behave in any 
given situation.117 Naturally, this will heavily rely on the associations that we have with 
each course of action and with our expectations. In many situations, we weigh the costs 
and benefits of particular courses of action and then opt for the one that appears to us the 
most meritorious (or least detrimental). These are called first-order reasons; conflicts 
between them are “resolved by the relative strength of the conflicting reasons”.118 
Relative strength is, of course, a subjective standard.  
There are also what have been called second-order reasons. These act on first-order 
reasons to make them more or less compelling: “any reason to act for a reason or to refrain 
from acting for a reason.”119 A particular kind of second-order reason is of the utmost 
importance: exclusionary reasons. These reasons do not strengthen or weaken other 
considerations per se; they make them irrelevant. “An exclusionary reason is a second-
order reason to refrain from acting for some reason.”120 Memes that have powerful 
exclusionary reasons operating in their favour are much more likely to have directive 
potency. Thus, for example, the laws of a given legal system are much more likely to be 
effective if there is some idea that they apply regardless of anything else.  
Let us take a simple example to elucidate the nature of practical reasoning and its 
connection with fixed expectations. There is a destitute person who happens to pass a 
bakery late one evening. A loaf of bread lies unattended on the counter. This person has 
neither money nor opportunity to earn any quickly; they are unable to pay for the bread. 
If they are to have the bread, they have to decide whether or not to take, which is to say 
steal, it. A first-order reason in favour of taking the bread might be that they are hungry. 
A first-order reason against might be that there is a chance of their being caught and 
                                                    
116 See: Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain (Vintage Books, 
2006); Steven W Kennerley and Mark E Walton, “Decision Making and Reward in Frontal Cortex: 
Complementary Evidence From Neurophysiological and Neuropsychological Studies,” Behavioral 
Neuroscience 125, no. 3 (2011): 297–317. 
117 Cf. Robert Audi, Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision (Routledge, 2006), esp. at 1. 
118 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999), 36. 
119 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 39. See further: 46-47. 
120 Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 39. See further: 46-47. 
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punished. A second-order reason in favour might be that they have not eaten for days, 
thereby strengthening the first-order reason that they are hungry; they are not only hungry, 
but starving. A second-order reason against might be that the punishment for stealing is 
severe.  
None of these are memes; they are practical considerations. However, memes might also 
be involved. For example, a meme of “everyone for themselves” could be a first-order 
reason in favour of stealing the bread; a meme “thou shalt not steal” could be a first-order 
reason against. The relative directive potency of each of these could well swing the 
balance.    
However, the introduction of an exclusionary reason would render this calculus moot. For 
example, an idea that not only is it against the law to steal, but that the law must be obeyed 
in all instances, would be an exclusionary reason. Practical considerations and the finer 
moral points of the matter would be irrelevant. This idea that “the law must always be 
obeyed without exception” could, of course, be a meme. If the destitute person were raised 
in an environment in which this idea was both prevalent and potent, they might have 
developed a strong aversion to theft; regardless of how hungry they are, theft is 
impermissible. They might attempt to beg for the bread, rather than steal it. 
4.15 Laws as Memes 
Not everything is a meme.121 However, the fact that laws can be memes should not be 
difficult to see.  
Memes, it can be remembered, are patterns of thought or behaviour, which are capable of 
being copied through processes of learning.122 These, ultimately, must have some 
physiological/neurological basis. Laws, too, are patterns of thought and behaviour, which 
also have a physiological/neurological basis, but they are patterns that are fixed – or, at 
least, we think or feel them to be fixed, to a greater or lesser degree. This sense of 
fixedness is a product of their being strongly established associations of the kinds outlined 
in the previous chapter (equivalence, etc.). They operate, then, as codes or instructions, 
which determine, or at least influence, how we think and behave.  
                                                    
121 For example, perceptions, emotions, memories, imaginings, etc. are not memes: Blackmore, The Meme 
Machine, 15, 42–46. On the point about emotions, it can be said that, whilst emotions themselves are not 
memes, ways of categorizing, expressing, and, perhaps, even regulating them might be. 
122 Supra 4.4. 
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Whilst we arrive at some of these independently, a great many of these are learned from, 
and, indeed, can only be learned from, others – especially when it comes to social matters. 
Some will be taught to us – and, perhaps, need to be taught to us, especially when it comes 
to the details and to laws that apply specifically to us (and therefore cannot be inferred or 
deduced) – quite explicitly.123 Others we will arrive at, or get a general sense of, by 
processes of inference or deduction from others’ behaviours.124 But, whichever is the 
case, the patterns that we hold in our minds will reflect what we have seen of, or heard 
from, others, and will be a legacy of our attempting – whether intentionally or 
unintentionally – to copy what they have said and done.125 In short, laws are replicable 
units of thought and behaviour, encoded as fixed associations in the mind – they are 
memes.126 
This means that we can study laws as we study memes.127 We can study replication and 
heredity; variation and selection; longevity, fecundity, and copying-fidelity; the process 
of expression, exposure, and assimilation; derivation, divergence, and convergence;128 
                                                    
123 Indeed, much as Sherif has noted, these laws, originating outside of the individual, often appear to ‘each 
individual who first confronts it’ to have an ‘objective reality’. They seem to be facts because they are 
presented as if they were facts; they are simply accepted. Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms 
(Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1936), 125, 131–33. 
124 Here, we can think of the distinction drawn by Timasheff between imitative uniformities and imposed 
uniformities. In both of these cases, the uniformities are “causally explained as reproductions of ‘original 
acts’, which are considered by men as ‘patterns of behaviour’”. However, whereas imposed uniformities 
are brought about, it might be said, imitative uniformities come about; the former involves active effort by 
some to determine the behaviour of others, whereas the latter involves individuals conforming to others’ 
behaviours, without necessarily having been forced, directed, or otherwise actively influenced to do so. 
These, it can be noted, Timasheff contrasted with natural uniformities – essentially, similarities of 
behaviour that arise by chance or circumstance, not primarily through social learning. Nicholas 
Sergeyevitch Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law (Harvard University Press, 1939), 5–10, 
quote at 6. 
125 Cf. “Man is not born into the world with a set of norms. They become part of him as he develops in a 
social environment. The social environment consists of people with whom he comes into contact as a baby 
in a family, as a playmate, as a pupil in a school, as a member of a religious group, an economic group, a 
social group, etc.” People incorporate these ‘norms or standards’ naturally – “[w]hether they wish to or not, 
whether they are conscious of the fact or not, makes no difference.” Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms, 
46, 25. 
126 Stake even once went so far – in a passing comment – as to suggest that we might call law-memes 
“lemes”, though this is perhaps not a necessary addition to our vocabulary and it does not appear to have 
caught on: Jeffrey Evans Stake, “Evolution of Rules in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of 
the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities,” Florida State University Law Review 32 (2005): 403. 
127 We can here compare Fried’s saying that “Rules of law, precedents, and legal doctrines can be treated 
as memes competing to appear in legal reporters.” He goes on to argue that “legal opinions are uniquely 
well-suited to a memetic analysis for several reasons.” One of these is that, as legal opinions, decisions, 
etc. are often written, there is a written trail, which is not unlike a ‘fossil record’. Moreover, as these 
opinions, etc. tend to be recorded in standardized forms and gathered together, there is an extent to which 
memetic analysis can be undertaken with convenience and ease; it improves memes’ traceability 
immensely. Fried’s ideas, it should be said, were clearly developed within the context of common law legal 
systems and appears to adopt a more formalistic definition of law than the structural definition here adopted. 
See: Fried, “The Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective,” 307ff. 
128 On this, see, for example, Timasheff’s brief discussion on what he termed similarities in legal systems 
due to ‘similarity of conditions’ (in our terms, convergence), as opposed to ‘imitation’ (in our terms, 
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and prevalence, potency, and persistency. We can study them in the light of the 
resemblance principle, and, in the case of legal systems, in the light of the variation and 
accumulation principles, as well as memetic migration. 
4.16 Customary Law 
With all of this in mind, we can better understand customary law. Customary laws are 
simply those fixed associations that tend to be prevalent and potent within a social group 
(cf. the resemblance principle). These are generally considered to have persisted within 
that group for an extended period of time, although this might as easily be false as true. 
Moreover, they are generally not associated with having been given by a particular 
individual or body; if this is so, it is their perceived long use, rather than their having been 
given, that is thought to underlie their potency.  
Customary and positive law are more alike than generally supposed. Besides differences 
in their respective rules of recognition and format, there is little to tell them apart. 
Likewise, mere custom is not greatly different either. Indeed, mere custom might easily 
become customary or positive law; customary or positive law might become mere 
custom; customary and positive law might easily become the other. Whether something 
is mere custom, customary law, or is made into positive law is largely dictated by the 
importance attached to it. Is it sufficiently important to require the dedication of time, 
energy, and resources so as to elucidate and enforce it? Mere customs tend not to attract 
this dedication; customary law, more so; positive law, even more so.  
4.17 Positive Law and Legal Positivism 
We can now properly understand the voluntarism fallacy introduced earlier – the idea of 
law as an exercise of will.129 Many laws, which we call customary, exist purely as a result 
of the vicissitudes of the memetic process – particularly in societies that lack durable 
media for communication (e.g. writing). In other words, they exist not so much because 
they were decided upon by some person, but, rather, because, through their various 
evolutions, they have remained sufficiently and persistently prevalent and potent within 
                                                    
derivation). For Timasheff, it was the phenomenon of convergence, as manifested in the “natural similitude 
of legal structures,” that found expression in “the idea of jus gentium by the Romans, and in that of natural 
law by the philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries”. This may to a large extent be true, 
but we cannot except the possibility that some of these similarities were due rather to some process or 
processes of derivation/diffusion. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting point. See: Timasheff, An 
Introduction to the Sociology of Law, 10–12, quote at 11. 
129 See, supra, 3.2. 
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the memepool. People follow and administer them not because they are command of some 
sovereign individual, but simply because it is their way of life.130  
However, the fact that laws can be purposefully created and promulgated is self-evident 
– these are usually termed legislation, ordinances, etc. In other words, an attempt can be 
made to dictate or otherwise determine what law-memes are prevalent and potent within 
the memepool. Whether this is successful will greatly hinge upon the creator-
promulgator’s connections and influence. If they are recognized within the group as 
having an activity of creating and promulgating laws, then their attempts are more likely 
to be successful than if they are not. Likewise, there is an argument that their success also 
hinges somewhat on whether they can compel compliance and punish non-compliance, 
although this argument can easily be pursued too far. The fact remains, though, that 
having recognized generators and managers of the laws can make everybody’s lives 
easier. So long as they do not abuse their position or act ineptly, having a single reference 
point can make things clearer. Indeed, it can help to systematize the laws, thereby making 
them more coherent and consistent. As such, whilst law need not be positive, a great deal 
is nowadays and that with good reason. 
Whilst the voluntarism fallacy is partially fallacious, the inherent goodness fallacy is 
wholly fallacious. There is no fixed association that is naturally good or bad; they are 
merely good or bad in our estimation. The recognition of this fact is one of the virtues of 
legal positivism. The upshot of this is that whether something is a law depends on its form 
and not its content.  
4.18 Objectivity of Law 
It has often been claimed that laws, regardless as to their source, are, or must be, in some 
sense objective: they are “detached from the consciousness of those who ought to comply 
with them, and have acquired their own autonomous existence”.131 This the Associational 
Theory of Law cannot maintain.  
Certainly, laws might seem objective, as if they were absolute facts, because they have 
been ingrained in us, because they have been given written formulation, or because 
everybody seems to accept them. However, there are two points to be noted. First, a large 
                                                    
130 Those in the legal positivist tradition, particularly after the manner of Austin, appear, as Pollock said, to 
err “by elevating what is at most one characteristic of law into its essence” (Frederick Pollock, “Law and 
Command,” Law Magazine and Review 1, no. 3 (1872): 191.) Some laws are purposefully made and 
promulgated, but not all.  
131 Cf. Santi Romano, The Legal Order, trans. Mariano Croce (Routledge, 2017), 8-10 [§7], quote at 8. 
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measure of intersubjective agreement (i.e. prevalence) – at least, amongst those supposed 
to be knowledgeable about such things – does not in any way make them ‘objective’.132 
It only means that people appear to agree about them and accept them.  
Second, it is often forgotten that many laws only seem objective because we tacitly accept 
certain other premises (e.g. their legitimacy, validity, utility, etc.). In other words, to claim 
that laws are somehow objective is to appeal to these other premises, which only produces 
a positive result if we actually accept them. In effect, there is always an argument to be 
made that everybody should accept such-and-such as a law, because they must do so if 
they accept certain premises.  
Further, there is always an argument to be made that everybody should interpret a law in 
such-and-such a way, because they must do so if they accept either (1) certain meanings 
for certain words, or (2) that the law ‘exists’ for a particular purpose or end. But 
everything is contingent upon acceptance, which means that laws are not ultimately 
objective or ‘out-there’, as if they were material things, but mental constructs entirely 
dependent upon us for their metaphorical life-force. The objectivity of law is a mirage – 
albeit a convincing one – which dissipates upon close inspection.  
4.19 Law and Society 
It was said earlier that rules, whilst being a common feature of social groups – and almost 
certainly in those whose members have frequent interactions with one another – are not 
central or, indeed, intrinsic to the definition of ‘social group’.133 It is worthwhile revisiting 
this idea in the context of defining law, as there is sometimes an idea that ‘there can be 
no society without law or law without society’.134  
When we imagine law, we tend to think of those shared (i.e. prevalent, as well as 
presumably potent) expectations that we have – not only those that we have regarding 
others’ patterns of thoughts and behaviours, but also those that we believe others have 
                                                    
132 Cf. supra, 4.11. 
133 See, supra, 2.16. 
134 For example, Romano: “First, it [law] must be traced back to the concept of society. […]. What remains 
in the purely individual sphere, and fails to overstep the individual’s life as such, is not law (ubi ius ibi 
societas). Moreover, there is no society, in the proper sense of the word, unless the legal phenomenon 
manifests itself within it (ubi societas ibi ius).” It is important to note how he goes on to define society, 
which seems to hint at a metaphysical fallacy: “By society I do not mean a simple relationship between 
individuals, such as e.g. friendship, where no legal elements are to be found. Rather, society is an entity 
constituting a concrete unity, though formally and extrinsically – one that is distinguished from the 
individuals who comprise it. And this has to be an effectively constituted unity. To give another example, 
a class or group of people that is not organized as such, but is only determined by mere affinities between 
people themselves, is not society proper.” Romano, The Legal Order, 12 [§10a]. 
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regarding our own patterns of thoughts and behaviour. There is often an idea, therefore, 
that there can be no purely personal law, which law is set by oneself, for oneself, and is 
enforced only by oneself; law must come ‘from society’.135 There are a few things to be 
said about this.  
First, nothing can come ‘from society’, as is apparent from the definition of ‘social group’ 
given earlier. Society is not an entity which can produce anything; it is a construct. 
Therefore, laws, in this respect at least, can only come from other people, i.e. other 
individuals.  
Second, in order to be worthwhile our knowing and, where appropriate, following or 
enforcing, laws usually must have some sense, if not of general applicability, then at least 
of applicability to some set of people. Moreover, some sense that other members of the 
group – if not all of them – are stakeholders in these laws being observed. Thus, we tend 
to dismiss self-regarding laws, because they are of little interest to us. If a person decides 
to follow some strict diet (e.g. by becoming a vegan, vegetarian, etc.), according to which 
they will only eat certain things at certain times, unless this results in markedly antisocial 
behaviour, it will probably not greatly concern most people and, as a consequence, they 
will not think it worthwhile investing time, energy, and resources into enforcing that 
pattern of behaviour. The point is not so much that personal or self-regarding laws are not 
laws, but, rather, they are not laws that concern us – at least, when they are made by and 
for others. Insofar and so long as this remains the case, and insofar as we think it within 
individuals’ discretion to create such self-regarding laws, these remain a largely 
unimportant type of law, simply because they are not socially important. Nevertheless, 
their root and structure remains the same as all other laws; they are merely a different 
species within the same genus.136  
Third, to ask whether law is necessary to society is to ask something of a loaded question. 
The word ‘society’ naturally evokes images of cohesion, which, in some respect at least, 
seems to require some measure of mutual coordination and adjustment, i.e. law. If people 
are to live their lives tolerably well, this would seem to require that other people behave 
in predictable and recognized ways,137 which ways often become enmeshed with the idea 
of the group’s identity. Insofar as it goes, there is a measure of sense to this, even if a 
number of problems remain, e.g. how much law must a society have, according to this 
                                                    
135 Ibid.  
136 Cf. supra, 3.16. 
137 Cf. Appendix II.  
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reasoning, in order to qualify as a society?138 However, this sense notwithstanding, it does 
not follow that there is an exclusive relationship between law and society.  
Law is important for society, but it can exist without, or, indeed, in spite of, so-called 
‘society’. This can be seen more clearly when one focuses on the less emotive and 
evocative term ‘social group’, as we have done in the last three chapters, rather than 
‘society’. There is too great an implicit bias inherent in the term ‘society’ in favour of a 
cohesive and unitary entity, which bias is liable to mislead. Having shared fixed 
expectations is important for social life and social life is immensely affected thereby, but 
social life can continue without those fixed expectations (even if not terribly successfully) 
and those fixed expectations, whilst being to a certain extent moulded by social life, do 
not necessarily derive from it. In sum, law and society are connected, but not inextricably. 
4.20 Summation of the Associational Theory of Law (II) 
Laws are psychological phenomena. They are patterns of thought, which can be expressed 
– through our actions, speech, etc. – and thereby assimilated by others who are either 
directly or indirectly exposed to them. Accordingly, they can be considered as memes and 
memeplexes. As such, successful laws are those that are prevalent, potent, and persistent 
within certain groups. On a basic level, this means that each instantiation of law-memes 
needs to last long enough to maximise its chances of being copied (longevity) a 
sufficiently large number of times (fecundity), and for each copy to remain as faithful as 
possible to the original (fidelity). There are certain strategies that can be adopted to 
increase copying-fidelity, including (a) repetition and (b) externalisation, i.e. the creation 
of anchor points, such as reduction to writing. Indeed, because the written word can be 
reproduced accurately, inexpensively, and abundantly, it is a particularly powerful tool in 
encouraging prevalence, if not also potency.139 
Memetic similarity is a product either of derivation or convergence. For legal and 
constitutional historians, as well as for comparative lawyers, it is important to distinguish 
instances of derivation (e.g. transplantations, etc.) from instances of convergence. It is 
only in this way that we can properly understand how they came about. Indeed, where 
derivation is involved, it is further necessary to investigate whether any changes or 
                                                    
138 Cf. the problems with cohesion models of social groups, discussed supra at 2.10. 
139 The written word is, of course, also stable and durable. Moreover, its form, if not its meaning, is 
practically incontrovertible; if its meaning is clear, it is very difficult to gainsay. It is perhaps for this reason 
that Euripides, through the mouth of Theseus, wrote: “With written laws, the humblest in the state, / Is sure 
of equal justice with the great”. Quoted in: Alfred Eckhard Zimmern, The Greek Commonwealth: Politics 
and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens (Oxford University Press, 1911), 126.  
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developments that occurred were a result of some continuing connection between the two 
‘lineages’ or whether similar forces pushed them to develop in a parallel manner. This 
helps us to ask the right questions; to better understand why things happened as they did.  
Individuals are inordinately influenced by those regularly around them; it is to these 
individuals and their memes that we are most frequently exposed. As such, I have 
suggested the resemblance principle: individuals are likely to hold memes similar to those 
with whom they regularly associate. In terms of laws, therefore, we are likely to share the 
same fixed associations as those around us. Indeed, this resemblance will be increased 
where it is accompanied by certain fixed associations concerning group membership, i.e. 
where people make an effort to educate those within the same social group as to the fixed 
associations held by that group. This, as it has been said, is the basis of customary law. 
There is a propensity towards systematization, i.e. the development of certain fixed 
associations as to, in particular: (1) what is and is not included in the system, which are 
normally in the form of categorical associations and which we might call by Hart’s 
appellation of rules of recognition; (2) where those elements included in the system stand 
in relation to one another in terms of order and priority, for which we suggested the name 
rules of ordering;140 (3) how the system might be altered by additions, subtractions, or 
modifications, which are usually in the form of sequential associations and can be called 
by Hart’s name of rules of change; and (4)(a) who decides what is within the system and 
its precise content and (b) who makes determinations in individual cases, which can 
collectively be called rules of decision.141 These fixed associations exert considerable 
influence on both selection and potency; they determine which associations we should 
regard or disregard, and which associations we should look to express and follow.142 It is 
                                                    
140 We have also called these rules of arrangement and priority (supra 3.14).  
141 For Hart’s discussion of his three types of rule (rules of recognition, change, and adjudication), see: 
HLA Hart, The Concept of Law, ed. Penelope A Bulloch and Joseph Raz, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 
1994), 94–97. 
142 Cf. Almeida: “New social norms, however, are evaluated in light of past norms; only those compatible 
with previous normative standards are maintained, in such a way that, in proper time, the cultural 
accumulation of social norms produces a matrix of interwoven rules that becomes the background 
normative assumption for the collective selection of novel social norms. The resulting process is a 
sophisticated system of interlaced social rules in which one rule presupposes a set of other social norms – 
but not only legal social norms specifically, since there is scarce functional differentiation and, as such, 
other kinds of norms and values become interwoven in the same cultural memeplex. This is the heart of 
customary law.” Almeida, “Constitution: The Evolution of a Societal Structure (PhD Thesis),” 251. 
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these that produce the formal basis of a legal system,143 which might equally be a 
customary system as one based firmly in the idea of positive law.144  
Besides the fact that we naturally develop fixed associations, we like having them. They 
make the world easier to understand and navigate. It is this that underpins our desire for 
the so-called rule of law.145 For this to happen on any scale, it is necessary for groups to 
have fixed associations in common; fixed associations that are prevalent, potent, and 
relatively persistent within that group. It is towards these ideas that formal theories of the 
rule of law have been driving. However, as laws are defined by their structure and not by 
their utility, value, appeal, etc., it is impossible to accept substantive theories of the rule 
of law. 
                                                    
143 Holdsworth wrote that “The historian of any legal system must begin his tale in the days before the law 
courts have made much law. Legal history therefore must always begin with the history of the courts.” In 
the light of the Associational Theory of Law, this can be seen to be not entirely true. In terms of creating a 
system and giving it coherence, there can be little doubt that places of adjudication and law declaration (i.e. 
courts, loosely interpreted) are important. Moreover, as Holdsworth recognized, by studying the various 
sets and types of court, one can appreciate how legal systems are arranged and how various systems and 
sub-systems interact; one can better appreciate the systems of jurisdiction. For example, to recognize that 
in England there have been courts of Common Law, Ecclesiastical Law, Admiralty, Equity, etc. is to 
recognize that, in the very least, the English legal system has been multifaceted. Nevertheless, that we must, 
as of necessity, begin with the courts is to go too far, especially as it rather assumes that the functions of 
adjudication and law declaration will be performed by discrete, identifiable, specialized, and 
institutionalized bodies within social groups. Furthermore, it assumes that the legal system is of ancient 
provenance and is without an easily identifiable foundation; Holdsworth is clearly very much thinking of 
England and the Common Law. Consequently, rather than necessarily beginning with the courts, the legal 
historian ought to begin by identifying social groups with shared associations and expectations, and any 
things that might make those a system (i.e. rules of recognition, etc.). The system(s) of courts might be a 
part of this, particularly in respect of rules of decision; they are not an unavoidable beginning. For 
Holdsworth, see: William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 1 (Little, Brown, and 
Company, 1922), 1–2, quote at 1. 
144 Kelsen argued that a universal characteristic of legal systems is that they are ‘coercive orders’; they 
specify punishments for behaviours “regarded as undesirable because detrimental to society”. Further 
down, he speaks of laws providing ‘collective security’, the aim of which is peace; this is presumably 
achieved through the coercive aspects of the legal system. It is this coercive nature that distinguishes laws 
from morals, according to Kelsen. Most social groups expect there to be consequences for deviant and 
undesirable behaviours – especially if such behaviours are considered dangerous or vexing. Often, these 
consequences are specified in advance. However, a system would be no less a system without this sort of 
content. It provides incentive to follow the system and thereby helps to make it efficacious, but it is not 
strictly necessary. Another characteristic identified by Kelsen was that “all social orders designated by the 
word ‘law’” are “orders of human behaviour”; this is broadly correct, insofar as they are human laws, as 
opposed to physical laws. Another argument made by Kelsen is that laws cannot exist in isolation: “a 
particular norm may be regarded as a legal norm only as part of such a system [of norms”. We cannot 
wholly agree with this, in the sense that laws are defined by their structure, rather than by their existence 
as part of some system. Nevertheless, from a juristic standpoint, it makes sense only to recognize as ‘legal 
norms’ those that are identified as being a part of the system. For Kelsen’s discussion of these points, see: 
Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967), 33–34, 37, 
47, 50–51, 54, 62.  
145 For this and the arguments immediately following, see Appendix I.  
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Laws exist properly in the mind and only in the mind. They might be written, codified, 
etc., but such externalization only has as much value as we attribute thereto.146 Indeed, 
we must be initiated and instructed in the meanings and grammar of the symbols 
deployed. Cuneiform, hieroglyphics, and other scripts and systems of symbolic 
representation might appear attractive to the eye, but, unless they have been explained to 
us, they are all but meaningless. In short: If we attribute no value to the external forms, 
there are but dead letters. If we are uninitiated, there are but hollow glyphs. They have no 
power but that which we imagine them to have. The life of the law is in the mind.  
Besides understanding the external forms, we also need to treat them with positive regard 
if they are to be effective. Naturally, this arises from other fixed associations – often as a 
result of having been taught to regard them positively or because they appeal to us. 
However, even if some written law is treated with consistent positive regard, there is no 
guarantee that its meaning or interpretation will remain constant – after all, each 
individual and each generation will bring with them their own interpretative baggage, as 
it were, which will affect how they view (or want to view) the externalized association.147  
As we have seen, due to the effects of the evolutionary forces of variation and selection, 
sets of laws (i.e. fixed associations) are almost certain to change; they are dynamic. 
Repetition and externalization can to some degree slow these down, as can maintenance 
forces. Nevertheless, due to time, chance, environmental changes, competition, 
inclinations, etc., change is practically inevitable (the variation principle) and these 
changes will likely be compounded over time (the accumulation principle). Furthermore, 
according to the divergence principle, if legal systems divide, it is highly likely that each 
child-system will develop its own idiosyncrasies,148 although mimetic migration, parallel 
                                                    
146 Often, the value that we attribute to fixed associations is determined, as Duguit identified, by a perception 
of the ‘social necessity’ of conformity thereto. Indeed, thought Duguit, there can be no ‘jural principle’ 
(une règle de droit) unless a fixed association “has so deeply penetrated the conscience of those composing 
the social group in question that its violation…entails such a profound group reaction that the principle can 
be socially organized”. It is what people believe that matters. As such, “A rule which is at first simply a 
moral rule can become in time a rule of law, and the change is accomplished when the social reaction 
produced by the violation of this rule has become energetic enough- and definite enough to receive from 
custom or from the written law a concreteness more or less complete”. Léon Duguit, “The Law and the 
State,” Harvard Law Review 31 (1917): 4. 
147 Cf. Drout’s argument that: “[E]ven completely textual traditions do change over time because even a 
fixed text requires interpretation. We need not be orthodox post-modernists and believe in free-floating 
meaning to recognize that as languages and cultures change, so do meanings recorded in texts. Even if the 
denotations of words remain the same from generation to generation (which is highly unlikely), the cultural 
connotations [can vary] from person to person in the same generation. Thus even the most textually bound 
tradition has some room to adapt and change to fit its current environment.” Indeed, “[s]ome freedom of 
interpretation seems necessary if a tradition is to survive at all”; memes and memeplexes impervious to 
change might easily find themselves outmoded and unfit. See: Drout, How Tradition Works, 32. 
148 The English and American legal systems provide good demonstration of this. 
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evolution, or convergence might produce similarities. All of these facts – particularly the 
inevitability of change – underlie the Generational Theory of Law, outlined in the next 
chapter.   
All societies have some form of laws,149 i.e. shared fixed associations.150 These define 
acceptable modes of thought and behaviour, as well as, more generally, the courses that 
thought and behaviour take and ought to take. We can profitably quote Pollock and 
Maitland: 
“Common knowledge assures us that in every tolerably settled 
community there are rules by which men are expected to order their 
conduct. Some of these rules are not expressed in any authentic form, nor 
declared with authority by any person or body distinct from the 
community at large, nor enforced by any power constituted for that 
purpose. Others are declared by some person or body having 
permanently, or for the time being, public authority for that purpose, and, 
when so declared, are conceived as binding the members of the 
community in a special manner.”151 
Moreover: 
“[T]he notion of law does not include of necessity the existence of a 
distinct profession of lawyers, whether as judges or as advocates. There 
can-not well be a science of law without such a profession; but justice can 
be administered according to settled rules by persons taken from the 
                                                    
149 Cf. Moore: “No society is without law; ergo, there is no society outside the purview of the ‘legal 
anthropologist’.” And Luhmann whose sentiment, if not his precise formulation, we can agree with: “We 
are not returning to the popular thesis that there have been societies without law either in the history of 
mankind or even in the crosscultural comparisons of the present (namely, those which do not have a 
coercive state apparatus). Rather, our functional concept of law makes it clear that law fulfils a necessary 
function in every meaningfully constituted society and must therefore always exist.” Shapiro was almost 
certainly incorrect when he stated that: “Anthropologists now believe that humans mostly lived without law 
for the vast majority of their time on earth” and “it is plausible to suppose that law is a comparatively recent 
invention, postdating the wheel, language, agriculture, art, and religion.” Sally Falk Moore, Law as 
Process: An Anthropological Approach (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978), 215; Niklas Luhmann, A 
Sociological Theory of Law, ed. Martin Albrow, trans. Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow (Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1985), 83; Scott J Shapiro, Legality (Harvard University Press, 2011), 35, 36; cf. Brian Z 
Tamanaha, A Realistic Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 84ff, 89ff.  
150 Indeed, Timascheff went so far as to say that “the triumph of law [over other forces, e.g. ‘divergent 
individual wills’], i.e. the conformity of human behaviour to legal precepts, is not a postulate, not a desire 
of well-intentioned individuals, but a fact of social life.” For Timascheff, such law “produces similarity or 
uniformity in the behaviour of individuals within a social group”, although, as he said a couple of pages 
previously to these two sentences already quoted, “[t]he conformity of social life to law is, however, only 
a tendency, not a complete actuality”. Timasheff, An Introduction to the Sociology of Law, 6, 4. 
151 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of 
Edward I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1968), xciii–xciv. 
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general body of citizens for the occasion, or in a small community even 
by the whole body of qualified citizens…”152 
Indeed, it would be surprising for any society to be devoid of law: 
“There are always points of accepted faith which even the strongest of 
despots dares not offend, points of custom he dares not disregard.”153 
Most everything we think and do is informed and hedged about by laws – by fixed 
associations. Laws, much like constitutions, are all-pervasive.154 
4.21 Divisions of Law 
Laws might be divided in a number of ways, many of which we have already noticed. We 
might divide them according to structure – whether they are qualitative, equivalence, 
etc. We might divide them according to source, e.g. whether they are customary, positive, 
statute, judge-made, etc. We might divide them according to nature, whether they are, in 
the first place, substantive or procedural and, if substantive, then of what kind – criminal, 
property, tort, etc. However, one of the greatest divisions of law is into public and 
private. Public law is generally said to regulate the composition, structure, and 
administration of the social group, and the relationship between individuals and that 
social group; private law, on the other hand, regulates the relationships and interactions 
between those individuals.  
Now, if we were to adopt the view of the legal realists and say that laws are “prophecies 
of what the courts will do in fact”,155 then this leaves us with something of a problem 
when it comes to public law. Much ‘public law’ appears to lie beyond, or in the very least 
lack, “judicial enforcement”,156 even if parts of it have some measure of judicial 
recognition. From the legal realist perspective, the implication would seem to be that 
much ‘public law’ is not, in fact and stricto sensu, law. However, whilst the courts are 
usually the principal interpreters and enforcers of the law, and whilst, in many respects, 
the only true rights possessed by persons are those that the courts are able and willing to 
enforce, it does not seem wholly wise to restrict the definition of law solely to bounds 
drawn by the (current) competencies of the courts. For there are fixed expectations that 
                                                    
152 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:xcvii. 
153 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 1:xcvii–xcviii. 
154 Much as Steven Vago in his Law and Society (1988): “Law permeates all realms of social behaviour. Its 
pervasiveness and social significance are felt in all walks of life”. Quoted in: Roger Cotterrell, The 
Sociology of Law: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Butterworths, 1992), 2. 
155 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of Law,” Harvard Law Review 10, no. 8 (1897): 461. 
156 Romano, The Legal Order, 4. 
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exist beyond these bounds, which determine and delimit the actions that might be taken 
by people as representatives of certain offices, institutions, etc., or even as private 
individuals. These are every bit deserving of the name of ‘law’, even if the litigant or 
lawyer might not achieve much in regard to them within the courts systems. 
Some divisions of law are more scientific, logical, and absolute, whilst others rather turn 
upon opinion and convenience. The division between public and private law veers 
towards the latter. This is in no small part due to the ubiquity and reach of public law – 
practically everything we do has a social context and, for that reason, the composition 
and structure of social groups, and our relationship to them, will always be somehow 
relevant.  Nevertheless, it is argued, by combining the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity 
and the Associational Theory of Law, we can come to a better understanding of public 
law, of constitutional laws.   
4.22 The Ubiquity and Associational Theories 
Constitutions have been defined as the distribution of activities and social influence 
within social groups. It should be obvious that we have many fixed associations relating 
to these things: who is included within the group; what sorts of activities should be 
undertaken, when, how, and by whom; what sorts of social influence are acceptable, 
when, in what manner, and by whom; etc. The majority of these we learn from, and share 
with, those around us; they are gained through social learning. In short, we have common 
fixed associations pertaining to the nature, attendant conditions, agency, qualifications, 
and purpose of activities and social influence, and the distribution thereof, as well as fixed 
associations pertaining to the nature of the social group. These are, in their most basic 
sense, constitutional laws.157  
One might call these fundamental laws or public law. The difference is academic; they 
concern the same thing. Moreover, they are not inherently different to other kinds of law 
– in particular, so-called ‘ordinary law’. There is often a sense that public law must 
somehow be different or special,158 but it is only so different or special as we think it to 
be. We can distinguish public law from so-called ordinary law, but there is nothing to say 
                                                    
157 It is the idea, then, of distribution that provides the foundation of public law, rather than, for example, 
as Loughlin had it, representation, although one can see how easy it is to move from one to the other. For 
Loughlin, see: Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), chap. 4. 
158 This would seem to be Loughlin’s main agenda in his Idea of Public Law and Foundations of Public 
law – to show that public law is, and must be, an ‘autonomous discipline’ and that it is, and must be, 
different from ordinary (i.e. Common Law); to equate public and ordinary law might result in ‘judicial 
supremacism’. See: Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law, esp. 1; Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), esp. 6. 
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that this must necessarily be the case. It depends on a willingness to create categorical 
associations separating them; associating constitutional laws with certain features and 
‘ordinary’ laws with certain other features. Nothing prevents us from putting them in the 
same category – from thinking of them as being created, administered, and altered in the 
same ways. Whether this would be wise is another matter. Indeed, as sensible as it is to 
separate constitutional laws from other laws, to think of constitutional laws or public law 
as being essentially different is to misunderstand the nature of constitutions and laws.  
Constitutional laws can be observed also among non-human animals – particularly those 
species displaying more complex forms of social interaction and organization, e.g. 
gregarious mammalian species like painted wolves, chimpanzees, and bonobos. It is 
arguably among such species – whose social lives are ‘based on individual recognition, 
long-term association, a high degree of mutual cooperation’,159 and interdependence – 
that the need for fixed associations concerning the distribution of activities and influence 
is greatest; they shape and regulate individuals’ actions and interactions; they make social 
life possible. Such animals clearly discriminate non-randomly between in-group and out-
group members; display ideas about social position and status, especially in terms of 
dominance hierarchies;160 show awareness that different animals do, or can do, different 
things (e.g. leading,161 mating, child-rearing, etc.); and even appear to follow collective 
decision-making processes.162 The precise mechanisms by which such laws arise is a 
question for another occasion, but it will almost certainly be due to some mixture of 
genetic, ecological, and social factors.163 
As constitutions vary in complexity, so do constitutional laws. This is to be expected, 
given that they might relate to larger social groups with a greater diversity of activities 
and more nuanced levels of influence, etc. Indeed, as compared with other social animals, 
humans certainly have greater scope for imagination and communication (via symbolic 
                                                    
159 Thelma Rowell, Social Behaviour of Monkeys (Penguin Books Ltd, 1972), 23. 
160 In particular, the ‘superior’ positions of alpha male and/or alpha female, which positions often carry 
both privilege and responsibility. 
161 On this, see esp.: Kummer, Primate Societies, 61–68. 
162 It would seem that painted wolves – also known as African wild dogs – have a system by which they 
decide whether or not to hunt. Whilst this is not yet fully understood, the animals clearly seem to have some 
sense that hunting takes place only after some condition precedent – in this case, some sufficient 
demonstration of a desire to hunt by a number of individuals. It would seem that, if the motion to hunt is 
initiated or supported by dominant individuals, the threshold for sufficiency is reduced; if they are more 
reticent or unwilling, the motion still might be carried, but the threshold will be higher. On this, see: Reena 
H Walker et al., “Sneeze to Leave: African Wild Dogs (Lycaon Pictus) Use Variable Quorum Thresholds 
Facilitated by Sneezes in Collective Decisions,” Proc. R. Soc. B, 2017, 284: 20170347. On this animals 
more generally, see: Scott Creel and Nancy Marusha Creel, The African Wild Dog: Behavior, Ecology, and 
Conservation (Princeton University Press, 2002).  
163 Cf. Kummer, Primate Societies, esp. chap. 1. 
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language), meaning that the associations made can be on quite a different order of 
magnitude. Moreover, humans are more adept at systemizing and thinking critically about 
what associations should be considered valid and sound. Nevertheless, even though 
constitutional laws vary considerably depending upon the context, their core remains the 
same: they are fixed associations concerning constitutional matters, i.e. the distribution 
of activities and social influence within a social group. 
As was earlier argued, it is unlikely that any given individual will be familiar with the 
totality of the constitution of their group – especially if theirs is a large group. One of the 
primary reasons for this is the existence of ‘differential lines of transmission’, much as 
Linton identified (e.g. only within families or as between members of the same sex).164 
These are reinforced by the fact that not everybody in the group will necessarily interact 
with one another or, even if they do, there is no necessity that the particular constitutional 
ideas or behaviours will be expressed when they do. Even if they interact and these things 
are expressed, it does not follow that they will be perfectly understood or remembered, 
or that which has been experienced is representative of what others do.165 It is for these 
reasons, as previously argued, that an outsider – with the appropriate evidence – might be 
able to describe a group’s constitution better than a given member of that group,166 
especially if they have access to parts of the group to which even some of its members 
are excluded. 
4.23 Constitutional and Legal Pluralism 
We have distanced ourselves from the pluralism of the early twentieth century,167 and we 
can also distance ourselves from the pluralism of more recent decades,168 but there is 
                                                    
164 “The incomplete participation of all individuals in the culture of their societies is reflected in the presence 
within all societies of differential lines for the transmission of various culture elements. These lines 
correspond not only to the membership of the social units which carry particular sub-cultures but also to 
the various socially established categories of individuals within each of the functional social units.” Linton, 
The Study of Man, 277. 
165 On this latter point, there is a revealing story from Linton. He had been investigating buckskin making 
amongst the Comanche. At first, Linton was taught one method – the method which his ‘teacher’ knew.  
However, on further investigation, he discovered through his ‘informants’ that there were (at least) three 
methods: “Some women were familiar with all three, some with two and some with only one”. To have 
asked the question “How do the Comanche make buckskin?” to any of these three groups of women would 
probably have returned a different answer, in part because of their ignorance of the other methods and in 
part because they probably favoured their own above the others. This is much a story of caution about how 
an outsider should go about describing the constitution of a group as it is about how much stock we ought 
to invest in any given member’s knowledge of their group. For the story, see: Linton, The Study of Man, 
279. 
166 See supra, 2.1 and 2.22. 
167 Supra, 2.6. 
168 See esp. John Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” Journal of Legal Pluralism 24 (1986): 1–55. 
Further, e.g.: Leopold Pospisil, Anthropology of Law: A Comparative Perspective (Harper & Row, 1971); 
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “Law: A Map of Misreading. Toward a Postmodern Conception of Law,” 
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clearly a strong sense in which the present theories are pluralistic: There is not one 
constitution and one legal system, but many; indeed, they are not only many, but also 
various. An individual, being a member of many groups, will recognize many 
constitutions; they might also recognize many sources of law, which will vary in 
relevance and force depending upon who that individual is, where they are and what is 
happening, what they are doing, and in what capacity or persona they are doing it.169 It is 
important to recognize that none of these constitutions, legal systems, etc. are necessarily 
prior or superior to, or reliant upon, any of the others, though we might construct them to 
be so.  
Furthermore, constitutions and legal systems are not necessarily coterminous. Any given 
social group might have more than one legal system; furthermore, its members might 
recognize fixed expectations from elsewhere, even to the point that it could be said that 
the group shares legal systems with other groups.170 If a group has multiple legal systems 
in operation, these might work relatively harmoniously or unharmoniously, though the 
latter is probable to have deleterious effects if it is significant in degree. Naturally, if we 
are to have clear guidance as to how we should think and behave, it is better for any such 
legal systems to be clearly limited to certain domains or to align with one another; failing 
that, for there to be clear rules of ordering,171 such that the various systems are themselves 
to some degree systematized.  
The theories presented here are not anti-statist, but they are equally not state-centric. 
Whilst they do not rule out the creation of systems based on the tenets of ‘legal 
                                                    
Journal of Law and Society 14, no. 3 (1987): 279–302; Sally Engle Merry, “Legal Pluralism,” Law & 
Society Review 22, no. 5 (1988): 869–96; Gunther Teubner, “The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal 
Pluralism,” Cardozo Law Review 13 (1991): 1443–62; Gunther Teubner, “‘Global Bukowina’: Legal 
Pluralism in the World Society,” in Global Law Without a State, ed. Gunther Teubner (Dartmouth, 1997), 
3–28; Roderick A Macdonald, “Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes and Legal Pluralism,” 
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law 15, no. 1 (1998): 69–92. These tend to see ‘law’ as 
a form of ‘social control’ and has a focus on ‘social facts’. This is in contrast to the current approach, which 
sees ‘law’ as a psychological and structural phenomenon; it begins, not with society, but with the individual. 
Thus, even though some of the conclusions are similar, the basis is different. Cf. Brian Z Tamanaha, “The 
Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism,” Journal of Law and Society 20, no. 2 (1993): 
192–217; Brian Z Tamanaha, “A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism,” Journal of Law and Society 
27, no. 2 (2000): 296–321; Brian Z Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to 
Global,” Sydney Law Review 30, no. July (2007): 375–411; Brian Z Tamanaha, “The Promise and 
Conundrums of Pluralist Jurisprudence,” The Modern Law Review 82, no. 1 (2019): 159–79. 
169 Cf. “A descriptive theory of legal pluralism deals with the fact that within any given [social] field, law 
of various provenance may be operative. It is when in a social field more than one source of ‘law’, more 
than one ‘legal order’, is observable, that the social order of that field can be said to exhibit legal pluralism.” 
Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” 38. 
170 If so, these groups sharing a legal system will probably form a supergroup.  
171 Cf. supra, 3.15 and 4.20. 
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centralism’,172 they argue that this is not necessarily the natural order of things – most 
certainly not in any absolutist sense. Thus, State recognition, incorporation, or validation 
might be required in order for social groups, laws, or legal systems to have an official and 
sanctioned existence. The State might be considered to be first in terms of priority and 
superiority.173 Indeed, there might be good reasons for ordering things in this way, viz. 
having a central, superior authority to solve coordination problems. However, unless the 
‘State’ can assert absolute hegemony over people’s minds, there will always be room for 
other – perhaps even competing – arrangements,174 particularly in remoter areas where 
the State has few advocates and representatives, and where ‘local’ systems have greater 
effect and appeal.  
One final thing to say about the State is that it is important not to commit an ontological 
fallacy. To assert that something is so does not make it so – unless, that is, in the case of 
constructs, some number of people can be brought to believe it. Thus, even though many 
things might seem to flow logically from the characteristics that we bestow upon the State, 
to bestow characteristics upon an idea is not to make that an idea into a reality;175 at best, 
                                                    
172 “According to what I shall call the ideology of legal centralism, law is and should be the law of the state, 
uniform for all persons, exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state institutions. To 
the extent that other, lesser normative orderings, such as the church, the family, the voluntary association 
and the economic organization exist, they ought to be and in fact are hierarchically subordinate to the law 
and institutions of the state.” Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” 3.  
173 On this and the previous point, cf. Griffiths, “What Is Legal Pluralism?,” 12. 
174 Teubner noted the interesting example of Mafia ‘tax laws’, which are imposed for the provision of 
‘protection’ and the transgression of which would almost certainly result in some negative consequence(s). 
This system of law – based largely on the principle of pay or else – will probably be in stark contrast to the 
municipal and state laws. The Mafia might be more or less successful in resisting these other sources of 
law, but the fact that the Mafia’s actions will give rise to certain fixed associations and expectations of 
behaviour cannot be gainsaid; for those with the Mafia’s power, these constitute a legal reality – break the 
Mafia’s laws at your peril. Another example is provided by the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC), which is a 
British organization founded in 1982. Its aim is to apply the principles of Islamic law, at least primarily, to 
family issues – most especially those relating to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. Ostensibly, this is 
supposed to complement the UK legal system, though it has proved controversial. The ISC is but one of a 
number of Sharia Councils. A further interesting example is provided by the nari adalats, or women’s 
courts, which ‘emerged in India in the mid-1990s to promote women’s rights’. In particular, in cases of 
domestic violence, harassment, divorce, maintenance, property, and child custody. Whilst these have no 
‘legal authority’ (i.e. state-sanctioned remedies), but rather rely largely on ‘pressure and shaming’, these to 
a considerable extent provide a complementary legal system to that provided by the State. For Teuber: 
Teubner, “The Two Faces of Janus,” 1451. On Sharia Councils and Sharia law in Britain, see e.g.: Shaheen 
Sardar Ali, “Authority and Authenticity: Sharia Councils, Muslim Women’s Rights, and the English 
Courts,” Child and Family Law Quarterly 25 (2013): 113–37; Sebastian Poulter, “The Claim to a Separate 
Islamic System of Personal Law for British Muslims,” in Islamic Family Law, ed. Chibli Mallat and Jane 
Frances Connors (Graham & Trotman, 1990), 147–66; Ihsan Yilmaz, “The Challenge of Post-Modern 
Legality and Muslim Legal Pluralism in England,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28, no. 2 
(2002): 343–54. And on the relationship between religious and State law more generally, see, e.g.: 
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, “The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of 
Islamic Law and State Law,” The Modern Law Review 73, no. 1 (2010): 1–29. On the nari adalats, see: 
Sally Engle Merry, “Transnational Human Rights and Local: Mapping the Middle,” American 
Anthropologist 108, no. 1 (2006): 46–48. 
175 A classic example of an ontological argument is that put forward by Descartes in his Meditations in 
favour of the existence of God. God, it was argued, is a perfect being and, therefore, must exist, because 
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it sets forth an aspiration. Therefore, simply to assert that the State has absolute 
sovereignty does not make either the State itself or this supposed quality of absolute 
sovereignty into a reality, though it certainly might set out a political agenda. 
A point to be stressed, once again, is that constitutions, laws, and legal systems are all 
constructs. They are not ‘real’ things possessed of concrete and independent existences. 
They are only what we think them to be. The more people who conceive of them, and 
conceive of them in particular ways, the more those ideas will seem to be meaningful, 
because everybody will be acting as if they were. This does not mean that they are an 
elaborate hoax. They are merely ways in which we construct our personal and social 
reality based on the premise that we might obtain some advantage or profit thereby, 
especially through their helping to facilitate more complex systems of cooperation (even 
if the benefits are not realized in every case).176  
4.24 Taxis and Cosmos 
How do these constitutions, laws, legal systems, which seem to have some reality for 
those who live by them, come about? To answer this question, we can turn to the 
distinction that Hayek drew between taxis and cosmos.177 
Both taxis and cosmos are types of order, which can be defined as an arrangement 
displaying certain patterns and regularities.178 Taxis is a ‘made order’,179 i.e. an order that 
has been consciously and deliberately designed and implemented. By contrast, cosmos is 
a ‘spontaneous order’,180 i.e. an order that arises, not according to some grand design, but 
through the interaction and mutual adjustment of many parts moving, albeit 
                                                    
non-existence would be a sign of imperfection. This is generally considered to be one of his weaker 
arguments as to the existence and nature of God. See: René Descartes, A Discourse on Method, Medications 
on the First Philosophy, and Principles of Philosophy, trans. John Veitch (Everyman, 1994), 112ff [Med. 
V]. 
176 For example, there have been many examples in history of people creating constitutional and legal 
constructs that are to their own advantage, though to the disadvantage of others. Slavery is one example of 
this, though it perhaps ought to be admitted that the conditions of slavery were perhaps the key determinant 
as to its advantage/disadvantage to the slave. After all, well-kept slaves, who were well-fed and well-treated, 
probably found that slavery, at least in some degree, suited them. In many respects, they were cared for by 
their owners and enjoyed some measure of security. This is by no means to defend or advocate slavery. In 
many, if not the majority of, cases, slavery was maintained to the distinct advantage of the owner and the 
distinct disadvantage of the slave.  
177 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, chap. 2. 
178 Cf. Hayek’s definition: “By ‘order’ we shall throughout describe a state of affairs in which a multiplicity 
of elements of various kinds are so related to each other that we may learn from our acquaintance with 
some spatial or temporal part of the whole to form concrete expectations concerning the rest, or at least 
expectations which have a good chance of proving correct.” Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 35. 
179 Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 36. 
180 Hayek also describes this as a ‘grown order’, but this perhaps contains a metaphor wont to mislead. 
Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 36. 
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unconsciously, towards some equilibrium or other. Where these parts are sentient social 
agents, there will, of course, be many actions that are entirely conscious and deliberate, 
and aimed towards particular ends. However, the order resulting from all of these actions, 
which actions will often be moving in various and opposite directions, will not be one 
that was particularly intended or imagined by any given individual. As such, it will be, in 
Ferguson’s words “the result of human action, but not the execution of any human 
design”.181  
Constitutions and legal systems might be made or spontaneous orders. The distribution 
of activities and influence might have been consciously and deliberately planned and 
determined; it might have come about simply through individual agents interacting, and 
adjusting to one another and the environment over time. Similarly, a legal system (i.e. a 
set of systematized laws) might be consciously and deliberately created; it might just be 
that certain associations and expectations have developed over time amongst a 
population, which things have developed a measure of prevalence, potency, persistency, 
and systematisation (we can think here especially of customary law).  
The second point to note is that made orders, in practice, tend to have their ultimate form 
determined by the spontaneous order that develops around, and perhaps in spite of, them. 
Thus, even the most brilliantly conceived plans might find themselves radically altered 
as soon as they are let loose into the world – where they have to contend with various 
(and often competing) interests, desires, ideologies, environments, etc. The only guards 
against this are mechanisms that encourage, if not enforce, prevalence, potency, and 
persistency regarding the tenets of the made order.  
The third is that made and spontaneous orders can coexist side-by-side, which is to say 
that constitutions and legal systems might have some elements that have been consciously 
designed and other elements that have not been. Removing the spontaneous element 
entirely, as per the previous point, seems difficult if not impossible, which means that 
there is something of a balance to be struck: To what extent, and in what ways, can a 
made order tolerate spontaneous order, particularly where that spontaneous order tends 
towards things anathema to that made order (or, more accurately, to those who designed 
and support it)? The answer to this must be left to political philosophy. 
                                                    
181 “Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made 
with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of 
human action, but not the execution of any human design.” Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of 
Civil Society, ed. Duncan Forbes (Edinburgh University Press, 1966), 122 [3.2](emph. added). 
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Both made and spontaneous orders can be complex, though the latter tends rather more 
towards complexity. Indeed, the complexity of spontaneous orders can be vast. After all, 
“[i]ts degree of complexity is not limited to what a human mind can master”.182 Within 
this complexity, there might be many conflicting and contradictory elements, which can 
be tolerated within the order insofar as they do not pull the order apart. However, we must 
be careful not to attach value judgements here: such conflicting and contradictory 
elements might cause the order to change or cause it to splinter into different orders, but 
this change or splintering is neither necessarily good nor bad in and of itself.  
With the notion of spontaneous order, we can dispense with socio-political arguments by 
design, i.e. arguments that posit that there must, as of necessity, be an ultimate and 
original creator or creative power; that there must be sharply delineated constituent and 
constituted powers. There need not be any original social contract or founder, and we 
have no need to posit one. Social groups, constitutions, and legal systems can arise 
without there being behind them any discernible monolithic creative impulse or force 
emanating from some person or group. They can arise through many chance occurrences, 
through manifold decisions and actions taken by individuals, essentially independently 
and with limited horizons.  
The closest that we might come to positing some creative power is to say that, because 
social groups, etc. are all constructs, and therefore reliant upon our believing in them, it 
is those who believe in them that are their true constituent power. Of course, where there 
is a disparity between those who (want to) believe and those who do not (particularly 
where this results in a non-consensual imposition of certain structures, laws, etc. by those 
who do on those who do not), this can become a hotly contested issue. In such cases, there 
might be no easy solution. It is better that the difference be settled by discussion and force 
of reason; by compromise and agreement. However, there can be little gainsaying that, 
historically at least, it has often been settled by coercion and force of arms.   
4.25 Material and Formal Constitutions 
Finally, we can turn to the ideas underlying so-called political/material and legal/formal 
constitutions.  
                                                    
182 Indeed, Hayek went further: “Since a spontaneous order results from the individual elements adapting 
themselves to circumstances which directly affect only some of them, and which in their totality need not 
be known to anyone, it may extend to circumstances so complex that no mind can comprehend them all.” 
Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 37, 39 [emph. added]. 
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Politics has to do with action and decision, and, in particular, with collective action and 
decision-making. Within this, it particularly focuses on how these things are informed by 
individuals’ desires and interests. These certainly produce potentiality for conflict, the 
resolution of which and the manner of that resolution is an important part of politics. 
Furthermore, politics has to do with the balance of influence, i.e. the ability of individuals 
to direct action and decision both in regard to themselves and others.183 It would be wrong 
to say that interests and desires alone inform action and decision. Fixed associations are 
just as important, if not more so. They not only help to mould action and decision, but 
also define the limits thereof; they determine what is to be considered possible.184 It is 
this mixture of action and decision, desires and interests, balance of influence, and fixed 
associations that makes up the political or material constitution. In many, if not all, 
respects, the material constitution is a spontaneous order. 
This can be contrasted with the legal or formal constitution, which is much narrower 
and moves much more in the direction of a made order: it is confined to that specific set 
of fixed associations that has been systematized in some way.185 In some cases, this 
formal constitution might even recognize parts of the material constitution – especially if 
custom is recognized. However, the formal constitution will always be subservient to the 
material constitution;186 it exists only insofar as the material constitution allows it to 
exist.187 If nobody were to pay any attention to it, it would – for a time at least – disappear. 
                                                    
183 Schmitt’s idea that politics is based in a friend-enemy distinction is only a part of the story. Of course, 
politics is partly predicated on who we like and dislike, and who we think to be in-group and out-group 
members. However, these things themselves are predicated on our interests and desires. What Schmitt was 
perhaps driving at was the fact that these interests and desires create a potentiality for conflict, which might 
cause us to distinguish between friends and enemies. Nevertheless, the friend-enemy distinction is far too 
simplistic and lacks explanatory power. For Schmitt, see: Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political: 
Expanded Edition, trans. George Schwab (The University of Chicago Press, 2007), esp. 26ff, 37ff. 
184 Cf. “Politics – in the grounded sense of the affairs of a polity – could not be conceived of without a 
constitutive legal setting and framework. Yet on the other hand, constitutional law always presupposed 
some prior political setting – in the double sense of requiring a pre-existing political context for its 
mobilisation and sustenance and re-imagining that political context… in its narrative of origins.” Neil 
Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,” Modern Law Review 65, no. 3 (2002): 340–41. 
185 See 3.14, supra. 
186 Indeed, there is justification in questioning, as Gough has, whether people – in times of crisis, 
emergency, or heightened passions – are “any safer with laws, even with fundamental laws and a written 
constitution”. After all, as Cicero wrote: silent enim leges inter arma – in times of war, the law falls silent. 
There is no reason why people would necessarily be safer with such things; they are only safer if such 
‘fundamental laws’ or ‘written constitutional documents’ are positively regarded, and if that regard has 
sufficient prevalence and potency so as to ensure that they are followed. For Gough, see: JW Gough, 
Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford University Press, 1955), 212. For Cicero, see: 
Cicero, Orationes: Pro Milone; Pro Marcello; Pro Ligario; Pro Rege Deiotaro; Philippicae I–XIV, ed. 
Albert Curtis Clark, 2nd ed., vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 1918), 5 [Mil. 4.11]. 
187 Indeed, Hayek has argued that there is a limit to which people are capable of designing and 
implementing, of constructing, a social order deliberately from first principles – a view which he terms 
‘constructivist rationalism’ – because “[t]he basic source of social order…is not a deliberate decision to 
adopt certain common rules, but the existence among the people of certain opinions of what is right and 
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It would also disappear if it were supplanted by another set of systematized laws – by 
another legal system.  
Generally speaking, formal constitutions consist of those things that are enforceable or, 
at least, cognizable by so-called courts of law. They influence the courts’ reasoning and 
might be subject to some directive decision or sanction given thereby. Moreover, they 
tend to be written, to some extent codified, and recognized only after some deliberate and 
solemn process by virtue of which they come within the cognizance of the courts. 
Contrariwise, material constitutions consist of those things that are generally enforceable 
rather by so-called ‘extra-legal’ means, e.g. social sanctions, social pressure, etc. They 
might still be written, but are less likely to have achieved their written form through 
deliberate and solemn process.  
These things are, however, only true generally speaking. The dividing line between 
formal and material constitutions is often indistinct, especially in systems that positively 
regard custom and convention. Moreover, formal constitutions are rarely uniform; some 
parts will often be more formalized than others. Indeed, some elements will appear none 
too different to the material constitution; others in stark contrast to it. The salient point, 
however, is that the lack of a formal constitution does not mean the lack of a constitution.  
When we study non-human social animals, we study their material constitution: how 
activities and influence are actually distributed; what fixed associations appear to be 
prevalent and potent. These we have to deduce as best we can from their behaviours. 
Thus, submissive behaviours regularly practised by a given animal in the vicinity of 
another would indicate the latter’s dominance. Likewise, if groups are regularly observed 
following a particular individual from place-to-place, then this indicates that that animal 
has some leadership role.  
Similarly, when we study smaller and less technologically-developed human societies, 
we are again looking primarily at material constitutions, albeit moving closer to the sorts 
of formal constitution with which we are familiar, i.e. with clear procedures, specialized 
officials, etc. However, to deny formal constitutions entirely to such societies would be 
                                                    
wrong”. Indeed, “[s]ince all power rests on pre-existing opinions, and last only so long those opinions 
prevail, there is no real personal source of this power and no deliberate will which has created it”: Hayek, 
Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 375. Without wishing to pursue the metaphor too far, there is some truth in 
the fact that any would-be framer of a formal constitution has to work with certain materials, which is to 
say their own pre-existing ideas and the pre-existing ideas of those around them (i.e. the contemporary 
memepool), not to mention the contemporary political situation. Their designs are likely only to be adopted 
if and insofar as these are favourable and, even if they are adopted, there is every likelihood that the colour 
and shape of their implementation will appear very different to their designers’ intentions or imaginings.  
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profoundly wrong. After all, formal constitutions can exist as much by tradition as by 
being specifically created. Even though it might not have been systematized and 
rationalized to the extent to which we are accustomed, it would be nonsensical to deprive 
it of the character of a formal constitution. Indeed, there is an extent to which it is doubtful 
as to whether any constitution – whether material or formal – could ever be perfectly 
systematized.188 
Beneath the hyperbole, and beneath the extravagant and elaborate stories we tell 
ourselves, there is a singular truth about modern laws and legal systems: they are sets of 
fixed associations. This fact has not changed because, fundamentally, people have not 
changed. Past societies had constitutions. This cannot be doubted. The question that 
remains is the extent to which past constitutions are identical with modern constitutions. 
Do enduring continuities connect past and present? 
                                                    
188 “No culture, of course, will ever be in a state of perfect integration, i.e. have all its elements in a condition 
of complete mutual adjustment, as long as change of any sort is under way. Since change of some sort, 
whether due to invention or diffusion, is always going on, this means that no culture is ever perfectly 
integrated at any point in its history.” Indeed: “Cultures, like personalities, are perfectly capable of 
including conflicting elements and logical inconsistencies”. Linton, The Study of Man, 357, 358.  
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5 – The Generational Theory of Law 
“Nothing is permanent but change…”1 
5.1 Introduction  
The Generational Theory of Law is the final component of the framework. It concerns 
the extent to which one can say that laws and constitutions persist over time, i.e. whether 
one can meaningfully say that legal systems or constitutions, taken at different times, are 
the same. The essential argument of the Generational Theory is that one cannot 
meaningfully say this. There might be similarities, and later systems might be influenced 
by the legacy of earlier systems, but they are not – nor could they ever be – perfectly 
identical.  
The Theory, then, is a refutation of the continuity thesis. It is a refutation of the idea that 
laws, legal systems, constitutions, etc. exist over long periods of time. It has been noted 
how such ideas informed the writings of the earlier constitutional historians. There was 
an idea that the constitution was connected to some national character; that there was 
something in the blood or even in the soil that, for example, gave Englishmen an inherent 
love of liberty and constitutional government. Moreover, there was an idea that this was 
of ancient provenance – whether through Trojans or Teutons. The fact of the matter is 
that the continuity thesis does not withstand close scrutiny. 
The Theory has two strands – one descriptive and one moral. The argument of the 
descriptive strand is that every generation has its own set of laws, legal system, and 
constitution as a matter of fact. This is a natural result of the fact that laws, etc. are memes, 
as discussed previously. As such, they are subject to the evolutionary forces of variation 
and selection; change is inevitable. Moreover, even where those things are faithfully 
copied from one generation to the next, by the act of copying they become the property, 
as it were, of the most recent generation. To a great extent, the arguments supporting this 
have already been made in the previous chapter and, therefore, will not be repeated here. 
However, these can be complemented by a fuller understanding of the philosophical 
problem of the persistence of identity, as well as some understanding as to what is meant 
by the term ‘generation’.  It should be said that, whilst there have been many ‘evolutionary 
                                                    
1 “…nothing constant but death.”: Ludwig Börne, quoted in: Kuno Francke and William Guild Howard, 
eds., The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, vol. 6 (The German Publication 
Society, 1913), 63. 
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theories of law’,2 which is to say, dynamic theories of law, it is the incorporation of the 
memetic approach (developed in the previous chapter), and consideration of the 
persistence of identity and the nature of generations (developed in this chapter) that have 
largely been lacking from these treatments; it is only with these, it is suggested, that we 
can fully understand the nature of legal and constitutional change. 
The argument of the moral strand is quite straightforward: it is both good and right that 
each generation should be seen to have its own laws, etc. In other words, it should be 
within the power of each generation to arrange themselves as they see fit.  
5.2 Descriptive Argument 
5.2.1 Problems of Identity 
There are two fundamental problems of identity: (1) demarcation and (2) persistence.  
The problem of demarcation has to do with (a) what makes a thing itself and (b) what 
distinguishes it from, or equates it to, other things. These can respectively be called the 
problems of description and differentiation. What, for example, makes the UK 
Constitution the UK Constitution and, furthermore, what separates it from, say, the 
German Constitution? These problems are not too difficult, because they essentially 
resolve down to whether or not we associate things together. Consequently, we will not 
dwell on them.   
The problem of the persistence of identity, however, is a much thornier matter: how does 
the passage of time and change, or lack thereof, affect a thing’s identity?  
5.2.2 Persistence of Identity: Reconciling Change and Continuity 
For how long something remains itself, even in spite of change, is not a new problem. 
Indeed, it features, in one way or another, in the thought of some of the earliest 
philosophers whose ideas survive. Heraclitus,3 for example, appears to have advocated a 
‘doctrine of perpetual flux’.4 This is exemplified in the phrase panta rhei (πάντα ῥεῖ), 
which is attributed to him and means ‘everything flows’. Plato interpreted Heraclitus’ 
                                                    
2 See, supra 4.3 and infra 5.2.4. 
3 Lived c.535-c.475BCE. 
4 On Heraclitus’ ideas and place in the history of philosophy see: Bertrand Russell, History of Western 
Philosophy (Routledge, 2000), 57–65; quote is at 65. It is worth noting that Heraclitus did see one thing is 
unchanging and that was that the world is made from fire, which though ever-changing in form was 
nevertheless the same fire. In other words, the total amount of matter is fixed, although its configuration is 
constantly changing. As will be seen, there is certainly something in this idea of perpetual flux, even if 
some of his other philosophy was more arcane. 
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doctrine as “nothing ever is, everything is becoming”;5 something of the same idea can 
be seen in Ovid’s phrase omnia mutantur, nihil interit (‘everything changes, nothing 
perishes’).6 For Heraclitus, permanence was an illusion. He is famous for saying that one 
cannot step in the same river twice.7  
If permanence is an illusion, then so too must be the persistence of identity. Perhaps there 
is something of Heraclitus in the Butterfield’s saying that “to the historian the only 
absolute is change.”8  
The classic paradox concerning the persistence of identity is that of Theseus’s Ship.9 
Throughout his journeys, Theseus has need to repair his ship. This ultimately leads to the 
replacement of every part of the ship, although these replacements are done piecemeal 
over an extended period. The question is, therefore, whether the ship at the end of his 
journeys is the same as at the start? Hobbes, building on this paradox, asked a further 
question: What would be the case if somebody had followed Theseus and built a ship by 
reassembling all the discarded parts? Who then would be in possession of Theseus’s 
ship?10 Such questions might be approached in a few different ways.  
Descartes addressed the question of identity in his second Meditation.11 He considered a 
piece of fresh beeswax and noted that its properties changed when heated. It developed 
some new properties (e.g. softness and malleability) and lost others (e.g. its original 
scent). Was it nevertheless the same piece of wax? Descartes answered in the affirmative: 
                                                    
5 Plato, “Theaetetus,” in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 7: The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin 
Jowett (William Benton, 1952), 517 (152). Plato also discussed Heraclitus’ ideas in Cratylus: Plato, 
“Cratylus,” in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 7: The Dialogues of Plato, trans. Benjamin Jowett 
(William Benton, 1952), 94 (401-402). Aristotle similarly interprets Heraclitus: “All things are in motion” 
and “Nothing steadfastly is”. Aristotle, “Topics (Topica),” in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 8: 
The Works of Aristotle (I), trans. WA Pickard-Cambridge (William Benton, 1952), 148 (104b 23-24); 
Aristotle, “On the Heavens (De Caelo),” in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 8: The Works of 
Aristotle (I), trans. JL Stocks (William Benton, 1952), 390 (298b 30-35). Cf. John Burnet, Early Greek 
Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Adam and Charles Black, 1908), 161–63; Russell, History of Western Philosophy, 63. 
6 For the original Latin, see: Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. Frank Justice Miller, vol. 2 (Harvard University 
Press, 1916), 376 (Liber XV, Ln. 165); cf. Ovid, Metamorphoses, trans. AD Melville (Oxford University 
Press, 1986), 357. This idea very much foreshadows the law of the conservation of energy – that the total 
energy in a closed system remains constant over time, although the form that the energy takes might change. 
7 See: Heraclitus, The Art and Thought of Heraclitus: A New Arrangement and Translation of the Fragments 
with Literary and Philosophical Commentary, ed. Charles H. Kahn (Cambridge University Press, 1979), 
53. 
8 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (WW Norton and Company, 1965), 58. 
9 This comes from a passage found in Plutarch (c.46-120CE): Plutarch, “Theseus,” in The Rise and Fall of 
Athens: Nine Greek Lives by Plutarch, trans. Ian Scott-Kilvert (Penguin Books, 1960), 28–29. 
10 See: Roderick M Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 
1976), 89–90. For what it is worth, the most reasonable answer to this problem would seem to be that 
Theseus’s ship is the one in his possession; any ship that might be created from his offcasts might, at best, 
be described as being formerly Theseus’s ship. 
11 René Descartes (1596-1650). 
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even in spite of its transformation, there was some ‘intuition of the mind’ that led 
irresistibly to this conclusion.12 
Locke distinguished between masses of matter and living bodies.13 According to Locke, 
merely rearranging the parts or ‘atoms’ of masses of matter leaves their overall identity 
unaffected. However, if one adds or removes parts, then they become something different. 
One might alter the structure without affecting identity, but not the material. The case is 
quite otherwise with living bodies: “an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and then 
lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt grown up to a horse, sometimes fat, sometimes, 
lean, is all the while the same horse”.14 The reason for this difference, Locke suggested, 
was that living things have “an organization of parts in one coherent body, partaking of 
one common life”; consequently, “it continues to be the same plant as long as it partakes 
of the same life…”15 If we were to apply this to social groups and constitutions, this would 
either mean that they assume a new identity every time they are recomposed or it would 
entail treating them analogously to organisms, which would move dangerously into 
Group Mind territory.  
Hume, like Locke, was particularly concerned with personal identity. Hume was a radical 
empiricist and believed that all knowledge must be based on particular sensory 
experiences or ‘impressions’. However, he argued in his Treatise on Human Nature that 
the “self or person is not any one impression”. People are composite; they are collections 
of perceptions and properties, and nowhere within that is an identifiable thing called the 
‘self’.16 This is what has become known as the ‘bundle theory’.17 There is something of 
Heraclitus in Hume. However, if things change so quickly, wherefrom comes our sense 
of things remaining the same? Hume suggests the following: 
“As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this 
succession of perceptions, it is to be considered, upon that account chiefly, as 
                                                    
12 René Descartes, A Discourse on Method, Medications on the First Philosophy, and Principles of 
Philosophy, trans. John Veitch (Everyman, 1994), 84–87. 
13 John Locke (1632-1704): John Locke, “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [1690],” in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding with the Second Treatise of Government (Wordsworth Editions 
Limited, 2014), 312. (2.27) 
14 Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” 312. (2.27) 
15 Locke, “Essay Concerning Human Understanding,” 312. (2.27). Locke’s views conformed to a version 
of vitalism. 
16 David Hume, “A Treatise of Human Nature [1739-40],” in The Essential Works (Wordsworth Editions 
Limited, 2011), 221. (1.4.6) 
17 “…I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of 
different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity”: Hume, “Treatise of Human 
Nature,” 222. (1.4.6) 
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the source of personal identity. Had we no memory, we never should have any 
notion of causation, nor consequently of that chain of causes and effects, 
which constitute our self or person. But having once acquired this notion of 
causation from the memory, we can extend the same chain of causes, and 
consequently the identity of persons beyond our memory, and can 
comprehend times, and circumstances, and actions, which we have entirely 
forgot, but suppose in general to have existed. […]. 
[…]. Identity depends on the relations of ideas; and these relations produce 
identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion. But as the relations, 
and the easiness of the transition may diminish by insensible degrees, we have 
no just standard, by which we can decide any dispute concerning the time, 
when they acquire or lose a title to the name of identity. All the disputes 
concerning the identity of connected objects are merely verbal, except in so 
far as the relation of parts gives rise to some fiction or imaginary principle of 
union…”18 
In many respects, this is a more refined version of Descartes’ ‘intuitions of the mind’. 
The persistence of identity is a construct of the mind, heavily reliant on memory and 
association; it is a psychological phenomenon. In this, Hume was absolutely correct.  
Identity is the perception or idea that something conforms to a particular pattern (i.e. a set 
of particular properties) or, at least, approximates sufficiently closely to it. There is, as 
Hume put it, an ‘easy transition’, or, as Hebb said, a ‘spontaneous association’.19 For this 
to continue to occur over time, two things must be true: (1) there must be no perceptible 
difference that is sufficient to prevent that ‘easy transition’ and (2) there must be some 
continuous narrative that helps us to explain away any differences, such that we modify 
our pre-existing associations rather than developing new ones. In all of this, the idea of 
what might be called sticky membership is important: even though parts might come 
and go, the greater part remains at any given time. There is a continuing sense of 
coherence and unity, and any changes that occur are within the level of tolerance. This 
means that our impression a thing at T3 will approximate to that at T2, which itself 
approximated to that at T1. Even though there might not be an easy transition between T3 
                                                    
18 Hume, “Treatise of Human Nature,” 230 (1.4.6)[emph. added].  




and T1, the fact that there was between each intermediary stage is enough to provoke the 
same neurological response.  
The persistence of identity results from the brain attempting to understand and make sense 
of the world, such that we might respond to things in a targeted and appropriate fashion. 
One can easily see the evolutionary benefits of such an ability.20 However, this does not 
hide the fact that the persistence of identity is, much as Heraclitus said, an illusion. Indeed, 
the brain often gets things very wrong – as a result of rigidity, imprecision, mistake, 
forgetfulness, etc. It is particularly prone to being misled where superficial similarities 
hide considerable changes or where superficial dissimilarities hide considerable 
similarities. 
It is important to remember that humans are ‘boundedly rational’.21 We often do not have 
the time, energy, resources, and opportunity to obtain perfect information and, more 
fundamentally, there is only so much that our minds can consciously process.22 Indeed, 
our minds rely heavily on approximations, shortcuts, assumptions, generalizations, 
simplifications, etc.; these are sometimes called heuristics. This is not because our brains 
are necessarily lazy, although it is of course in our best interests for them to conserve 
energy insofar as possible; rather, it is because the brain only possesses so much 
processing power. It is amazing and wonderful, but is nevertheless limited and imperfect. 
People too often take their impressions and ideas for granted; the brain presents these to 
us so concretely that we do not stop to question them. Indeed, very often the brain focuses 
only on what confirms the picture that it has developed; it will ignore things that might 
contradict it (cf. confirmation bias). Anything that it cannot ignore, it will attempt to 
rationalize – perhaps by concluding that the thing in question is exceptional or abnormal. 
The brain is, in a sense, naturally conservative. Insofar as possible, it will tend to resist 
making extensive changes – especially those that might entail drastically recalibrating 
one’s worldview.  
Ideas of concrete social groups, constitutions, legal systems, etc. are a direct result of this 
bounded rationality, as are ideas of the concreteness and persistence of identity. They are 
                                                    
20 For example, being able to remember that a particular plant in a particular place is one that previously 
was found to be either harmful or beneficial. Alternatively, remembering that a particular animal has 
responded to us in a certain way in the past, which makes it likely that, were we to cross paths with that 
animal again, it might treat us similarly.  
21 On bounded rationality, see, e.g.: Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten, eds., Bounded Rationality: The 
Adaptive Toolbox (The MIT Press, 2002). 
22 Cf. Owen D Jones and Timothy H Goldsmith, “Law and Behavioral Biology,” Columbia Law Review 
105, no. 2 (2005): 445. 
210 
 
also highly subjective. We have to remember that they are constructs of the mind and that 
they are, all too often, flawed. We might be able to live passably in spite of such flawed 
constructs, but this does not make them right. Many people continue to live with the idea 
that nations are like organisms, which might grow and adapt, but nevertheless remain 
essentially the same. Indeed, many very successful people continue to live with such 
ideas. Their success does not demonstrate that they are right, merely that having such an 
idea does not necessarily adversely affect one’s life chances. The fact of the matter is that 
it is misguided; it fails to appreciate and see individuals as themselves and, moreover, 
fails to recognize that change is constantly occurring.  
None of this means that we should give up ideas of identity and the persistence thereof 
entirely. Instead, it means that we have to acknowledge them for what they are (i.e. 
constructs) and acknowledge that they can be flawed. Moreover, it means that we should 
be prepared to adopt correctives to our mind’s shortcomings in this regard. We need to 
strive to think clearly and exactly; to be discerning; not to be too easily misled by our 
often hastily made and ill-informed impressions. We must not mistake the appearance of 
continuity for actual continuity. For the constitutional historian, this is imperative.  
5.2.3 ‘Generation’ 
Mannheim, in a classic paper,23 argued that earlier writers had been of two schools.24 The 
Positivist School argued that generations should be assessed quantitatively and often 
attempted to assign a fixed length to generations.25 This might work if generations are 
discrete and staggered, but in humans they typically are not. By contrast, the Romantic-
Historical School argued that generations should be assessed qualitatively.  
Mannheim appears to have favoured a more qualitative approach, i.e. generations are 
differentiated not so much by time as character; by differences of culture. For Mannheim, 
this follows from certain fundamental truths concerning generations. Firstly, individuals 
only participate in groups for limited periods of time; new participants join and older 
participants leave. In many social groups, this process of addition and subtraction occurs 
                                                    
23 Karl Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, ed. Paul 
Kecskemeti (Routledge, 1952), 276–322. 
24 For Mannheim’s discussion of the two schools of thought, see: Mannheim, “The Problem of 
Generations,” 276–86. 
25 Some suggested that a generation lasted around 15 years, whereas many others suggested 30 years: 
Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 277–78. Cf. Thomas Jefferson who calculated generations to 
last for 19 years (see infra). 
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through the “biological rhythm of birth and death”.26 Groups, therefore, undergo 
“constant rejuvenation”.27 Secondly, ideas – or ‘cultural heritage’ – are transmitted from 
each generation to the next. These are absorbed by the newer members and then modified 
by them; in this process, some things are retained, other things lost.28 Thirdly, these 
processes of turnover and transmission are continuous.29  
This continuous process of turnover and transmission contributes to what Mannheim 
called differences in Lagerung or location. One’s socio-historical location, as well as, 
more generally, one’s spatio-temporal location, have a profound impact: “Any given 
location…excludes a large number of possible modes of thought, experience, feeling, and 
action, and restricts the range of self-expression open to the individual to certain 
circumscribed possibilities.”30 In essence, individuals are products of the time and place 
of their existence; individuals existing in the same place at the same time are more likely 
to bear a greater resemblance to one another than those removed in space and time. It is 
to be stressed that the specificity of location is important; generations are not necessarily 
homogeneous.31 We can summarize Mannheim in his own words: 
“[T]he social phenomenon 'generation' represents nothing more than a 
particular kind of identity of location, embracing related 'age groups' 
embedded in a historical-social process. [G]eneration location is determined 
by the way in which certain patterns of experience and thought tend to be 
brought into existence by the natural data of the transition from one 
generation to another.”32 
‘Generation’, in the context of humans, is far from being a scientific term. As the 
reproductive cycle is continuous, it is practically impossible objectively to distinguish 
                                                    
26 In his paper, Mannheim made this into two facts: “(a) new participants in the cultural process are 
emerging whilst (b) former participants are continually disappearing.” Mannheim, “The Problem of 
Generations,” 292–96, quote at 290. 
27 Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 296. 
28 In his paper, Mannheim had this as two facts: (c) members of any one generation can participate only in 
a temporally limited section of the historical process, and (d) it is therefore necessary continually to transmit 
the accumulated cultural heritage.” Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 292, 296–301. The 
importance of forgetting in memory was identified by Mannheim: Mannheim, “The Problem of 
Generations,” 294. Of course, this observation has been made by many others; for its observation by an 
historian, one might consider, for example: Lesley Ann Coote, “Prophecy, Genealogy, and History in 
Medieval English Political Discourse,” in Broken Lines: Genealogical Literature in Late-Medieval Britain 
and France, ed. Raluca L Radulescu and Edward Donald Kennedy (Brepols, 2008), 27–44. 
29 Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 292, 301–2. 
30 Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 291. 
31 See: Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 302–4. 
32 Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 292. 
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generations from another in human populations.33 It is rather a term of convenience, which 
roughly expresses the idea that groups gain and lose members over time, and that each 
intake tends to have and develop its own idiosyncrasies. It is possible to construe 
generations along various lines, e.g. according to perfect displacement of members,34 
average length of membership,35 average length of active contribution,36 and average 
length of reproductive fertility.37 None of these is necessarily better than the others; in 
large part, which measure is best depends on the nature of the group in question and the 
aspects being studied. Whatever measure is adopted, it is merely necessary that the 
relevant members either joined around the same time or were members at the same time; 
they must be contemporaries. Generations will seem more distinct in some cases than in 
others, and there is no necessity that generations be of equal length. 
Generations are ultimately constructs. As they are basically groups of individuals that we 
associate together, this should be unsurprising. It is just that these various groups 
represent instantiations of a particular group-idea across time, presumably accompanied 
by some overarching narrative explaining and reconciling the changes that occur.  
It is important to remember that the continuous process of turnover and transition affects 
the memepool: some memes will be faithfully transmitted across generations, whereas 
others will be modified in the process; new memes will be added, others will be lost; the 
prevalence and potency of particular memes will change. After all, memes ultimately rely 
on people and they change as people change. One would expect, ceteris paribus, the 
effects of generational turnover to be more marked in pre-literate societies, in which the 
memepool is more reliant on human memory alone. The implications for customary law 
are not difficult to see; it typically relies much more heavily on this ‘collective memory’.38 
However, whether this is borne out in fact must remain a topic for future study.  
                                                    
33 Earlier in this thesis, the various generations of writers on constitutional history were distinguished 
roughly on the basis of quarter-centuries. Whilst this possesses a large degree of explanatory power, 
because there were qualitative differences between the generations, these categorizations were constructs, 
which in perhaps some finer details do not hold and there is a degree of arbitrariness in their delimitation. 
34 I.e. each generation begins when every single member of the previous generation has departed. In 
humans, generations could last for upwards of one hundred years by this measure. 
35 I.e. generations last for about the length of time for which the average person is a member. In humans, 
this could mean that a generation could last for around seventy to eighty years, depending on local life 
expectancy. 
36 I.e. generations are measured according to the typical length of time for which members are active. In 
humans, this could vary wildly depending on the type of social group in question; it could mean that 
generations last anything between one to fifty years – or more. 
37 I.e. generations are measured according to the length of time that individuals are able to generate new 
members. In humans, this is a figure most likely to be measured in decades. 
38 For a discussion of the transition from being a largely oral culture to a literate one, see: MT Clanchy, 
From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307, 3rd ed. (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013). 
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5.2.4 Ideas of Changing Constitutions 
Constitutions, it will be remembered, are constructs. They do seem to have some degree 
of persistence over time. There is often an easy transition in one’s mind from one point 
in time to the next, and, because we are able to develop an overarching narrative, there is 
a sense in which we are justified in continuing to use a common label. However, it has to 
be remembered that this impression of persistence is an illusion. Constitutions are 
constantly changing – whether through natural processes or through conscious and 
deliberate changes being made. They are, metaphorically speaking, dynamic and fluid; 
they are in perpetual flux. This applies equally to legal systems.  
This idea, as it relates to constitutions and legal systems, is not new. It can be found 
underlying many jurists’ and theorists’ writings from many different backgrounds and 
schools. We might think of: Bagehot’s ‘living reality’;39 Kohler’s neo-Hegelian idea of 
law being an intrinsic aspect of ongoing process of development of culture (Kultur) and 
psychic life (Seelenleben);40 Stammler’s neo-Kantian ‘natural law with variable 
content’;41 Adams’ idea of law being ‘the resultant of the [ongoing] conflict of forces’, 
conforming to the will of the then ‘dominant class’;42 Duguit’s doctrine of perpetual legal 
                                                    
39 “But an observer who looks at the living reality [of the English constitution] will wonder at the contrast 
to the paper description. He will see in the life much of which is not in the books; and he will not find in 
the rough practice many refinements of the literary theory.” Moreover: “Language is the tradition of 
nations; each generation describes what it sees, but it uses words transmitted from the past. When a great 
entity like the British Constitution has continued in connected outward sameness, but hidden inner change, 
for many ages, every generation inherits a series of inapt words – of maxims once true, but of which the 
truth is ceasing or has ceased. […]. Or, if I may say so, an ancient and ever-altering constitution is like an 
old man who still wears with attached fondness clothes in the fashion of his youth: what you see of him is 
the same; what you do not see is wholly altered.”: Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 2nd ed. (Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1873), 67–68, see also 3-5. 
40 See esp.: Josef Kohler, Philosophy of Law, trans. Adalbert Albrecht (The Boston Book Company, 1914). 
On Kohler, see further: Roscoe Pound, “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence. II.,” 
Harvard Law Review 25, no. 2 (1911): 155–58. 
41 Stammler spoke of a ‘Theory of Just Law’, in which law was objectively, though not absolutely, just. In 
effect, what is just in one time and place, and in one situation, might not be so in another. Consequently, in 
order to be just, law must change. See: Rudolf Stammler, The Theory of Justice, trans. Isaac Husik (The 
Macmillan Company, 1925). Further: George H Sabine, “Rudolf Stammler’s Critical Philosophy of Law,” 
Cornell Law Quarterly 18, no. 3 (1933): 321–50. 
42 Melville M Bigelow and Brooks Adams, Centralization and the Law: Scientific Legal Education (Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1906), 23, 63–64. For Adams in context, see: Roscoe Pound, “The Scope and 
Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence. III.,” Harvard Law Review 25, no. 6 (1912): 489–516. 
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change;43 Ehrlich’s ‘living law’ (lebendes Recht);44 Sherif’s ‘norms as survivals’;45 
Holmes’ ‘transformations’,46 Pound’s ‘law-in-action’,47 Llewellyn’s idea of constitutions 
as ‘living institutions built around particular documents’,48 as well as the works of other 
American legal realists, including Cardozo and Corbin;49 Petrazycki’s ‘unofficial law’;50 
                                                    
43 “Law, like every social phenomenon, is subject to perpetual change…”: Léon Duguit, Law in the Modern 
State, trans. Frida Laski and Harold Laski (BW Huebsch, 1919), xxxv. 
44 See: Eugen Ehrlich, Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law, trans. Walter L Moll (Harvard 
Library Law School, 1936). This is different from the ‘living law’ of antiquity and the medieval period, i.e. 
the idea that the monarch or judge was a living law (nomos empsychos, lex animata, lex loquens). Ehrlich’s 
idea was that law was shaped by, and equitable to, what happened in practice, whereas the classical idea 
was that the monarch was the mouthpiece of the law, either in the sense of merely declaring it (e.g. after 
consideration of the eternal natural law) or creating it. This was often linked with ideas of equity, that the 
monarch (or judge) could soften the impact of the law where it would otherwise be overly harsh. On this 
topic, see e.g.: John Procopé, “Greek and Roman Political Theory,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval 
Political Thought, c.350-c.1450, ed. JH Burns (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 26–27. 
45 Muzafer Sherif, The Psychology of Social Norms (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1936), 198–203. Cf. 
William Halse Rivers Rivers, “Survival in Sociology,” The Sociological Review 6, no. 4 (1913): 293–305. 
46 See, esp.: Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Law in Science and Science in Law,” Harvard Law Review 12, no. 
7 (1899): 443–63. And also: Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path of Law,” Harvard Law Review 10, no. 8 
(1897): 457–78; Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Little, Brown, and Company, 1923). For a 
discussion of Holmes as an evolutionary theorist, see: E Donald Elliott, “The Evolutionary Tradition in 
Jurisprudence,” Columbia Law Review 85 (1985): 51–55. It is an interesting point to note that Holmes, by 
his own admission, never read Darwin (or Spencer): Herbert J Hovenkamp, “Evolutionary Models in 
Jurisprudence,” Texas Law Review 64, no. 4 (1985): 660. 
47 See: Roscoe Pound, “Law in Books and Law in Action,” American Law Review 44 (1910): 12–36.  
48 KN Llewellyn, “The Constitution as an Institution,” Columbia Law Review 34, no. 1 (1934): esp. at 3. 
49 For Benjamin N Cardozo, see esp.: Benjamin N Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale 
University Press, 1921); Benjamin N Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (Yale University Press, 1924). 
For/on Arthur Linton Corbin, see, e.g.: Arthur Linton Corbin, “Principles of Law the Their Evolution,” 
Yale Law Journal 64, no. 2 (1954): 161–63; Elliott, “The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence,” 55–59. 
It is noteworthy that the American realists warmly received Ehrlich’s work: Brian Z Tamanaha, A Realistic 
Theory of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 23, 26. On legal realism more generally, see, e.g.: 
Brian Z Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Realism,” Texas Law Review 87, no. 4 (2009): 731–86. 
50 This was as opposed to ‘official law’. On Petrazicky, see: Jan Gorecki, ed., Sociology and Jurisprudence 
of Leon Petrażycki (University of Illinois Press, 1975); Krzystof Motyka, “Law and Sociology: The 
Petrażyckian Perspective,” in Law and Sociology, ed. Michael Freeman (Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Roger Cotterrell, “Leon Petrazycki and Contemporary Socio-Legal Studies,” International Journal of Law 
in Context 11 (2015): 1–16. 
215 
 
Hayek’s ‘evolutionary approach to law’;51 McBain’s ‘living constitutions’;52 Dworkin’s 
‘chain novel’;53 and Jouanjan’s ‘second life’.54 It can also be seen in the ideas of the 
Scandinavian legal realists,55 and the following passage by Olivecrona is worth quoting 
at length: 
“The legal system is never static. The formation and transformation of 
rules continue. Innumerable agencies are at work proposing new rules or 
modifications to old ones, making propaganda their views, pushing texts 
through the legislative machinery, pronouncing decisions in courts of 
law, laying down statutes associations, concluding contracts, and so on. 
Each generation takes over a body of rules from the preceding one and 
leaves it in a more or less different states to the next generation. Some 
rules are formally abrogated, others are modified, still others fall into 
oblivion, new rules are produced through legislation in several forms and 
through imitation; and an altered body of rules is left to the next 
generation to be changed in similar ways. There is no single ‘will’ behind 
                                                    
51 See, in particular: Friedrich August Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge Classics, 2006); 
Friedrich August Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of 
Justice and Political Economy (Routledge Classics, 2013). It is worthwhile quoting the context within 
which Hayek overtly identified his approach as an evolutionary one: “The evolutionary approach to law 
(and all other social institutions) which is here defended has thus as little to do with the rationalist theories 
of natural law as with legal positivism. It rejects both the interpretation of law as the construct of a 
supernatural force and its interpretation as the deliberate construct of any human mind. It does not stand in 
any sense between legal positivism and most natural law theories, but differs from either in a dimension 
different from that in which they differ from each other”: Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 224. For 
an assessment of Hayek’s evolutionary approach, see esp.: Ulrich Witt, “The Theory of Societal Evolution: 
Hayek’s Unfinished Legacy,” in Hayek, Co-Ordination and Evolution: His Legacy in Philosophy, Politics, 
Economics, and the History of Ideas, ed. Jack Birner and Rudy van Zijp (Routledge, 1994), 178–89; Paul 
H Rubin and Evelyn Gick, “Hayek and Modern Evolutionary Theory,” Advances in Austrian Economics 7 
(2004): 79–100; Guilherme Vasconcelos Vilaça, “From Hayek’s Spontaneous Orders to Luhmann’s 
Autopoietic Systems,” Studies in Emergent Order 3 (2010): 50–81. It is noteworthy that Hayek believed – 
as regards both biological and cultural evolution – that selection occurred on the group level: Friedrich 
August Hayek, “The Rules of Morality Are Not the Conclusions of Our Reason,” Twelfth International 
Conference on the Unity of the Sciences, The Chicago Marriott Hotel, November 25, 1983. 
52 Howard Lee McBain, The Living Constitution: A Consideration of the Realities and Legends of Our 
Fundamental Law (The Macmillan Company, 1941). 
53 See: Ronald M Dworkin, Law’s Empire (FontanaPress, 1986), 228–38. 
54 “If we accept that constitutions do not lie quietly and lazily within their texts, but have a wild life in the 
imagination of those who are submitted to it (a kind of virtual ‘second life’, which is often more exciting 
than the life one is really living), then the exploration of these imaginary constructions, their dynamics, 
their failures, their coherence, and their conflicts, becomes a central issue for constitutional history. What 
I have in mind is the establishment of a kind of Begriffsgeschichte, a history of concepts, though not a 
conceptual one, but much more a conflictual one. And I am convinced that among concepts there are many 
metaphors to be found.”: Olivier Jouanjan, “What Is a Constitution? What Is Constitutional History?,” in 
Constitutionalism, Legitimacy, and Power: Nineteenth-Century Experiences, ed. Kelly L Grotke and 
Markus J Prutsch (Oxford University Press, 2014), 331. 
55 On Scandinavian legal realism, see, e.g.: Johan Strang, “Two Generations of Scandinavian Legal 
Realists,” Retfærd Årgang 32, no. 1/124 (2009): 62–82. 
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all this activity. It results from the efforts, struggles, and cooperation of 
millions of people. 
Thus it appears that the formation of rules is a continuous process. Acts 
of legislation are only its most conspicuous parts. Less perceptible 
changes are always going on as in the living organism.”56 
Indeed, as Cohen has stressed, the legal profession plays a prominent role in this: 
“But the sober fact is that law, as an actual and continuously changing 
social institution, is governed by the professional activity of lawyers, 
judges, administrators and jurists who must make the law in the guise of 
finding, interpreting and applying it.”57 
The trajectory, if not the full force, of these ideas can also be found underlying the 
arguments of the likes of King or Bogdanor that the UK constitution is currently 
undergoing a phase of change.58 They were absolutely right and could have gone much 
further than they did.59 It also underlies Ackerman’s arguments, in relation to the US 
Constitution, that it has had three ‘regimes’ or eras;60 even codified constitutions are not 
static and unchanging documents, impervious to concurrent developments.61 
                                                    
56 Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, 2nd ed. (Stevens & Sons, 1971), 111–12. On this book and Scandinavian 
Realism more generally, see: Geoffrey MacCormack, “Law as Fact,” ARSP: Archiv Für Rechts- Und 
Sozialphilosophie/Archives for Philosophy of Law 69, no. 4 (1974): 484–503; Geoffrey MacCormack, 
“Scandinavian Realism,” The Juridical Review 15 (1970): 33–55. 
57 Morris Raphael Cohen, “Positivism and the Limits of Idealism in the Law,” Columbia Law Review 27, 
no. 3 (1927): 238. 
58 See: Anthony King, The British Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2007); Vernon Bogdanor, The 
New British Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2009). Indeed, particularly important in this regard is 
Bogdanor’s saying that: to enact a British constitution, therefore, would be to seek to capture the essence 
of a tradition that was in the process of being altered while it was being described. The problem for the 
British constitution-maker is that of deciding which elements of a fully functioning system of government 
ought to be selected as being of such special significance that they should be included in the constitution 
whilst the system of government is itself changing, and perhaps changing at a particularly rapid rate.”: 
Bogdanor, The New British Constitution, 218. 
59 They only argued that the constitution was moving away from its historic position prior to the Second 
World War. 
60 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Harvard University Press, 1991), 58–80. 
61 With regard to the US Constitution, see further, e.g.: Jack M Balkin, “How Social Movements Change 
(Or Fail To Change) the Constitution: The Case of the New Departure,” Suffolk University Law Library 39 
(2005): 27–65; Reva B Siegel, “Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional 
Change: The Case of the de Facto ERA,” California Law Review 94 (2006): 1323–1420; Jack M Balkin, 
“Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution,” Northwestern University Law Review 103, no. 2 
(2009): 549–614; Cass R Sunstein, A Constitution of Many Minds: Why the Founding Document Doesn’t 
Mean What It Meant Before (Princeton University Press, 2009); David A Strauss, “Do We Have a Living 
Constitution?,” Drake Law Review 59 (2011): 973–84; Jack M Balkin, “The Roots of the Living 
Constitution,” Boston University Law Review 92 (2012): 1129–60. 
217 
 
The ideas underlying the Generational Theory have also found some acceptance in 
judicial pronouncements. In Canada, there is the ‘living tree doctrine’,62 which relates to 
the interpretation of the Canadian Constitution: “The British North America Act planted 
in Canada a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits”.63 There 
is a similar doctrine of progressive interpretation to be found in the judgment of the 
European Court of Human Rights that the European Convention on Human Rights is a 
“living instrument which…must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.64  
In the UK, one might consider Lords Wilberforce’s and Diplock’s statements in British 
Railways Board v Herrington;65 Lord Diplock’s remarks in Fleet Street Casuals;66 Lord 
Keith in R v R;67 or Lord Roskill’s favourable citation of Maitland in the GCHQ case,68 
which he followed by saying that: “[I]t is our legal history which has enabled the present 
                                                    
62 In French: “théorie de l'arbre vivant”. 
63 These are the words of Viscount Sankey in the so-called Persons Case, which provided the basis of the 
doctrine: Edwards v Canada (Attorney General) [1930] A.C. 124 at 136. 
64 These words come from the judgment in Tyrer v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1 at 10. For a 
comparison of the Canadian ‘living tree’ and European ‘living instrument’ metaphors, with some reference 
to English law besides, see Baroness Hale’s speech: Brenda Hale, “Beanstalk or Living Instrument? How 
Tall Can the ECHR Grow?,” UK Supreme Court, June 16, 2011. 
65 “But the common law is a developing entity as the judges develop it, and so long as we follow the well 
tried method of moving forward in accordance with principle as fresh facts emerge and changes in society 
occur, we are surely doing what Parliament intends we should do." (Per Lord Wilberforce); “It [the decision 
of the court in this case] takes account, as this House is the final expositor of the common law should always 
do, of changes in social attitudes and circumstances and gives effect to the general public sentiment of what 
is ‘reckless’ conduct as it has expanded over the forty years which have elapsed since the decision [in the 
earlier case which went the other way].” (Per Lord Diplock). British Railways Board v Herrington [1972] 
AC 877, [1972] 1 All ER 749, HL. These were quoted in: Antony Allott, The Limits of Law (Butterworth 
& Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1980), 102–3. 
66 “The rules as to ‘standing’ for the purpose of applying for prerogative orders, like most of English public 
law, are not to be found in any statute. They were made by judges, by judges they can be changed; and so 
they have been over the years to meet the need to preserve the integrity of the rule of law despite changes 
in the social structure, methods of government and the extent to which the activities of private citizens are 
controlled by governmental authorities, that have been taking place continuously, sometimes slowly, 
sometimes swiftly, since the rules were originally propounded. Those changes have been particularly rapid 
since World War II. Any judicial statements on matters of public law if made before 1950 are likely to be 
a misleading guide to what the law is today.”: R v IRC ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and 
Small Businesses Ltd [1982] AC 617, per Lord Diplock at 639-640 
67 “The common law is, however, capable of evolving in the light of changing social, economic and cultural 
developments. Hale’s proposition reflected the state of affairs in these respects at the time it was enunciated. 
Since then the status of women, and particularly of married women, has changed out of all recognition in 
various ways which are very familiar and upon which it is unnecessary to go into detail. Apart from property 
matters and the availability of matrimonial remedies, one of the most important changes is that marriage is 
in modern times regarded as a partnership of equals, and no longer one in which the wife must be the 
subservient chattel of the husband. Hale's proposition involves that by marriage a wife gives her irrevocable 
consent to sexual intercourse with her husband under all circumstances and irrespective of the state of her 
health or how she happens to be feeling at the time. In modern times any reasonable person must regard 
that conception as quite unacceptable.” R v R (rape: marital exemption) [1991] 3 WLR 767 (HL) per Lord 
Keith at 616. This case concerned whether or not it was possible for a husband to rape his wife; the court 
concluded that this was both possible and criminal. 
68 This was from a letter sent by Maitland to Dicey in 1896 in which Maitland said: “The only direct utility 
of legal history (I say nothing of its thrilling interest) lies in the lesson that each generation has an enormous 
power of shaping its own law”. 
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generation to shape the development of our administrative law by building upon but 
unhampered by our legal history.”69 There are other statements of similar ideas to be 
found in the case-law,70 all of which are founded on ideas of the responsiveness of legal 
systems to socio-economic changes.  
Of course, judges must be wary of taking the Generational Theory too much to heart – 
especially in jurisdictions where a judge’s role (i.e. their assigned activities) is to judge 
according to the fixed associations, as identified by certain rules of recognition, and to do 
no more than that.71 It is not an excuse for them to fashion themselves into law-makers. 
Nevertheless, judges ought also to be wary of enforcing outdated laws ill-suited to the 
modern-day, especially where these severely frustrate people’s fixed associations. As 
such, there is a delicate balance to be struck. There are some uncontentious alterations 
that can probably be made, especially if these modify previous judicial pronouncements; 
indeed, this happens all the time through the interpretation and reinterpretation of laws. 
However, other alterations, which are more contentious, ought rather to be referred to the 
social group – either as a whole, through its representative bodies, or through its 
leadership.  
It would be incorrect to think that all of these ideas and theories mentioned in this section 
are one and the same. However, what can hopefully be seen is that they all drive very 
much towards the same point: Tempora mutantur, nos et mutamur in illis.72 As such, the 
Generational Theory can act as something of a unifying force, bringing all of the 
aforementioned ideas together.  
5.2.5 Momentary Systems 
                                                    
69 Council of Civil Service Unions and Others v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 (HL)(‘GCHQ’ 
case) per Lord Roskill at 417. 
70 For example, Dyson Holdings Ltd v Fox [1976] QB 503, which case is discussed in: Allott, The Limits of 
Law, 103ff. 
71 Cf. Lord Ellenborough in Ashford v Thornton (1818) 106 ER 149, which concerned whether a wager of 
battle (i.e. a challenge of trial by battle) was still permissible – subject to certain qualifications of age, 
infirmity, or sex – in cases where a strong presumption of guilt appears to arrive, though that guilt could 
neither be proved nor disproved by ordinary means: “[I]t is our duty to pronounce the law as it is, and not 
as we may wish it to be. Whatever prejudices therefore may justly exist against this mode of trial, still as it 
is the law of the land, the Court must pronounce judgment for it.” [460]. The judges unanimously concluded 
that wagers of battle remained permissible, though, in this case, the offer of battle was refused by the 
defendant. Trial by battle was – somewhat hastily – abolished as a mode of trial in the following year: 
Appeal of Murder, etc. Act 1819 (59 Geo. III, c. 46). 
72 The times change, and we change with them.  
219 
 
We can follow Raz’s distinction of systems and momentary systems.73 A momentary 
system is the system as it is thought to exist at a given time; it is the set of all its properties, 
qualities, etc. at that time. For a legal system, this would include all laws “valid at a certain 
moment”;74 all of the fixed associations that fulfil the recognition criteria. For a 
constitution, it would include a detailed description of the distribution of activities and 
influence, and an explanation as to the nature of those things. Obviously, actually 
quantifying these systems could be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. They are 
likely to be incomplete and inconsistent; there will be significant grey areas. Nevertheless, 
in theory, it would be possible to quantify such systems and, to a workable extent, we 
actually can.  
A system, by contrast, is the general idea – the construct – that we have in our minds. It 
is the impression that we have of some common identity across various momentary 
systems; the impression of the persistence of that identity. Usually, this idea will revolve 
around certain properties, qualities, etc. that the mind deems to be significant; for two 
momentary systems to have these properties, etc. in common is enough to evoke the same 
neurological response. These defining features, as it were, can change over time, but so 
long as there is an easy transition and overarching narrative, the mind can feel 
comfortable in associating each instance with the others. In a sense, then, the system is 
an idea of something greater than a momentary system; it includes not only all properties 
as they pertain at a given time, but all properties at all times. For legal systems, as Raz 
noted, two laws enacted at different times might well belong to the same system, though 
they belong to different momentary systems.75 
There is no preordained unit of time with which to measure the duration of momentary 
systems. Some might be considered to exist for a matter of seconds, others for many years. 
To a great extent, it depends on some perception of there being an appreciable and 
sufficiently significant difference; in a word, judgement. It is unnecessary to categorize 
every momentary system; indeed, it is probably unwise. The salient point about 
momentary systems is that any given system as it exists at T1 is probably going to be 
somewhat different to that at T2; each manifestation, as it were, of the system lasts but a 
                                                    
73 Raz actually drew his distinction between legal systems and momentary legal systems, but the general 
distinction applies to all systems: Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 2nd ed. (Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 34. For a comparison of Raz’s ideas concerning the continuity of legal systems with those of 
Kelsen, and their explanatory power with regards to Australian law in the eyes of one theorist, who sees 
merit in both, see: Benjamin Spagnolo, The Continuity of Legal Systems in Theory and Practice (Hart 
Publishing, 2015). 
74 Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 34. 
75 Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 34. 
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moment. As Raz said of legal systems: “Two different momentary systems which are 
subclasses of one legal system may overlap or even be identical in their laws, or they may 
have no law in common.”76 
In many respects, then, it is the task of the constitutional historian to study the series of 
momentary systems (both constitutional and legal), to attempt to describe each change as 
it occurs, and, moreover, to offer some explanation as to why each occurred.  
5.3 Moral Argument 
The upshot of the first strand is that any given generation is only truly bound by previous 
generations to the extent that it feels bound, although generations might make certain 
things easier or more difficult for subsequent generations in practical terms. However, 
there remains the question as to whether generations ought to be able to bind succeeding 
generations? Should later generations feel bound thereby? The answer should be in the 
negative. 
Jefferson, writing to Madison in September 1789, argued that new written constitutions 
ought to be forged at regular intervals: 
“[N]o society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The 
earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and 
what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters 
too of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as they please. 
But persons and property make the sum of the objects of government. The 
constitution and the laws of their predecessors extinguished then, in their 
natural course, with those whose will gave them being. This could preserve 
that being till it ceased to be itself, and no longer. Every constitution, then, 
and every law, naturally expires at the end of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, 
it is an act of force and not of right.”77 
Jefferson’s term of nineteen years is artificial; the idea of reviewing the constitution 
periodically, a heavy imposition, which would be wrong to impose on subsequent 
generations. However, the idea that constitutions belong to the living, and that the dead 
                                                    
76 Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 35. 
77 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to James Madison (Paris, 6 September 1789),” in The Works of Thomas 
Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford, vol. 6 (GP Putnam’s Sons, 1904), 8–9. Jefferson settled on a period of 
nineteen years as this is what he calculated to be the average length of generations. It is interesting to note 
that this Positivist account was written whilst Jefferson was in France, given that Mannheim associated the 
Positivist approach most closely with French authors: Mannheim, “The Problem of Generations,” 278. 
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should have “neither powers nor rights” over future generations,78 is entirely correct both 
in fact and as of right. Paine put the point rather more forcefully in 1791:  
“Every age and generation must be as free to act for itself, in all cases, as the 
ages and generations which preceded it. The vanity and presumption of 
governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all 
tyrannies.”79 
Furthermore, as Holmes said in 1897: 
“It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid 
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon 
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists 
from blind imitation of the past.”80 
Holmes would certainly have agreed with the proverb: custom without reason is but 
ancient error.81 Webster, similarly, counselled against ‘perpetual constitutions’, 
especially in light of the “unceasing change of circumstances”;82 “time makes ancient 
good uncouth”.83 None of this is especially novel. Epictetus, for example, spoke of the 
“wretched laws of dead men” two millennia ago.84 
We should only do things for which there is good reason. Mere reference to some past 
decision, practice, etc. does not constitute a good reason. Though we cannot escape the 
legacy of the past and must necessarily work within the situations in which we find 
                                                    
78 Jefferson, “Letter to James Madison (Paris, 6 September 1789),” 4. 
79 Thomas Paine, “Rights of Man (1791),” in Rights of Man, Common Sense and Other Political Writings, 
ed. Mark Philp (Oxford University Press, 1995), 91–92.  
80 Holmes, “The Path of Law,” 469. One might think particularly here of the decision in R v R, quoted 
above. As Allison noted, legal history can, of course, help us immensely in this regard; it can help us 
identify the historical context of legal provisions and demonstrate “how that context has disappeared or 
otherwise changed, rendering the text or institution obsolete or unsuitable.” In this way, legal history can 
‘liberate’, to use Allison’s word, us from the past: JWF Allison, “History To Understand, and History To 
Reform, English Public Law,” The Cambridge Law Journal 72, no. 3 (2013): 541. 
81 Wolfgang Mieder, ed., The Prentice-Hall Encyclopedia of World Proverbs: A Treasury of Wit and 
Wisdom Through the Ages (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1986), 95. It is perhaps interesting to note that Matthew 
Hale, in the seventeenth century, said that custom, effectively, was “commonly called the mistriss of 
Fooles”; Hale himself disagreed strongly with this assessment: William Searle Holdsworth, A History of 
English Law, 2nd ed., vol. 5 (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1945), 505. 
82 Noah Webster, “Bills of Rights (1788),” in A Collection of Essays and Fugitiv Writings on Moral, 
Historical, Political, and Literary Subjects (Thomas and Andrews, 1790), 47–48. 
83 This comes from the final stanza of Lowell’s poem The Present Crisis: “New occasions teach new duties; 
Time makes ancient good uncouth; / They must upward still, and onward, who would keep abreast of Truth; 
/ Lo, before us gleam her camp-fires! we ourselves must Pilgrims be, / Launch our Mayflower, and steer 
boldly through the desperate winter sea, / Nor attempt the Future's portal with the Past's blood-rusted key.” 
James Russell Lowell, Poems of James Russell Lowell (Oxford University Press, 1912), 98. 




ourselves, we should never feel honour-bound or otherwise compelled to follow what 
went before simply because it went before.85 Just because things might have worked 
tolerably in the past, there is no guarantee of their being fitting or profitable now or in the 
future.86  
Furthermore, we must not idolize or reverence the past or historical persons. They were 
neither all-seeing nor all-knowing; they were flawed, and often biased and prejudiced. 
They were human. It is difficult to see why they should have a greater right to affect how 
others live simply by virtue of their having lived first. Have we not the same right to alter 
things as they themselves had? It is a matter of distributive justice. As we are essentially 
the same as them, and as one ought to treat like cases alike, we should have what they 
had; those after us should have the same. It is right to learn, but it is wrong follow 
blindly.87 
It is also important to have critical self-awareness. Often those things that we regard as 
being fundamental and sacred – which it is sacrilegious, heretical, or treasonous to 
question – are “but the oracles of the nursery”.88 It is inculcation, indoctrination, and 
insularity that produce our love of them, not their merit. It is simple chance that we come 
to love them; a function of the time and place of our birth and upbringing. To receive 
these things unexamined and uncritically would be great folly. 
Whereas the descriptive argument rests on what is, the moral argument rests on what is 
right and good: it is both right and good that each generation should be able to determine 
for itself how it lives; it would be both wrong and bad for the case to be otherwise.  
5.4 Problems and Challenges 
                                                    
85 There is something, as Zane said, of an “ineradicable tendency of human beings…to continue social 
habits long after reasons for a change have arisen”. Indeed, “[w]e should expect to find customs in full force 
long after they should have been changed, and this is the history of law. That history may be summed up 
by saying that men cling to their customs.” The desire to do so is understandable, but it is not necessarily 
the right course of action; reasons for change ought to occasion change, unless there is very good reason 
for resisting it. For Zane: John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law, ed. Charles J Reid Jr, 2nd ed. (Liberty Fund, 
Inc., 1998), quotes at 37 and 36 respectively.  
86 In this context, we might think of the words from the Repeal of Statutes as to Treasons, etc. (1 Edw. VI, 
c. 12, 1547): “But as in Tempest or Winter, one Course and Garment is convenient, in calm or warm weather 
a more liberal case [sic] or lighter Garment both may and ought to be followed and used; so we have seen 
divers strait and sore laws made in one Parliament (the Time so requiring) in a more calm and quiet Reign 
of another Prince, by the like Authority and Parliament, repealed and taken away…” Quoted in: AF Pollard, 
England under Protector Somerset (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1900), 61. 
87 In this context, we might bear in mind Holdsworth’s words: “But it is obvious that such a disregard of 
the teachings of history is as foolish as a blind and literal following of all the solutions of particular problems 
which may be extracted from those teachings.” William Searle Holdsworth, Some Lessons from Our Legal 
History (The Macmillan Company, 1928), 7–8. 
88 These are the words of John Locke from one of his minor works, Of Study. Quoted in: David Resnick, 




For how long laws ought to be considered valid is a difficult question. Some are made 
explicitly with the intention that they should expire after a fixed term;89 others on a 
particular basis, the withdrawal or disappearance of which deprives them of their 
metaphorical life-force. However, many are laid down as though to last perpetually. How 
does the Theory respond to these? 
Laws that continue to be prevalent and potent are unlikely to be contentious. There is no 
compulsion to maintain them forever, but there is little cause to think that they become 
invalid simply because of the passing of time. There is no need to discard them simply 
because they were introduced by a previous generation. However, the question is more 
difficult when it comes to those associations that have ceased to be prevalent and potent 
– especially if a long period of time has elapsed since they were last so. Should present 
generations pay these any mind? 
Generally speaking, the position should be this: laws properly made should be considered 
valid and binding until declared otherwise. If there is some movement so to declare, it 
would be wise first to consider why any such laws were originally introduced, as well as 
what their merits were and remain.90 As indicated above,91 judges are particularly 
important in all of this, even if there are limits to what they can do without overstepping 
their bounds. 
Judges often have a power of decision,92 i.e. some power to decide what the law is. After 
all, if they are to apply the law, they must first decide what it is and make declarations to 
                                                    
89 These are often called ‘sunset clauses’, which are not an uncommon phenomenon – particularly in 
controversial areas like counter-terrorism measures. On this latter point, see, e.g.: John E Finn, “Sunset 
Clauses and Democratic Deliberation: Assessing the Significance of Sunset Provisions in Antiterrorism 
Legislation,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 48, no. 3 (2010): 442–502. 
90 There is perhaps a danger, as Blackstone identified, that certain laws might be dispensed with out of 
hand, whose “reason could not be remembered or discerned”, but the “wisdom” of which is revealed by the 
“inconveniences that have followed the innovation”. He continues: “The doctrine of law then is this: that 
precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust: for though their reason be not obvious 
at first view, yet we owe such a deference to former times as not to suppose they acted wholly without 
consideration”. William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book I: Of the Rights of 
Persons, ed. David Lemmings, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2016), 53 [70]. The point that we can return 
to is that we should only maintain in force that for which there is good reason. Whilst we should not presume 
– perhaps as Blackstone does – that those who went before were possessed of some higher wisdom, we 
should also not presume that they were stupid or primitive. Whatever they determined and maintained in 
force was probably not without some reason, and it makes sense to attempt to discover what that reason 
might have been; whether it remains a good reason, or whether there is some other good reason, is for us 
to decide. In effect, we ought to be cautious and show a sense of humility, but, nevertheless, to feel it to be 
within our power to shape our lives as we see fit.  
91 Supra, 5.2.4. 
92 This might be considered as a more proactive and extensive power of declaration. See: 3.14, supra. 
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that effect. If there is some rule of ordering that newer laws take priority over older laws,93 
judges can often easily dispense with older laws. This is because newer laws tend to 
modify or supersede older laws – if not expressly, then impliedly. Consequently, they 
cease to be valid; if not wholly, then partially. Insofar as they are invalid, they can be 
disregarded.94 
In principle, judges ought to decide what the law is and apply it – cautiously and 
discerningly.95 Any creativity employed ought to be minimal, interstitial (i.e. designed to 
gap-fill),96 and designed so as to fulfil people’s expectations, especially where they might 
otherwise have been frustrated. To go further and become active lawmakers would 
probably introduce uncertainty into the system and undermine the rule of law.97 Nothing 
                                                    
93 This is sometimes expressed in the Latin phrase, which means much the same thing: leges posteriores 
priores contrarias abrogant [later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws]. 
94 Admittedly, matters are not always so straightforward. It is not always clear whether there is some newer 
law overriding the earlier, especially if any such contenders are ostensibly of lesser legal authority, i.e. there 
is reason to suspect that they themselves are invalid, because they did not emanate from sources sufficiently 
high enough to override the older law. If they did not and were accepted, it would prima facie frustrate our 
expectations concerning the rules of ordering. It is worth adding that matters might be further complicated 
if the rules of ordering themselves have also changed. 
95 Cf. Sir James Parke: “Our common law system consists in applying to new combinations of 
circumstances those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents, and for the 
sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty, we must apply those rules when they are not plainly 
unreasonable and inconvenient to all cases which arise; and we are not at liberty to reject them and to 
abandon all analogy to them in those which they have not yet been judicially applied, because we think the 
rules are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves could have devised.” Mirehouse v Rennell (1833) 
1 Cl. & F. 527, 546.  
96 See: Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 68ff. 
97 We might consider Matthew Hale’s argument made in response to a work by Hobbes, which must have 
been written sometime before Hale’s death in 1675. Hale’s concern was what would be the basis of judicial 
reasoning if that reasoning went beyond the letter of the law; presumably, it would involve some appeal to 
reason, but people often disagreed as to what reason dictated. Hale wrote as follows: “Though a certaine 
and determinate Law may have some mischiefes in relation to particulars, w[hich] cannot all by any humane 
Prudence att first be foreseen and provided for, yet [it] is p[re]ferrable before that Arbitrary and uncertaine 
rule w[hich] Men miscall [the] Law of reason.” It would perhaps be an act of arrogance for a judge to 
assume that they of all people know best. Indeed, one can certainly foresee problems if all judges were to 
adopt such an attitude; they might be found to be constantly correcting one another’s pronouncements – or, 
at least, attempting to do so. Insofar as this, Hale’s argument is strong and sound. However, judges ought 
not to take as their maxim Tennyson’s words: ‘Ours not to reason why, ours but to do and die’. Were they 
to do so, it might cause a great deal of senseless harm. It is also wrong to assume, as Hale seemed to, that 
laws, seemingly of long standing, must necessarily be imbued with wisdom, which is discoverable through 
careful consideration: “Againe it is a reason for me to preferre a Law by w[hich] a Kingdome hath been 
happily governed four or five hund[red] yeares then to adventure the happiness and Peace of a Kingdome 
upon Some new Theory of my owne tho’ I am better acquainted w[ith] the reasonableness of my owne 
Theory then w[ith] that Law. Againe I have reason to assure myselfe that Long Experience makes more 
discoveries touching conveniences or Inconveniences of Laws then is possible for the wisest Councill of 
Men att first to foresee. And that those amendm[ents] and Supplem[ents] that through the various 
Experiences of wise and knowing men have been applyed to any Law must needs be better suited to the 
Convenience of Laws, then the best Invention of the most pregnant witts not ayded by Such a Series and 
tract of Experience.” It is right to show humility; it is wrong to show unthinking deference. Hale’s treatise 
is printed in: Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 5:499–513, quotes at 503 and 504 respectively. The 
line is adapted from Tennyson’s poem, The Charge of the Light Brigade, Stanza II: “Theirs not to make 
reply, / Theirs not to reason why, / Theirs but to do and die.” See: Alfred Lord Tennyson, Poems and Plays, 
ed. T Herbert Warren and Frederick Page (Oxford University Press, 1971), 206.  
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in this, of course, prevents judges from expressing their opinions in the course of their 
judgments (e.g. concerning the merits or demerits of some law), even if their rulings must 
in the event be at odds with those opinions.98 
Where the application of a law might lead to absurdity or grossly frustrate people’s 
legitimate expectations, there ought perhaps to be some facility for interim relief or the 
correction of any mischief caused by its application. The principal method of doing this 
would be to suspend its application pending its confirmation. Rather than undermining 
the rule of law, this would uphold it. After all, if people could not reasonably have 
expected such an outcome – especially if there is some uncertainty as to whether the law 
itself is valid – it would be unreasonable and unfair to hold them to it, particularly if 
resulting in some radical curtailment of their liberties. In this, there is also some role for 
judges. If judges find themselves powerless, then retroactive legislation might be the 
answer, if justice is to be done.  
The point is that laws, once considered valid, should not be disregarded except with due 
process. They do not cease to be valid and fall into desuetude simply with the passing of 
time, unless there is some specific expectation to that effect. After all, dispensing with 
anything that is ostensibly valid would frustrate our expectations and undermine our sense 
of the rule of law. However, as Holdsworth said:  
“We must not suppose that, because we find a rule or an idea in a Year 
Book or in an old writer, we must accept the law as so stated without 
comment and without criticism. Legal history used in this way becomes 
merely…unintelligent conservatism…”99 
There has to be a balance and, ultimately, whether to accept or reject the older law should 
be within the decision of the present generation; it should make that decision using due 
                                                    
98 Whether judges ought to refuse to decide particular cases or, indeed, resign their positions, whether out 
of a sense of honour, duty, or integrity, and especially if they are in profound disagreement with the current 
legislative regime, are exceedingly difficult questions. In terms of symbolism, it can be dramatic and 
impactful, but, especially in the case of resignation, there is always the possibility that the judge in question 
might be better able and willing to mitigate the ill-effects of the ‘evil’ laws than any person who might 
replace them on the bench. Indeed, again particularly in the case of resignations, it might be better to 
concede some battles, such that others might be won. In this context might be considered the cases of 
countries occupied during the Second World War by Nazi Germany and the extent to which their respective 
judiciaries collaborated with the occupying power. In this context, there are some forthcoming essays of 
great interest, to be edited in a volume by Martin Löhnig. The cases of the Norwegian and Dutch courts are 
especially interesting: See: Hans Petter Graver, Sacrificing the Pig in the Temple – The Supreme Court in 
Occupied Norway and Derk Venema, The Netherlands: The Hoge Raad (both forthcoming in the 
aforementioned volume). 
99 Holdsworth, Some Lessons from Our Legal History, 7. 
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process.100 The fact that circumstances have changed is often a good reason for dispensing 
with it.  
5.4.2 Primacy 
A similar problem – and one already touched upon – is that of primacy, i.e. whether fixed 
associations of earlier or later provenance ought to have priority. The basic position 
under the Generational Theory is that more recent associations ought to have priority, 
unless there is a specific expectation to the contrary. This brings us to one final issue: the 
validity of eternity clauses.   
5.4.3 Eternity Clauses 
Eternity clauses or Ewigkeitsklauseln are provisions claiming to make certain fixed 
associations immortal and immutable – they are to remain in force forever unchanged.101 
This obviously links to the issue of primacy – if a fixed association benefits from the 
protection of an eternity clause, it would seem impossible for later associations 
inconsistent with it to take priority. 
The view of the Generational Theory is simple: eternity clauses are only ever persuasively 
binding. They are rhetorical devices, nothing more. Special procedures might be 
necessary to override, amend, or repeal them, but they are never invulnerable. It would 
be arrogant and wrong to think otherwise. To this end, we might quote Rousseau: 
                                                    
100 It is worthwhile remarking that the need for due process in these cases is largely justified by the simple 
fact that generations often overlap. Even though newer members have joined, there might still exist older 
members for whom these fixed associations are prevalent and potent. They still form a part of their system 
of expectations; to disregard these without due process would be very much to frustrate their expectations. 
Their expectations must be adjusted in the proper fashion. They might not agree with the change in 
principle, but, it is enough if they can agree that the change was properly made. 
101 An example of eternity clauses is to be found in the German Basic Law or Grundgesetz, Art. 79(3), 
which protects certain other provisions in the Grundgesetz against amendment. There is a sense in which, 
of course, this is not a true eternity clause, bearing in mind Art. 146 pertaining to the duration of the 
Grundgesetz. Art. 146 says that the Grundgesetz will remain effective until replaced by a new constitution. 
Consequently, the amendments made unconstitutional by Art. 79 can ultimately be made, but only by 
replacing the constitution in its entirety. In effect, what Art. 79(3) really says, then, is that certain other 
provisions in the Grundgesetz are protected forever or, failing that, until a new constitution is devised. In 
this context, one might also consider the French Constitution of the Fifth Republic, Art. 89, which provides 
wide powers of amendment excepting that “The republican form of government shall not be the object of 
any amendment”. The French Constitution contains no provision corresponding to Art. 146 in the 
Grundgesetz, although there is a sense in which Art. 3 of the French Constitution approximates to it. This 




“[T]here is not in the state any fundamental law which may not be revoked, 
not even the social pact; for if all the citizens assemble to end this pact by a 
common accord, one cannot doubt that it is very legitimately ended.”102 
5.4.4 Sociobiology and Evolutionary Analysis 
Should at least some, if not all, laws be informed, if not determined, by principles of 
sociobiology and the insights of evolutionary analysis?103 Ought legal systems and 
constitutions to have some ‘minimum content’, which is derived from facts about human 
nature (e.g. narrow altruism and bounded rationality104)?105 Ought they to represent 
certain ‘human universals’?106 Are there some fundamental ideals that humans have 
evolved to desire and which help to shape law?107 Is there some basis to Natural Law?108 
More to the point: Ought each generation to be limited in the extent to which it can shape 
its constitution and legal system, because there are certain fundamentals that must always 
be recognized?  
These questions are too large to address fully here and, in any case, to answer them would 
stray too far into political philosophy. However, three points need to be stressed. First: 
supposed ‘empirical observations’ and ‘descriptive premises’ should not be turned into 
‘normative conclusions’;109 to do so is to commit the naturalistic fallacy of turning an ‘is’ 
                                                    
102 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (Penguin Books, 2004), 121 
[3.18]. 
103 On the possible benefits of evolutionary analysis to law, see, e.g.: Owen D Jones, “Evolutionary Analysis 
in Law: An Introduction and Application to Child Abuse,” North Carolina Law Review 75, no. 4 (1997): 
1117–1242; Jeffrey Evans Stake, “Pushing Evolutionary Analysis of Law or Evolving Law: Design without 
a Designer,” Florida Law Review 53 (2001): 884–90; Jones and Goldsmith, “Law and Behavioral Biology.” 
But compare: Roger D Masters, “Comment on Article by Professor McGinnis,” Journal of Contemporary 
Legal Issues 8 (1997): 241–48; Brian Leiter and Michael Weisberg, “Why Evolutionary Biology Is (So 
Far) Irrelevant to Legal Regulation,” Law and Philosophy 29, no. 1 (2010): 31–74. 
104 See, e.g.: Wojciech Zaluski, Evolutionary Theory and Legal Philosophy (Edward Elgar Publishing 
Limited, 2009), chap. 1. 
105 Cf. John O McGinnis, “The Original Constitution and Our Origins,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public 
Policy 19, no. 2 (1996): 251–62; John O McGinnis, “The Human Constitution and Constitutive Law: A 
Prolegomenon,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 8 (1997): 211–40. 
106 On the idea of human universals, see: Donald E Brown, Human Universals (McGraw-Hill Education, 
1991). 
107 Cf. “Our law instinct is deeply entrenched in epigenetic rules like reciprocity, justice, fairness, loyalty, 
authority, liberty, and sanctity. While culture molds these rules, genetics preserves their universality and 
spreads them from one generation to the next. Such revisable survival codes standardize and stabilize the 
law even as it changes and diversifies.” Alan Calnan, “Beyond Jurisprudence,” Southern California 
Interdisciplinary Law Journal 27, no. 1 (2017): 58. ‘Equality’ might also be added to the list. Perhaps, too, 
a natural ‘scorn and abhorrence’, as noted by Adam Smith (though it is doubtful that this is entirely original 
to him), that is felt towards acts of ‘[f]raud, falsehood, brutality, and violence’: Quoted in Tamanaha, A 
Realistic Theory of Law, 5. 
108 Cf. Fábio Portela Lopes de Almeida, “Constitution: The Evolution of a Societal Structure (PhD Thesis)” 
(Universidade de Brasília, 2016), 261ff. 
109 Cf. Nils-Frederic Wagner and Georg Northoff, “A Fallacious Jar? The Peculiar Relation between 
Descriptive Premises and Normative Conclusions in Neuroethics,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 36, 
228 
 
into an ‘ought’. Second: even if there does appear to be some tendency, predisposition, 
etc. towards or away from some specific behaviour, this does not mean that it will – or 
must – be realized or, indeed, realized in all cases. Third: even if something has been true 
in the past, it does not mean that it will be true or, indeed, has to be true, for all time. Even 
so-called ‘human nature’ can change.110  
5.5 Conclusions 
The Generational Theory of Law concerns change and ownership. With regards to the 
former, it says that human constructs – including laws, institutions, etc. – are constantly 
changing, because the people from whom they stem are constantly changing (not to 
mention the circumstances in which they live). Thus, even though momentary 
constitutional and legal systems might appear similar, they are never exactly the same. 
Indeed, even in spite of the best of efforts to the contrary, such things will probably 
continue to change ‘organically’ and become ‘the unintended products of historical 
development’,111 for no constructed system can last forever in any given form. 
With regards to the latter, it says that each generation has ownership of its constitutional 
and legal system as a matter of fact; it should thereby feel empowered to shape it. It should 
say: ‘these are ours, to do with as we think best’. Laws and constitutions are proper to 
each generation; it is up to current members to decide their form and content.112 There is 
an extent to which each generation is limited in what it can do and achieve, taking into 
account its socio-economic, ecological, and spatio-temporal context,113 the philosophical 
problem of free will, and the difficulties often experienced in trying to achieve our 
                                                    
no. 3 (2015): 215–35; Jones and Goldsmith, “Law and Behavioral Biology,” 484–85; Todd J Zywicki, 
“Evolutionary Psychology and the Social Sciences,” Law and Economics Working Paper 00-35 (George 
Mason University), 2000, 2. 
110 Cf. supra, 4.2. 
111 In Menger’s view, this being the ‘unintended product of historical development’ is the only sense in 
which there is a valid analogy between social phenomena and natural organisms: Carl Menger, Problems 
of Economics and Sociology, ed. Louis Schneider, trans. Francis J Nock (University of Illinois Press, 1963), 
Bk. III, esp. 129–34. 
112 Cf. Cole: “If once the principle of consent is established as the basis of the State, it is impossible to set 
limits on the operation of the principle. If the members consent to despotism, well and good; but as soon as 
they desire to assume a more active co-operation in the affairs of State, they clearly have a right to do so.” 
GDH Cole, Social Theory, 3rd ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923), 92. For ‘consent’, we might substitute 
‘belief’. 
113 Cf. Cohen: “The law, at any given time, is administered and expounded by men who cannot help taking 
for granted the prevalent ideas and attitudes of the community in which they live. Even if it were logically, 
it would certainly not be psychically, possible for any man to think out an absolutely new system of jural 
relations. The law reformer who urges the most radical change, can justify his proposal only by appealing 
to some actually prevailing idea as to what is desirable; and the history of the law shows how comparatively 
small is the addition or subtraction to the system of jural concepts and ideas that the most creative judges 
and jurists have been able to bring about.” Morris Raphael Cohen, “The Place of Logic in the Law,” 
Harvard Law Review 29, no. 6 (1916): 630–31. 
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designs.114 However, insofar as it is able, each generation should be free to decide for 
itself how it lives. 
The Theory is not an argument that reference can, or should, never be had to the past.115 
Moreover, it does not justify everybody in doing whatever they like, arguing that it is 
their right to do so. This would be inconsistent with our desire for order and predictability. 
It is also not an argument in favour of revolution.116 Indeed, it favours gradual and 
incremental change where possible, such that people might have the time properly to 
adjust their fixed associations and corresponding expectations.117 Yet, it equally does not 
preclude revolution where generations find that they simply cannot live according to the 
ideas of their predecessors. Nevertheless, any changes ought to be made in a clear and 
orderly fashion; preferably, too, democratically and peaceably.118   
                                                    
114 This is both in view of the limits of individuals’ abilities to influence others (and thus make them 
conform to their designs), as well as unforeseen (perhaps, even, unforeseeable) circumstances and 
unintended consequences. Hayek, in particular, was sceptical as to people’s abilities to ‘plan’ or ‘design’ 
social institutions and, indeed, societies themselves. He was very much convinced by Ferguson’s 
observation quoted above. For Hayek in this context see, e.g.: Friedrich August Hayek, The Counter-
Revolution of Science (The Free Press, 1955), chaps. 8-10; Friedrich August Hayek, Individualism and 
Economic Order (The University of Chicago Press, 1948), chap. 4; Friedrich August Hayek, The Fatal 
Conceit: The Errors of Socialism, ed. WW Bartley III (The University of Chicago Press, 1989).  
115 In fact, it would be impossible to avoid reference to the past. It is with reference to the past that we tend 
to set our associations and expectations; sometimes with reference to specific decisions, declarations, etc., 
other times to perceived common practices, etc., and other times still to discourses, disquisitions, etc. These 
points of reference might be in the very recent past; they might be in a remote past. They are sometimes 
real; other times imagined, distorted, or misunderstood. The point is that – unless we are making new 
associations – we have to set our associations and expectations by something and that something must 
necessarily be in the past; the past is all we have ever known. If we are to have settled and stable lives, then 
there have to be points to which we can have constant recourse. The argument of the Generational Theory, 
therefore, is not that we should disregard the past. Rather, its argument is that we should not feel inextricably 
bound by, or to, it. It should be added that there is, almost naturally, a tendency towards the development 
of ‘traditions’. These are often based, as Krygier has identified, on notions of antiquity, presence, and 
constancy (these are my labels): traditions are often thought to have originated in some distant time, from 
which they derive much of their authority; they are thought not merely to be antiquities, but possessed of 
continuing relevance; and they are thought to have been passed down through an unbroken chain. Indeed, 
there is a sense in which Krygier was right to say that “[l]aw is a profoundly traditional social practice, and 
it must be”. What the Theory teaches, however, is that older is not necessarily better; the past, at least 
properly understood, is often not as relevant as it is thought to be; and that the idea of unbroken, unerring, 
and uncontested chains rarely accords with reality. For Kyrgier, see: Martin Krygier, “Law as Tradition,” 
Law and Philosophy 5 (1986): 237–62, quote at 239. 
116 We cannot say with Voltaire, for example, that “if you want good laws, burn those you have and make 
new ones”. Quoted in: Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 25. 
117 To this might be added the limitations of utopian planning. Cf. Popper: “In all matters, we can only learn 
by trial and error, by making mistakes and improvements… Accordingly, it is not reasonable to assume 
that a complete reconstructions of our social world would lead at once to a workable system. Rather we 
should expect that, owing to lack of experience, many mistakes would be made which could be eliminated 
only by a long and laborious process of small adjustments; in other words, by that rational method of 
piecemeal engineering whose application we advocate.” Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies. 
Volume One - The Spell of Plato (Routledge Classics, 2003), 177. 
118 Hayek, seemingly following Burke in this regard, argued that: “[A]ll progress must be based on 
tradition. We must build on tradition and can only tinker with its products.” Hayek, Law, Legislation, and 
Liberty, 499; Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, ed. Conor Cruise O’Brien (Penguin 
Books, 2004), passim. We must respectfully disagree. We have but one life and that life, in the grand 
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The Theory illustrates something of the fragility of constitutional and legal systems. They 
rely on human memory, attentiveness, constancy, and will; on a sustained belief in their 
existence, tenets, and merits.119 Where these fail, they fail. Often conflicts arise, too, 
which undermine these systems as previously understood. There might be conflicts as to 
social identity – for example, where one group wishes to assert its independence. There 
might equally be conflicts as to the ways in which affairs ought to be conducted. As soon 
as there is a sufficient shift in the prevalence and potency of ideas, the old systems fall. It 
matters but little how beautifully they had been imagined and with what care they had 
been constructed. It does not matter if they had been written, codified, and entrenched 
for, as soon as attitudes and ideas change, they become but dead letters. No constitutional 
settlement can be fixed for all time.120  
It is incumbent on each of us to participate in the ongoing dialogue concerning our 
constitutional and legal settlements – to argue for changes and to defend the current 
settlement where we think fit. We must take ownership of our constitutional and legal 
systems. There are probably some who think this freedom dangerous. This might stem 
from a pessimistic view of human nature: unless we adhere to the wise standards of our 
forebears as laid out, for example, in a definitive document, chaos and injustice will 
ensue. People – especially governments – simply cannot be trusted to do the right thing. 
This is nonsense. It does, however, highlight the importance of ensuring comprehensive 
and open education, such that each generation is possessed of the fullest and best 
knowledge that it can possibly have.121 
                                                    
scheme of things, is relatively short. It is no use for evils to persist and mar that life, when the remedy is at 
hand, simply because we fear changes that happen apace. As a general policy, then, gradual and incremental 
change seems best, but, in the specific circumstance, there might be good reason for overriding that general 
policy. However, this is not to say that sweeping changes ought to be made without caution or pause for 
sober reflection; without an examination of the merits and demerits of the present settlement, and the 
reasons and arguments therefor; without remembering that change, if it is to have any measure of success 
and permanence, often does take time and, therefore, requires some measure of patience; without reining 
in our idealism, eagerness, and enthusiasm; without checking our confidence in our ability; without 
remembering the fact that, in spite of many of the greatest intentions, utopias remain more or less an idle 
fantasy. 
119 Cf. “All social phenomena are, directly or indirectly, human creations. A lump of matter may exist which 
no one has perceived, but not a price which no one has charged, or a disciplinary code to which no one 
refers, or a tool which no one would dream of using.” JWN Watkins, “Ideal Types and Historical 
Explanation,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3, no. 9 (1952): 28. 
120 There are similarities here to what Loughlin has said when he said that constitutions have a ‘dynamic 
quality’ and that “there can be no fixed constitutional settlements”. The basis of Loughlin’s argument is 
somewhat different, as his appears to be based largely on an ever-changing relationship between constituent 
and constituted powers, as well as ever-changing political circumstances. In this, there is only partial truth. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate recognition of ongoing change is fundamentally correct. See Martin Loughlin, 
Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 12. 
121 As Paine observed: “a long habit of not thinking a thing wrong, gives it a superficial appearance of being 
right, and raises at first a formidable outcry in defence of custom. But the tumult soon subsides. Time makes 
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Those most likely to oppose the Theory are those who fear change,122 and who largely 
agree – for whatever reason – with the settlement of their day. They wish to give it as 
much authority as they can by bestowing upon it an eternal or everlasting aspect. 
However, this clouds their judgement. It is egocentric and myopic, and quite simply does 
not accord with reality. One might agree with liberal values, but this does not mean that 
constitutions are necessarily there to protect them; likewise, one might agree with certain 
religious values, but that does not mean that constitutions are there to express them. 
Constitutions express our values, whatever they are. Where there are certain values that 
we think ought to be encouraged or discouraged, it is once again incumbent upon us to 
enter into an open discourse. One would hope that a constitution would facilitate such 
open discourse, but it would not be any less a constitution if it did not. 
As constitutional historians, we must be aware that there is a very real danger of not seeing 
things as they are and as themselves, which danger can only be averted by attention to 
detail and properly understanding things in their context.123 We must be alive to the fact 
that things are constantly changing; that the impression of continuities and the persistence 
of identity is an illusion produced by the mind. We can disregard any form of continuity 
thesis, particularly essential continuity theses based on metaphysical notions. We might 
note repetitions and similarities,124 but not continuities – especially over long periods of 
time when the idea of there being a continuity becomes increasingly tenuous.125 Past 
                                                    
more converts than reason”: Thomas Paine, “Common Sense (1776),” in Rights of Man, Common Sense 
and Other Political Writings, ed. Mark Philp (Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. In other words, people 
might at first be unwilling to depart from what they believe to have the authority of long usage, but, in time, 
and as people become accustomed to the new way of things, fears and doubts tend to subside.  
122 As Benedict argued, such fear of, and resistance to, change is often misplaced: “Change, we must 
remember, with all its difficulties, is inescapable. Our fears over even very minor shifts in custom are 
usually quite beside the point. Civilizations might change far more radically than any human authority has 
ever had the will or the imagination to change them, and still be completely workable. The minor changes 
that occasion so much denunciation today, such as the increase of divorce, the growing secularization in 
our cities, the prevalence of the petting party, and many more, could be taken up quite readily into a slightly 
different pattern of culture. Becoming traditional, they would be given the same richness of content, the 
same importance and value, that older patterns had in other generations.” Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture 
(Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 36–37. 
123 This, in many ways, follows the advice of the Swiss historian and economist Simonde de Sismondi when 
he wrote in 1837: “I am convinced that one falls into serious error in wishing always to generalize 
everything connected with the social sciences. It is on the contrary essential to study human conditions in 
detail. One must get hold now of a period, now of a country, now of a profession, in order to see clearly 
what a man is and how institutions act upon him.” Quoted in: W Richard Scott, Institutions and 
Organizations: Ideas, Interests, and Identities, 4th ed. (SAGE Publications, 2014), 262. 
124 After all, even though the patterns might be old, each instantiation of it is nevertheless new. Thus, it 
might be said that laws, etc., which seem to have a measure of persistency, are tam antiqua et tam nova 
(‘ever ancient and ever new’). The phrase is from Augustine: Augustine of Hippo, Confessions, Volume II: 
Books 9-13, trans. William Watts (Harvard University Press, 1912), 146-147 (X.XXVII). 
125 We cannot say of constitutions and legal systems, like the refrain of Tennyson’s brook, “For men may 
come and men may go, / But I go on for ever.” Lord Tennyson, Alfred, The Brook: An Idyl in John Wain, 
ed., The Oxford Library of English Poetry, vol. 3 (Guild Publishing London, 1990), 97–103. 
232 
 
societies had their constitutional and legal systems as we have our constitutional and legal 
systems; they were themselves and we are ourselves. Whilst we might live with their 
legacy, it does not mean that we are their extension. They might have made things 
politically, economically, and even physically difficult for us, but, once they are gone, 
they are gone – and, with them, their power. 
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6 – The Tripartite Theory of Succession 
“…the Advocates of Both sides pretend equally to support themselves upon 
Arguments drawn from Nature, Scripture, Law, History, Custom, and 
Political Expedience… Now as it is utterly impossible for a Contradiction, to 
be Both ways in the Right; so the Difficulty will not be much less, for a 
Common man, in a Proposition of this Nicety, to distinguish betwixt the Truth, 
and the Paradox; and to determine, upon which side Reason lies.”1 
6.1 Introduction 
We have discussed the nature of constitutions, laws, and constitutional and legal change. 
Before proceeding from the theoretical to the historical part of this thesis, it would be well 
to discuss the theory behind the idea of succession, which idea, naturally, underpins the 
laws of succession. This will be of benefit later when discussing the mediaeval laws of 
succession. 
The laws of succession are important for any social group. They are a major determinant 
of how activities and influence come to be distributed; they play a significant role in the 
ongoing process of (re-)distribution. They are also important because, to a considerable 
extent, a group’s stability relies upon them. If the laws surrounding succession are 
unclear, or if they are otherwise insufficiently prevalent and potent, then there is risk of 
division and infighting – particularly in respect of lucrative positions, e.g. the headship 
of the group.2 Such internecine conflict might result in the weakening, fragmentation, or 
                                               
1 This comes from a particularly colourful pamphlet written by Sir Roger L’Estrange during the Exclusion 
Crisis; it concerned the prospect of the succession to the thrones of England and Scotland by the then D. 
York (who later became James II). L’Estrange’s pamphlet demonstrates rather neatly that there were a 
number of different prevailing ideas in his time concerning the laws of succession; indeed, a great deal of 
confusion and division was caused by this fact: Roger L’Estrange, The Case Put Concerning the Succession 
of His Royal Highness the Duke of York (London: M. Clark, 1679), 1–2. For L’Estrange’s part, he sought 
something rather more lasting than history or custom as a base. He thought that they ought to be “Sacred 
and Inviolable Resolutions, that are founded upon Equity, and the Common Good”; indeed, “[t]he 
Foundations of Government should be like Those of the Earth; not to be moved”. In this light, his distrust 
of historical examples and precedent is unsurprising: L’Estrange, Concerning the Succession of the D. York, 
see esp. for these points and quotations 2-3, 6, 16. It is worthwhile noting that L’Estrange clearly thought 
that there was a constitution that operated according to certain laws (i.e. activities and influence were 
distributed in accordance with certain fixed associations); as to the substance of those laws, he took a rather 
conservative view.   
2 Cf. Wormald’s argument that “Violence and chicanery were always inherent in early English regnal 
succession, and were to remain so long after the Norman Conquest, perhaps so long as the office of 
sovereign was still worth fighting for. The principles that were supposed to operate can be summarized in 
the formula: election from the blood royal of a candidate of suitable maturity. Unfortunately, each of the 
three elements in this formula is ambiguous”: James Campbell, Eric John, and Patrick Wormald, The Anglo-
Saxons, ed. James Campbell (Phaidon Press Limited, 1982), 115-116 (emph. added). Furthermore, 
Dumville’s earlier argument that, “in England in the eleventh century, as in the sixth, the eventual arbiter 
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even destruction of the group. Yet, in spite of the obviousness of this fact, the pages of 
history are replete with examples of contested successions, as well as instances of 
succession that appear to be inconsistent with one another (i.e. which seem to have 
operated on different principles). Contested successions do not mean that there were not 
considered to be operational laws of succession; they certainly do not indicate the lack of 
a constitution. As will be seen both in the present chapter and later on, nothing could be 
further from the truth.  
Studying instances of succession goes a long way towards demonstrating the theories set 
out in the previous chapters. Any social group with established roles or positions – which 
is most – will almost certainly possess some fixed expectations concerning succession to 
those things. The ubiquity of ideas surrounding the succession helps to demonstrate the 
Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity. Moreover, even for societies for which we possess 
very little information, we are often possessed of information regarding who was chief, 
king, emperor, etc. and who their successors were. As such, succession is a lens through 
which we can study practically all societies in recorded history – through which we can 
see that they all had constitutions.  
With regard to the Associational Theory of Law, studying the succession often brings us 
face-to-face with that great rival of constitutions and law: politics. It confronts us with 
the (vested and often competing) interests and desires of various individuals and groups, 
which create an incentive to subvert the laws of succession; to aspire to positions of 
wealth and influence regardless as to the means by which they are attained. However, we 
often find that, even in such cases, they are hedged about by fixed associations. Indeed, 
even when they are being subverted, they are often dressed in the garb of conforming to 
shared fixed associations. They also generate discussion as to what the fixed associations 
are and what they should be; they provoke, as it were, negotiations. In such negotiations, 
one can quite clearly see the prevalence and potency of certain fixed associations; over 
time, one can study their persistency. 
Finally, with regard to the Generational Theory of Law, succession makes for good study 
in two respects. Firstly, we return to the fact of evidence: succession, especially to 
prominent positions within social groups, can be studied across the pages of recorded 
history. It can, therefore, be studied in a way in which things like the detailed, day-to-day 
                                               
in matters of succession was the sword”: David N. Dumville, “The Ætheling: A Study in Anglo-Saxon 
Constitutional History,” Anglo-Saxon England 8 (1979): 33.  
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organisation of government cannot. We can study how the ideas surrounding the 
succession changed over long periods. Secondly, succession is an event that happens 
regularly. In cases like that of kingship, it tends to happen once per generation. 
Consequently, it is a good way in which to see how each generation takes ownership of 
the laws of succession and turns them to their purposes; how each generation takes 
ownership of its constitution. 
6.2 Windows into Associations: Beliefs and Behaviours 
As has been said, the succession makes for good study as it is often an event for which 
we possess evidence. Even still, a significant problem remains: understanding why events 
happened as they did and, moreover, understanding precisely what was going on in 
individuals’ minds – what motivated them. In some cases, we have direct evidence of 
people’s beliefs; in other cases, we have to work backwards from their actions.3 Let us 
explore this in more detail.  
The most direct evidence we have for people’s beliefs is what they say their beliefs are 
or report them to be. These are, we might say, professed beliefs.4 Such professions might 
be explicit or implicit. They might be expressed in different ways and in different places; 
they might be found in prose, poetry, orations, etc. The most important source, however, 
are supposedly authoritative statements, which claim to contain those beliefs that ought 
to be both prevalent and potent, e.g. legislation and judicial pronouncements. These are 
considered to express not just some personal opinion, but, rather, are designed so as to be 
shared by all within the group. They act, we might say, as anchors. A danger for 
constitutional and legal historians is to study these in isolation; to assume that they were 
indeed authoritative. Many were dead letters or stillborn; others forgotten with the 
passage of time. They might help us to understand the formal constitution to a greater or 
lesser extent, but they can fall short of explaining the constitution as it actually was. For 
this, we must be prepared to take into account all evidence – all beliefs, professed or 
otherwise.  
Studying professed beliefs gets us only so far. This is in no small part due to the facts 
that: (a) for a great many people, if evidence of their professed beliefs ever existed, that 
                                               
3 Indeed, in many ways, everything that we ‘know’ of others’ thoughts must be derived ultimately from 
their behaviours. As Hebb once said: “All one can know about another's feelings and awarenesses is an 
inference from what he does…” DO Hebb, The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1949), xiii. 
4 For our purposes, it matters not whether these are professed privately or publicly, except insofar as the 
latter are more likely to survive in the historical record. 
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evidence has not survived; (b) what people say and what people really think are two quite 
different matters; and, moreover, (c) what people say and what people do are also quite 
different. We ought to judge others by their actions, so says the proverb. It is true here. It 
is by studying people’s behaviours that we can gain some understanding of their: (a) 
unconscious beliefs, i.e. beliefs of which they are not (wholly) conscious or aware, but 
are nevertheless apparent – these often take the form of assumptions, prejudices, and 
biases, and have much to do with predispositions and inclinations; (b) unarticulated 
beliefs, i.e. beliefs that people never cared to put into words or otherwise communicate, 
except through their actions; and (c) concealed beliefs, i.e. beliefs that people have 
purposefully attempted to keep hidden – at least, from public view.  
More fundamentally, however, studying people’s behaviours helps us to understand how 
any such beliefs translate into practice – how they fare in processes of practical reasoning 
and, in particular, when faced by competing interests and environmental influences. 
Indeed, when people act in a contrary manner to their direct and immediate interests and 
desires, and in a manner that means the temporary, indefinite, or even permanent 
deferment of gratification, then there is a strong indication that people’s beliefs – i.e. their 
fixed associations about how they should behave – are the guiding force.  
Behaviour can tell us much. However, it has its limitations. Behavioural studies often 
have to be based on inference, the exact processes of reasoning and motives being 
shrouded. To know how somebody acted is not necessarily to know why they acted so. 
Nevertheless, we can offer our best guess on the balance of probabilities, taking into 
account all that we know; in truth, this is sometimes the best evidence that can be 
mustered and, for lack of it, we would have no evidence whatsoever. 
6.3 Succession Events 
As with any event, succession events – and the beliefs and behaviours relating thereto – 
can be considered at three points in time: (1) before, (2) during, and (3) after.  
In terms of beliefs, we are particularly interested in what might be called alignment, i.e. 
the extent to which beliefs at each stage agree. Where they align, there is a great deal to 
be said for their potency – even if, in the event, they were somewhat ineffectual. For 
example, if a person maintained that somebody was the rightful claimant to a position 
both before, during, and after the event, then that would speak volumes as to the potency 
of that belief, even if that claimant was not actually successful. Where there is a lack of 
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alignment, it is interesting to see how people justify – one might say rationalise – that; 
whether and how they seek to reconcile their former and later beliefs.  
In terms of behaviours, those before an event we might call preparatory behaviours. 
There are two kinds of particular interest. On the one hand, there are what might be termed 
anticipatory behaviours, i.e. actions undertaken in the belief that certain eventualities 
seem probable – undertaken, as it were, in anticipation. Such behaviours tell us much 
about people’s assumptions, especially where these seem to be so strong that the outcome 
is taken as a foregone conclusion. On the other hand, there are what might be termed 
constructive behaviours, which are actions undertaken to affect the outcome of an event, 
whether through: (a) facilitation, i.e. creating a favourable environment for the given 
eventuality, (b) promotion, i.e. actively attempting to bring about that eventuality, or (c) 
prevention, i.e. actively working against it. As such, there are attempts to construct the 
course of events. 
Let us take the example of a king who is old and near to death. If people think that his 
successor is beyond doubt, life will probably continue as normal. However, if people 
think his successor unclear, then we are more likely to see people making preparations 
for a contested succession – either by preparing themselves for such an eventuality (e.g. 
fleeing abroad) or beginning to make manoeuvres to affect the outcome. There are here 
both anticipatory and constructive behaviours. 
Next, we must consider behaviours during the event and the outcome thereof. Behaviours 
during the event, which attempt to affect the outcome, we might call executive 
behaviours.5 It is by looking at these and the outcome that we can truly appreciate the 
prevalence and potency of particular beliefs – or, indeed, lack thereof. Where these 
executive behaviours appear to be uncontested and align with people’s professed beliefs 
(especially as expressed in so-called authoritative statements), we can deduce with 
relative safety that the outcome was broadly in alignment with people’s beliefs. However, 
where we see a number of executive behaviours working in different directions (i.e. a 
contested succession), the situation becomes more nebulous. 
Finally, we must consider the aftermath. There are two aspects of particular importance. 
On the one hand, we can study the amount of time, effort, and resources that the principal 
actors have to invest to cement the outcome. These we might call consolidating 
                                               
5 These are, admittedly, very alike to constructive behaviours; the distinction we draw is that these are not 
so much made in preparation, but, rather, with real and immediate intent.  
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behaviours. On the other hand, we can look at the wider social group to see how the 
outcome was received; what the reaction was. These we might call receptive behaviours. 
Where an outcome was contested, where much was invested to consolidate that outcome, 
where the general reaction was one of shock or hostility – in these cases we can conclude 
that people’s fixed associations concerning the succession were probably somehow 
frustrated. Alternatively, where the outcome appears uncontested, where little effort was 
made to consolidate the outcome, and where the reception appears to have been 
favourable – in these cases we can conclude that people’s fixed associations were 
probably fulfilled. We can, then, make corresponding conclusions as to the prevalence 
and potency of those associations.  
6.4 Nature and Types of Succession 
In order to understand the laws of succession, one must understand what ‘succession’ 
means. We define ‘succession’ in the following manner: 
Where one thing follows (on from), or comes after, another thing either 
spatially or temporally.6  
This contains four elements:  
(1) Non-identity element (‘one thing’, ‘another thing’);  
(2) Spatial element (‘spatially’);  
(3) Temporal element (‘temporally’); and  
(4) Sequential or lineal element (‘follows (on from), or comes after’).7  
The first three are variables; the fourth is a constant. As such, succession has to do with 
how two or more things sit with regard to one another in time or space; there needs to be 
some impression of some order or pattern that might be imagined as a line, sequence, or 
procession. In this latter respect, we must have regard to both order and timing. 
                                               
6 It is worthwhile noting that the “or” in “spatially or temporally” is an inclusive, not exclusive, “or”. 
7 It is perhaps interesting to note here the etymology of ‘succession’, which is derived from the Latin sub + 
cedere, the latter part of which means, amongst other things, ‘to yield’ or ‘to give way’; as in, one thing 
yields, or gives way, to another. See: “cedo, cessi, cessum, v.” CDN Costa and Mary Herberg, eds., 
Langenscheidt’s Universal Dictionary: Latin-English, English-Latin (Langenscheidt/Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1966); “cedo, cedere, cessi, cessum.” Sir William Smith and JF Lockwood, eds., A Smaller 
Latin-English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (John Murray, 1933), 103; “cedo, cessi, cessum, 3, v.” James Morwood, 
ed., Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2005), 29. 
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By modifying the spatial and temporal elements, we can venture three fundamental types 
of succession: (1) avenue-like;8 (2) wave-like;9 and (3) occupational succession. The 
latter is of greatest interest to us presently and, therefore, will be our focus. However, it 
is worthwhile stressing the importance of proximity in all three types – the things in 
question must be seen to be near in either time or space for there to be some impression 
in our minds of succession. If they are insufficiently proximate, then we are unlikely to 
think of them as following on from, or coming after, one another; we would regard them 
as separate, unrelated incidents. For longer chains of succession, this means that each and 
every link in the chain needs to be sufficiently close to its neighbours for there to be an 
impression of there being any chain at all.  
Occupational succession occurs where the same space is occupied at different times by 
non-identical things. It might be that the original occupier has undergone some 
transformation; this we can call metamorphosis.10 Alternatively, it might be that the 
original occupant has been displaced by some new occupant; this we can call 
displacement. The latter lays claim to our present attention.  
We can speak of displacements occurring within either physical and literal spaces, or 
figurative and metaphorical spaces. Thus, we might say that Jane, Jemima, and Lucie 
all successively occupied the same armchair during the course of an evening. The 
armchair is a physical and literal space, which they all occupied at different times; it is 
tangible, real, and geographical. Alternatively, we might say that they each successively 
occupied the same position in the art-world as Picasso did during his lifetime. This space 
is figurative and metaphysical; it is not a real, tangible, and geographical place, but, 
rather, one reliant more on the imagination; their physical location perhaps matters little.   
Whether one is speaking about a physical-literal or figurative-metaphorical space, the 
important thing is relative position, i.e. where things are situated in relation to one 
                                               
8 This occurs where the things in question are both contemporaneous and contiguous, i.e. they exist at the 
same time, but in different spaces. The salient factor here is that those different spaces form some sort of 
lineal sequence, i.e. they form a line or row. Thus, one might say that a road is lined by a succession of 
trees, which is to say that they formed an avenue (hence, ‘avenue-type’ succession). This type of succession 
is very much static; it is probably the least common in common usage. 
9 This occurs where the things in question are non-contemporaneous and contiguous; they occupy different 
spaces at different times, but the order of those spaces and the timing of their occupation gives one the 
impression of a lineal or sequential pattern. One might thing, for example, of a Mexican wave, in which 
each section of a crowd stands up and waves their arms in succession. This type of succession gives us the 
impression of movement; it feels as though something is moving, like the crest of a wave. 
10 One might say, for example, that a butterfly was successively an egg, a larva (i.e. caterpillar), a pupa (i.e. 
chrysalis), and then a butterfly. Whilst we might think of it being the same animal, it has changed its state 
several times such that each state is non-identical to the states that both proceeded and succeeded it. In other 
words, each state follows on from or comes after the other. 
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another and other things. For literal-physical spaces, that space is measured relative to 
other physical spaces and, in particular, certain objects or landmarks within those spaces. 
For figurative-metaphorical spaces, it is measured, as it were, with reference to whatever 
thing is pertinent. In the art-world example, other artists are the points of reference. 
In this context of displacements, we can introduce the terminology of predecessor, 
incumbent, and successor – the former, current, and next occupant respectively. Thus, 
when Jemima was incumbent in the armchair, her predecessor was Jane and her successor 
was Lucie; when they succeeded to Picasso’s position in the art-world, Picasso was their 
predecessor and they his successors. It is only in this context that we can properly speak 
of these things.  
6.5 Succession: A Construct 
Succession is, in the final analysis, a mental construct. It is the impression of a particular 
kind of relationship between things. Certainly, the natural world provides us with much 
material for these impressions, but it is only observers who can associate the things in 
question with one another and perceive some linear or sequential pattern.  
The fact and importance of succession as a mental construct is magnified when one 
considers less tangible forms of succession – in particular, cases of occupational 
succession as regards displacements in figurative-metaphorical spaces. This is especially 
the case if it takes place over long periods of time, because that requires an ability to 
remember the ‘successive’ events and an impression of their being somehow connected.  
Succession could not be anything other than a mental construct. We have already 
discussed how identity is a construct. Identity is foundational to succession. Succession 
is rooted in ideas of difference and change, which requires an ability to conceive of 
different things and of things changing over time. If one cannot conceive of differences 
and changes, of things with different identities, then one cannot conceive of succession. 
Indeed, this ability to conceive of differences and change is, if we follow Hume, crucial 
for our ability to conceive of time. For Hume, time is change;11 things that do not change 
appear timeless. The idea of time is crucial to most forms of succession, because it 
requires an ability to develop a chronology – to be able to think of events in terms of 
having an order and timing. 
                                               




The fact that succession is a mental construct means that it is open to perspective and 
interpretation; some feel there to be a pattern when others do not. Further, it means that 
succession is open to creative effort; one might even say manipulation and abuse. If one 
can create a narrative of events tying together earlier and later events in some way, then 
one might engineer or discover – depending upon one’s perspective – a succession. This 
can be particularly powerful when one considers the power of associations in the mind. 
If one can show that something is in some way connected to some other thing, then one 
might profit from the feelings and ideas associated with that other thing; in the right 
circumstances, it can lend an aura of legitimacy.12 
6.6 Modes of Relation-Transmission 
In order to understand succession more fully, it would be well to compare it with other 
similar ideas, i.e. descent and inheritance.13  
Descent, inheritance, and succession are all what might be termed modes of relation-
transmission. In each case, it is a relationship that is being transmitted, transferred, or 
transposed from one person to another. In the case of descent, it is the relationship to 
some form of social identity, i.e. one’s membership of a particular group, class (e.g. 
labouring, bourgeois, etc.), category (e.g. caste, free or unfree, etc.), race, religion, etc.14 
This one derives almost exclusively from one’s family members and, in particular, one’s 
                                               
12 We can take the example of the Holy Roman Empire. Its history and development is complicated, but the 
salient point is that it was supposed in some way to be the successor of the classical Roman Empire. Given 
that a number of centuries lapsed between the proverbial fall of the Roman Empire and the supposed 
foundation of the Holy Roman Empire in Charlemagne’s investiture, there is already cause to think that the 
one is insufficiently proximate to the other. Furthermore, there are many reasons for thinking that being 
emperor of the Roman Empire (or, at least, its western half) was quite unlike being emperor of the Holy 
Roman Empire – whether in its Carolingian beginnings (at which time it was not called the Holy Roman 
Empire) or at the time of its dissolution in 1806. It is easy to be sympathetic to this view. As Voltaire wryly 
remarked, the Holy Roman Empire was ‘neither holy, nor roman, nor an empire’ (‘ni saint, ni romain, ni 
empire’). Nevertheless, one can see why there was an attempt to connect the former and latter bodies; the 
former potentially had much to offer. Whether or not one sees the Holy Roman Empire as the successor of 
the Roman Empire is a matter of belief. It depends upon creating a sufficiently convincing narrative 
connecting the two together in such a way that the latter follows the former. For Voltaire, see: Voltaire, 
Essai Sur Les Mœurs et l’esprit Des Nations, ed. Par M Beuchot, vol. 2 (Werdet & Lequien fils, 1829), 
chap. 70, para 12. See also Loughlin, who quotes this, although without its original attribution, saying that 
the HRE appears “To modern eyes…a strange edifice”: Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), 28. 
13 Cf. anthropologist WHR Rivers’ definitions of these terms: “[D]escent applies only to the mode of 
determining membership of a social group; inheritance refers solely to the transmission of property; and 
succession denotes the mode of determining who shall succeed to rank or office of any kind, and especially 
to chieftainship.” William Halse Rivers Rivers, The History of Melanesian Society, vol. 2 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1914), 90. 
14 In the constitutional histories, the discussion of descent is often integrated into a discussion of ‘ranks’ 
and ‘status’, see, e.g.: William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and 
Development, 6th ed., vol. 1 (Clarendon Press, 1903), 21–27; William Stubbs, The Constitutional History 
of England in Its Origin and Development, 4th ed., vol. 2 (Clarendon Press, 1896), 171–76, 184–86. 
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parents.15 In the case of inheritance, it is the relationship to some form of property, 
whether tangible or intangible; in particular, it is relationships of ownership and benefit 
(and possibly liability) that are being transferred, normally upon the death of the previous 
owner or benefactor. In the case of succession, it is the relationship to some particular 
and pre-existing social standing or position within a social group. Sometimes this will 
involve redefining certain individuals’ relationship to a particular physical and literal 
space. For example, a successor might occupy the same physical spaces occupied by their 
predecessors, e.g. their throne or abode. However, what is most important is the 
redefinition of their relationship to a more figurative and metaphorical space: their 
relationship to the other members of the social group; redefinition of their position within 
the network.16 
To a great extent, one’s social standing or position will be affected by the types and 
quantity of resources to which one has access. However, social standing or position 
within a social group is defined by the activities and influence with which one is 
associated. Oftentimes, these are neatly bundled together to form recognisable groupings. 
These groupings take various names, e.g. role, status, office, rank, title, etc.17 It is the 
transmission of these bundles from one person to the next that constitutes the kind of 
succession in which we are especially interested as constitutional theorists and historians.  
There are two important principles of succession that require mention. The first is the 
principle of exclusivity: each instantiation of a social position can only be held by one 
individual at any given time; in order for one person to succeed another, the first in time 
must vacate the position before their successor can succeed to it. It is only in this manner 
that the successor can be said to follow on from, or come after, their predecessor. There 
needs to be some sense of replacement or supersession. The second is the principle of 
                                               
15 For example, in the mediaeval context, one was a member of the nobility, for the most part, by virtue of 
one’s parents, just as one was a serf, villein, or slave by the same token. 
16 Thus, for example, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States 
move into 10 Downing Street, Westminster and the White House, Washington DC respectively at the start 
of their tenures of office. They physically displace their predecessors who previously lived in those places. 
However, in the grand scheme of things, it is not so important that they live where their predecessors lived, 
but that they perform – or can perform – the same sorts of activities and influence as their predecessors did 
(especially in relation to, and as compared with, others). Indeed, it is possible to refuse to live either at 10 
Downing Street or the White House and yet retain precisely the same activities and influence – though no 
Prime Minister since the Marquess of Salisbury has refused to live at 10 Downing Street and no American 
President since the White House was built has lived anywhere other than the White House – which indicates 
the symbolic importance of those places. 
17 Cf. Luhmann’s definition of ‘roles’ as “bundles of expectation”. This is fundamentally correct, although 
he was not perfectly clear as to the question: expectations about what? We can be clear here: they are 
expectations as to activities and influence. See: Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law, ed. Martin 
Albrow, trans. Elizabeth King and Martin Albrow (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), 67. 
243 
 
sufficient similarity: the social position need not have exactly the same qualities for both 
predecessor and successor, but it needs to be sufficiently similar for there to be some 
impression that they are occupying, roughly speaking, the same position.18 If they are not 
sufficiently similar, we could not say that the one succeeded to the place of the other; the 
place is different.  
The principle of exclusivity is fundamental to both succession and inheritance, as one 
must relinquish either the social standing or property in question in order for it to be 
passed on. We must think, therefore, in terms of translation or transposition. By 
contrast, in cases of descent we must think much more in terms of reproduction or 
duplication: when one passes on one’s social identity, which might include one’s social 
position, one rather copies it and passes it on, whilst retaining, as it were, a copy for 
oneself.  
Underlying descent, inheritance, and succession is a strong vein of intergenerationality, 
i.e. things are typically passed from generation to generation, vertically as opposed to 
horizontally. Thus, one’s descent and inheritance are often derived from one’s parents; 
one’s social standing, if not derived from one’s parents, is typically derived from one’s 
parents’ generation. In other words, one is more likely to succeed to positions held by 
one’s elders than positions held by one’s juniors. It is not universally the case, but it is 
the case more often than not – particularly when it comes to more ‘senior’ social positions.  
There is significant interplay between descent, inheritance, and succession. For example, 
one’s descent can affect the types of property that one can inherit, as well as the types of 
social position to which one can succeed. If one were a mediaeval villein, there would be 
a limit to what one could inherit and the social positions to which one might aspire; the 
field was much more open to the mediaeval nobility. 
Descent, inheritance, and succession often run together – especially the latter two.19 For 
example, the inheritance of certain property was often associated with the holding of a 
                                               
18 Sometimes only some of the activities and influence previously associated with a position are passed to 
the successor; the rest is withheld or abolished. As such, the social standing is only partially transmitted. 
Much of the time, however, the bundle passes through the transmission process whole or complete. Indeed, 
in some cases it might even be enhanced or augmented along the way; in other cases, reduced or diminished. 
These are important to bear in mind in the context of the Generational Theory of Law. Whether social 
standing changes or remains the same, it says a great deal concerning people’s willingness to preserve or 
change their constitutional environment; whether changeovers are seen as an opportunity for reform.  
19 Indeed, in modern times, ‘succession’ and ‘inheritance’ are often used interchangeably, as in the use of 
the phrase ‘the law of succession’ where we might more strictly call it the ‘law of inheritance’. For example, 
take the following textbook, which deals with inheritance: Roger Kerridge and AHR Brierley, Parry & 
Kerridge: The Law of Succession, 12th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2009). 
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particular social position.20 One can see evidence of this connection in a phrase that was 
profligate throughout mediaeval charters, edicts, law-codes, treaties, etc.: ‘heirs and 
successors’ (heres et successores). Thus, when a lord died and held his land in fee-tail, 
his eldest son (if he had one) would both inherit the land and succeed to his father’s 
position as lord (bringing with it all the attendant privileges and responsibilities), even if 
he had to pay dues upon entry (i.e. a relief, relevium). Insofar as possible, however, it is 
important to attempt to distinguish carefully instances of inheritance and succession. 
Inheritance, like succession, can be partial or complete, which is to say that either some 
or all of the property or social standing are transferred. Indeed, the transfer is sometimes 
thought to be so complete that, besides their personal identity, there is thought to be 
(legally) no difference between former and current possessors. This means embracing not 
only what the former possessed, but also any debts and obligations they had incurred or 
to which they themselves had succeeded.21 Ideas that inheritance or succession must be 
complete are often accompanied by ideas of indivisibility and inalienability. 
Descent and inheritance are, of course, not the only ways in which one might come by a 
certain social identity or property. For example, slaves might be manumitted or 
enterprising merchants might scale the social ladder. These, too, can affect the types of 
social position to which one might succeed and hold. Indeed, in the modern day, these 
other sources of social identity and property are perhaps far more important than descent 
or inheritance. However, historically and in more ‘traditional’ societies, this was not the 
case. As constitutional historians, this must be kept in mind. There were very many fixed 
associations about what sorts of person could do what that have to be navigated; in this 
respect, their constitutions were much more complex than our own. 
                                               
20 Even though in the modern-day United Kingdom the concepts of descent, inheritance, and succession are 
largely distinct, there is still an on-going and slow-burning process of separating them in some quarters. 
One might take, for example, reform of the House of Lords. Historically, it was the case that when a peer 
of the realm died his heir would be entitled to inherit his father’s estate and to succeed to his place in the 
House of Lords – this is no longer the case. This position was of course amended by the House of Lords 
Act 1999, which set out that no person could sit as a member of the House of Lords by virtue of hereditary 
peerage (s. 1) with the exception of 90-92 members (s. 2(2)) who are excepted by a Standing Order of the 
House (s. 2(1)). The first hereditary peers to sit after the Act were elected from the body of hereditary peers 
theretofore entitled to sit and, upon the death of any current hereditary peer, their seat will not pass to their 
next of kin but, rather, under s. 2(4) will be the subject of a by-election. To be eligible to stand in a by-
election, one must be on the Register of Hereditary Peers, which is maintained and published yearly by the 
Clerk of the Parliaments in accordance with Standing Order 10 of the House of Lords (26 July 1999). Thus, 
whilst there is still an hereditary element, it is merely necessary and not sufficient to hold an hereditary 
peerage and, of course, the majority of the members of the present House of Lords hold their peerage on 
the basis of appointment and not heredity. 
21 Cf. the principle of universal succession in Roman law, by virtue of which heirs inherited not only the 
property but debts and obligations of their forebears. See: Paul du Plessis, Borkowski’s Textbook on Roman 
Law, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2010), 205, 226–27. 
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It is also worthwhile mentioning that there are also types of social identity that one cannot 
gain through descent; they are non-transferable. For example, one’s sex, 22  level of 
education, marital status, age, etc.23 are not obtained through descent nor can they be 
passed on. Nevertheless, they can substantially affect one’s social position, including 
one’s eligibility for various social positions. For example, one might only be able to 
succeed to given positions if one is biologically male or of a certain age. 
6.7 Bundles of Activities and Influence  
It has been said that there are bundles of activities and influence, and that these bundles 
are often given names such as role, status, office, rank, title, etc. To give each of these 
neat, analytically distinct definitions would be nigh impossible. However, it would be 
remiss not to distinguish them somewhat.  
Role is the broadest and can be deployed in most situations where there is some feeling 
of obligation to perform some activity or to exercise some influence; it is also particularly 
overshadowed with a sense of telos or purpose, i.e. of some function needing to be 
performed. Status and title (as well as, perhaps, estate) are more of an account at any 
given time what activities or influence to which a given individual is entitled or obligated 
to perform; they are particularly associated with ideas of prestige and privilege.24 Rank 
is particularly focused on the idea of levels or strata of influence – of who commands and 
who obeys; it is concerned with seniority and inferiority.  
Office is not only the most important, but it is also, in many ways, a combination of the 
ideas underlying the other terms. In it, there is a sense of function and obligation,25 as 
                                               
22 One’s biological sex is, of course, derived from one’s biological parents. Nevertheless, the resulting 
social identity that one has is derived through descent; rather, one might have it because of one’s parents, 
but not by virtue of them.  
23 Cf. Hollingshead’s ‘four factor index of social status’ of education, occupation, sex, and marital status: 
August B Hollingshead, “Four Factor Index of Social Status (Unpublished Working Paper, 1975),” Yale 
Journal of Sociology 8 (2011): 21–52. 
24 ‘Status’ and ‘role’ were famously defined by Linton as follows: “A status, in the abstract is a position in 
a particular pattern. It is thus quite correct to speak of each individual as having many statuses, since each 
individual participates in the expression of a number of patterns. […]. A status, as distinct from the 
individual who may occupy it, is simply a collection of rights and duties.”  By contrast: “A rôle represents 
the dynamic aspect of a status. […]. When [a person] puts the rights and duties which constitute the status 
into effect, he is performing a rôle. Rôle and status are quite inseparable… There are no rôles without 
statuses and no statuses without rôles.” Ralph Linton, The Study of Man: An Introduction (Appleton-
Century-Crofts, Inc., 1936), 113–14. Linton’s definition of ‘status’ is very close to the present definition of 
‘social standing or position’ (which makes sense, seeing as ‘status’ derives from the Latin for ‘standing’), 
but, because ‘social standing/position’ is freer from associations with prestige and privilege, it is here 
preferred as the general descriptor.  
25 Indeed, the idea of obligation is, etymologically, very much connected with the word office, which comes 
from the Latin officium – often translated with the word ‘duty’. See, e.g.: “officium, (i)i, nt.” Morwood, 




well as a sense of prestige and privilege; likewise, there is a sense of seniority or 
inferiority. Furthermore, office is often associated with ideas of formality – of the 
observance of certain processes and forms. These might have, to use Bagehot’s language, 
more of a dignified or efficient aspect:26 they might be saturated with symbolism, such as 
in certain accoutrements, ceremonies, rites, rituals, etc.; they might be thoroughly useless 
and outmoded. Nevertheless, there is a sense that not only will certain activities and 
influence be performed, but they will be performed in specific ways. There is further a 
sense of publicness or openness; an office is something that is held in respect to a social 
group at large; it is, as it were, public facing.   
In modern, meritocratic societies, social standing tends to be something that is acquired 
– or, perhaps, earned – through some act or acts. Thus, beyond a basic egalitarian social 
standing that everyone shares, if one wants to have a particular role, status, title, office, 
etc., then one must gain it based on recognition of past, or promise of future, success. This 
has not been universally the case. There is also an idea that there are differentiated social 
standings that are somehow inherent in – or, to use Linton’s term, ascribed to,27  – 
individuals, often by virtue of descent or social identity. Thus, a person might have a 
particular status, title, or rank because their parents held (and continued to hold) that 
social standing (e.g. being a member of the aristocracy) or because of some biological 
fact (e.g. one’s sex, age, familial relationships28). It is important to distinguish between 
an inherent general social standing held by virtue of one’s social identity and an inherent 
right to succeed to a particular social standing. Both of these can be gained by descent, 
but the latter social standing can only be realized through an act of succession (i.e. 
transposition).  
6.8 Implications of Proximity 
It was said earlier that proximity is particularly important; where proximity is lacking, to 
describe things as succeeding one another is often strenuous. It is worthwhile considering 
the implications of this with regard to offices, roles, etc.  
                                               
26 The ‘dignified’ parts of the constitution are those “which excite and preserve the reverence of the 
population”; the ‘efficient’ parts are those “by which it, in fact, works and rules”. Every constitution, if they 
are to be successful, says Bagehot, ‘must attain’ these: “every constitution must first gain authority, and 
then use authority, it must first win the loyalty and confidence of mankind, and then employ that homage 
in the work of government”. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution, 2nd ed., 1873, 70. 
27 Linton, The Study of Man, 115. 
28 See, e.g. Linton, The Study of Man, 116–28. 
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Between the end of one tenancy, as it were, and the start of another, there is often a period 
of vacancy. This might occur for a number of reasons, e.g. the successor is yet to be 
selected or inaugurated. However, if this vacancy becomes chronic and a long period of 
time elapses, there is a question as to whether the latter really succeeds to the same social 
standing (or one sufficiently similar). After all, prevailing conditions might have changed 
so much that it would be nonsensical to think of the so-called successor as performing the 
same activities and exercising the same kinds of influence as were performed and 
exercised formerly. There is, then, a thin line between abeyance and extinction. If a 
certain social standing has fallen into abeyance but is then filled, then one might say that 
it is revived;29 if the connection would be too tenuous, it is better to speak of new creation.  
6.9 Monarchy as Social Standing and Office 
The historical part of this thesis has to do with royal minorities. It would be well, 
therefore, to apply the foregoing to ideas of royalty and monarchy.  
Monarchy – in whatever form – is a type of social standing. There are certain kinds of 
activities that we typically associate with monarchs. They are war leaders (dux belli), 
lawmakers and lawgivers, fountainheads (fons et origo) and guarantors of peace and 
justice, figureheads, administrators, decision-makers, etc.; they declare war or make 
peace, grant or rescind liberties, etc.30 The precise nature of their activities is often ill-
                                               
29 Sir Bernard Burke published in 1866 a list of all of the former peerages that had existed the time of 
writing his book: Bernard Burke, A Genealogical History of the Dormant, Abeyant, Forfeited, and Extinct 
Peerages of the British Empire (Harrison, 1886). In referring to the peerages as “dormant” and “abeyant” 
he is expressing his belief that they may one day be revived and, indeed, at page ix he says that there may 
be descendants of peerages thought extinct living abroad who are entitled to that peerage. 
30 Many languages possess many words associated with various positions and types of leadership, the 
precise meanings and connotations of which often change over time. Many of these words have ancient 
roots and have cognates in other languages (cf. Sanskrit raj-, Latin rex-, and Celtic rig-, which all appear 
to derive from a PIE root, *reg-, meaning ‘to straighten out or rule’; the German Reich and Old English 
rice both appear to derive from the same root, although perhaps not from PIE through the Germanic Parent 
Language (GPL), but, rather, as a later Celtic borrowing). Even though the ultimate and exact origins of 
many of these words are lost – to a greater or lesser extent – to obscurity (cf. the Ancient Greek anax (ἄναξ), 
with its female equivalent of anassa (ἄνασσα), and basileus (βασιλεύς)), many contain, reveal, and reflect 
some of the ideas about the nature of the positions that they denote. For example, ‘monarch’, from the 
Ancient Greek monarkhes (μονάρχης) is a compound of monos (μόνος), meaning ‘sole’ or ‘only’, and 
arkhos (ἀρχός), meaning ‘leader’; arkhos itself appears to be derived from arkhein (ἄρχειν), which means 
‘to be first’ or ‘to begin’, which can be seen in the Ancient Greek office of archon (ἄρχων), as well as in 
the English prefix arch- (e.g. archbishop and archangel); hierarch and hierarchy are also connected with 
arkhos and, in this case, they are formed from hieros (ἱερός), meaning ‘holy’, and arhko (ἄρχω), meaning 
‘rule’. In these roots, then, can be seen ideas of directorship and primacy; a person who directs and a person 
who is first. The Germanic languages, as opposed to other Proto-Indo European languages, appear to favour 
a slightly different idea. The English king (German: König) derives from the Old English, cyning, which is 
itself derived from cyn- or cynn, from which comes our ‘kin’, and –ing, which means something like ‘son 
of’, ‘descended from’, or ‘belonging to’. The exact meaning of cyn-/cynn is difficult to identify, though it 
appears to derive from the same root, for example, as the Latin gens and genus, and the Ancient Greek 
genos (γένος); they all derive from PIE *ǵenh₁-, which meant ‘to produce, beget, give birth’. It is easy to 
see, therefore, how cyn-/cynn and ‘kin’ are surrounded by ideas of family, people, race, etc. It was once 
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defined,31 but their general association with the monarch is the salient point. No ordinary 
person could do these things without special permission. Furthermore, there is a certain 
kind of influence that tends to be associated with monarchs, which might be called a 
plenitude of influence: the monarch commands all and is commanded by no-one.32   
These activities and influence are bundled together and it would not be inappropriate to 
apply the label of ‘office’ to the monarchy. After all, there are usually associations of 
obligation and purpose, prestige and privilege, seniority, formality, and publicness. 
Furthermore, monarchy is an office capable of entertaining succession. It is an office 
considered to be both exclusive and transferable. Successors often succeed to both 
physical-literal spaces occupied by previous monarchs (e.g. fortifications, palaces, etc.), 
as well as figurative-metaphorical spaces (e.g. in the government, army, etc.).  
6.10 Tripartite Theory of Succession 
The process by which succession occurs can be divided into three stages: (1) decoupling, 
i.e. the process by which the previous incumbent ceases to hold the position, bearing in 
mind the principle of exclusivity; (2) transmission, i.e. the process by which the position 
is transferred or the successor is selected; and (3) coupling, i.e. the process by which the 
                                               
thought that cyning originated from an idea of being ‘father of the race or family’; it would rather seem, 
however, that it originated from an idea of being ‘one or the son or the product of the people, race, tribe, 
etc.’, though, if it did come to signify the inheritor of the headship of the family, it is easy to see how it 
might become enmeshed with ideas of fatherhood. This could, theoretically, be a purely hereditary thing 
and the –ing, in this case, might refer to some specific noble or otherwise special family, etc. In this sense, 
the cyning was the (or perhaps a) representative of some noble family. It could, also, indicate some elective 
element – as in, the one chosen or given by the tribe or people. This would certainly tie in with many 
people’s ideas about ancient Germanic liberties, but we should be careful in drawing any conclusions from 
mere speculation. Whatever the case, the fundamental idea appears to be that of family – and, perhaps, some 
special place therein or with some special care therefor. It is possible that this family was defined according 
to genetic relatedness or, perhaps, much in line with Fustel de Coulanges ideas, it might have had something 
to do with being united by a common and sacred worship – by being united by common rites and 
ceremonies, deities, and objects of fear and devotion. From all of these ideas, it is easy to see how functions, 
such as sacerdotal, military, and pastoral, might arise. It is interesting to note, by contrast to king, the origin 
of the word queen. This comes from OE cwen, denoting ‘woman’ or ‘wife’, and seems to indicate the 
subsidiary importance of the position – as the king’s consort, i.e. the king’s woman or wife. On these points, 
see, e.g.: Thomas G Palaima, “The Nature of the Mycenaean Wanax: Non-Indo-European Origins and 
Priestly Functions,” Aegaeum 11 (1995): 119–39; Lothar Willms, “On the IE Etymology of Greek 
(w)Anax,” Glotta 86 (2010): 232–71; Herwig Wolfram, “The Shaping of the Early Medieval Kingdom,” 
Viator: Medieval and Renaissance Studies 1 (1971): 4; CT Onions, GWS Friedrichsen, and RW Burchfield, 
eds., The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford University Press, 1966), 47, 506: “arch-”, 
“king”; Stubbs, Constitutional History, 1903, 1:158; Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, The Ancient City: 
A Study on the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome, trans. Willard Small (Doubleday 
Anchor Books, 1956); A Lexicon Abridged from Liddell and Scott’s Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford 
University Press, 1891); Eric Partridge, Origins: A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, 4th 
ed. (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 872: “-arch, etc.” 
31 This often allows the monarch large amounts of discretion and liberty, often paraded under the banner of 
the royal prerogative. 
32 At least, this is true in more absolutist systems, although in many systems the influence of the monarch 
is either qualified or much reduced. 
249 
 
new incumbent is installed in their new position. For any given social position, each of 
these stages will be attended by various fixed associations. It is these patterns of fixed 
associations that constitute the laws of succession.  
Each stage will be considered in turn with particular reference to monarchical succession. 
6.11 Decoupling  
Individuals might be decoupled from social positions in a number of ways, principally: 
(1) Expiration: the term of the position comes to an end after a given length of time 
or event. It has, as it were, a natural or predetermined lifespan. 
(2) Resignation: the holder gives up the social position (ostensibly willingly).  
(3) Removal: the holder is ejected from their social position (perhaps forcibly).  
(4) Arrogation: the activities and influence associated with the social position are 
assumed by another; the implication is that their gain is the original holder’s loss 
(cf. removal). 
(5) Forfeiture: the holder has violated the terms of their holding so grossly that their 
term is deemed to cease automatically (cf. expiration). 
(6) Nullification: it is deemed that the holder was never, in fact, the proper holder –
usually because of some defect or deficiency in their claim to the position or the 
process by which they came by it. In a word, there was some irregularity, which 
frustrates certain fixed associations.33 
Let us discuss these with reference to monarchy. 
As the monarchical office is normally held for life, the most commonly associated mode 
of decoupling is expiration, i.e. the monarch’s term of office ends with their death – 
whether natural or otherwise.34 Historically, it was unusual for a successor to reign during 
the lifetime of their predecessor;35 indeed, the persistence in life of a predecessor was 
often problematic for their successors, because there were often still those who regarded 
                                               
33 This can perhaps only be loosely described as ‘decoupling’; it is rather a declaration that the individual 
was at no time properly coupled with the position. 
34 For some illustrations of the deaths of kings in mediaeval England, see: Michael Evans, The Death of 
Kings: Royal Deaths in Medieval England (Hambledon Continuum, 2003). 
35 There are, however, some examples of this occurring, for example, in earlier Anglo-Saxon England. 
Indeed, it was not especially uncommon. We might think of Sigebehrt of East Anglia, who abdicated in in 
the mid-630s to become a monk; we might think of Centwine of Wessex in the late seventh century who 
abdicated to become a monk or his successor, Caedwalla, who abdicated and went to Rome. Alternatively, 
we might think of Æthelred and Coelred of Mercia, who vacated their thrones respectively in 704 and 709 
to become monks and go on pilgrimage to Rome. 
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(for whatever reason) the former as the legitimate (and only) monarch.36 This was a 
problem that often required solving.37 For the most part, however, there was only ever 
one person alive that had been monarch and the expectation was that it would remain thus 
until they died. Indeed, there was a very potent, prevalent, and persistent idea that the 
monarch’s death ought not to be in any way hastened or brought forward. Many laws 
attest to this expectation.38 In particular, the various laws of treason, e.g. Alfred, c. 4;39 V 
Æthelred, c. 30;40 II Cnut, c. 57;41 and Edward III’s Statute of Treasons,42 which was 
much broader than its predecessors and laid the foundations for the modern law.43 
                                               
36 We might think of Shakespeare’s lines from Richard II (Act 3, Scene 2): “Not all the water in the rough 
rude sea / Can wash the balm off from an anointed king.”  
37 Between the unification of England in the tenth century and the death of George VI in 1952, only 
Æthelred II managed to survive the reign of his (arguable) successor, Swein Forkbeard (d. 1014). It is true 
that James II (d. 1701) survived one half of the pair that succeeded him, Mary II (d. 1694), but he died of 
natural causes before the other, and arguably more important person, William III (d. 1701) died. However, 
their feats of survival, such as they were, were largely achieved by their going into exile and thus removing 
themselves from the clutches of their erstwhile competitors. Those monarchs who remained or were caught 
(i.e. Edward II, Richard II, Henry VI, and Edward V) were all kept in confinement and died or disappeared 
in somewhat mysterious circumstances – at times that were, rather conveniently, politically expedient. For, 
so long as they lived, they posed a potential threat; there were still those who regarded them as the rightful 
and legitimate monarch. As to whether Æthelred or James would have met an untimely end had they 
remained in the country, one can only speculate. Whether one might also count Edgar the Ætheling and the 
Empress Matilda in this category of survivors is something of a moot point. If one accepts Edgar’s ‘election’ 
in 1066, then he did, indeed, manage to outlive two of his successors (William I and William II). Similarly, 
in the case of the Empress Matilda, there is a case that she was the legitimate heir to the English throne 
following the death of her father (Henry I). However, as she was never crowned, she can properly be said 
to have only remained a contender; nevertheless, she did outlive her main rival (K. Stephen). Yet, when the 
time came, she deferred to her son (Henry II). There is also the tricky matter of Charles II, who survived 
the Commonwealth and Protectorate after his father’s (i.e. Charles I’s) execution. Technically, Charles did 
not survive his successor because, during the interregnum, there was no successor per se. Nevertheless, 
Charles, like Æthelred, Matilda, Edgar, and, later, James, survived largely by virtue of his living abroad. It 
is interesting to note that, Edward VIII, who abdicated the throne in 1936, managed not only to see out the 
entirety of the sixteen-year reign of his brother, George VI, but also the first twenty years of the reign of 
his niece, Elizabeth II. That he did this in self-imposed exile is noteworthy. It is also important to remember 
that, by this time, the monarch was no longer the principal operant in government. 
38 For example, there is perhaps something of this sort of motivation behind the provisions in the Laws of 
Æthelbehrt (c. 5) and Ine (c. 6), which provide penalties for killing and fighting in the king’s house 
respectively. These provisions were largely concerned with maintaining the integrity of the lord’s mund or 
protection in his own lands, not to mention his honour. After all, if a king could not keep peace in his own 
lands and household, how could he keep peace in the kingdom? However, it is possible that these provisions 
were also motivated by a desire to keep the king safe – for fighting in his presence could result in his being 
harmed, albeit accidentally and collaterally. For these provisions, see: FL Attenborough, ed., The Laws of 
the Earliest English Kings (Cambridge University Press, 1922), 4–5, 38–39.  
39 “If anyone plots against the life of the king, either on his own account, or by harbouring outlaws, or men 
belonging to [the king] himself, he shall forfeit his life and all he possesses.”: Attenborough, The Laws of 
the Earliest English Kings, 64–65. 
40 “And if anyone plots against the king, he shall forfeit his life…”: AJ Robertson, ed., The Laws of the 
Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I (Cambridge University Press, 1925), 86–87. 
41 “If anyone plots against the king or his own lord, he shall forfeit his life and all that he possesses…”: 
Robertson, The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I, 204–5. 
42 25 Edw. III, st. 5, c. 2 (1352). 
43 Of course, these acts of lawmaking were not all that constituted the law of treason and, indeed, the act of 
Edward III was in part a reaction to the shape that the law of treason was taking in the absence of a 
legislative enactment, see: Dudley Julius Medley, A Student’s Manual of Constitutional History, 6th ed. 
(Oxford University Press, 1925), 92–93; Theodore FT Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead’s English 
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It was not universally the case that the end of a monarch’s term of office coincided with 
their death. There were times when the monarch was, for whatever reason, deemed to 
resign their office, i.e. they abdicated. Some appear to have done this largely of their own 
volition. 44  However, there were others whose abdications were only effected after 
considerable pressure had been brought to bear upon them. We might think of Edward 
II,45 Richard II,46 and Edward VIII,47 who all made formal declarations of abdication; we 
might also think of James II, whose abdication was assumed from his ‘withdrawing from 
the kingdom’ in the face of William of Orange.48  
Closely related to the above incidents of abdication under duress is the removal of the 
monarch, i.e. deposition.49 In English history, deposition has occurred most clearly in the 
cases of Richard II and Charles I. Richard’s abdication appears to have already been 
secured,50 when his contemporaries took the additional step of deposing him.51 As such, 
Richard could then neither argue that his abdication was invalid nor could he rescind it; 
his deposition would stand regardless. It would seem that both abdication and deposition 
were in themselves thought sufficient to decouple Richard from the throne; it fell vacant 
and was claimed by Henry [IV]. Charles I, unlike Richard, never abdicated; he was 
                                               
Constitutional History: From the Teutonic Conquest to the Present Time, 11th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd., 
1960), 512ff. 
44 In the English context, we might again think of Æthelred and Coelred of Mercia who vacated their thrones 
in the early eighth-century, seemingly voluntarily, to devote themselves to religious life 
45 Edward II’s abdication was extracted from him, by a delegation of whose composition we are not entirely 
certain, at Kenilworth in mid-January 1327. He was threatened that, if he did not resign the throne, his son, 
Edward [III], would also be deprived of an opportunity to hold it. See further below. 
46 Richard II’s abdication was extracted from him in late September 1399, whilst he was imprisoned in the 
Tower of London. See: Nigel Saul, Richard II (Yale University Press, 1999), 420–21. 
47 Edward VIII came to the throne in January 1936. He wished to marry an American divorcee, Wallis 
Simpson, but he faced considerable opposition, particularly from the Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin and 
the leader of the opposition, Clement Attlee. It appeared to be a choice between remaining king and being 
able to marry Ms. Simpson. Edward opted for the latter and, on 10 December 1936, he signed the instrument 
of abdication.  
48 See: Henry Hallam, Constitutional History of England: Henry VII to George II, vol. 3 (JM Dent & Sons 
Limited, n.d.), 84. It is the crown’s vacancy by virtue of abdication that is mentioned in the Bill of Rights 
1689: WC Costin and J Steven Watson, eds., The Law and Working of the Constitution: Documents 1660-
1914, vol. 1 (Adam and Charles Black, 1952), 69. 
49 On deposition in English history, see, inter alia: William Huse Dunham Jr. and Charles T Wood, “The 
Right to Rule in England: Depositions and the Kingdom’s Authority , 1327-1485,” The American Historical 
Review 81, no. 4 (1976): 738–61; Claire Valente, “The Deposition and Abdication of Edward II,” The 
English Historical Review 113, no. 453 (1998): 852–81; Maude V Clarke and VH Galbraith, “The 
Deposition of Richard II,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 14, no. 1 (1930): 125–81; Bertram 
Wilkinson, “The Deposition of Richard II and the Accession of Henry IV,” English Historical Review 54, 
no. 214 (1939): 215–39. 
50 This was, in fact, the date on which his reign was deemed to have ended: Saul, Richard II, 423. 
51 See: Saul, Richard II, 422; Thomas Walsingham, The St Albans Chronicle: The Chronica Maiora of 
Thomas Walsingham II 1394-1422, ed. and trans. John Taylor, Wendy R Childs, and Leslie Watkins 
(Oxford University Press, 2011), 200–203; Adam Usk, The Chronicle of Adam Usk, 1377-1421, ed. and 
trans. Chris Given-Wilson (Oxford University Press, 1997), 68–69; AR Myers, ed., English Historical 
Documents, vol. 4 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1969), 180–84. 
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deposed after a trial of dubious validity.52 Also unlike Richard, who was initially suffered 
to live, Charles’ fate was clear from the moment of deposition; he was executed three 
days after his condemnation. 
The so-called deposition of Edward II requires more attention. In most histories, it is taken 
for granted that Edward II was deposed, which is little surprise as the chapters and papers 
on the subject describe it as a ‘deposition’.53 Certainly, there appears to have been some 
discussion of deposing Edward,54 and the Articles of Accusation are testament to the fact 
that people thought there were good reasons for his removal.55 Indeed, it is possible that 
a statute was drawn up, which, according to Knighton, was shown to Richard II in 1386; 
if true, it was probably later destroyed.56  However, it is difficult to share Valente’s 
conviction that Edward was indeed deposed.57 Everything that happened prior to the 
sending of the delegation to Edward II at Kenilworth, rather than being interpreted as a 
discussion as to whether or not to depose Edward, could as easily be interpreted as a 
discussion as to whether Edward should be called upon to abdicate – a discussion that 
resulted in an affirmative. The order of events is also revealing. If Edward had already 
been deposed, there would have been little need to send a delegation to Kenilworth asking 
him to relinquish the throne.58 The only possible reason might have been that Edward, 
aside from relinquishing the office of kingship, might also have needed to relinquish his 
lands and wealth to his son, which, being personal property, he could not be deprived of 
without his consent. Yet there is no mention of this as a reason in contemporary accounts. 
Further, whether or not the group that sent the delegation to Kenilworth and received 
Edward’s answer had the power to depose him is arguable. The fact of the matter is that, 
                                               
52 There is an argument to be made that Charles I, like James II, was not deposed so much as had forfeited 
his right to the throne through his subversion of the fundamental laws and constitution of the country. See: 
the sentence of the High Court upon Charles I and the House of Commons’ resolution on 28 January 1689 
after James II’s flight, printed in, respectively: Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., The Constitutional 
Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-60, 3rd ed., 1906, 377–80; John Miller, “The Glorious 
Revolution: ‘Contract’ and ‘Abdication’ Reconsidered,” The Historical Journal 25, no. 3 (1982): 541. 
53  See, e.g.: Bertram Wilkinson, The Constitutional History of England, 1216-1399: Politics and the 
Constitution, 1307-1399, vol. 2 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1952), 157-176 ('The Deposition of Edward 
II'); Maude Violet Clarke, Medieval Representation and Consent: A Study of Early Parliaments in England 
with Special Reference to the Modus Tenendi Parliamentum (Longmans, Green and Co., 1936), 173-195 
('Committees of Estates and the Deposition of Edward II'). 
54 See: Valente, “The Deposition and Abdication of Edward II,” 855–57. 
55  For these, see: George Burton Adams and H Morse Stephens, eds., Select Documents of English 
Constitutional History (The Macmillan Company, 1901), 99. 
56 Clarke, Medieval Representation and Consent, 177. 
57 Valente, “The Deposition and Abdication of Edward II,” esp. at 862. 
58 The fact that later in the century Richard II was required to abdicate prior to any attempt to depose him 
is important; the order, there, was reversed. 
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on the evidence we possess, it would seem better to say only that Edward abdicated the 
throne; whether he was formally deposed we will perhaps never know. 
We will not enter here into a detailed discussion of arrogation (which is closely related to 
the idea of usurpation),59 forfeiture,60 and nullification61 with regards to the monarchy. It 
is sufficient to say that, whereas resignation, removal, and arrogation require agency to 
bring them about, expiration, forfeiture, and nullification happen, as it were, 
automatically.  
6.11.1 Complete and Partial Decoupling 
It has thus far been assumed that decoupling applies to the social standing in question in 
toto, i.e. the successor completely replaces their predecessor in their activities and 
influence. It is at this point that we must add a qualification to the principle of exclusivity: 
it is possible for a person to succeed only to some portion of their predecessor’s activities 
and influence. Yet, it must be emphasised, that this person can only be said to be the 
other’s successor in respect of these. As such, we can distinguish between complete and 
partial decoupling.  
6.12 Eligibility and Candidature 
In order to succeed to a given social position, a person needs to be both eligible and a 
candidate. Any deficiency or irregularity in either of these could be fatal to that person’s 
claim; it would frustrate people’s fixed associations.  
Eligibility is a matter of both having the right qualifications or qualities and not being 
disqualified. In other words, a person must have everything deemed necessary in order to 
stand without having anything that would bar them from standing. Age, nationality, social 
                                               
59 In such cases, the person is, against their will and without the formalities associated with resignation and 
removal, ejected from their position and replaced by another. In other words, the process of decoupling 
follows no set pattern of expectations, which has often led to a residual belief that the former occupant was 
still, by rights, incumbent. In English history, there have been many plots in order to dethrone a usurper 
and restore the supposedly rightful holder for, although they might have been de facto decoupled from their 
position, they were never de jure decoupled. We might think of Edmund, E. Kent who, in March 1330, was 
executed for having intrigued for the release from prison of Edward II, whom he thought to still be alive 
and, presumably, still the rightful king. (For a record of this event, see: Myers, English Historical 
Documents, 4:50–51. See also: May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399 (Oxford University 
Press, 1959), 100.). Alternatively, one might think of the Windsor Plot of January 1400, in which a group 
of disgruntled earls planned to arrogation Henry IV and his progeny at Windsor and restore Richard II.59 
Indeed, it was this event that probably accelerated Richard’s death. 
60 There has been no clear-cut case of forfeiture in English history, although the accusations levelled against 
the negligence, ineptitude, tyranny, and malice of Edward II, Richard II, Charles I, and James II all 
approximate it somewhat. 
61 Nullification often becomes a prominent issue in the case of a usurpation, because, so it is argued, the 
usurper’s title was null and void ab initio. 
254 
 
class, personal income, etc. might all affect one’s ability to stand for a given position. It 
is worthwhile noting the categorical association here: persons qualified-and-not-
disqualified form a set of ‘eligible’ persons. Anybody outside this set cannot be rightfully 
countenanced as succeeding to the position – for them to do so would frustrate our fixed 
associations.  
In the context of monarchy, eligibility is sometimes called throneworthiness. Those 
throneworthy were usually a small and select group, i.e. the monarch’s close relatives. 
Those of lower social status are unlikely to have ever been thought eligible to succeed to 
the throne. Similarly, being born abroad, even if of ‘royal blood’, might have made one 
ineligible,62 as would being – or marrying somebody – of a proscribed faith.63 
It is not enough to be eligible. In order to stand any chance of actually succeeding, one 
must be considered at the right time with regard to the position. In other words, they must 
be brought to the attention of others; one must be a candidate.  
Candidates need to show (or have shown for them) that there are good reasons why the 
social position is, or ought to be, theirs. Moreover, they need to advance those reasons in 
the proper manner. In other words, they must conform with others’ expectations as 
regards to both substance and form when advancing their candidature. Failure regarding 
either of these might frustrate others’ expectations and invalidate one’s candidature. 
Candidature is normally based on claims of either title or right, on the one hand, or merit, 
on the other. A person claiming according to title is claiming that the social position is 
somehow theirs by right or, in the very least, that they have a right to be considered. 
There are some fixed associations, the force and effect of which identify the given person 
as the successor. This in itself is considered to be a sufficiently good reason.64 By contrast, 
                                               
62 For example, De Natis Ultra Mare or A Statute for those who are born in Parts beyond the Sea (25 Edw. 
III, c. 3, 1350)  declared that the Lord King, “willing that all Doubts and Ambiguities should be put away, 
and the Law in this Case declared and put in a Certainty”, had caused the matter to be discussed in 
Parliament and it was settled that “the Law of the Crown of England is, and always hath been such, that the 
Children of the Kings of England, in whatsoever Parts they be born, in England or elsewhere, be able and 
ought to bear the Inheritance after the death of their Ancestors.” This Act was made particularly in view of 
the fact that John of Gaunt had been born abroad – in Ghent, hence his epithet.  
63 The Bill of Rights 1688/9 (1 Will. and Mar. Sess. 2, c. 2), for example, excluded Catholics from the 
succession to the throne of England, Scotland, etc. for “it hath beene found by Experience that it is 
inconsistent with the Safety and Welfaire of this Protestant Kingdome to be governed by a Popish Prince”. 
This prohibition was rehearsed in the Act of Settlement 1701 (12 and 13 Will. III c. 2), in which it was 
added, at II, that those who married Catholics would also be excluded.  
64 Cf. Hobhouse: “Generically, therefore, a right is a kind of expectation; but it is not only an expectation, 
but an expectation held to be justified… [I]t may be a legal right, and the justification then lies in an appeal 
to law. But, in addition, there are, or there may be, rights which the law does not recognize and which the 
moral consciousness holds ought to be recognized. The older thinkers spoke of them as ‘natural rights’, but 
to this phrase, if uncritically used, there is the grave objection that it suggests that such rights are 
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those claiming on merit are claiming that they are the most or best qualified candidate. 
The position ought to be theirs either as (1) a reward for, or recognition of, past actions 
(i.e. they deserve it), or (2) in view of their abilities and likely future performance (i.e. 
they have the greatest potential).  
Title and merit are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are often complementary. 
Nevertheless, there is usually felt to be a great deal more discretion allowed in cases of 
merit as opposed to cases of title. Even so, establishing some form of title is not 
necessarily enough to secure the position. That title might be defeasible; it might be 
vulnerable to a superior (i.e. better) claim.65 
A person might be advanced for candidature either by themselves or by some third party. 
The process of advancement goes under many different names, e.g. nomination, petition, 
application, claim, etc. It is possible, of course, for a person to succeed to a social position 
without having been eligible or a bona fide candidate; however, they must have these 
things if they are to be generally considered legitimate and rightful holders.  
6.13 Transmission 
6.13.1 Pushing and Pulling Forces 
It will be recalled that social standing is a set of associated activities and influence; a 
bundle, which might be given a collective name or label. Even though this bundle is 
ultimately a cognitive construct, we can imagine it as though it were an object with a real, 
physical existence. We can imagine it being passed from person to person; being lost by 
one and acquired by another; being given and taken. Indeed, we often invest certain 
physical artefacts with ideas of this bundle (e.g. certain insignia or paraphernalia of 
                                               
independent of society, whereas, if our arguments hold, there is no moral order independent of society and 
therefore no rights which, apart from the social consciousness, would be recognized at all. Our analysis of 
the term ‘right’ goes to show that a right is nothing but an expectation which will appeal to an impartial 
person.” Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory (Columbia University Press, 
1911), 197. As Hobhouse himself recognized on the previous page, rights are often correlated with 
corresponding duties – whether a positive duty to actively realize and uphold the right, or a negative duty 
to respect it (i.e. not infringe it). In terms of the succession, a recognized title might put create a duty in 
some to take certain actions to ensure that title is realized (e.g. in the archbishop to crown the next in line) 
or to prevent pretenders to the title from taking it (e.g. by waging war against them); indeed, it would create 
a duty in would-be pretenders not to aspire to the position, for they have a duty to respect the rightful 
holder’s title.  
65 For example, we might draw a distinction between an ‘heir apparent’ and an ‘heir presumptive’. The 
former has indefeasible title (i.e. no title could be better than theirs), the latter has defeasible title (i.e. a 
closer heir might appear). 
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office),66 such that their transfer signifies the transference of the social position itself.67 
This physical analogy helps us to conceptualise and understand the different ways in 
which social standing is transmitted.  
For social standing to be transferred, there needs to be some form of movement. The 
movement of an object requires the application of some force. This might be a pushing 
force, or, alternatively, a pulling force. Consequently, a bundle of social standing might 
be conceived of as either being pushed or pulled towards a given person (i.e. the 
successor). With the addition of agency to this picture, one can elegantly categorise the 
various ways in which social standing can be said to move.  
First, there are pushing and pulling forces involving some human or personified agency. 
Thus, one might be given or presented a social position by somebody else. In this case, 
we can imagine the bundle being pushed towards the recipient by that agent. This we can 
call presentation. Alternatively, one might take the social position for oneself, perhaps 
by force. In this case we can imagine either the person pulling the bundle towards 
themselves. This we can call appropriation.68 In presentation, the active agent is some 
third party; in appropriation, the would-be successor themselves. Each of these has a 
number of sub-categories, which are discussed further down.  
Second, there are impersonal forces; there appears to be no agent. Here, the bundle of 
social standing moves as if of its own volition; it moves independently and automatically; 
rather than being given or taken, it falls naturally. Whether this is imagined as a push- or 
pull-force is academic; the salient point is that it moves. There are a number of different 
analogies that one might adopt here. For example, one might imagine the bundle moving 
according to some principle of magnetism. However, the analogy we will adopt is one of 
gravity – there is something about the recipient that makes the bundle gravitate towards 
them; there is something about them that draws or attracts it. For this reason, we will call 
this category gravitation. It is under this head that the importance of fixed associations 
is perhaps most apparent.  
                                               
66 One might here think of the various symbols of royal authority, e.g. crown, sceptre, orb, throne, etc. 
Alternatively, we might think, for example, of the woolsack – the seat of the Lord Speaker of the House of 
Lords, which practice originated in the time of Edward III. 
67 It is worthwhile remembering the words of Hobhouse here: “[E]ven though social institutions may in a 
sense be actually incorporated in material things, in buildings, in books, in coronation robes, or in flags, 
still it need not be said that these things are nothing but for the continuity of thought which maintains and 
develops their significance.” Hobhouse, Social Evolution and Political Theory, 34. 
68 The word ‘appropriation’ is fitting, for the person involves make it such that the thing in question is 
considered ‘proper’ to themselves; in other words, they establish their ownership over it by creating this 
impression in people’s minds that it belongs to them, even if it was ill-gotten.  
257 
 
These three categories – presentation, appropriation, and gravitation – constitute the main 
heads of transmission. Even though succession is our present concern, it is worthwhile 
mentioning that these three can be applied to the transfer of any kind of social standing, 
regardless as to whether or not there was some former holder. It should also be said that 
they are not necessarily mutually exclusive; they often run parallel to, complement, and 
reinforce one another. Where this is the case, matters can become quite complex, 
especially where it is unclear as to which of these is the predominant force.  
We will now consider each in turn.  
6.13.2 Presentation 
Presentation is initiated by some person other than the recipient. There are fundamentally 
two kinds of agent who might do this: (1) a predecessor (i.e. some previous holder of the 
same position) or (2) some third-party (i.e. anybody else). In order to do this 
legitimately, the predecessor or third-party must have some power of disposition, i.e. a 
power to make a determination upon the question of the succession. There must be some 
association in people’s minds between this predecessor or third-party and the power to 
dispose of the succession. Where this association is absent, the attempt to dispose of the 
succession by this person or persons would probably frustrate our fixed associations; it 
would be illegal.  
Where a predecessor attempts to stipulate their successor, we tend to call this designation. 
Where a third-party attempts to stipulate who is to be the successor, we tend to refer to 
this as being the result of either appointment or election.69 
It was previously said that agency might be personified. The reason for this can now be 
made clear. It has not always been the case that third-parties were considered to be human. 
Historically, many saw the hands of supernatural or divine beings at work, whose wills 
were demonstrated, for example, through omens, miracles, or revelation. As such, one 
might have been thought of as being appointed by God, rather than any fellow human-
being. In societies pregnant with superstition and faith, such supposed sources cannot be 
underestimated.  
                                               
69 Distinguishing appointment and election can be difficult, but the difference seems to lie in the method 
and transparency of the decision-making process. If there is an open and transparent vote, then we would 
probably call this an election; if there is no apparent vote or if the detail of any vote is hidden from view, 
then we might be more inclined to call it an appointment. 
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A final point might be made about the psychological impact of the act of presentation 
upon the respective parties, which is much akin to gift-giving. For the recipient, it often 
prompts feelings of indebtedness. For the donor, there is often some expectation that the 
recipient will show gratitude and, where appropriate, will reciprocate in some way; there 
is also a feeling that the recipient is somehow beholden to them. Furthermore, the donor 
often retains some residual feeling that the thing in question is somehow theirs. This 
produces within them the desire to continue to control it even after it was given – 
especially if they think it is being neglected or abused. In the history of monarchical 
succession, these respective feelings and the resultant relationship between the office-
holder and those who supposed themselves to be the givers of that office were of 
fundamental importance.  
6.13.3 Appropriation 
In the cases of presentation and gravitation, the recipient is largely passive. However, in 
the case of appropriation, the recipient is very much the active agent: the social standing 
is something they take or seize – often forcibly. This might be directly from their 
processor or from some third-party who, for a time, had control over it.  
Under appropriation, there are broadly three subcategories: (1) outright appropriation; (2) 
appropriation by adverse possession; and (3) occupation of terra nullius. 
Outright appropriation is perhaps the most commonly occurring of these and often 
takes the form of conquest, annexation, or coup d’états.70 The salient feature is that the 
position is achieved through use of real influence, often underpinned with the threat and 
                                               
70 Annexation occurs where the position gained is added to, or subsumed within, some other position; 
conquest, by contrast, occurs where the position retains its separate identity. A coup d’état is mostly 
associated with depriving the predecessor only of their social standing; conquest implies that their life and 
possessions are potentially also forfeit. 
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use of force. The accessions of Swein Forkbeard (1013-4),71 Cnut (1016),72 William I 
(1066),73 Edward IV (1461 and 1471),74 and Henry VII (1485),75 can all be understood in 
this context. Their claims of presentation or gravitation are somewhat dubious; the fact 
of succession was determined, as much as anything, by their military backing.  
Appropriation by adverse possession is similar, except that it occurs over longer 
periods of time. Indeed, it is the passing of time that strengthens the new holder’s title, 
                                               
71 Swein had invaded – or, at least, raided – England on a number of occasions prior to this. It seems that 
he participated in Olaf Tryggvason’s raid on England in the 994, but the first major expedition that he led 
was in 1003-5. The precise reasons for Swein’s invasion are unclear, as are his initial intentions and 
objectives, but it is generally agreed that it was driven or, at least, justified partly by revenge for the St. 
Brice’s Day massacre of 1002 (in which some of his relatives were possibly killed). The nature of Swein’s 
involvement in the subsequent raids over the following decade are also unclear, but he once again invaded 
in 1013. Again, revenge – in this case, for the defection of Thorkell the Tall – probably loomed large in his 
reasoning; it is possible that he already had designs on the English throne. Æthelred II put up some 
resistance to Swein, but was driven into exile. Swein died not long afterwards, on 3 February 1014. Besides 
the fact of his conquest, Swein appears to have had little right to the English throne. See: FM Stenton, 
Anglo-Saxon England, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1971), 378, 380, 384–86; Peter Hunter Blair, An 
Introduction to Anglo-Saxon England, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1977), 91, 93–95, 98; 
Campbell, John, and Wormald, The Anglo-Saxons, 174, 194, 198–99; Levi Roach, Æthelred the Unready 
(Yale University Press, 2016), chap. 6. 
72 Cnut was Swein Forkbeard’s son and appears to have claimed the English throne principally on this basis. 
However, Æthelred II had returned to England and so Cnut had to fight with him; Æthelred died of 
apparently natural causes during this conflict, but it was maintained under his son, Edmund Ironside. After 
a series of battles, Cnut and Edmund came to terms, dividing England between themselves. Edmund’s death 
shortly thereafter enabled Cnut to claim hegemony. The important point is that, but for his campaigns in 
1015-6, Cnut is unlikely to have been in a position to succeed to the English throne. See: MK Lawson, 
Cnut: England’s Viking King, 1016-35, 2nd ed. (The History Press, 2011), chap. 1; Roach, Æthelred the 
Unready, chap. 6; Stenton, Anglo. Sax. Engl., 386–93. 
73 William’s claim to the English throne was not based on conquest, but it was vindicated thereby. It was 
through force of arms that he unseated his rival, Harold II, and suppressed risings and reduced to the country 
to obedience. The need for the aggressive programme of castle-building is also indicative of the insecurity 
felt by William and his barons. See: Stenton, Anglo. Sax. Engl., chap. 16; David C Douglas, William the 
Conqueror (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), chaps. 8–10, 14. 
74 Edward’s father, Richard, D. York, had claimed the English throne by right, alleging that he – not Henry 
VI – was the true heir to Edward III. Richard was killed at the Battle of Wakefield on 28 December 1460, 
but Edward assumed his father’s claim. He defeated the Lancastrians at Mortimer’s Cross on 3 February 
1461 and, again, at the Battle of Towton on 29 March 1461. Edward was crowned shortly thereafter. Further 
attempts were made by the Lancastrians to unseat Edward, but, in 1464, Henry VI himself was captured 
and sequestered in the Tower of London. In 1470, however, the E. Warwick (the ‘Kingmaker’) turned on 
Edward and drove him from the kingdom; Henry VI was restored (the ‘Readeption’). A matter of months 
later, Edward returned; defeated Warwick at Barnet (14 April 1471); defeated Henry’s wife, Margaret, and 
killed their son, Edward of Westminster, at Tewkesbury (4 May 1471); and, very likely, had Henry 
murdered shortly thereafter. It was through violence that Edward secured the throne from his rivals; indeed, 
given the scale and death-toll at Towton alone, Edward’s accession can be considered one of the most 
violent. See: Charles Ross, Edward IV (Eyre Methuen, 1974), chaps. 1–3, 6–7; Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI 
(Eyre Methuen, 1981), chaps. 15–17; Ralph A Griffiths, The Reign of King Henry VI, 2nd ed. (Sutton 
Publishing, 1998), chaps. 23–25. 
75 Henry Tudor’s claims were somewhat tenuous. In any case, his path to the throne was blocked by an 
incumbent, Richard III. Henry brought Richard to battle at Bosworth on 22 August 1485. The former was 
victorious; the latter, slain. After the battle, Henry claimed his right was based on only on his supposed 
hereditary right, but also on the “true judgment of God” – to borrow a phrase from Chinese history, Henry 
believed that his act of conquest had demonstrated the ‘Mandate of Heaven’. Notwithstanding these claims, 
Henry made sure to have his title confirmed in, if not granted by, Parliament. See: Kenneth Pickthorn, Early 
Tudor Government: Henry VII (Cambridge University Press, 1934), 4–5; Stanley Bertram Chrimes, Henry 
VII (Methuen, 1977), chaps. 1–3; Charles Ross, Richard III (Methuen, 1988), chap. 11. 
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even if they originally had none. This can, in a number of respects, be related to the labour 
theory of ownership, most famously associated with Locke.76 The longer one possesses 
something, and the more one invests in it, the more it appears to belong to one as of right. 
The same is true of social standing.  
Finally, there is occupation of terra nullius. In outright appropriation and appropriation 
by adverse possession, there would appear to be somebody who is deprived in order to 
make way for the aggressor. In other words, a position is taken that was not actually 
vacant. This can be contrasted with occupation of terra nullius, in which the position 
taken was, at the time, vacant. The successor, in this case, is likely to have been highly 
opportunistic. One might take Henry IV’s accession in 1399 to be an instance of an 
occupation of terra nullius; the throne, having fallen vacant owing to Richard II’s 
abdication and deposition, was there for the taking.  
An undertone of appropriation is that might makes right. However, few conquerors base 
their claims on naked power. Usually, their claims are intermixed with forms of 
presentation or gravitation. These serve not only to make their conquest seem more 
legitimate, but, moreover, to make that conquest seem rather to be a vindication of some 
pre-existing title than an unadulterated power grab – especially if that conquest was seen 
as demonstrating the will or favour of God, who always favours the righteous.  
Appropriation highlights some of the weaknesses of niceties in the face of practicality. 
Often, people will accept the outcome of some event, a fait accompli, if that acceptance 
helps to restore a modicum of normality – and if there is little other alternative but to 
accept it. The maxim factum valet perhaps to a certain extent encapsulates the idea of 
retrospective acceptance;77 after all, what is done, is done and things, being done, cannot 
be undone.  
6.13.4 Exchange 
                                               
76 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 287ff 
(II.27ff). 
77 Factum valet quod fieri non debuit [or debet] – that which ought not to be done, but, being done, shall be 
valid. It is probable, based on the early glosses, that the maxim of factum valet was originally intended to 
apply only to actions that at some point in time, or in some circumstance, would have been valid, but for 
some minor obstruction. Thus, an appeal, which should have been made within a number of days, might 
still be upheld, even if, by a technicality, it was ‘wrongfully’ accepted after that period. As such, it might 
be held valid, though its validity was not assured; though not irredeemably void, it was nevertheless 
voidable. Whether the maxim also extends to actions that at no time, and under no circumstances, would 
be valid – e.g. usurping the throne – is debateable. It is quite possible that it was never intended to apply to 
categorically prohibited acts; these, with no possibility or hope of ever being valid, remain null and void. 
For a discussion of the history of factum valet, see: J. Duncan M. Derrett, “Factum Valet: The Adventures 
of a Maxim,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1958): 280–302. 
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There are times when social standing is thought of not as having been merely given or 
taken, but, rather, as having been given or taken in exchange for something else; there is 
some understanding or bargain – one might even say, contract. In the context of 
monarchy, many thrones have been given in exchange for something else – often money 
or support.78 It was not always the case that all parties were entirely willing participants 
in this exchange. It is important not to confuse things actually given in exchange with 
mere goodwill gestures.79 
6.13.5 Gravitation 
Whereas presentation and appropriation are agency-based, gravitation is rule-based; it is 
based on patterns of fixed associations. The successor is such because they fulfil some 
criteria, which do not necessarily provide for them by name. As such, the successor is not 
selected by an agent but, rather, by an algorithm or formula. This gives the impression of 
the social standing being transmitted ‘automatically’.  
There are many possible rules or algorithms for selecting successors, but, historically, 
perhaps the most important is heredity. If one can establish some familial connection or 
kinship to some former holder and, furthermore, establish that one’s claim is neither 
deficient nor defeasible, then one can be said to possess a hereditary right. Hereditary 
right can be divided into two kinds: (1) congenital right, which is a kinship tie present 
from, and by virtue of, one’s birth; and (2) acquired right, which is a kinship tie 
developed later in life, e.g. through marriage (e.g. jure uxoris) or adoption. Congenital 
right is generally considered to be the stronger.  
There are many algorithms for determining hereditary succession. The one with which 
we are today most familiar is that of primogeniture, which favours firstborns and can 
                                               
78 One might think, for example, of Henry III’s attempt to secure the kingdoms of Sicily and Apulia for his 
younger son, Edmund. He attempted to do this by making an agreement with Pope Innocent IV such that, 
in exchange for Edmund’s investiture by the Bp. Romania on behalf of the pope in 1255, Henry would 
transfer over to the pope a large sum of money, as well as send a military expedition to unseat the pretender 
Manfred of Sicily. It is noteworthy that, in addition to this exchange, there is also potentially an element 
here of appropriation, for the crown had still to be wrested in practice from Manfred. In the event, however, 
Henry neither managed to raise the money nor send the expedition, and Edmund’s claim collapsed. For this 
event, see: Matthew Paris, Matthew Paris’s English History from the Year 1235 to 1273, trans. JA Giles, 
vol. 3 (Henry G Bohn, 1854), 137–38. 
79 Admittedly, deciding in practice what is given in exchange and what is a goodwill gesture is difficult. A 
case in point is the Coronation Charter of Henry I. Was it, on the one hand, part of an (implicit) agreement 
with the nobility that he should be allowed the throne only under certain conditions or, on the other hand, 
was it completely unconnected with his title to the throne and merely a gesture of goodwill and gratitude 
on his part? Whatever the case, finding there to be an exchange can have profound consequences because 
it implies that, if there is a breach on the one side, the other can take action to either enforce or revoke the 
agreement: he who giveth, taketh away. 
262 
 
take a number of forms, e.g. absolute, 80  male-preference, 81  agnatic/patrilineal, 82  and 
uterine/matrilineal.83 There is also ultimogeniture/postremogeniture, which favours the 
youngest child; this, too, has its equivalent variations with respect to which sex or gender 
is favoured or excluded. There are also systems of partible succession, in which the 
position is divided and split into distinct parts.84  
Hereditary right demonstrates how closely succession and inheritance can be intertwined 
– certain social positions are often associated with certain forms of property, which things 
are passed on in tandem. It is unsurprising, therefore, that there has often been a close 
connection between the laws of succession, on the one hand, and the laws of property and 
inheritance on the other. Similarly, there is a close connection between hereditary right 
and descent, for descent largely determines one’s eligibility, if not one’s actual title.85  
The connection between hereditary right and presentation is also noteworthy. Often, 
hereditary right is thought to be rooted in some original act of presentation – whether by 
some assembly, deity, etc. The extent to which this is merely a historic fact varies. In 
some cases, they are thought merely to be a founder or prime mover; after their initial 
act of presentation, their input ceases and successors are chosen according to some 
formula. In other cases, their influence – and ability to present – might continue for 
longer, however directly or indirectly.86 
Besides hereditary right, there are some rarer forms of gravitation, in which some 
condition precedent is fulfilled, e.g. the completion of some trial or quest, or fulfilment 
of some prophecy.87 To take an un-historical example, the legends in which Arthur draws 
a sword from a stone are based on an idea that whoever draws the aforementioned sword 
                                               
80 This favours the eldest child irrespective of their sex or gender. Following the Succession to the Crown 
Act 2013 (c. 20), this is now the system used respecting the British crown. 
81 This favours the eldest male child or, failing male children, the eldest female child. 
82 This favours the eldest male child and completely excludes females from consideration. 
83 This is the opposite of agnatic/patrilineal primogeniture; it favours the eldest female child and completely 
excludes males. 
84 Such a system was common, at least with regard to land holdings, in Wales and Ireland prior to the 
incursions of outside (especially English) influence. 
85 Cf. phrases such as ‘princes of the blood’ or the Old English ‘ætheling’, which, at least in later Anglo-
Saxon England, meant much the same thing as the first phrase. On ‘ætheling’, see: Dumville, “The 
Ætheling: A Study in Anglo-Saxon Constitutional History.” 
86 This can perhaps be seen somewhat in the mediaeval idea that “only God can make an heir,” for “[t]he 
birth of an heir is the judgment of God, and has the same sanctity attached to it, as the ordeal or the lot”: 
John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1914), 36. 
87  On the subject of prophecy and the succession, see esp.: Paul Strohm, England’s Empty Throne: 
Usurpation and the Language of Legitimation, 1399-1422 (Yale University Press, 1998), chap. 1. 
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(condition precedent) will be king (consequent); Arthur achieved the former and, by so 
doing, became king.  
There is one other form of gravitation that bears mention. It is possible that some social 
standing has been divided into distinct and corresponding parts, and thereafter shared; 
there is some form of power-sharing. When one or more of these persons are decoupled, 
their bundle might be deemed to transfer automatically to their colleague(s). This can be 
called survivorship; it is the ‘survivor’ who succeeds. 
Most forms of gravitation stem from some original act of presentation or appropriation. 
Often, it is this that provides an overarching sense of legitimacy or illegitimacy, as the 
case might be (although in the latter case, time might be a redeeming feature). In the 
context of modern UK law, this is important: the Crown is most certainly hereditary, but 
it is such by determination of Parliament. Even though successors are directly chosen by 
some algorithm,88 they are indirectly chosen by Parliament who, theoretically, might 
decide to change, or create exceptions to, that algorithm. 
6.13.6 Transmission and Coupling 
The act of transmission is sometimes thought sufficient in itself to install a person in their 
newfound position. Nothing more need be done once the act of transmission is complete; 
the act itself couples the person with the position.89 However, there is often some further 
stage that needs to be completed. The act of transmission has created, as it were, a 
presumption in favour of a particular candidate, but they must yet be confirmed or 
installed. As such, it is important to recognise that the processes of transmission and 
coupling are analytically distinct.  
6.14 Coupling 
The importance of the process of coupling is fourfold: (1) it provides confirmation and 
establishes the new position-holder as the (sole) occupant; 90  (2) it provides public 
                                               
88 I.e. being the eldest child, irrespective of sex or gender, of the previous incumbent. 
89 For example, Louis Servin (1555-1626) had, in his Vindiciae (1592), in the words of Figgis: “a lengthy 
argument to prove that coronation and unction are mere ceremonies and no essential part of the regality, 
and that the coronation oath gives the people no rights against him. It is a pious custom only; it will not 
affect Henry[ IV of France]’s authority, though the Archbishop of Rheims refuse to crown him, as a 
heretic”. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 122–23. 
90 In this context, the Latin phrase qui prior est tempore potior est jure (the person earlier in time is stronger 
in law) comes to mind. 
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demonstration and recognition; (3) it often acts as a commencement condition;91 and (4) 
it can, in some circumstances, be thought to bring about a transformation in the 
individual, particularly if some sacred ritual is involved. The speed with which many 
mediaeval monarchs were crowned, whose title was perhaps somewhat uncertain, neatly 
demonstrates the coupling’s importance.92 
Coupling can take a number of forms, which often involve some form of ceremony or 
ritual. Some of the most important forms of coupling include: acclamation, ratification, 
investiture, consecration, and oath-taking. Acclamation and ratification are similar in 
that they both involve seeking the approval or blessing of some person or body. Likewise, 
investiture and consecration are also similar in that they both involve certain rites and 
ritual, which, when performed, secure the person in their position. Finally, oath-taking 
involves the making of certain promises, which, if broken, might constitute grounds for 
initiating a process of decoupling.  
6.14.1 Coupling and Decoupling 
There is an intimate connection between the manner of coupling and the corresponding 
possible modes of decoupling. Coupling creates a bond, as it were, between the person 
and the position, which bond might be dissolvable or breakable only in specific ways. 
For example, there was some idea in the mediaeval period that monarchs, when they 
acceded, concluded a marriage with their kingdom.93 Marriages might be nullified on rare 
occasions, but the idea of divorce did not yet have great prevalence and potency. As such, 
the idea of marriage carried with it very much the idea of until death do us part;94 
marriages between monarchs and kingdoms might only be broken by the former’s death.  
6.15 Prime and Ordinary Succession 
There was an idea in the mediaeval Catholic Church that the Pope was not the successor 
of the “preceding holder of the papal office,” but, rather, “the immediate successor of 
                                               
91 There might also be certain qualifications imposed if the person in question is permitted to exercise any 
of their activities/influence before the point of coupling; the act of coupling therefore removes these 
qualifications. On commencement conditions and qualifications, see, supra, 2.18. 
92 For example, the coronations of Henry I, Stephen, and Henry III were all an attempt to vindicate their 
claims, exclude their rivals, and transforming themselves in the eyes of God. In effect, this meant that their 
rivals then either had to show that their titles were null and void, that their coupling was completely 
irregular, or they had to take the throne by brute force. Either way, it was considerably more difficult after 
they had been crowned than before. 
93 See: Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Methuen & 
Co. Ltd., 1974), 181–82. 
94 It is recognized that the phrase “till death do us part” is from the marriage litany of the Book of Common 
Prayer, which originated in the 1540s and 1550s. Nevertheless, the idea is of much older provenance.  
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Peter [the Apostle].”95 There was something of an artifice about this. It were almost as 
though the office reverted to Peter at the end of each tenancy, as though there had been 
no other Popes in the intervening period. This was of great consequence, particularly in 
light of the adoption of the principle of universal succession vis-à-vis the papal office.96 
It was undergirded by a desire to ensure that the activities and influence attributed to the 
Pope descended intact or, at least, undiminished as compared with how they supposedly 
stood in Peter’s day. As such, popes could not be bound by their predecessors’ decisions.97 
This idea that position-holders are deemed directly to succeed some original or 
emblematic position-holder, rather than some intermediary, we might call prime 
succession. Such succession is always a fiction, but one with important repercussions. It 
can be contrasted with what might be called ordinary succession, in which successors 
replace their immediate predecessors in the normal, lineal fashion. Royal succession 
normally follows this pattern. 
6.16 Laws of Succession 
The laws of succession pertain to our fixed associations regarding the circumstances and 
ways in which social standing is transferred from one person to another; it concerns the 
ways in which we cease to associate a certain set of activities and influence with one 
person and come to associate them with another. In effect, we redefine an equivalence 
association such that we go from equating Person A with the position to Person B. 
Thenceforward, if any other than B attempted to exercise the activities and influence 
attached to that position, it would frustrate our fixed associations – even if that person 
were A.  
This process of transference, as has been said, generally begins with the position being 
vacated; we have called this decoupling. For most positions, there exist specific laws (i.e. 
fixed expectations) as to how this decoupling might and must take place; decoupling by 
any other means would frustrate our expectations. If the decoupling is not rightly done, 
then, by commutative principle, there would probably be a feeling that the position is not 
rightly held by the successor. This would be compounded if there were thought to be 
irregularities in the processes of transmission or coupling. Within all of this is a sequential 
                                               
95 See: Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 39. 
96 Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 37–38. 
97 On this point, see: Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 72. 
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association.98 The position is not vacated until that event. In royal succession, this was 
normally death. 
Once the former holder has been decoupled, the question arises as to the selection of their 
successor, which process we have called transmission. There are many fixed associations 
that are associated with this process, but, as has been said, these can be categorized under 
three principal headings: presentation, appropriation, and gravitation. Once again, there 
are sequential associations present: If the transmission is conducted properly, then the 
position is deemed to have been transferred. If improperly, then not. 
Finally, it is often the case that merely selecting a successor is not enough. Some 
additional process needs to be undertaken in order to bind them firmly with that position; 
to create an equivalence association in our minds between them and the holding of that 
position. We have called this coupling. This is normally done through some form of 
public ceremony or ritual, which impresses upon us the connection between the person 
and their new position. The form of coupling most associated with royalty is coronation; 
there is an argument that no person is properly monarch until they have passed through 
this ceremony. The absence of such a ceremony might well frustrate expectations, as 
would a ceremony ill-performed.  
The fixed associations concerning decoupling, transmission, and coupling to certain 
social positions are usually shared amongst members of the relevant social group – even 
if the extent to which they were shared (i.e. prevalence) and their actual impact on 
people’s behaviour (i.e. potency) changes across time. Indeed, many groups have gone to 
great lengths to make authoritative declarations of these fixed associations, which 
declarations are themselves often made in accordance with some formal process; they 
become laws in the classical sense.  
Yet, they are not the be-all-and-end-all of the laws of succession; they are but a part, 
which holds only as much sway as people allow. If people are unwilling to be complicit 
in such declarations and prefer other fixed associations, then the declarations will 
probably fail. Any alternative might not be lawyers’ law, fully systematised according to 
some supposed rule of recognition. Nevertheless, its basis and effects are precisely the 
same: it shapes people’s thoughts and behaviours. This is apparent in societies that have 
not made formal, written declarations of their laws, which fact affects their social life but 
little: there are still social positions that might be passed on – and only in certain ways. 
                                               
98 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡(𝑥) → [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑] 
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For the anthropologist or the constitutional historian, there is no impediment to study but 
lack of evidence. 
The laws of succession and succession events make for good study for the constitutional 
historian. In the first place, by understanding the way in which a person comes by a 
position, we can understand much about the terms under which they hold it. Moreover, it 
is often here that people’s fixed associations come into conflict with their desire for 
gratification, i.e. of succeeding to certain positions, even if with little right. As such, the 
potency of those fixed associations in the face of counteracting interests and desires can 
be studied. Their impotency in some cases would not necessarily mean that there were no 
fixed associations. Indeed, what is interesting about such events is often how hard 
individuals strive to shoehorn their interests and desires into generally recognised 
constitutional forms. In the case of monarchy, how hard they try to justify their accession 
and how they attempt to ensure that all formalities (especially those of coupling) are 
followed. Moreover, even though some of our expectations might be frustrated, others 
will be fulfilled – e.g. those relating to what the holding of that position entails. The 
frustration of any particular fixed association does not suddenly mean that there is no 

























7 – Constitutions and Mediaeval Thought 
“Vast chain of being, which from God began, 
Natures æthereal, human, angel, man, 
Beast, bird, fish, insect! what no eye can see, 
No glass can reach! from Infinite to thee.”1 
7.1 Introduction 
This short chapter serves as a bridge between the theoretically-orientated earlier chapters 
and the historically-orientated later chapters. It seeks to show that constitutional ideas 
(i.e. ideas relating to social groups and the distribution therein of activities and influence) 
were prevalent throughout the mediaeval period. In part, this is to demonstrate the Theory 
of Constitutional Ubiquity – especially in the sense that people are predisposed to thinking 
in constitutional terms. In part, it is also to provide some background to the later chapters; 
it helps to draw out some of the ‘premisses and bases’ upon which mediaeval governance 
rested – without this, as Ullmann said, “one cannot successfully penetrate into the texture 
of the medieval scene.”2 
Due to the scope of the topic and limitations of space, there will be no attempt here fully 
to expound constitutional ideas as they existed during the mediaeval period. Instead, I 
will merely illustrate some of the types of idea that existed and were relatively prevalent 
in mediaeval writing. In many respects, the structure of this chapter is the most important 
thing. It provides a blueprint for a much larger study, which blueprint is based upon the 
framework, and would provide for a study that is perhaps at once more methodical and 
enlightening than previous studies have been. 
7.2 Social Groups in Mediaeval Thought 
7.2.1 Humans as Social Animals 
The fact that humans are gregarious social animals did not escape ancient and mediaeval 
writers. Whether ‘Man’ was held to be inherently good or bad, he was nevertheless held 
to be social. It is part of his nature to form into ‘political’ society – to coalesce into social 
                                               
1 Alexander Pope, The Poetical Works of Alexander Pope, ed. Adolphus William Ward (Macmillan & Co., 
1871), 199 [Essay on Man, Epistle I, 237-240]. 




groups.3 There is here, in fact, a qualitative fixed association – mediaeval people 
associated the idea of Man with the quality of being social;4 it was a law of nature. 
The most famous statement of this idea is perhaps in Aristotle’s Politics: “Hence it is 
evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that by nature man is a political animal.”5 
From the twelfth century onwards, Aristotle’s influence was felt forcefully in western 
Europe.6 Aquinas,7 who drew heavily on Aristotle, also espoused this idea of political 
naturalism. He opens his De regimine principum by arguing that “man is by nature a 
social and political animal, who lives in a community: more so, indeed, than all other 
animals; and natural necessity shows why this is so.”8  
There was some idea that human sociality proceeds from our inherent inadequacy; our 
inability to survive unaided. Aquinas, like Aristotle, argued that no individual could 
provide for all of their needs by themselves, which fact forced people into communities; 
indeed, why has humankind language, unless it was designed for cooperation?9 Cicero, 
by contrast, thought that communities were founded “not so much [because of] weakness 
as a sort of innate desire on the part of human beings to form communities”.10 An 
individual might be able to provide for themselves, but nevertheless humans yearn for 
something more. Indeed, for Cicero, the civitas or res publica was a natural union for 
humans, along with the family, which idea continued throughout the mediaeval period.11 
                                               
3 See, e.g.: RW Carlyle and AJ Carlyle, A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West, vol. 1 (William 
Blackwood & Sons Ltd., 1962), passim. 
4 ∀𝑥(𝐻𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛(𝑥) → 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙(𝑥)) 
5 Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. Jonathan Barnes and 
JM Moore, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 13 [1.2.1253a 2-3] and see further 70 [3.6.1278b 
16ff]. This is similar to what Aristotle had said in his Nicomachean Ethics when he said that“…man is by 
nature a social being”: Aristotle, Nicomachaen Ethics, trans. Harris Rackham, Loeb Classical Library 73 
(Harvard University Press, 1926), 28-29 [1.7.1097b 11]. In footnote [a] Rackman noted that a more literal 
rendering would be that ‘man is a political thing’, the idea of being a political animal being added in the 
Politics. Cf. David Ross translated this part of the NE as “since man is born for citizenship”: Aristotle, The 
Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Lesley Brown, trans. David Ross (Oxford University Press, 2009), 11 [1.7.1097b 
11-12]. In the accompanying notes (p. 207) it is said that an alternative translation is “is a political creature”. 
JAK Thomson, on the other hand, translates this line as “For man is a social animal”: Aristotle, The Ethics 
of Aristotle, trans. JAK Thomson (Penguin Books, 1953), 37 [1.7]. 
6 SJ Curtis, A Short History of Western Philosophy in the Middle Ages (MacDonald & Co. Ltd., 1950), 115; 
Thomas Aquinas, St Thomas Aquinas: Political Writings, ed. and trans. RW Dyson (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), xxiii. Indeed, Thomson is somewhat justified in saying that Aristotle’s authority was 
‘absolute’: Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle, 16. 
7 Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274). 
8 Aquinas, Political Writings, 5-6 (De Reg. Pri., 1.1). See also the following where he references Aristotle, 
or ‘the Philosopher’: Aquinas, Political Writings, 135 (Sum. Th., I-II 95.4, res.). 
9 See: Aristotle, The Politics and The Constitution of Athens, 11-14 (Pol. 1.1-2); Aquinas, Political 
Writings, 5-8 (De Reg. Pri., 1.1); Antony Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1992), 22–23. 
10 Cicero, “The Republic,” in The Republic and The Laws, trans. Niall Rudd (Oxford University Press, 
1998), 19 (1.39). 
11 See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 20. 
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7.2.2 Types of Social Group  
That mediaeval people conceived of a wide variety of different kinds of social group can 
hardly be doubted. Indeed, “[m]ost people belonged to several groups with overlapping 
functions – family, guild, village, town, domain, church, realm – giving intersecting or 
concentric allegiances.”12 These various kinds of social group can be classified in many 
ways,13 but some might be classified along the following lines: 
(1) Interrelatedness,14 e.g. family (familia), household (domus), race or nation (gens 
or natio),15 clan, tribe, etc.; 
(2) Residence,16 which provided the basis of administrative divisions, including (a) 
secular divisions (e.g. village, town,17 borough, city, municipia, hundred and 
wapentake, the shire, and the county or comitatus, region, province; the kingdom, 
regnum, rice, or Reich; the fatherland, etc., patria;18 we might also include here 
the people or populus,19 polis, civitas,20 and res publica) and (b) ecclesiastical 
divisions (e.g. parish, diocese, bishopric, archbishopric, etc.);  
(3) Allegiance to, or dependence upon, some individual,21 e.g. the honour, affinity, 
following, etc.;  
                                               
12 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 5. 
13 As Poplin has said, “there are literally hundreds of variables which could be used to differentiate between 
types of communities”; to create a definitive list of community types would probably be, again following 
Poplin, “an impossible task”. Dennis E Poplin, Communities: A Survey of Theories and Methods of 
Research (The Macmillan Company, 1972), 29–30. 
14 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑦 𝑡𝑜 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑒𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑎𝑑} 
15 For an example of mediaeval definitions of these four terms, see: Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies of 
Isidore of Seville, trans. Stephen A Barney et al. (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 202 [9.4.1]. 
16 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 𝑔𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛 𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎} 
17 On the idea of villages and towns as self-governing communities in the Middle Ages, see: Ullmann, 
Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 217–20. 
18 For an interesting discussion of the place of patria in mediaeval thought, particularly respecting the extent 
to which one should lay one’s life on the line for it, see: Ernst H Kantorowicz, “Pro Patria Mori in Medieval 
Political Thought,” The American Historical Review 56, no. 3 (1951): 472–92; Gaines Post, “Two Notes 
on Nationalism in the Middle Ages,” Traditio 9 (1953): 281–320. 
19 “Some people think that by the word people is meant the common people…, but this is not the case… [It 
is] the union of all men together, those of superior, middle, and inferior rank…; for all are necessary, and 
none can be excepted, for the reason that they are obliged to assist one another in order to live properly and 
be protected and supported.” Robert I Burns, ed., Las Siete Partidas - Medieval Government: The World of 
Kings and Warriors, trans. Samuel Parsons Scott, vol. 2 (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 332 
(Part. II, Tit. X, Law I). 
20 It is interesting to note that Henry of Ghent, writing in 1279, thought that the civitas was “the appropriate 
condition for men living in civil partnership and community (societate et communitate civili)” and that, for 
people to live together harmoniously, it was necessary that the civitas was “bound together by the deepest 
friendship, by which each person is regarded by each other as another self…, and by the deepest charity, in 
which each of them loves the other as himself, and by the highest benevolence, by which each wills for the 
other what he wills for himself”. This is quoted in: Antony Black, Guilds and Civil Society in European 
Political Thought from the Twelfth Century to the Present (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1984), 78. There is perhaps 
something of a cohesion model underlying what Henry says.  
21 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜, 𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙}. This is 
often associated with ideas of homage, fealty, and tenure. 
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(4) Worldliness,22 e.g. whether one is a layperson or in holy orders;  
(5) Faith/belief/religion,23 e.g. Christian, Jew, Muslim, heretic, non-conformist, etc.;  
(6) Occupation,24 e.g. businesses, partnerships, guilds (e.g. craft, trade, merchant, 
policing, religious, etc.),25 collegia, commenda,26 societas, universitas, etc.;  
(7) Military service,27 e.g. the fyrd, militia, army, navy, etc.; and  
(8) Social status,28 e.g. commonalty, gentry, nobility, etc.29 
Some of these groups were more definite, others less definite; some more ephemeral, 
others less so. The important point is that mediaeval people were accustomed to ideas of 
social identity – to thinking of people in terms of being members of groups. For 
considerations of space, we will not here go into any of these in detail. However, it is 
worthwhile spending a few words on the idea of communitas. 
Like its modern counterpart (i.e. community), communitas was a versatile word, which 
could be applied to many different kinds of group. There is, for example, reference to a 
communitas bacheleriae Angliae in the Annals of Burton under 1259.30 Whether this was 
in any sense a formal and cohesive body with self-identifying individuals, or, rather, a 
loose collection of individuals lumped together by the annalist is difficult to tell. Stubbs 
was certainly of the former opinion,31 though modern opinion follows Tout in favouring 
the latter.32 Then there is the idea of the communitas regni, which is a perhaps somewhat 
more concrete group, although still vague around the periphery.33 In many respects, it is 
a group identical with the gens and natio, although it is a more inclusive term in that it is 
                                               
22 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑑, 𝑖𝑠 𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑠 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠} 
23 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑓𝑠, 𝑑𝑜𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠, 𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑠, 𝑒𝑡𝑐. } 
24 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑠𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠, 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦, 𝑒𝑡𝑐. } 
25 On guilds, see esp.: Black, Guilds and Civil Society; Steven A Epstein, Wage Labor and Guilds in 
Medieval Europe (The University of North Carolina Press, 1991). 
26 This was a partnership in which there was, in effect, a sleeping partner; it was more common on the 
Continent than in England. See: CA Cooke, Corporation, Trust, and Company: An Essay in Legal History 
(Manchester University Press, 1950), 45–47. 
27 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠} 
28 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝 = {𝑎 ∈ 𝐺: ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠, 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑐ℎ 𝑚𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑚 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑟 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠} 
29 For another list demonstrating the “enormous diversity of expressions for units of government” used 
throughout the mediaeval period, see: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 14–15. 
30 See: William Stubbs, Select Charters and Other Illustrations of English Constitutional History from the 
Earliest Times to the Reign of Edward the First, ed. HWC Davis, 9th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1913), 
331. 
31 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Development, 4th ed., vol. 2 
(Clarendon Press, 1896), 83. 
32 Thomas Frederick Tout, “The ‘Communitas Bacheleriae Angliae,’” English Historical Review 17, no. 65 
(1902): 89–95. 
33 On the emergence and use of communitas regni in thirteenth century England, see: Ullmann, Principles 
of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 175. 
273 
 
potentially also open to those of foreign-birth; in many respects, however, it is a much 
more restricted group, in that it encompasses only, as it were, the political classes.34  
Then there is the more encompassing communitas fidelium – the community of the 
Christian faithful, of all Christendom – or, indeed, the universitas fidelium or 
Christianitas.35 It was to this idea, for example, that Popes appealed, not only when 
attempting to assert their authority, but also when attempting to coax the Christian West 
into fighting crusades – especially in the Holy Land.36 Finally, there is the all-
encompassing tota communitas universi, humana civilitas, humana universitas, 
humanitas, or universitas humani – an idea that everybody in the universe lives as a 
community under one God and one Law.37 These two ideas – humanitas and Christianitas 
– built into the idea of duplex ordo or two orders, i.e. society naturally divided into secular 
and ecclesiastical divisions, each which might have a separate structure and rules.38 
Dualist or Gelasian doctrine held these two orders to be mutually supportive – the one 
providing temporal guidance and the other spiritual.39 
Each of these groups had its own constitution – even if, in many respects, these were 
derivative, and existed within the framework, of the constitutions of more encompassing 
groups. Thus, within the familia there was a head of the family, whose task it was to 
ensure the survival and advancement of the family, and who must, within reason, be 
obeyed; similarly, there were various grades throughout the rest of the family group, 
which, in mediaeval Europe, tended to favour older males, whose responsibility and 
authority was greater than their younger and female relatives. Similarly, within the affinity 
the lord was at the apex, who had unequalled – though not uncontrolled – power and 
authority within the group. Likewise, within groups like the county (comitatus) we find 
officials charged with overseeing things like tax-collection, convening the county court, 
                                               
34 On communitas regni, see, e.g.: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 15.  
35 The idea of a universitas fidelium was particularly prominent in Marsiglio of Padua’s thought. See: Otto 
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge University 
Press, 1922), 58–59. There was a similar phrase, congregatio omnium fidelium, for which, see: Frederic 
William Maitland, “The Corporation Sole,” Law Quarterly Review 16 (1900): 344. 
36 See: Norman Housley, “The Crusades and Islam Norman,” Medieval Encounters 13 (2007): 195–96. 
37 See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 38; Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics 
in the Middle Ages, 258–59. Indeed, as Gierke has said, there was a distinct and widespread system of 
thought “which culminated in the idea of a Community which God Himself had constituted and which 
comprised All Mankind”: Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 4. 
38 On the idea of duplex ordo in Aquinas’ and Dante’s thought, see: Ullmann, Principles of Government 
and Politics in the Middle Ages, 247ff, 258ff. 
39 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 44. 
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and raising the local militia – for much of the mediaeval period in England, these were 
tasks associated with the sheriff. For every social group, there was a constitution.  
7.2.3 Nature of Social Groups  
The approach to social groups throughout the mediaeval period is probably much more 
similar to that of the nineteenth century than today. It was saturated with metaphysical 
ideas and ideas of the inescapability of identity; ideas that wholes are greater than their 
sums;40 ideas and feelings of nationalism and patriotism, of indebtedness and loyalty to 
some enduring group.41 We do not have to look far to find the Group Mind.42  
We can find echoes of commonality theories and the Historical School of Law, for 
example, in Engelbert of Admont,43 when he defined the gens tota (whole nation or race) 
as “a community united by language, fatherland, customs and laws”; moreover, when he 
argued that peace is better maintained with fewer, rather than more, foreigners of different 
fatherlands, languages, customs, and laws.44 Such ideas were hardly peculiar to Engelbert. 
One might take John Buridan,45 for example, when he says that: 
“One polity is suitable for one people and another for another, as 
[Aristotle] says.46 For it is appropriate that the positive laws and 
                                               
40 This can be seen, for example, in Aquinas where he says that the common good is distinct from the 
individual good and, moreover, that social groups, like the state and family, have a “unity of organisation 
(ordinis) only, so that [they are] not one in a simple way”. For this, see: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 
1250-1450, 32–33. 
41 “The idea of fatherland (patria) was ingrained in medieval culture, and one may assume that it was not 
absent from popular consciousness, as an ideal entity which it was a good, free man’s duty to serve and die 
for.” Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 108. Moreover: “It is commonly thought and partially 
true that national divisions became sharper during the later Middle Ages. The European peoples had always 
kept their own languages, laws and customs; and many of them had a distinct consciousness of themselves 
as political units under their own king, to be governed by their own native traditions.  Many people, as 
individuals and communities, were aware of national identity and regarded it as a significant social fact 
about themselves: English, Franks or Frenchmen, Spaniards, Magyars and so on. In the later Middle Ages 
there were trends towards a more articulate self-consciousness of nationhood.” Black, Political Thought in 
Europe, 1250-1450, 109–10. 
42 It is worthwhile pointing out that it was certainly not the case that all mediaeval writers succumbed to 
the Group Mind or like fallacies. For example, Baldus took umbrage with the idea that the Holy Roman 
Empire might delegate acts, for, as Gierke reports Baldus’ argument, “the Will which is expressed in the 
act of delegation is the Emperor’s, not the Empire’s, for the Empire has no Mind and therefore no Will, 
since Will is mental. (Imperium non habet animum, ergo non habet velle nec nolle, quia animi sunt).” 
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 69–70. 
43 Sometimes known as Engelbert of Volkersdorf (c. 1250-1331). 
44 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 112. 
45 Lived c. 1300 – c. 1358/61. 
46 Politics VII.7, 1327b. 
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governments of people should differ according to the diversity of their 
regions, complexions, inclinations and habits.”47 
As will be seen further down, it was common throughout the mediaeval period, as well 
as antiquity, to draw comparisons between social groups, on the one hand, and organisms 
and their parts, on the other. It can be recalled how easily ideas of social groups as 
organisms lead into ideas of the Group Mind. It can be seen clearly, for example, in 
Fortescue. He begins by saying that it is a people that wills itself into becoming a 
kingdom; as a body grows from an embryo, so a kingdom grows from a people. This body 
has a head, heart, blood, and sinews, although it is a “body mystical”, as opposed to an 
organic body. He then adopts the Trojan originary myth and says that the kingdom of 
England “blossomed forth into a political and royal dominion” from Brutus and his 
band.48 Throughout Fortescue there is a distinctive sense that kingdoms, particularly 
England, are more than the mere sum of their parts; that there is an overarching and 
irreducible metaphysical entity.  
Ideas of purpose or telos were also common in mediaeval thought, particularly in the 
context of political communities: “Some such purposes were at once moral and utilitarian; 
peace, unity, and common good were advantages which it was assumed to be one’s duty 
to strive for. Others were distinctively moral: defence of defenceless and provision for 
the needy were based on religious teaching; the good or sufficient life was emphasised 
after the recovery of Aristotle.”49 The summum bonum or common good was a recurrent 
theme.50 
There was some dislike of corporations, especially when it came to holding land. The 
problem was that these lands would often become mortmain.51 As corporations do not 
die, gifts to them remain with them in perpetuity; they would never be subject to 
periodical dues upon inheritance or entry. In effect, it was a permanent alienation over 
which the lord – in particular, the crown – lost all control and from which they ceased to 
benefit. This dislike was not because mediaeval people disliked corporations per se. 
Rather, they disliked corporations that they thought artificial or unnatural; more to the 
point, those they thought unhealthy to the body politic. Corporations that engorged land 
                                               
47 Aristotle’s ‘Politics’ (Livre de ‘Politiques’ d’Aristote) 7.10, 291b-294a, quoted in Black, Political 
Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 112. 
48 John Fortescue, “In Praise of the Laws of England,” in On the Laws and Governance of England, ed. 
Shelley Lockwood (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20-23 (13). 
49 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 24. 
50 See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 24ff. 
51 Literally, ‘dead hand’ from the Latin manus mortua. 
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were like tumours consuming society’s resources, which is to say depriving people of 
what they thought to be theirs.  
It has been common in the past to stress particular aspects of mediaeval political thought, 
e.g. corporatist, communal, collectivist aspects, etc.52 It tends to say more about the 
agenda and inclinations of the writer than about mediaeval life and thought. It would be 
foolish and foolhardy to make sweeping generalizations about mediaeval beliefs and 
behaviour,53 particularly if they build into overly simplistic narratives of stages of 
development.  
7.3 Ideas Concerning the Distribution of Differentiated Activities and Social 
Influence 
The fact that people throughout history have conceived of people in society having 
various functions is easy to demonstrate. One might think of Plato’s basic division of 
society into those who work and those who fight.54 Similarly, one might think of the idea 
of the three orders of society in mediaeval thought: those who work (laboratores), fight 
(bellatores), and pray (oratores).55 It would be impossible here to discuss all of the 
various possible types of activity and influence that people during the mediaeval period 
thought existed. However, it would be profitable to discuss some of the ideas that 
mediaeval people had, which lent themselves to the notion that order was an intrinsic part 
of social existence, i.e. that there was a reason why people performed different activities 
and had different levels of influence.  
In so doing, we will focus on three broad ideas: (1) that social order is ordained by 
design, either because it is willed by heaven or because earthly society reflects heavenly 
society; (2) that social order is ordained by nature, i.e. there is something intrinsic in 
the universe that means that it would be unnatural for unordered social groups to exist; 
and (3) that social order is ordained by reason or necessity, i.e. the nature of reality 
                                               
52 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 12. 
53 “It is amazing that the Middle Ages is still subject to the kind of generalisations that would be laughed 
at by specialists in other fields. […]. European political thought from 1250 to 1450 was not essentially 
feudal, hierocratic or authoritarian, nor was it essentially comradely or civic. It is a copse containing many 
different species.” Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 12–13. 
54 This was first put forward in Plato, The Republic, trans. Robin Waterfield (Oxford University Press, 
1993). Plato later summarised his arguments in Timaeus, see: Plato, Timaeus. Critias. Cleitophon. 
Menexenus. Epistles, trans. RG Bury (Harvard University Press, 1929), 19.  
55 For the reception of this idea in Anglo-Saxon England, for example, see: Timothy E Powell, “The ‘Three 
Orders’ of Society in Anglo-Saxon England,” Anglo-Saxon England 23 (1994): 103–32. More generally, 
see: Georges Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (The 
University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
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means that order is a precondition for surviving and flourishing. Each will be discussed 
in turn. 
7.3.1 Order Ordained by Design: Divine Will, Imago Caeli, and Cosmic Order 
In Christian theology, God created everything (except, perhaps, Himself).56 As such, 
everything is as it is because God made it so. Even if a thing has free will – an ability to 
shape its own destiny – it is unable to change its essence; it cannot make itself into what 
it is not. Furthermore, as embodied by the teleological argument for the existence of God, 
there is a clear idea that God did not create a chaotic universe; He created an ordered one. 
It is a universe in which each thing has its place and in which things are not necessarily 
one another’s equals.  
Thus, God set humans (being made in His image57) over the rest of Creation,58 man over 
woman,59 the Pope over the communitas fidelium (i.e. Christendom),60 kings over 
peoples,61 etc. In effect, God willed that different people should do different things and 
that, moreover, different people should be more or less powerful than others. As such, 
social order is the product of divine will or, perhaps even, some divine plan.62 To upset 
this order would be to defy the will of God.63 
There is also the idea in Christian theology of what we might call imago caeli (image of 
heaven): “On earth, as it is in heaven”, so says the gospel of Matthew.64 Earthly society 
is a reflection of heavenly society.65 As there is but one God, there is but one king or 
emperor, or pope – one person with such activities and influence. We find this idea, for 
                                               
56 Genesis 1:1-31, Colossians 1:16 
57 Genesis 1:26 
58 Genesis 1:28-30 
59 This point, in the English context, was famously argued by Fortescue. See: John Fortescue, “De Natura 
Legis Naturae,” in The Works of Sir John Fortescue, Knight, Chief Justice of England and Lord Chancellor 
to King Henry the Sixth, ed. Thomas Fortescue, trans. Chichester Fortescue, vol. 1 (Chiswick Press, 1869), 
322-323 (2.59). 
60 See infra. 
61 See infra. 
62 As Gierke wrote: “Now the Constitutive Principle of the Universe is in the first place Unity. God, the 
absolutely One, is before and above all the World’s Plurality, and is the one source and one goal of every 
Being. Divine Reason as an Ordinance for the Universe (lex aeterna) permeates all apparent plurality. 
Divine Will is ever and always active in the uniform government of the World, and is directing all that is 
manifold to one only end”; “Unity is the root of All, and therefore of all social existence”. Gierke, Political 
Theories of the Middle Age, 9, 10.  
63 Romans 13:1-7; 1 Peter 2: 13-19.  
64 Matthew 6:10 
65 There was a similar idea identified, for example, by Gierke, in which each ‘microcosm’ was a reflection 
of the ‘macrocosm’; each microcosm “is a diminished copy of the World”; it is a reflection of some greater 
ordering or structure. See: Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 7–8.  
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example, in Eusebius,66 although such notions were not by any means confined to 
Christian theology. We find a similar idea in Themistius, who saw parallels between the 
kingship of Zeus and human kingship.67  
Earthly society also reflects heavenly society in another way, according to mediaeval 
Christian theology. As there are many orders among the angels (i.e. angels with different 
tasks and levels of authority), there are also many orders among humankind. One can see 
this idea, for example, in the preamble to a letter sent by Pope Gregory the Great in August 
595: 
“Providence has established various degrees [gradus] and distinct orders 
[ordines]… Indeed, the community [universitas] could not subsist at all 
if the total order [magnus ordo] of disparity [differentia] did not preserve 
it. That creation cannot be governed in equality is taught us by the 
example of the heavenly hosts; there are angels and there are archangels, 
which are clearly not equals, differing from one another in power 
[potestas] and order [ordo].”68 
One can also see this argued forcefully by Fortescue in the fifteenth century, who used 
the idea to show – as he thought – that men were set over women by God: Higher angels 
were set over lower angels and given greater dignity, power, and office by reason of their 
greater virtue; likewise, man was set above woman, whom he should rule, by reason of 
his virtue. 69  
As Ullmann observed regarding the idea of angelic hierarchies in the Pseudo-Dionysius, 
it was often the case that the ecclesiastical hierarchy, inter alia, was regarded not merely 
as a copy of the celestial hierarchy, but a continuation thereof.70 This builds into the idea 
of cosmic order in Christian theology, i.e. an order encompassing the entirety of Creation 
and which is often called the Great Chain of Being.71 This was thought to begin with 
                                               
66 DM Nicol, “Byzantine Political Thought,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, 
c.350-c.1450, ed. JH Burns (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 52–53. Eusebius lived c.263-c.339. 
67 Nicol, “Byzantine Political Thought,” 51. Themistius lived 317-c.390. 
68 Quoted in: Duby, The Three Orders, 3–4. 
69 Fortescue, “De Natura,” 324 (2.61). Sir Robert Filmer (c.1588-1653) later made similar arguments: “[he] 
claimed biblical proof that God had ordained a social order of gradations in which fathers were placed over 
sons, men over women, elders over the young, and kings above everyone.” Martin Loughlin, Sword and 
Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Hart Publishing, 2000), 163. 
70 Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 46. See also: FC Copleston, A 
History of Medieval Philosophy (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1972), 53. For Pseudo-Dionysius’ works, see: 
Pseudo-Dionysius, The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid and Paul Rorem (Paulist Press, 1987). 
71 On this, see: Arthur O Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being: A Study of the History of an Idea (Harvard 
University Press, 1936). See also: Loughlin, Sword and Scales, 114–16. 
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God or Christ,72 and run consecutively through the orders of angels, humankind, and right 
down through all fauna and flora of Creation: 
“The whole universe appeared as planned by God in a wonderful 
hierarchy of ranks and orders, in which each member had its appropriate 
niche, contributing in its own special way to the beauty and order of the 
whole. This concept was developed elaborately in patristic thought, and 
above all by Augustine.”73 
7.3.2 Order Ordained by Nature (I): Corporeal Analogies 
It was also common throughout the mediaeval period to draw comparisons between 
human society and the natural world.  
One of the commonest comparisons drawn was one between the structure of social groups 
and the structure of the body.74 This idea was very far from being new by the mediaeval 
period. Perhaps the oldest evidence for such a comparison comes from the Rigveda, a set 
sacred Hindu hymns. These have been dated to around 1400-1000BCE,75 although the 
relevant passage was probably composed towards the latter date.76 The passage is a 
creation myth in the vein of the dismemberment of a ‘world parent’;77 in this case, a 
gigantic cosmic being named Purusha. From Purusha’s separation came, inter alia, the 
four varnas (the elements of the Indian caste system78): the priestly class (Brahmins) from 
the mouth; the ruling class (Rajanyas or Kshatriyas) from the arms; the farming and 
trading class (Vaishyas) from the thighs; and the labouring class (Shudras) from the feet.79  
Around the same time in Egypt, there is evidence of the beginning of a tradition that 
would carry right through classical antiquity to the mediaeval period. An inscription, 
                                               
72 For example: Colossians 1:15-18, Ephesians 1:18-23, Romans 13:1-5. Indeed, within the Sayings of 
Candidus about the Image of God, attributed to a certain monk of Fulda from the early ninth century, “there 
is an argument for the existence of God, based on the idea that the hierarchy of being demands the existence 
of an infinite divine intelligence”: Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy, 59. 
73 Ewart Lewis, ed., Medieval Political Ideas, vol. 1 (Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1974), 196–97. 
74 On this, see, e.g.: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 15–16; Gierke, Political Theories of 
the Middle Age, chap. 4. 
75 Stephanie W Jamison and Joel P Brereton, trans., The Rigveda: The Earliest Religious Poetry of India, 
vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 5, 15–17.  
76 Vivekanand Jha, “Social Stratification in Ancient India: Some Reflections,” Social Scientist 19, no. 3 
(1991): 22. 
77 On this type of creation myth, see: David Adams Leeming, Creation Myths of the World: An 
Encyclopedia, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (ABC Clio, 2010), 16–21. 
78 It should be noted that these were not called varnas in the passage; indeed, it appears to have a use in the 
Rigveda distinct from the meaning it was later to acquire: Jha, “Social Stratification in Ancient India: Some 
Reflections,” 24–25. 
79 Stephanie W Jamison and Joel P Brereton, trans., The Rigveda: The Earliest Religious Poetry of India, 
vol. 3 (Oxford University Press, 2014), 1540 (10.90.12). 
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dating to c.1000BCE, depicts a court battle between head and stomach, in which the head 
puts forward its case for being the better part; unfortunately, the stomach’s repost and the 
verdict are missing.80 It is this ancient Egyptian tradition, however, which is regarded as 
providing the basis of the Graeco-Roman tradition of the fable of ‘the Belly and the 
Members’.81 This tale tells of how various parts of the body, envying the fact that the 
stomach sat reposed amongst them enjoying the fruits of their labour but seemingly 
undertaking little work of its own, decide to go on strike; they soon discover, however, 
that the stomach was not as idle as it seemed. In some versions, order is restored;82 in 
others, the tale ends in the body’s demise.83 The moral of the story, of course, was that 
each has their own functions, which are essential to the maintenance of the wider system; 
were some part of that system to cease to work, there would be serious repercussions for 
the system in its entirety.  
This fable, as we know it, is usually attributed to either Aesop,84 or the Roman consul 
Menenius Agrippa.85 Whether Aesop or Menenius had any knowledge of the fable and, 
if so, whether one was drawing from the other is difficult to tell, not least because all 
extant attributions post-date them considerably.86 The evidence would appear to point 
                                               
80 See: Lewis Spence, Myths and Legends of Ancient Egypt (David D Nickerson & Company, 1910), 194–
95. See also: Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable, trans. Leslie A Ray, vol. 1 
(Brill, 1999), 329–30. This may be the same thing as Joseph Jacobs refers to having been discovered by 
Gaston Maspero, which he dates 250 years earlier; otherwise, this represents another object with a similar 
theme that is potentially earlier: Aesop, The Fables of Æsop: Selected, Told Anew, and Their History 
Traced, ed. Joseph Jacobs (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1922), 207. 
81 See: Francisco Rodríguez Adrados, History of the Graeco-Latin Fable: The Fable during the Roman 
Empire and in the Middle Ages, trans. Leslie A. Ray, vol. 2 (Brill, 2000), 106–7, 199. 
82 Livy, History of Rome, trans. BO Foster, vol. 1, Loeb Classical Library 114 (Harvard University Press, 
1919), 355-325 (Bk 2, XXXII, 9ff). 
83 For example, Romulus Vulgaris. See: David G Hale, “Intestine Sedition: The Fable of the Belly,” 
Comparative Literature Studies 5, no. 4 (1968): 379. A tragic ending appears to have been common in the 
mediaeval Latin versions of the fable: Aesop, Aesop’s Fables, trans. Laura Gibbs (Oxford University Press, 
2002), 35. 
84 It is now part of the Aesopic canon, and is number 130 in the Perry Index. Interestingly, Laura Gibbs 
arranged this fable under the theme ‘Fables About Solidarity’ (Fable 66): Aesop, Aesop’s Fables, 35. Aesop 
lived c.620-564BCE. 
85 Menenius is reported to have died in 493BCE; he is recorded telling the fable in 494BCE. His telling of 
the fable is first recorded by Livy (64/59BCE-17CE) and Dionysius (c.60BCE-a.7BCE), and later by Plutarch 
(c.46-120): Livy, History of Rome, 1:355-325 (Bk 2, XXXII, 9ff); Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Roman 
Antiquities, trans. Earnest Cary and Edward Spelman, vol. 4, Loeb Classical Library 364 (Harvard 
University Press, 1943), 98-117 (Book VI, 83-87); Plutarch, Makers of Rome - Nine Lives, trans. Ian Scott-
Kilvert (Penguin Books Ltd, 1965), 19-20 (Cariolanus, 6). 
86 Livy records simply that Menenius related the fable in a quaint or antiquated style (prisco, from priscus,-
a, -um), which might indicate that he was quoting from an older source; Dionysius says that Menenius 
composed the fable himself, albeit after the manner of Aesop; Plutarch merely notes that the fable was well-
known, again indicating an opinion that the fable pre-dated Menenius. The divergence between Livy and 
Dionysius is interesting, as they appear to have both been drawing from the same (now lost) source, Quintus 
Aelius Tubero (b.74BCE, notably not much closer to the events recorded): Wilhelm Nestle, “Die Fabel Des 
Menenius Agrippa,” Klio - Beiträge Zur Alten Geschichte 21, no. 21 (1927): 350. As for Aesop, this fable 
is not featured in the early collections, such as Phaedrus or Babrius, so the evidence would appear to indicate 
that it was a later attribution. 
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towards a common, widespread tradition. This is not only testified by the possible 
Egyptian connection, but also by the proliferation of corporeal-anatomical comparisons 
from at least the fifth century BCE onwards. One can think of Xenophon’s story about 
how brothers are made in the same way that the hands, feet, and eyes were made, i.e. for 
‘mutual help’;87 of the curious work On Sevens,88 attributed to Hippocrates,89 which takes 
as its central thesis the idea that the number seven is a pervasive directing number of the 
universe – the body reflects the seven parts of the world and the topography of the 
Mediterranean reflects the seven parts of the body.90  
Fables were known in England, at least after the Norman Conquest. The Bayeux Tapestry 
is embroidered with a number of fables and two of the most important collections of 
mediaeval fables are supposed to have been made by Englishmen in the twelfth century. 
These are the collections of ‘Walter of England’ (Gualterus Anglicus) and Alfred of 
England. It is noteworthy that Walter’s collection, which was one of the most popular in 
Europe,91 included the fable of the Belly and the Members. John of Salisbury’s and John 
of Sheppey’s works also contain fables.92 Indeed, John of Salisbury attributes a long 
speech to Pope Adrian IV – interestingly, the only Englishman to have sat upon the papal 
throne – in which he recounts a version of the Belly and the Members and consequently 
links it directly to society.93  
                                               
87 Xenophon, Memorabilia. Oeconomicus. Symposium. Apology., trans. EC Marchant and OJ Todd, Loeb 
Classical Library 168 (Harvard University Press, 2013), 132-133 (Memorobilia, 2.3.18ff). Xenophon lived 
c.430-354CE. 
88 The Ancient Greek title is: περι έβδομάδων. In Latin: De hebdomadibus.  
89 This is the Hippocrates of the eponymous Hippocratic oath. He lived c.460-c.370BCE. 
90 Interestingly, these seven parts were different from those previously listed. For the text (in Latin and 
German), see: Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher, Die Hippokratische Schrift Von Der Siebenzahl in Ihrer 
Vierfachen Überlieferung (Ferdinand Schöningh, 1913), 10–11, 15-16 (ch. 7 and 11). For commentary and 
discussion, see: Elizabeth M Craik, The “Hippocratic Corpus”: Content and Context (Routledge, 2015); 
Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher, Über Alter, Ursprung Und Bedeutung Der Hippokratischen Schrift von Der 
Siebenzahl: Ein Beitrag Zur Geschichte Der Ältesten Griechischen Philosophie Und Prosaliteratur, 
Abhandlungen Der Philologisch-Historischen Klasse Der Königl. Sächsischen Gesellschaft Der 
Wissenschaften; Bd. 28, n. 5 (B. G. Teubner, 1911); Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher, “Das Alter Der Weltkarte 
in ‘Hippokrates’ Περί Εβδομάδων Und Die Reichskarte Des Darius Hystaspis,” Philologus - Zeitschrift 
Für Antike Literatur Und Ihre Rezeption 70, no. 1–4 (1911): 529–538; ML West, “The Cosmology of 
‘Hippocrates’, De Hebdomadibus,” The Classical Quarterly 21, no. 2 (1971): 365–88. According to Craik, 
the dating is ‘problematic’, although it could well date to the fifth century BCE, i.e. during Hippocrates’ 
lifetime, although arguments have been made that it could have been written as late as the first century CE: 
Craik, The “Hippocratic Corpus”: Content and Context, 128.  
91 Hale, “Intestine Sedition: The Fable of the Belly,” 379. 
92 See: Aesop, The Fables of Æsop: Selected, Told Anew, and Their History Traced, xviii–xix; John Edwin 
Wells, A Manual of the Writings in Middle English, 1050-1400 (Yale University Press, 1916), 180–82. 
John of Salisbury died in 1180 and John of Sheppey in 1360. 
93 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, ed. and trans. Cary J Nederman (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
135-136 (6.24). Pope Adrian’s version ends with reason, as advocated by the heart, prevailing and order 
restored. Adrian is also reported as having mentioned the Liber Medicinalia of Quintus Serenus, which was 
a verse medical treatise, in which Serenus affirms the truth that the stomach is “the king of the whole body” 
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In 1337, John Grandisson, Bp. Exeter, said that the king represented the head, whereas 
peers the members of the body politic.94 Later, Henry Beaufort, Bp. Winchester and 
Chancellor, opened Parliament with a sermon in which he drew a comparison between 
the kingdom and the body;95 likewise, it seems that Bp. Russell, later the same century, 
had prepared a similar sermon for Edward V’s first Parliament.96 Fortescue thought that 
an acephalous body politic was not properly a body and could not function; body politics 
grow, as an embryo, through the will of the people; common interest flows amongst the 
people, as though it were blood; laws, which are like sinews, bind them together; 
furthermore, just as the head cannot change the body, the king cannot change the body 
politic.97 These are but a few examples. Other like comparisons might be found in 
Aquinas,98 Dante,99 and Nicholas of Cusa.100 
Besides the ideas of differentiated activities and interdependence embodied in these 
ideas,101 there was also the idea of common pathology. As can be plainly seen in 1 
Corinthians 12:12-26, there was an idea that God created the body and provided each part 
so that it might help its fellow parts; if one part suffers, all suffer. This idea is found, inter 
alia, in Aquinas,102 and Marsiglio of Padua.103 Similarly, deformities were thought to be 
repulsive, if not deleterious: just as Fortescue thought an acephalous body politic 
dangerous, Pope Boniface VIII, in his bull Unam Sanctum (1302), said it was monstrous 
                                               
(regem totius corporis esse): Quintus Serenus, Liber Medicinalis, ed. Friedrich Vollmer, Corpus 
Medicorum Latinorum II (B. G. Teubner, 1916), 17 (XVII, lns. 300-306); Plinio Prioreschi, A History of 
Medicine, vol. 3 (Horatius Press, 1996), 509–10. See also: DE Luscombe and GR Evans, “The Twelfth-
Century Renaissance,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350-c.1450, ed. JH 
Burns (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 326. Pope Adrian lived c.1100-1159. 
94 Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 179. 
95 See: Gerald Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort: A Study of Lancastrian Ascendancy and Decline (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 30–31. 
96 See: Stanley Bertram Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 1936), 175, 178. 
97 Fortescue, “In Praise of the Laws of England,” 20-21 (13). 
98 Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:226.  
99 Durante degli Alighieri or Dante Alighieri (c.1265-1321). See: Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:213.  
100 Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464). See: Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:315. Other examples, besides, 
include: Alvarius Pelagius, Ptolomaeus of Lucca, Aegidius Colonna, Engelbert of Volkersdorf, Marsilius 
of Padua, William Ockham, John of Paris, Jean Gerson, Pierre d’Ailly, and Peter of Andlau. On these, see: 
Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 25–26. 
101 Regarding the point about interdependence, it is worthwhile stressing the importance of the ideas of 
unity (unitas) and cohesion (cohaerentia) in mediaeval thought. See: Gierke, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age, 25. 
102 Thomas Aquinas, “‘De Regimine Princiupum’ or ‘De Regno,’” in St Thomas Aquinas: Political 
Writings, ed. and trans. RW Dyson (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 7-8 [1.1]. 
103 Marsiglio or Marsilius of Padua (c.1275-1342). See: Marsilius of Padua, The Defender of the Peace, ed. 
and trans. Annabel Brett (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 12-13 [1.2.3]. 
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for a body to have two heads.104 Pathological comparisons, it can be said, have an ancient 
pedigree. Plato, for example, speaks of ‘inflamed’ or ‘feverish’ communities – 
embodying an idea that communities suffer as a body might.105  
There was, furthermore, the idea of hierarchy among parts, which idea was at least 
implicit in most of the ideas already mentioned. A curious example of this idea is to be 
found in Arnulf of Lisieux’s speech to the Council of Tours (1163), in which he said, 
inter alia, that, as power flowed from the head to the beard and thenceforward, so power 
flowed from Christ downwards.106 
We are today little more innocent of drawing comparisons between the body and other 
things. We speak of the: ‘backs’, ‘arms’, ‘legs’, and ‘feet’ of chairs; ‘hands’ and ‘faces’ 
of clocks; ‘heads’ of families;107 ‘Members’ of  Parliament;108 ‘limbs’ and ‘organs’ of 
State.109 It would seem a very natural comparison; its antiquity should not surprise us.  
7.3.3 Order Ordained by Nature (II): Analogies with Other Social Animals 
Besides comparisons between the body and society, there was also often a comparison 
drawn between human society and the societies of other social animals. We find this, for 
example, in Ambrose, who drew a comparison between republics and cranes, as well as 
between bees and monarchy.110 Indeed, bees were a particular favourite of mediaeval 
writers. For example, we find Aquinas comparing kingship in humans with that of bees. 
He appears to have thought that in bees this was primarily the result of God-given instinct, 
whereas in Man it was the product of reason;111 yet, it must not be forgotten that reason 
was deemed to be embodied in the natural order, meaning that the difference, for Aquinas, 
was really rooted in the matter of freewill – bees act in such a manner because they cannot 
                                               
104 “Therefore there is one body of the one and only Church, and one head, not two heads, as if the Church 
were a monster.” Frederic Austin Ogg, ed., A Source Book of Mediæval History (American Book Company, 
1907), 386. 
105 Plato, The Republic, 64 (II 372e); Cf. Nestle, “Die Fabel Des Menenius Agrippa,” 355. 
106 See: Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 53–54. 
107 Albeit, admittedly, in a somewhat antiquated manner. 
108 ‘Member’ comes from the Latin membrum, meaning ‘limb’: CT Onions, GWS Friedrichsen, and RW 
Burchfield, eds., The Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford University Press, 1966), 568; Sir 
William Smith and JF Lockwood, eds., A Smaller Latin-English Dictionary, 3rd ed. (John Murray, 1933), 
429. The term was first used in the fifteenth century: AF Pollard, The Evolution of Parliament, 2nd ed. 
(Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1926), 160–61. 
109 Other examples include: the ‘legs’ of a table; we talk of things being at the ‘bottom’ or ‘foot’ of the bed; 
roads have ‘shoulders’; we thread a needle through its ‘eye’; things can lie at the ‘heart’ of the matter; and 
we speak of the long ‘arm’ of the law. Undoubtedly, the list continues. An alternative manner of speaking 
of the ‘organs’ of State is to speak of the ‘branches’ of the state, which maps a comparison from the domain 
of plants, rather than animals. 
110 RA Markus, “The Latin Fathers,” in The Cambridge History of Medieval Political Thought, c.350-
c.1450, ed. JH Burns (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 98–99. Ambrose lived c.340-397. 
111 Aquinas, “De Regimine,” 36-37 [1.13]. 
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act otherwise, whereas we act in such a manner because it is best by virtue of its being in 
accordance with nature. Perhaps one of the best passages in this vein, however, is to be 
found in John of Salisbury. Drawing on Plato and Cicero, he firmly held that “civil life 
should imitate nature” and took bees as an exemplum for social living.112 
7.3.4 Order Ordained by Reason or Necessity 
Besides ideas that social order is somehow preordained or natural, there is also the idea 
that social order is in some way rational or necessary, i.e. unless people know their place 
and fulfil its duties, society will disintegrate and everybody will suffer;113 obedience is a 
virtue.114 
One metaphor employed in this context was the idea of the monarch, etc. as being a ship’s 
helmsman,115 or, as an anonymous poem written following Edward III’s death had it, a 
ship’s rudder.116 This draws on the idea that there must be a clear leader who can, for 
better or worse, provide the ‘ship of state’117 with unity and direction.118 In the words of 
Aquinas: 
                                               
112 John of Salisbury, Policraticus, 126–29. 
113 We might think of what Shakespeare wrote: “O, when degree is shak'd, / Which is the ladder of all high 
designs, / The enterprise is sick! How could communities, / Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods in cities, 
/ Peaceful commerce from dividable shores, / The primogenity and due of birth, / Prerogative of age, 
crowns, sceptres, laurels, / But by degree, stand in authentic place? / Take but degree away, untune that 
string, / And hark what discord follows!” William Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, Act 1, Scene 3. 
114 Thomas à Kempis (c. 1380-1471), for example, said: “It is an excellent thing to live under obedience to 
a superior and not to be one’s own master. It is much safer to obey than to rule.” Thomas à Kempis, The 
Imitation of Christ, trans. Leo Sherley-Price (Penguin Books, 1952), 36 [1.9]. 
115 For example Wipo or Wippo of Burgunday (d. post 1046), in the eleventh century, “vividly described a 
kingdom during an interregnum as a ship that had no steersman and that could not therefore be navigated”: 
Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 133. 
116 This was the poem, Death of Edward III, presumably written in 1377 or shortly thereafter. It says that 
there was a figurative “Englis schip”, in which: Edward of Woodstock (the Black Prince, s. Edward III) 
had been the helm; Henry of Grosmont, D. Lancaster a “swifte barge”; and the “gode comunes [Commons]” 
the mast. Most importantly, however, Edward III had been the rudder of this ship, which steered it safely 
on its course; his death and, by implication, Richard II’s minority, left England somewhat rudderless. For 
this poem in the original Middle English, see: Thomas Wright, ed., Political Poems and Songs Relating to 
English History, Composed during the Period from the Accession of Edw. III to That of Ric. III, vol. 1 
(Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1859), 215–18. See also, with notes: Celia Sisam and Kenneth 
Sisam, eds., The Oxford Book of Medieval English Verse (Oxford University Press, 1970), 342–47. 
117 The metaphor of a ‘ship of state’ is to be found in, and was certainly popularized by, Plato in his 
Republic: Plato, The Republic, 208-210 [488a-489d]. There are earlier examples of the metaphor to be 
found, for example, in Alcaeus, Sophocles, and Aeschylus, see: Roger Brock, Greek Political Imagery from 
Homer to Aristotle (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), chap. 4. 
118 There was a common idea that “every Social Body needs a Governing Part (pars principans) which can 
be pictured as its Head or its Heart or its Soul. Often from the comparison of Ruler to Head an inference 
was at once drawn that Nature demanded Monarchy, since there could be but one head…”: Gierke, Political 
Theories of the Middle Age, 28. In this context, one might think of the Siete Partidas, a Castilian law-code 
of the thirteenth century. It says that humans, as compared with most animals, are naturally somewhat 
helpless and defenceless. For this reason, humans need must work together: “But man has nothing of all 
this for himself, except through the aid of many persons, who seek for, and bring together, those things 
which are suitable for him. The collection of these cannot be made without justice, which cannot be done 
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“Now it is manifest that what is itself one can more effectively bring 
about unity than can a plurality… Therefore, the government of one man 
is more useful than the government of many. Further, it is manifest that a 
plurality of men disagreeing about everything would not preserve the 
unity of a multitude at all. For there has to be a certain union among the 
many if they are to be able to rule at all, even as many helmsmen, unless 
they agree in some way, cannot bring a ship to one harbour; now a 
plurality is said to be united as it approximates unity. Therefore, one man 
rules better than a plurality, because of the approximation to unity. And 
again, things are at their best when they most resemble nature; for in each 
individual case nature does what is best…”119 
There was a constant strain in mediaeval thought towards social harmony.120 This is 
found in the idea of concordia (lit. together-heartedness).121 Another mode of expressing 
this idea was through the idea of polyphony: each has their own song to sing, as it were, 
each of which interweaves with the others to make an altogether more impressive piece. 
This would only be possible, however, if each kept to their brief and, moreover, if they 
performed with synchronicity. As such, society could only be like a well-oiled machine 
                                               
except by superiors, whom others are obliged to obey. And, as these are many in number, it is unavoidable 
that sometimes they should disagree… For this reason it is necessary, for the sake of just authority, that 
there should be one person who should act as their head, by means of whose wisdom they should agree and 
be guided, as all the members of the body are guided and commanded by the head. Wherefore it was proper 
that there should be kings, and men accepted them as lords.” It then continues to say that another reason 
for having kings is the fact that God needs an agent in each place – presumably, following the previous 
argument that multitudes tend to disagree, only the one agent in each place. Burns, Siete Partidas, 2:272–
73, quote at 273 (Part. II, Tit. I, Law VII). 
119 Aquinas, De Regimine Principum in Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:285. Cf. Aquinas, St Thomas 
Aquinas Polit. Writings, 5-8 (De Reg. Pri., 1.1). A similar idea is found, for example, in Dante, which 
Gierke summarized thus: “[H]e argued that the unifying principle of Bodies Politic is Will, and that, for the 
purpose of presenting a Unity of Wills (unitas in voluntatibus) the governing and regulating Will of some 
one man (voluntas una et regulatrix) is plainly the aptest mean.” Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle 
Age, 32. 
120 An interesting line of thought is to be found in Augustine, who thought that the State was necessitated 
by the Fall. As Coplestone wrote of Augustine’s argument: “Human beings would, of course, have lived a 
social life [had there been no Fall]. But there would have been no need of the coercive and punitive power 
which we call the State”. In other words, social order within human social groups is necessary because of 
humankind’s fall from grace and because of the existence of (and, perhaps, humankind’s predilection to) 
sin. If society is to exist harmoniously, there need must be a State. See: Copleston, A History of Medieval 
Philosophy, 44–45, quote at 45. 
121 As Gierke identified, there was an idea that, for example, the spiritual and temporal powers were vital 
co-ordinate parts of the social order; “the fulness of Life was only attained by their ‘harmonious concord’ 
and by their mutually supplementing co-operation in the task that is set before Mankind”. See: Gierke, 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, 17–18. We might note, further, the anatomical analogy in the idea of 
concordia. See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 120. For the idea of ordinata concordia in 
Augustine, see: Thomas F Martin, “Augustine and the Politics of Monasticism,” in Augustine and Politics, 
ed. John Doody, Kevin L Hughes, and Kim Paffenroth (Lexington Books, 2005), 177. 
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if each performed their assigned roles and did so with regard to those around them. As 
with the organic metaphor, this was to the benefit of all.122 
7.3.5 Differentiated Social Standing 
Regardless as to the basis of social order, it is clear that people throughout the mediaeval 
period thought that there were discrete roles in society that might be performed. There 
were bundles of activities and influence, which might be – and were – defined, labelled, 
and distributed. This, in itself, should be sufficient to indicate the existence of 
constitutions. Certainly, some positions were considered more necessary and 
consequential than others – especially senior secular and ecclesiastical leadership 
positions. Most mediaeval people would have found it difficult to contemplate purely 
anarchistic societies in which there was no king or emperor,123 no pope or bishop. Indeed, 
many would have been horrified by such a prospect; they would have thought such ideas 
dangerous and subversive.  
It would be impossible to list all of the positions that existed during the mediaeval period, 
although some of the most prevalent and important have already been mentioned (i.e. 
king, emperor, pope, bishop, etc.). However, it is worthwhile remarking some general 
terms that were used to denote differentiated social standing, particularly such standing 
that carry connotations of public service and which we might today call an ‘office’. In the 
earlier mediaeval period, a number of terms were used roughly interchangeably: officium, 
dignitas, honor, ministerium, and actio. As time wore on, usage preferred officium in the 
context of duties and public service.124 It is an important fact that many such offices were 
thought to be established features of social life within particular groups; they persisted 
across time, even in spite of changes in personnel. 
There was also a very clear idea of stratification and hierarchy. It is unsurprising that 
“[m]edieval language abounded in words for rank: status, honor, ordo, gradus, dignitas, 
and so on.”125 Words such as auctoritas, gubernaculum, dominium, and majestas all attest 
to differentiated influence. There were some set above others, with more important 
activities; others were set below, with less important – though perhaps not necessarily 
                                               
122 “Another message of the organic metaphor was social harmony: society and polity are by nature 
intrinsically harmonious; strife, rebellion and tyranny are manifestations of sin, pride and greed. All 
members of society should avoid quarrels and live in friendship with one another.”: Black, Political 
Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 17–18. 
123 Cf. “Belief in the rightness of kingship was a deep-seated conviction seldom contested outside the Italian 
city-republics.” Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 136. 
124 Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 136. 
125 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 16. 
287 
 
unimportant – activities. Even if there were some respects in which people were seen to 
be equal, the idea of equality was neither so prevalent, potent, nor all-pervasive so as to 
pose serious challenge to the idea of a stratified society.  
None of this is to say that mediaeval thought was devoid of ideas about liberty; it was 
often highly prized, particularly in the need for obtaining consent in various cases.126 It 
was just that such liberty was largely derived from one’s social identity and position, was 
circumscribed thereby, and was not accompanied by pervasive notions of equality. Even 
if one’s social identity and position were relatively inflexible, one might still possess a 
modicum of liberty and self-determination. Moreover, even if individuals did not possess 
extensive liberty themselves, the groups to which they belong might, e.g. a freedom or 
right to govern themselves. Regardless, this all fitted into a larger framework of 
differentiated activities and influence.  
7.4 Role of Law 
The importance of social order is emphasized by the introduction of laws (i.e. fixed 
associations) that reflected and reinforced it. We might take, for example, the wergild or 
man-price, which was to be paid upon the causing the death of another; the level of 
payment was contingent upon the status of the person killed. Whether the wergild system 
was supposed to represent particularly some intrinsic, instrumental, or invested value is 
difficult to ascertain,127 but it clearly entrenched the idea that not all in society were of 
equal worth. We might also take the example of sumptuary legislation,128 which, once 
again, drew strong distinctions between different classes of person; indeed, its very point 
was to ensure that people dressed and acted in a manner appropriate to their social position 
– that they did not attempt to arrogate the privileges of their superiors.129 It was a symbolic 
embodiment of social order. 
                                               
126 For ideas of liberty in mediaeval thought, see, e.g.: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 28–
33. 
127 Intrinsic value would mean that some people had an inherent value higher or lower than others; 
instrumental value would mean that some people were worth more to society than others; invested value 
would mean that some people were the product of greater economic investment and, as such, were more 
valuable. 
128 On the sumptuary law from 1363, for example, see: Stubbs, Constitutional History, 2:434. 
129 Beyond the sumptuary law, there was also social pressure to ensure that people wore clothing fitting to 
their station. This can be seen, for example, in Caxton’s Book of Curtesye, a guide on etiquette and manners 
aimed at children: “Euery garment / that ye shal on were / Awayte wel / that it be so syttynge / As to your 
degre / semeth acordynge / Thenne wil men saye / forsoth this childe is he / That is wel taught / and louyth 
honeste.” That the wearing of suitable clothing is attached with the idea of being praised is a point worth 
marking; it is a behaviour that is positively encouraged and received. Frederick J Furnivall, ed., Caxton’s 
Book of Curtesye, Printed at Westminster about 1477-8 AD and Now Reprinted with Two MS Copies of the 
Same Treatise (Early English Text Society, 1868), 26 (lns. 52-56). 
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There was also a very strong idea that laws not only defined, but also constrained what 
governments – and, in particular, kings – could do.130 There was little notion that kings 
could rule absolutely, arbitrarily, or without counsel or consent; they could not be purely 
autocratic,131 although extraordinary circumstances might permit extraordinary 
measures.132 Kings might be restrained by the lex terrae, common law, or fundamental 
law, which things often had contractual (especially feudal),133 immemorial usage, or just-
so underpinnings.134 Even if the king were above the laws of the community, he was 
nevertheless subject to the laws of Nature and God.135 Moreover, all of those beneath him, 
at whatever degree of remove, were very much subject to the laws of the community from 
whatever source they came. If they were to flout these, the community would come 
                                               
130 For example, we find the following famous passage in Bracton: “The king must not be under man but 
under God and under the law, because law makes the king [Ipse autem rex non debet esse sub homine sed 
sub deo et sub lege, quia lex facit regem], [Let him therefore bestow upon the law what the law bestows 
upon him, namely, rule and power.] for there is no rex where will rules rather than lex. Since he is the vicar 
of God, [And that he ought to be under the law appears clearly in the analogy of Jesus Christ, whose 
vicegerent on earth he is, for though many ways were open to Him for his ineffable redemption of the 
human race, the true mercy of God chose this most powerful way to destroy the devil's work, he would use 
not the power of force but the reason of justice. Thus he willed himself to be 11under the law that he might 
redeem those who live under it. For He did not wish to use force but judgment. And in that same way the 
Blessed Mother of God, the Virgin Mary, Mother of our Lord, who by an extraordinary privilege was above 
law, nevertheless, in order to show an example of humility, did not refuse to be subjected to established 
laws. Let the king, therefore, do the same, lest his power remain unbridled.]” Henry de Bracton, De Legibus 
Et Consuetudinibus Angliæ (Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England), ed. George Woodbine, trans. 
Samuel E Thorne (Harvard Law School Library, 2003), 2:33, http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/. 
131 On this, see: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, chap. 5. This is, of course, in spite of the 
stock phrases: the ruler as lex anima (a living law/spirit of the law); quod principi placuit legis habit 
vigorem (what pleases the prince has the force of law); princeps legibus solutus est (the prince is exempt 
from, or above, the law); and omnia iura habet princeps in pectore suo (the prince has all law in his breast). 
For these, see Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 77–78. 
132 “A king…can demand and take from a kingdom, not only what other kings who preceded him were 
accustomed to do, but even more, when he has such great need of it for the common benefit of the country 
that he could not avoid doing so just as other men, in times of distress, have recourse to what is their own 
by inheritance.” Burns, Siete Partidas, 2:273 (Part. II, Tit. I, Law VIII). The proviso that this must be ‘for 
the common benefit’ is an important point to stress; kings could not augment their powers or rights 
arbitrarily, but only with good reason, i.e. for the summum bonum. Cf. the section on tyranny (2:274-275, 
Part. II, Tit. I, Law X) and, in particular, the section ‘A King Should Not Desire to Do Anything Contrary 
to Law’ (2:293, Part. II, Tit. V, Law XIV), which says that kings ought to obey the precepts of nature, 
justice, propriety, and moderation, as well as avoid covetousness.  
133 Within feudal kingship, kings were bound by law because they were a party to its creation and were 
unable to change it unilaterally. On this point, within the context of Bracton, see: Ullmann, Principles of 
Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 176–77. 
134 For example, on King John’s and Richard’s attempts to rule autocratically, on the tensions between 
theocratic and feudal kingship in England, see: Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the 
Middle Ages, 164ff, 182ff. 
135 Whether people could do anything about a king who strayed from the path of righteousness, and what 
they could do, was a contentious issue throughout the mediaeval period. There were some who thought that 
there was little to be done; it was up to God, as the judge of all, to do as He saw fit as and when He saw fit 
to do it. There were others who thought that the Church, especially the Pope, might be able to intervene to 
correct or even to depose the offending monarch. There were others still, far more radical, who thought that 
there was some right of resistance; that the people might resist a tyrant. On all of these points, see, e.g. 
Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, passim. 
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undone; to remove the sinews, to take Fortescue’s analogy, would be to destabilize the 
community.  
Mediaeval ideas were permeated by a sense of Natural Law – an idea that which naturally 
is ought to be. Social order formed a part of this Natural Law – different types of people 
fulfil different roles in society. As Black has said, “[m]any believed that some set of 
institutions – whatever it might be – was intrinsically right and valid for all time.”136 
Society had a natural constitution; to adhere to that was best. Law kept everybody in their 
place. It ensured that everything ran smoothly and effectively. Questioning this natural 
order, or the laws sustaining it, might be considered dangerous; life would be much better 
if all accepted their preordained places. Of course, each society might arrange themselves 
to their liking, but their constitutions – in the mediaeval theory – were derivative of a 
universal constitution.  
There were not really any concerted efforts to reduce constitutions to writing, at least in 
any extended and detailed sense. There were not written and codified constitutions, 
although there some constitutional provisions did find their way into writing and into 
formally recognized sources of law.137 However, this lack of written and codified 
constitutions should not be overemphasized. It simply indicates that, whereas most people 
today would appeal to written documents, mediaeval people appealed to custom and 
notions of right reason;138 they drew on the various analogies that have been outlined. 
They still had strongly fixed expectations as to how society should look and operate; they 
still thought that society should operate according to law.139 In this sense, they are no 
different to us. Of course, none of this should be surprising. As discussed in the 
Associational Theory of Law and Appendix II, the desire for law is a natural human trait. 
                                               
136 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 3. 
137 Perhaps the most famous example of such a provision is Magna Carta 1297, Cl. 29 (one of the survivors 
of the 1215 version and, indeed, one of the three provisions still current law), which provides that: “No 
Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be 
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor condemn him, but by 
lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the Law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer 
to any man either Justice or Right.” 
138 Custom, it should be said, was not necessarily regarded by mediaeval people as something that ought to 
last forever. Indeed, there was certainly a view that custom might be quickly altered, at least in England: 
JW Gough, Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History (Oxford University Press, 1955), 14. 
139 As Holdsworth discussed, the idea that “law should govern the state was held by English lawyers and 
many other mediaeval thinkers”: William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 3rd ed., vol. 2 
(Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923), 252–54, 435; quote at 441. This is not to say, as Holdsworth himself – and 
later Gough – argued, that there was necessarily a widespread belief in an immutable ‘fundamental law’: 
Holdsworth, A History of English Law, 1923, 2:441ff; William Searle Holdsworth, A History of English 




7.5 Monarchy and Royal Minorities 
As the latter part of this thesis will be concerned with royal minorities, it would be 
worthwhile briefly to consider some of the ideas associated with monarchy and how 
children might pose problems thereto.  
Royal minorities posed theoretical as well as practical problems for their contemporaries. 
For example, children cannot readily dispense justice, which James of Viterbo (ca. 1255 
– 1308) saw as the “principal and special act of royal authority”;140 Bracton also saw the 
king’s primary task as the administration of justice.141 Such an idea was established 
Christian tradition.142 To this idea of doing justice might also be attached the idea of 
granting grace.143 The problem is that, if all human laws are derivative of the natural law 
and discoverable through reason, children can hardly be thought to possess the sufficient 
“natural clear reason, wisdom, and foresight” to deduce what those laws were and act as 
a lawgiver.144 A similar argument is to be found in Aegidius, who thought that societies 
were better ruled by the best kings, rather than laws, because human laws were often 
defective in the light of natural justice; these required the correction of a king, through 
the exercise of right reason.145 Once again, it doubtful whether a child could do this. 
Indeed, the etymology of the Latin word for king, rex, was not lost on writers like 
Aegidius,146 and Bracton. As Bracton says, “For a king (rex) is so called from ruling 
(regendo) well and not from reigning, because when he rules well he is a king, but he is 
a tyrant when he oppresses with violent domination the people entrusted to him.”147 A 
child might reign, but it seems unlikely that they would be able to rule well, especially if 
they were only an infant who could, in truth, do very little. By Bracton’s logic, child kings 
were not kings at all.  
                                               
140 James of Viterbo, De Regimine Christiano, quoted in: Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:182. 
141 Bracton, De Legibus quoted in Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:282–83. 
142 As Jeremiah 23:5 says: “Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will raise unto David a righteous 
Branch, and a King shall reign and prosper, and shall execute judgment and justice in the earth.” 
143 Billing J in Bagot’s Case said: “It pertains to every king, by reason of his office, to do justice and grace: 
justice in executing the laws, and grace in granting pardon to felons”. Quoted in: Chrimes, English 
Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century, 16. 
144 The quote is from Nicholas of Cusa, De Concordantia Catholica in Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 
1:192. 
145 Giles of Rome, De Regimine Principum in Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:290–91. 
146 See: Giles of Rome, De Regimine Principum in Lewis, Medieval Political Ideas, 1:290–91. 
147 The rest of this passage is of interest: “Therefore, let him temper his power by law, which is the bridle 
of power, that he may live according to the laws, since a human law has stated that laws bind the lawgiver 
himself, and elsewhere in the same source, ‘It is a saying worthy of the majesty of rulers that the prince 
profess himself bound by the laws’ [Codex, I, 14, 4].” Bracton, De Legibus quoted in Lewis, Medieval 
Political Ideas, 1:283. 
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Fortescue saw the tasks of kingship being twofold: “Lo! To fight and judge are the office 
of a king.”148 As a child lacks the cognitive maturity to judge, they also lack the physical 
maturity to fight, which once again seems to make children signally inadequate to the 
tasks of kingship. Nevertheless, as will be seen, child kings existed. 
7.6 Secularization and Public Law 
It is sometimes said that modern public law was created through a process of 
secularization,149 in which external supernatural sources were substituted for profane, 
human sources. Indeed, some have argued public law was rather created by the conversion 
of theological concepts into secular ones.150 To an extent, both viewpoints (substitution 
and conversion) have merit – theology has now largely been displaced in academic work 
and it seems probable that there has been a degree of borrowing from theology. However, 
it would be wrong to press these arguments too far. 
In the first place, even though politico-constitutional thought has become increasingly 
less religious in tone since the Middle Ages, there is every reason to believe that this has 
much to do with who was writing as with some fundamental rejection of religious 
arguments. After all, earlier in the Middle Ages, writers were likely to be ecclesiastics; 
with the spread of literacy, education, and the means to write, by the early modern period 
even those not well-versed in scripture could write on such matters. Moreover, it is 
possible that the idea of conversion has confused somewhat the chain of causation. If one 
agrees with Feuerbach that theology is itself a reflection of human society,151 then public 
law ceases to be founded in secularized theological concepts but concepts that have been 
applied in both secular and theological contexts – each borrowing at a time from the other.  
7.7 Conclusions 
Whether drawn from notions of design, nature, or reason, there appears a strong strain in 
mediaeval thought that it was natural and, indeed, advisable, for individuals within social 
                                               
148 Fortescue, De Natura quoted in Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas in the Fifteenth Century, 14. 
149 Loughlin, for example, has argued that it was the secularization – alongside rationalization and 
positivization – of the mediaeval concept of ‘fundamental law’ that led to the development of modern public 
law: Martin Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 2, 6–7. 
150 See, for example: Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. 
George Schwab (The MIT Press, 1988). 
151 For Feuerbach, see: Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (Dover 
Publications, Inc., 2008). Especially at 152 (1.18), where he says that: “We have reduced the supermundane, 
supernatural, and superhuman nature of God to the elements of human nature as its fundamental elements. 
Our process of analysis has brought us again to the position with which we set out. The beginning, middle 
and end of religion is MAN.”  
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groups to perform different activities and exercise different levels of authority. Moreover, 
there was clearly a desire that these be regulated by laws, such that each knew their place 
and what was expected of them.152 Any society not adhering to these precepts was either 
damned or doomed. Without order, there would be chaos. As such, mediaeval people 
were primed to think in constitutional terms: in terms of social groups, and the distribution 
therein of differentiated activities and social influence. It is an important point, however, 
that mediaeval writers, when speaking of constitutional matters, were often not so 
concerned with expounding the details of constitutions in their entirety. The thing with 
which they were most concerned was leadership. Indeed, for many writers, without 
government (i.e. without leadership), there could be no society.153 
None of this is to say that there was not profound conflict throughout the mediaeval period 
as to the roles of social groups and of individuals therein. In fact, for much of the period, 
there was a preoccupation with discussing how two social groups intersected and 
interacted: the ecclesiastical and secular polities.154 Some argued for the supremacy of 
the former;155 others for that of the latter.156 Some advocated a closer union between them; 
                                               
152 Cf. the following lines from Ælfric’s Grammar, written towards the end of the tenth century: “'Whether 
you are a priest or a monk, a layman or a soldier, apply yourself to that and be what you are; as it is a shame 
for a man not to be what he is and what he ought to be”. Quoted in: LF Salzman, English Life in the Middle 
Ages (Oxford University Press, 1926), 141. 
153 See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 23. 
154 These might alternatively be referred to as the spiritual and temporal polities respectively. We might 
mark here what Gierke said: “along with this idea of a single Community comprehensive of Mankind, the 
severance of this Community between two organized Orders of Life, the spiritual and the temporal, is 
accepted by the Middle Age as an eternal counsel of God.” Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 
10. See further, e.g.: John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 
1914), chaps. 3-5. 
155 There were a number of popes and ecclesiastical commentators who argued vociferously for the 
supremacy of the Church and, more particularly, of the Papacy over secular powers. After all, there was an 
argument that the Pope “could judge all and be judged of none (sedes apostolica omnes iudicat et a nemine 
iudicatur)”. Indeed, not only were secular powers subject to the papal power, they were also beholden to 
it. This latter idea was particularly expressed through the idea of the ‘two swords’, which were supposedly 
both given to the papacy through being given to Peter. The spiritual sword was retained by the papacy and 
the temporal sword was within their gift; the spiritual sword bestowed upon the papacy a supervisory role, 
through which the use of the temporal sword was monitored, directed, and corrected where necessary. On 
these things, see esp.: Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, pt. 1; Gierke, 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, chaps. 3, quote at 49. 
156 These were often driven either by ideas of theocratic kingship or populist sentiments in which the secular 
power was independent of the ecclesiastical powers. On this, see esp.: Ullmann, Principles of Government 
and Politics in the Middle Ages, pts. 2 and 3. Gierke was perhaps not too far from the mark when he said 
that “Lonely in the Middle Age was Marsilius of Padua when he taught as a principle the complete 
absorption of Church in State”: Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 16. 
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others a greater separation;157 others still some ‘middle way’.158 Religious arguments 
were found to support all sides. There were those who argued that, as God and His Law 
ruled over everything, it was only natural that the Church, as His representatives and 
interpreters, should have supremacy.159 There were others, particularly as one moves 
towards the end of the period, who saw religion as being rather a personal matter and a 
matter of conscience; this was often conjoined with a distrust of institutionalized religion. 
As such, the Church’s role should be rather smaller. Besides and in conjunction with this 
debate was an ongoing debate as to the ultimate source of political authority, i.e. as to 
whether social groups operated on descending or ascending principles of government;160 
the extent to which the commonalty had a hand and say in government. These were 
complemented by debates on participation and representation.161 
                                               
157 William of Ockham, for example, thought that the Church and Papacy ought to have no claims to 
temporal possessions or jurisdiction, which argument he based on the idea that Christ refused such things. 
See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 74. More radical ideas in this direction were expressed 
by the likes of Wyclif, who rather sought to deny institutionalized religion. See: Black, Political Thought 
in Europe, 1250-1450, esp. 79-80. 
158 Juan de Torquemada is perhaps a good example of this, who argued that there was a balance to be struck 
between secular and ecclesiastical powers such that each might – in some matters – be directed by the other. 
See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 82–84. In theories such as this, the ecclesiastical and 
secular polities were rather regarded as ‘co-ordinate powers’, i.e. so-called sacerdotium and imperium were 
“two independent spheres instituted by God himself”; neither was reliant on the other for their authority. 
Nevertheless, it tended to be admitted that “when compared with the State, the Church, having the sublime 
aim, might rightly claim, not only a higher intrinsic value, but also a loftier external rank”: Gierke, Political 
Theories of the Middle Age, 16–17. 
159 Who within the Church was the principal agency was a matter of some debate. In the earlier mediaeval 
period, the Papacy was generally recognized as being in the ascendant. However, towards the end of the 
mediaeval period, a substantial conciliar school developed: “For d’Ailly, Gerson, Zabarella, Andreas 
Randuf, Dietrich of Niem and some of their contemporaries, the whole Constitution of the Church was 
based on the thought that the plenitude of ecclesiastical power was in substance indivisible and inalienable, 
and was vested in the Universal Church represented by the Council, while the exercise of that power 
belonged to the Pope and the Council in common.” Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 52–53. 
Conciliarism was particularly prominent – and, indeed, triumphant – at the Councils of Constance (1414-
18) and Basel (1431-49), but was not ultimately successful.  
160 Descending theories of government were typically theocratic in nature (i.e. political power and authority 
are derived from God). Such theories equally fuelled ideas of papal monarchy or hierocratic government 
as theocratic kingship, in which popes and monarchs respectively were held to be directly beholden to God 
and His grace for their powers; these were given through or by some act of concession. Ascending theories, 
by contrast, tended to be more populist in nature (i.e. political power and authority are derived from the 
People; this is the doctrine of popular sovereignty), but also supported feudal kingship (i.e. political power 
and authority are derived from some covenant or contract between rulers and ruled). On descending and 
ascending theories of government, see: Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 
passim. On the doctrine of popular sovereignty, see, e.g.: Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 
chap. 6. 
161 See, e.g.: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, chap. 6; Gierke, Political Theories of the 
Middle Age, chap. 7. In the context of England, see esp. Maude Violet Clarke, Medieval Representation 
and Consent: A Study of Early Parliaments in England with Special Reference to the Modus Tenendi 
Parliamentum (Longmans, Green and Co., 1936). Whatever their general position, there does appear to 
have been a widespread opinion – which is unsurprising – that, in the words of Gierke: “the consent of the 
Whole Community was requisite for the validation of any acts of the Ruler which were prejudicial to the 
rights of the Whole…”: Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, 44. 
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It is only in more recent times that the prevalence and potency of the classical and 
mediaeval ideas have begun to be worn away. With modern liberal, egalitarian, and 
naturalistic beliefs, people are less inclined to believe in any natural social order,162 
especially one necessarily putting some above others.163 Those who have historically 
advocated forms of equality have tended not to do so absolutely and also tended rather to 
be revolutionary and cultish. We might think of the Pythagoreans in the ancient world,164 
or a number of movements during the mediaeval period, many of which were inspired by 
an immanent second coming of Christ.165 To see how far we have come, we might 
consider the following sentence: “The social system is not an unchangeable order beyond 
human control but a pattern of human action.”166 A sentence such as this would have been 
almost unthinkable prior to the modern period.  
It would be wrong to in any way paint ancient and mediaeval ideas as homogeneous. To 
speak of a singular “mediaeval idea” would be as ridiculous as fallacious. However, what 
we can clearly see is that there were some ideas that had a greater prevalence, potency, 
and persistency throughout the mediaeval period, as compared, for example, with today.  
In particular, one might reflect on the declining potency of the ideas touted by the 
mediaeval Church – up to and including the existence of God. The decline of this idea 
has profoundly affected how we conceptualize and approach constitutions. No longer are 
they seen as products of some divine or natural order; rather, they are seen as things 
almost entirely within our power to shape and craft. Nevertheless, when one reads 
medieval writers, one is struck by the fact that they talk about many of the same things 
that we do, as well as by the sophistication of their writing and their systems. The fact of 
the matter is that they attempted to describe and rationalise much the same phenomena as 
we do today and there has been a great mistake in the scholarship in thinking that there 
was a time at which the ‘modern idea’ of the ‘State’ or what-have-you was ‘discovered’ 
or ‘invented’. We can very much agree with Lovejoy that: 
“The seeming novelty of many a system is due solely to the novelty of 
the application or arrangement of the old elements which enter into it. 
                                               
162 Cf. “As the unity of the medieval world disintegrated, the belief that humans occupied a fixed place 
within a universal order was placed in question.” Loughlin, Sword and Scales, 161. 
163 Indeed, as Black has said: “the idea of an organic division of labour was, in pre-modern times, the 
antithesis of the idea of equality.” Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 17. 
164 On the Pythagoreans, see, e.g.: Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (Routledge, 2000), 49–
56. 
165 See: Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 17. 
166 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1999), 88. 
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When this is realized, the history as a whole should look a much more 
manageable thing. I do not, of course, mean to maintain that essentially 
novel conceptions, new problems and new modes of reasoning about 
them, do not from time to time emerge in the history of thought. But such 
increments of absolute novelty seem to me a good deal rarer than is 
sometimes supposed.”167 
If anything, perhaps the true difference between modern and pre-modern ideas is not so 
much that we talk about different things, but rather, that we approach them with a different 
set of assumptions. Even still, we owe much to our mediaeval forebears.168  
 
 
                                               
167 Lovejoy, Great Chain of Being, 4. 
168 “Yet some of the main configurations of political thought in modern Europe were laid down before 
1450: the authority of the state and its separation from the church, the rule of law, the legitimacy of lesser 
associations; absolute monarchy, popular consent, parliamentary representation. Justice, liberty, peace, the 
common good remained dominant social norms. Similarly, there was underlying continuity in the evolution 
of territorial states, legal systems, monarchies and, in some cases, parliaments. The truly epochal shifts in 
European thought occurred in the eleventh and eighteenth centuries: in between was essentially a single 
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8 – Introduction to the Case Studies 
8.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this brief introduction is to set out in greater detail the reasons for pursuing the 
case studies presented in this Part,1 as well to emphasize their relation to the framework set out 
in Part I. 
8.2 Purpose Rehearsed and Expanded 
It is to be remembered that there have been doubts as to the compatibility of constitutional 
history and mediaeval history; the former has been thought to be meaningless in the context of 
the latter for lack of an object.2 These two studies, with the aid of the interpretative framework 
set out in Part I, are intended to be the first steps towards showing that this is not the case. 
Obviously, if the aim had been merely to demonstrate the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity, 
almost any time or social group could have been selected – arguably, the more remote and 
obscure the better. However, the aim here is to revive constitutional history. Therefore, 
considering the fact that the obstacle to this is largely the current opposition to mediaeval 
constitutional history, especially as it applies to England, it makes sense to begin in the 
mediaeval period and to do so in England.  
There are a few reasons for focusing on the central government, which is but one small part of 
the overall constitution (albeit arguably the most important). First, the availability of evidence 
and material in general: it is easier to form a more detailed and comprehensive picture about 
this than in many other cases. Second, constitutional history, whilst comprised of many 
branches and sub-disciplines, is always likely to have as its mainstay the history of the activities 
and influence held and exercised at the centre of the social group, i.e. in large social groups, 
the history of the central government – its offices, institutions, etc. Third, these studies are 
intended, as already said, to be first steps; to have taken a social group or aspect thereof that 
was too far removed from the mainstay of constitutional history would have probably defeated 
the purpose.  
In the time and space provided, some narrower focus was necessary. For focusing on the royal 
minorities, there are several reasons. Firstly, the royal minorities, as a subject of study unto 
themselves, have not received a great deal of attention and therefore provide an opportunity for 
                                                            
1 Cf. supra, 1.1. 
2 Cf. supra, 1.3. 
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fresh analysis. Secondly, there is a sense in which they seem to defy the central assumption of 
mediaeval government: that it was the monarch who ruled, whether alone or in conjunction 
with others. Indeed, given that the fifteenth century (the context of Henry VI’s minority), for 
example, has often been viewed as a time in which people were driven predominantly by 
private interests, and given the fact that a royal minority might be seen as a departure from the 
norm, it is interesting to consider the extent to which the royal minorities came about and were 
conducted according to fixed – even predetermined – ideas, i.e. according to what was thought 
to be law, which law was, by its nature, constitutional. Thirdly, the possibility or realization of 
a royal minority is an event that occurs several times over the course of the mediaeval period, 
which makes them peculiarly suited to discussing changes over time, especially in the context 
of the Generational Theory of Law. Fourthly, there is an argument that the royal minorities, 
taken individually or collectively, had an important and lasting impact on the nature of the 
changes that occurred to the successive instantiations of the English constitution.3 Finally, there 
is the fact that they possess greater and more general interest than perhaps that possessed by 
drier and more recondite aspects of the constitution.  
In terms of choosing the succession and administration of government in the context of the 
royal minorities, the reasons are straightforward. The former explains how they came about 
and the latter how they were managed. 
8.3 Connection with the Framework 
Constitutions have been defined as the distribution of activities and influence; laws as fixed 
associations, which give rise to fixed expectations; and constitutional laws as fixed associations 
concerning the distribution of activities and influence, such that there are potent – and to some 
degree prevalent and persistent – ideas as to what that distribution should look like in a given 
social group, how and by whom it can be made, etc.  
Today, we would expect for many of these expectations to have been formally declared, 
recorded, etc. and, consequently, would more likely regard anything not so declared, recorded, 
etc. as something not to be incorporated into our processes of theoretical and practical 
reasoning. In the mediaeval period, we cannot expect to find such formal declarations, records, 
                                                            
3 For example, Carpenter argued that the Paper Constitution of 1244, the measures of 1258, and the Ordinances 
of 1311, which together represent the “high watermark of medieval constitutional reform,” found their origins in 
Henry III’s minority – not to mention the entrenchment of Magna Carta and “the genesis of the constitutional 
programme over which king and country were still fighting in the seventeenth century”. David A Carpenter, The 
Minority of Henry III (University of California Press, 1990), 412. 
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etc., but that does not mean that there were not prevalent and potent fixed expectations about 
who could do what (i.e. exercise certain activities), who could cause others to think or behave 
in given ways (i.e. exercise certain influence), or how individuals might become possessed of 
such activities and influence.  
Thus, whenever we are talking about the distribution of activities and influence, and the 
prevalence, potency, and persistency of ideas and fixed associations relating thereto, we are 
employing the framework to analyse the constitution as it existed at each point of time.  
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9 – Succession and the Minorities: A Study in Transmission 
9.1 Introduction  
There is a strong argument that it is better to have a clear, albeit somewhat defective, rule 
– in this case, of succession – than invite faction and disorder in its absence.1 A child-
king might be inconvenient, but is preferable to civil war. 
Yet a child’s accession could be deeply dissatisfactory.2  It might confound people’s 
expectations of both government and good government. “Woe to thee, O land,” runs the 
oft-quoted biblical passage, “when thy king is a child”. 3  Without a proper head, 
government might become paralysed. Discord could ripple outwards. The consequence: 
private war,4  private justice, and public disorder – perhaps leaving the social group 
divided, weak, and vulnerable. In constitutional systems heavily reliant on the person of 
the monarch, the threat was perhaps considerable. 
Even if strong government were maintained, its manner might frustrate people’s 
expectations. Might the monarch’s being a child invite tyranny in their name? Might their 
being young and impressionable result in their being unduly influenced? Even if they 
                                                            
1 “It is inconuenient…to be gouerned by a king, who is defectiue in body or in minde: but it is a greater 
inconuenience, by making a breache in this high point of state, to open an entrance for all disorders, wherein 
ambition and insolencie may range at large.” John Hayward, An ansvver to the first part of a certaine 
conference, concerning succession (1603), sigs A2r and A3r quoted in Martin Loughlin, “The State, the 
Crown and the Law,” in The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis, ed. Maurice Sunkin and 
Sebastian Payne (Oxford University Press, 1999), 53. 
2 It was not uncommon for the “leitmotifs of youth and bad counsel” to make their appearance during royal 
minorities: Emily Joan Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - 
c.1250” (University of Cambridge, 2018), 217. 
3 “…and thy princes eat in the morning!”, runs the rest of the sentence: Ecclesiastes 10:16 (KJB). There 
was also biblical authority for an idea that royal minorities were not necessarily bad, even if perhaps 
suboptimal as compared with competent and just adult kings. As Ælred of Rievaulx noted in the twelfth 
century, it would appear that Judah was better ruled during Jehoash’s minority – when it was ruled by 
Jehoash in conjunction with the high priest and chieftains – than it was during his adulthood when he ruled 
alone: Ælred of Rievaulx, Aelred of Rievaulx: The Historical Works, ed. Marsha L. Dutton, trans. Jane 
Patricia Freeland (Cistercian Publications, 2005), 61. Ælred’s authority was 2 Kings 12:1-19. Indeed, there 
was biblical authority for an idea that, contrary to Jehoash’s example, minor kings might grow up to become 
righteous rulers and, therefore, minorities were not necessarily to be feared. Josiah is a good example of 
such a ruler. See: 2 Chronicles 34-35; 2 Kings 22-23. It is important to note that “In thirteenth-century 
France, Louis IX’s hagiographers emphasised a comparable affinity between the young king and the 
biblical Josiah”: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 162. 
4 This is a particular danger in heavily-armed societies. Private war was often waged, and regarded as a 
public evil, throughout the mediaeval period in Europe. For a discussion of internecine conflict amongst 
the nobility in the late Middle Ages, see, e.g.: Howard Kaminsky, “The Noble Feud in the Later Middle 
Ages,” Past & Present 177 (2002): 55–83. Kaminsky warns against the use of the phrase ‘private war’ as 
being a non-contemporaneous term, but we can reasonably well employ the phrase without fear of 
anachronism; we know perfectly well what is, and what is not, imported by the term. Indeed, as compared 
with Kaminsky’s suggested alternative, “feud”, there is a sense in which it is preferable. ‘Feud’ tends to 
imply a prolonged and especially bitter dispute, whereas ‘private war’ is more neutral; it merely denotes 
that multiple parties are in a state of aggression vis-à-vis one another without colouring it with ideas of 
length or height of feeling.  
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were able to exert their own personality on government, there is every reason to suspect 
that they would lack the knowledge, experience, and advanced faculties of decision-
making to govern well. They might maintain some semblance of government in the short-
term, but this might merely sow seeds of future disorder – especially if they were to make 
unwise concessions, etc.5  
Consequently, even though there is incentive for adopting a strict rule of hereditary right 
(i.e. a fixed expectation that some identified relative of the deceased monarch will be their 
successor, regardless of their supposed merits, etc.),6 there is disincentive also. A strong 
rule of succession does not necessarily guarantee good government; it does not guarantee 
order, peace, and prosperity.7 Indeed, a rigid rule, by its very rigidity, might bring about 
those things its rigidity was purposed to avoid.8  
However, royal minorities were not universally unwelcome. A minor’s innocence might 
help warring factions to put aside their differences. Indeed, there was opportunity: to put 
wrongs aright;9 to mould the minor into a model monarch. Thus, royal minorities might 
be times of optimism and hope; like springtime after winter, even if summer remained 
distant.10 
There was also danger in passing over a royal minor, which follows from the connection 
between landholding and monarchy. Ideally, monarchs were the greatest landholders in 
their realms. Much of their pre-eminence was derived from this fact. Moreover, in the 
absence of regular general taxation, they often had to rely on their own resources in the 
course of their duties. Enthroning anybody else but the heir to these lands presented a 
considerable problem. Either some lesser landholder would become monarch, which held 
dangers,11 or the minor would have to be disinherited, which not only threatened to 
                                                            
5 Henry VI’s profligacy in the exercise of his powers of patronage during his youth, for example, appears 
to have caused some consternation amongst his contemporaries. See: John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics 
of Kingship (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 133, 154–55. There was also a very real danger that the 
Crown might concede powers – e.g. concerning its prerogative – thereby weakening its future position and, 
indeed, efficacy.   
6 See Chapter 6, esp. 6.12 and 6.13. 
7 Cf. Marsiglio of Padua: “Whence, it seems, we can properly infer that an elected ruler, without hereditary 
succession, is greatly preferable for a polity to those who are not elected or those who are established with 
dynastic succession.”: Marsiglio of Padua, Defensor Pacis quoted in Ewart Lewis, ed., Medieval Political 
Ideas, vol. 1 (Cooper Square Publishers Inc., 1974), 189. 
8 Cf. the arguments made concerning the limits of the rule of law in Appendix I. 
9  For example, if previous monarchs had wrongfully arrogated unto themselves certain activities and 
influence, then a minority provided an opportunity to disassociate those things from the idea of the monarch 
and, where appropriate, associate or, indeed, re-associate, those things with those deemed proper. 
10 As we will later see, the accession of Henry III particularly comes to mind in this context, in the wake of 
his father, King John. 
11 For example, they might have insufficient resources to do what was expected of them, meaning that either 
they would fail to do what they were supposed to do or they would have to raise taxes more regularly and 
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frustrate expectations,12 but also opened the possibility for future internecine conflict if 
the minor were ever to seek to recover their patrimony.  
Nevertheless, in spite of some redeeming features, there is no glossing over the difficulties 
and challenges posed by royal minorities – especially lengthy ones.13 It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that royal minors were sometimes passed over and other times allowed. 
Whatever the case, it says interesting things about the contemporary constitution and 
generation.  
This chapter considers the succession in the context of the avoided and allowed English 
royal minorities between the accession of Alfred the Great (April 871) and the battle of 
Culloden (April 1746).14 In view of shortness of space, the focus will be on the most 
important element of succession: transmission. In this way, we can begin to see how the 
laws of succession were seen by each generation, and how those views changed or 
persisted over time.  
Through this study, we will be able to see several things. First, in one important respect 
at least, the constitution changed but little during the period covered – there was a 
prevalent, potent, and persistent idea that there should be a king or queen in England, 
excepting in the middle decades of the seventeenth century when the opposite was true 
                                                            
at a higher level; taxation being, of course, often unpopular. Furthermore, if there were landholders of 
approximately equal holdings or, even, landholders of greater holdings, then the monarch would be less 
able to stand over and above them; there was greater risk that they would become the puppet of others or 
just simply ineffectual.  
12 After all, there was a persistent, prevalent, and potent fixed association throughout the period, following 
the pattern of a sequential association, that – at least, for land held in fee tail – the death of the parent would 
be followed, as a matter of course, by the entrance of the child into their inheritance. Henry [IV]’s return 
from exile, before challenging Richard II for the throne, was, at least ostensibly, undertaken on this basis – 
Henry felt that he had been wronged by Richard, who had attempted to disinherit Henry of his lands after 
the death of Henry’s father, John of Gaunt.  
13 For a discussion of some of the challenges potentially posed by permitting the accession of a minor king, 
see: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” chap. 8. 
14 This timeframe has been chosen for the following reasons. Alfred’s accession recommends itself in two 
ways as the starting-point. First, prior to the reigns of Alfred’s brothers and himself, and prior to the Danish 
invasions, there were a number of different Anglo-Saxon kingdoms (i.e. social groups) – each of which 
with its own rules of succession. However, the movement towards the unification of England began in 
Alfred’s reign – the movement towards a social group existing in a geographical area now roughly 
coextensive with modern-day England and calling itself by such a name. As this was done under the 
auspices of the House of Wessex, the traditions of that House were naturally important in defining the 
kingship of England; Alfred was part of that tradition. However, the principal reason for beginning with 
Alfred’s reign is not so much to do with its wider significance, which is often overstated, but, rather, to do 
with the fact that Alfred could very well have succeeded to the exclusion of a minor: his nephew, 
Æthelwold. As an end-point, the battle of Culloden recommends itself in two ways, although it has little to 
do with royal minorities per se. Firstly, England and Scotland had already formally come together in the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and we are here principally interested in English rather than British 
constitutional history, albeit without drawing too many conclusions about the distinction between the two. 
Secondly, it was at the battle of Culloden where it was pretty much definitively decided that the succession 
was in Parliament’s power and that Parliament could do with it largely what it willed. 
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(although such republican ideas were obviously, in the long run, less potent and persistent 
than monarchical ideas).  
Second, there was a prevalent, potent, and persistent idea that the transmission of the 
crown was based on principles of heredity (i.e. gravitation), although, towards the end of 
the period, there emerges a prevalent and potent idea that the ultimate basis of the 
succession was not heredity, but gift of parliament (i.e. presentation), even if it still 
operated according to hereditary principles.  
Third, there does not appear to have been a prevalent, potent, and persistent idea that the 
monarch absolutely had to be an adult. There are indications that, at least in the earlier 
part of the period, there was an idea that it was permissible to overlook a potential 
successor if they were a minor, but this idea seems to have disappeared by the thirteenth 
century, from which time the prevalent, potent, and persistent idea appears to have been 
that the person identified by the hereditary formula would succeed even if they were a 
minor. In effect, minority was no bar to a person’s taking over – at least nominally – the 
bundle of activities and influence associated with the title of King or Queen of England. 
Nevertheless, not being disqualified on one ground does not guarantee being accepted or, 
indeed, not being disqualified, on another.  
9.2 Æthelhelm/Æthelwold (871) – Avoided 
Æthelred, K. Wessex, died sometime after 15 April 871. 15  Although Æthelred was 
survived by two sons,16 it was his younger brother, Alfred, who succeeded him. We do 
not know when Æthelred’s sons were born, but they were probably minors in 871. This 
raises the question: but for their minority, would Alfred have become king?  
To answer this, some background is required. In the early 820s, Mercia was in the 
ascendant, and controlled East Anglia and Kent. However, in 825, Egbert, K. Wessex, 
defeated the Mercian forces at Ellandun, which victory was promptly followed by the 
expulsion of the Mercian sub-king from Kent. Egbert’s son, Æthelwulf, was then installed 
                                                            
15 Michael Swanton, trans., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 2nd ed., 2000, 72–73; Simon Keynes and Michael 
Lapidge, trans., Alfred the Great: Asser’s Life of King Alfred and Other Contemporary Sources (Penguin 
Books, 1983), 80–81. It is possible that it was on 23 April of that year: John of Worcester, The Chronicle 
of Florence of Worcester with Two Continuations, ed. and trans. Thomas Forester (Henry G Bohn, 1854), 
64. 
16 These were called Æthelhelm and Æthelwold and are both mentioned in Alfred’s will, which was made 
sometime after Æthelred’s death. Æthelhelm is mentioned first and is given more properties. This would 
indicate that he was the elder of the two. This is the only mention of him, so it seems probable that he 
predeceased Alfred; he was probably living, though, in the 880s when the will was made: Keynes and 
Lapidge, Asser’s Life and Other Sources, 177, 313, 321. 
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as sub-king in Kent under his father’s authority.17 Things continued roughly in this vein 
until Egbert’s death in 839, when Æthelwulf became the first West Saxon king directly 
to succeed his father for almost two centuries.  
Æthelwulf appears to have had five or six children.18 On Æthelwulf’s promotion to the 
West Saxon throne, the eldest, Æthelstan, became K. Kent, much as his father before him. 
There was being established an idea that the K. Kent would be (a) son of the K. Wessex 
and (b) successor to the West Saxon throne. Æthelstan’s installation in Kent, therefore, 
can be seen both as an anticipatory and a constructive behaviour,19 – undertaken with the 
expectation of his eventual succession to the West Saxon throne, but also attempting to 
create such an expectation. However, Æthelstan predeceased his father, dying around 
852.  
In 855, Æthelwulf set out on pilgrimage to Rome, having already sent his younger sons, 
Æthelred and Alfred, ahead of him. During his absence, his territories were cared for by 
his living adult sons: Æthelbald had the care of Wessex and Æthelbehrt was installed as 
K. Kent. There are some points to be made here. First, Æthelwulf’s pilgrimage was rather 
unusual. It seems probable that, had he remained in Wessex, Æthelbald, like his elder 
brother, would have been given Kent and Æthelbehrt would have remained without. 
Second, we do not know if Æthelbald ever had children, but one wonders if Æthelbehrt 
would have been installed as K. Kent in 855 if Æthelbald had had a living, adult son at 
that time. Third, following the previous point, in the absence of any children, Æthelbehrt 
was – under a system of male-preference primogeniture – next in line in the succession, 
meaning that this arrangement still represents a clear ordering of successors. It still 
associates the kingship of Wessex with the eldest son. Finally, there never appears to have 
been a thought given in this connection to Æthelswith – Æthelwulf’s daughter and 
seemingly then his eldest surviving child; there remained a strong association between 
the throne and being male. As such, this situation was somewhat unusual, particularly in 
                                                            
17 We might note the succession through appropriation here. 
18 These were, in order of birth: Æthelstan, Æthelswith (his only known daughter), Æthelbald, Æthelbehrt, 
Æthelred, and Alfred. The D, E, and F versions of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle had Æthelstan as Æthelwulf’s 
brother, rather than his son. However, the A, B, and C versions, along with Æthelweard’s Chronicle all 
have Æthelstan as his son. There has been some contemporary opinion in favour of the idea of Æthelstan 
being a brother, not a son (cf. Williams), but generally opinion appears to be weighted towards the idea that 
Æthelstan was, indeed, Æthelwulf’s son (cf. Stenton, Yorke, and Kirby): FM Stenton, Anglo-Saxon 
England, 3rd ed. (Oxford University Press, 1971), 236 n. 1; Barbara Yorke, Kings and Kingdoms of Early 
Anglo-Saxon England (Routledge, 1990), 148; DP Kirby, The Earliest English Kings, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 
2000), 160; Ann Williams, “Some Notes and Considerations on Problems Connected with the English 
Royal Succession, 860-1066,” in Proceedings of the Battle Conference on Anglo-Norman Studies, ed. R 
Allen Brown (The Boydell Press, 1978), 145, 225 n. 10. 
19 See, supra, 6.3. 
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the sense that a younger brother was a king whilst the elder was not, but it does not really 
frustrate the expectations of succession: the elder brother remained associated with the 
greater social standing; the younger with the lesser.  
Æthelwulf possibly did not anticipate returning from his pilgrimage, but both he and his 
younger sons did. During their stay in Rome, it seems that Æthelred and Alfred were 
invested with the consulship of Rome – the reasons behind, and significance of, this are 
unclear.20 On their return, Æthelbald appears to have been unwilling to relinquish the 
activities and influence he had exercised back into his father’s hands. We do not know 
precisely what arrangement was struck, but it appears that Æthelwulf conceded some of 
his authority to Æthelbald, which might also have resulted in the downgrading of 
Æthelbehrt’s status as K. Kent.  
In any case, after Æthelwulf’s death in early 858, something of the status quo ante was 
restored: Æthelbald became indisputably K. Wessex and Æthelbehrt remained K. Kent. 
This situation lasted until late 860 when Æthelbald also died. In the apparent absence of 
surviving children, Æthelbehrt succeeded his brother to the West Saxon throne. For the 
five years of his reign, Æthelbehrt seems to have united Wessex and Kent under one 
headship; he appointed no sub-king, which might have been partly due to the fact that 
Æthelred and Alfred were still young.21 Æthelbehrt, like his elder brothers, does not 
appear to have had surviving children at the time of his death in 865. The throne passed 
to the next surviving brother, Æthelred.  
Like Æthelbehrt, Æthelred appears to have kept the Kentish throne vacant.22 Unlike his 
elder brothers, however, Æthelred had at least two sons: Æthelhelm and Æthelwold. We 
do not know when these were born, possibly not until after his accession in 866;23 they 
appear to have been young when Æthelred died in 871. Æthelred might have kept the 
Kentish throne vacant as he was waiting until one of his sons was old enough to occupy 
it; whilst he had living offspring, he could not install his younger and only surviving 
brother, Alfred, in Kent. Nevertheless, these children were passed over on Æthelred’s 
                                                            
20  On this, see, e.g.: Janet L Nelson, “The Problem of King Alfred’s Royal Anointing,” Journal of 
Ecclesiastical History XVIII, no. 2 (1967): 145–63. 
21 Williams, “Some Notes and Considerations on Problems Connected with the English Royal Succession, 
860-1066,” 146. 
22 Quite possibly, with Alfred’s consent: Charles Plummer, The Life and Times of Alfred the Great (Oxford 
University Press, 1902), 89. 
23 Plummer, The Life and Times of Alfred the Great, 91. 
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death in favour of Alfred. Whether they were passed over because they were children is 
the point in question. 
Asser says that, prior to his accession in 871, Alfred had been secundarius. There are 
three possible interpretations of this term: (1) Alfred was heir-apparent to Æthelred; (2) 
Alfred was in some sense Æthelred’s deputy; or (3) Alfred had been, up until that point, 
merely of secondary importance.  
The first interpretation was favoured by Plummer, who even thought it might have belied 
some Celtic influence.24 Keynes and Lapidge, in a similar vein, qualifiedly translated 
secundarius with ‘heir apparent’. 25  The second interpretation appears to have been 
favoured by Smyth, following WH Stevenson and Niermeyer, who argued that it rather 
meant viceroy or joint-king; 26  this is plausible in light of the precedents of power-
sharing.27 Whilst we cannot wholly agree with him that “[a]part from the Life of Alfred, 
                                                            
24 Plummer, The Life and Times of Alfred the Great, 40, 89–91. Cf. David N. Dumville, “The Ætheling: A 
Study in Anglo-Saxon Constitutional History,” Anglo-Saxon England 8 (1979): 1–3. 
25 Keynes and Lapidge, Asser’s Life and Other Sources, 77, 79, 80, 240.  
26 See: Alfred P Smyth, King Alfred the Great (Oxford University Press, 1995), 190; William Henry 
Stevenson, ed., Asser’s Life of King Alfred: Together with the Annals of Saint Neots Erroneously Ascribed 
to Asser (Oxford University Press, 1904), 227; “secundarius” JF Niermeyer and C van de Kieft, eds., 
Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus (EJ Brill, 1976), 951. Stevenson dismisses Freeman’s suggestion of 
subregulus, but this interpretation is none too different and can be included in this category.  
27 Whilst regnal lists tend only to list sole kings – or, at least, kings as if they ruled alone – there are a 
number of indications of power-sharing arrangements from the adventus Saxonum onwards. Kent, for 
example, was supposedly founded by the legendary brothers Hengest and Horsa. The extent to which this 
was actually a joint venture is uncertain, as is whether or not either of them were kings. Hengest always 
appears the more prominent of the two and Horsa arguably died before either of them could be said to have 
a kingdom over which to rule. Hengest was certainly described as being in the possession of a kingdom 
(rice), but he is not described as king (cyning). In any case, after Horsa’s death, Hengest might have shared 
power with his son, Æsc or Oisc. Considering that the people of Kent came to be called oiscingas, it is 
possible that it was actually Oisc, rather than his father or uncle, who was the true founder of Kent; there is 
certainly less cause to doubt his kingly status – he is described as cyning. This is all provided, of course, 
that these figures did exist and that what is written of them – we have only later accounts – is accurate. In 
late seventh century Kent, there is the curious example of uncle and nephew, Hlothere and Eadric; notably, 
there is a law code in their joint names. Whether they actually ruled together is uncertain. Similarly, in 
Wessex, there is, to begin with, the example of the founder, Cerdic, and his son, Cynric, who, in 519, 
undertook or assumed (ofengun) the rule or kingdom (rice) of the West Saxons. There is later, perhaps, also 
Cynegils and Cwichelm; at least, according to Malmesbury, who thought them brothers; this is supported, 
albeit somewhat indirectly, in Bede; less so by the ASC. The precise nature of any of these arrangements, 
such as they were, is unclear, e.g. whether a relationship of joint kings, high and sub-kings, senior and 
junior kings, nominal and actual kings, etc. Nevertheless, it is possible that power-sharing arrangements 
continued until much later; the use of sub-kings, as in Æthelwulf’s case, etc., is testament to this. On the 
reasons why regnal lists listed sole kings – perhaps because joint arrangements were more complicated to 
record or because of ecclesiastical opposition, see: Frederick M Biggs, “Edgar’s Path to the Throne,” in 
Edgar, King of the English 959-975, ed. Donald Scragg (Boydell & Brewer, 2008), 124–39. On Hengest, 
Horsa, and Æsc, see: JA Giles, ed., Six Old English Chronicles (Henry G Bohn, 1848), 399-400 (§37), 405 
(§45); Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, ed. and trans. Judith McClure and Roger 
Collins (Oxford University Press, 1999), 27 (1.15); Swanton, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 12-13 (A, E). 
On the term rice, in the context of the above, see: Swanton, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, xxxii, 14, 15. On 
Hlothere and Eadric, and their law code, see: FL Attenborough, ed., The Laws of the Earliest English Kings 
(Cambridge University Press, 1922), 2; Lisi Oliver, The Beginnings of English Law (University of Toronto 
Press, 2002), 119–20. On the term ofengun, which has been translated in a number of different ways, see: 
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there is no evidence whatever to suggest that the office of heir apparent had emerged in a 
recognizable or institutionalized form within the West Saxon dynasty at any time in the 
pre-Conquest period,” we can share his scepticism that secundarius imported some notion 
of being heir-apparent – particularly if to the exclusion of Æthelred’s sons, whatever their 
age.28 Giles and J Stevenson appear to lie somewhere between the second and third 
interpretations. They translated the term variously as: ‘subordinate station’, ‘secondary 
rank’, ‘subordinate authority’, and ‘second-in-command’.29 In some ways, these seem 
nearer to the classical Latin (i.e. the third interpretation), where secundarius meant rather 
second-rate or inferior. 30  It seems unlikely that Asser would have talked in such 
disparaging terms of Alfred, but he might have used the term for dramatic effect: until 
Æthelred’s death, Alfred was only of secondary importance, but, afterwards, he was 
second to no-one. 
The truth seems to lie somewhere between the second and third interpretations; most 
likely, with the second. This seems the most natural interpretation, which is nowhere ill-
suited. Whether it constituted a recognized contemporary title or office, however, is 
difficult to tell. Certainly, in one instance, it is used in the context of a battle, which could 
indicate that the term had military import and meant second-in-command.31 Indeed, it 
could have been conveyed as an act of appeasement – given in lieu of the kingship of 
Kent, which Alfred might otherwise have expected based on the examples of his father 
and brothers. It would also give him more concrete authority – not necessarily a bad thing 
in face of the Viking aggressions.  
                                                            
Swanton, The Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 16–17; Dorothy Whitelock, ed., English Historical Documents, c. 
500-1042, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 1979), 155; JA Giles, ed., The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 
trans. James Ingram (JM Dent & Sons Limited, 1912), 28–29; Bruce Mitchell and Fred C Robinson, A 
Guide to Old English, 5th ed. (Blackwell Publishing, 1994), 343; Mark Atherton, Complete Old English 
(Anglo-Saxon) (Teach Yourself, 2010), 332; Henry Sweet and Norman Davis, Sweet’s Anglo-Saxon Primer, 
9th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1980), 109. On power-sharing in Kent, see further: Barbara Yorke, “Joint 
Kingship in Kent c. 560 to 785,” Archaeologia Cantiana, 1983; Yorke, Kings and Kingdoms of Early 
Anglo-Saxon England, 32–34. On Cynegils and Cwichelm, see: William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the 
Kings of England from the Earliest Period to the Reign of Stephen, trans. JA Giles (George Bell & Sons, 
1904), 19–20; Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 85; Swanton, The Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicles, 22–25. 
28 Smyth, King Alfred the Great, 190. This is because, as we have seen, certain persons were very definitely 
associated with succession to the throne such that there was a very strong presumption in favour of their 
succession. This might not have been accorded with a neat label, but that does not detract from the 
underlying fact of the presumption. 
29 Giles, Six Old English Chronicles, 53, 55, 56; Joseph Stevenson, ed., The Church Historians of England, 
vol. 2.2 (Seeleys, 1854), 451, 453, 454. 
30 “secundarius” Sir William Smith and JF Lockwood, eds., A Smaller Latin-English Dictionary, 3rd ed. 
(John Murray, 1933), 670. 
31 This was the battle of Ashdown, which took place in January 871. See: Keynes and Lapidge, Asser’s Life 
and Other Sources, 79 (38). 
308 
 
Such a preeminent position might have made Alfred a natural successor to his brother, 
but it did not predestine him to be such. It did not create a direct association between 
being secundarius and being next in the line of succession, though it probably made it 
easier to countenance Alfred as his brother’s successor. This was perhaps not 
unintentional on Æthelred’s part; in this, we might see something of a constructive 
behaviour planning for the succession if it were to happen sooner, rather than later.32  
More curious are the arrangements by which Æthelred ‘virtually disinherited’ his sons.33 
There can be little doubt that, by so doing, Æthelred effectively designated Alfred as his 
successor – for with land comes wealth and, with wealth, power. This was clearly a 
constructive behaviour.34 The pertinent question is whether the situation would have been 
the same had Æthelred died when his sons were full-grown. One would suspect that it 
would not have been. It was, rather, an arrangement designed to meet immediate needs. 
Had Æthelred lived longer, he probably would have rewritten his will; this solution was 
simplest at the time it was made. In sum, Alfred probably became king only because 
Æthelred’s sons were minors; his kingship was allowed to avoid a minority in a time of 
crisis.  
That this arrangement was allowed shows the Generational Theory of Law at work; the 
people of the time were willing to modify their associations to best suit. However, it still 
generally conformed to people’s expectations regarding the succession and was largely 
conservative: Alfred was of the House of Wessex, male, and next in line after Æthelred’s 
sons. Nevertheless, some expectations were frustrated by this – particularly, Æthelwold’s 
(Æthelred’s son). Æthelwold, though seemingly quiet during Alfred’s reign, rebelled 
when Alfred’s son, Edward the Elder, acceded. Æthelwold almost certainly saw himself 
as the rightful successor – being the eldest son of the eldest son who had had children. 
Although he does not appear to have gained overwhelming support in Wessex, his support 
across the country indicates perhaps the prevalence of this frustration – that he was right 
to feel aggrieved, because, according to gravitational principles, he was the rightful heir.35 
                                                            
32 It is worthwhile noting that, if secundarius did mean in some sense joint-king, Alfred might have claimed 
the kingship by virtue of survivorship; this scenario seems unlikely. 
33 Williams, “Some Notes and Considerations on Problems Connected with the English Royal Succession, 
860-1066,” 147. 
34 See, supra, 6.3 
35 It would be wrong, of course, to entirely discount the possibility of opportunism here – Æthelwold might 
have found support around the country because those other parts were fearful of the power of Wessex and, 
indeed, perhaps because they thought that Æthelwold might make a more pliable king than Edward, 
especially if he had been raised to the kingship of Wessex with their support.  
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In any case, his death in battle ended his claim.36 It is noteworthy that Edward the Elder 
later followed his uncle’s example of settling the succession by will.37 
9.3 Eadwig/Eadgar (946) – Avoided 
Eadred acceded in 946 to the exclusion of his nephews, Eadwig and Eadgar (sons of his 
older brother and predecessor, Edmund). As with all succession events, it can only be 
properly understood in its context: the unification of England.  
Under Edward the Elder, West Saxon influence had spread across the English and Danish 
territories. Edward had been succeeded by his son, Æthelstan, whose accession was by 
no means guaranteed, although the fact that he was Edward’s eldest surviving son 
probably counted for much, even in spite of other factors;38 the hereditary principle was 
probably prevalent and potent. Even still, not everybody was convinced: a rebellion under 
one Alfred had to be put down in Winchester; Æthelstan’s half-brother, Edwin, possibly 
conspired for the throne.39 Æthelstan does not appear to have had any surviving male 
children. When he died, the crown passed to his half-brother, Edmund, whose reign, like 
Æthelstan’s, was short.40 Eadwig, Edmund’s eldest son, was probably no older than six 
when his father died.   
Edmund, like his half-brother and father, had spent much of his reign fighting. West 
Saxon dominance was widespread, but not yet entrenched. There was a choice between 
Eadred (Edward’s youngest son and Edmund’s full-brother), who appears to have been 
of poor health, and Edmund’s sons who, as aforesaid, were children. In this case, the 
children were overlooked in favour of Eadred. Though the hereditary principle was bent, 
it was not broken: Eadred was next in line after them and, as things turned out, they 
succeeded each in turn after him – still as minors.  
                                                            
36 On Æthelwold’s rebellion, see: James Campbell, “What Is Not Known about the Reign of Edward the 
Elder,” in Edward the Elder, 899-924, ed. NJ Higham and DH Hill (Routledge, 2001), 21–23; Stenton, 
Anglo. Sax. Engl., 321–22. 
37 This is according to Malmesbury: “Æthelstan, as his father [Edward the Elder] had commanded in his 
will, was then hailed king, recommended by his years – for he was now thirty – and the maturity of his 
wisdom”: William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of England, 131. 
38 There is some indication that Æthelstan was favoured by his grandfather, Alfred the Great – in which we 
can see elements of designation and constructive behaviours. Moreover, his popularity in Mercia – where 
he was raised – probably also counted for much. On these, see: Sarah Foot, Æthelstan: The First King of 
England (Yale University Press, 2011), 11; Stenton, Anglo. Sax. Engl., 339. There is also a later tradition 
– to be found in Malmesbury – that prophecy played some role. See: William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of 
the Kings of England, 139. 
39 See: Foot, Æthelstan, 40–43. 
40 He reigned for around six and a half years before he was murdered in an affray by one Liofa/Leofa in 
946. For this event, see: William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of England, 143; Swanton, The 
Anglo-Saxon Chronicles, 112 (D); John of Worcester, Chronicle, 99. 
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9.4 Eadwig (955) and Eadgar (959) – Minorities 
Eadred was the last of Edward the Elder’s sons; Edward the Elder’s brother, Æthelweard, 
was long deceased. Besides Eadwig and Eadgar, there were no living sons of a former 
West Saxon monarch. If the hereditary principle were to be maintained, there was little 
choice but to accept one of Edmund’s sons. The fascinating thing about Eadwig and 
Eadgar is not so much the fact of their accession as minors, but, rather, the manner 
thereof. 
Eadwig, the elder of the two, appears at first to have succeeded to all of his uncle’s 
dominions. However, he proved unpopular and fell out with prominent ecclesiasts. The 
North rejected him in favour of his younger brother, Eadgar. That they turned to Eadgar 
and not some other is noteworthy. After Eadwig, Eadgar was the most throneworthy – 
who better to challenge the throne than the next in line? After a period of conflict, it was 
settled that Eadwig would have Wessex; Eadgar would have the rest. Eadwig’s death 
ended this arrangement and Eadgar incorporated Wessex into his dominions. He was 
thereafter undisputed king. Nowhere appears any doubts as to the suitability of minors 
for kingship.   
9.5 Edward the Martyr (975) and Æthelred II (978)  – Minorities 
Eadgar had at least four children by three women. It is uncertain as to whether he married 
the first two of these, whose children were Edward and Eadgyth respectively;41 their 
legitimacy, therefore, is doubtful,42 and, consequently, their eligibility to succeed to the 
throne. 43  Eadgar was certainly married to the third, Ælfthryth, who was mother to 
Edmund and Æthelred;44 she was also certainly invested as queen.45 As such, Ælfthryth’s 
children arguably had better claim to the throne, being legitimate and doubly royal. 
Eadgar probably intended that the eldest of these succeed him and undertook constructive 
behaviours towards this end,46 amounting perhaps to an act of presentation; originally, 
this was to Edmund’s benefit, but, after his death,47 it fell to Æthelred.48  
                                                            
41 Eadgyth is sometimes known as Edith ‘of Wilton’. 
42 Levi Roach, Æthelred the Unready (Yale University Press, 2016), 43–45. 
43 Eadgyth, being female, was, of course, perhaps also considered ineligible because of her sex. See, supra, 
6.12. 
44 Roach, Æthelred the Unready, 48ff. 
45 Stafford, Pauline, “Ælfthryth” in Michael Lapidge et al., eds., The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of 
Anglo-Saxon England, 2nd ed. (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2014), 11. 
46 Miller, Sean, “Edgar” in Lapidge et al., The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Anglo-Saxon England, 164; 
NJ Higham, The Death of Anglo-Saxon England (Sutton Publishing, 1997), 6–7. 
47 This occurred c. 971. 
48 Higham, The Death of Anglo-Saxon England, 7. 
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Both Edward and Æthelred were children when Eadgar died – the problem does not 
appear to have been whether one of them would succeed but, rather, which of them. In 
spite of Eadgar’s apparent intentions, it was Edward – his eldest son by any pairing – who 
succeeded. There can be little doubt that politics played a significant role in this – 
especially the support given him by prominent churchmen.49 However, the associational 
environment in which this took place cannot be ignored. Both Edward and Æthelred were, 
in a sense, Eadgar’s eldest surviving sons. Each arguably had a claim to the throne. Their 
status as minors appears to have been unimportant. That the factions rallied around these 
and no others is the salient point. There might have been a succession crisis of sorts, but 
this was largely due to complications rather than lack of rules.  
Edward died prematurely in 978 – probably at the hands, or orders, of his step-mother, 
Ælfthryth. If so, this can be interpreted as opportunism, but it can also be seen in the light 
of Ælfthryth’s expectations having been frustrated. To her mind, her son was not only 
most throneworthy, but also designate of Eadgar (i.e. he had both gravitational and 
presentational claims); Edward should never have been king, which fact justified his early 
demise. Æthelred was still only around twelve years old when his succeeded his half-
brother. He was now Eadgar’s sole surviving son by any coupling; his accession appears 
to have been unopposed. Though some might have been upset with the manner of his 
accession, there could be little gainsaying the fact that he was, as things stood, the rightful 
heir according to the principles of hereditary right – and regardless of his age.  
9.6 Edmund Ætheling/Edward the Exile (1016) – Avoided 
On the face of it, the avoided minorities of Edmund Ætheling and Edward the Exile 
(Edmund Ironside’s sons) resulted from act of outright appropriation by the Danish 
invader, Cnut.50 However, there is a great deal more to it than this.  
In the years 1014-6, Cnut waged war against Æthelred II and his son, Edmund Ironside.51 
The hereditary principle is to be found here. Cnut’s father, Swein Forkbeard (K. 
Denmark), had successfully invaded England, driven out Æthelred II, and been crowned 
in late 1013 – only to die a few weeks later. As such, Cnut was not so much a barefaced 
conqueror as successor to his father’s English claim.52 Indeed, neither Swein’s nor Cnut’s 
claims were entirely capricious. In the eyes of some, Æthelred, through his misrule, had 
                                                            
49 See: Higham, The Death of Anglo-Saxon England, 7ff. 
50 On ‘outright appropriation’, see, supra, 6.13.3. 
51 See: MK Lawson, Cnut: England’s Viking King, 1016-35, 2nd ed. (The History Press, 2011), 25–52. 
52 His brother, Harald, succeeded Swein in Denmark. 
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forfeited his right to the throne, which forfeiture might extend to his descendants; though 
accepted back after Swein’s death, in his initial displacement, the damage had been done. 
After Æthelred’s death in 1016, Ironside and Cnut agreed to divide the kingdom; 
following Ironside’s death shortly thereafter, Cnut was accepted as king to the exclusion 
of any claimant of the House of Wessex.53 His claim was far from indefeasible. Ironside 
left two infant sons, Edmund Ætheling and Edward the Exile; he also had a full brother, 
Eadwig, and two half-brothers by Æthelred’s Norman wife, Emma, named Alfred and 
Edward.54 However, there appears to have been little appetite for their claims, especially 
after Emma wedded Cnut with the stipulation that it would be their children who would 
be Cnut’s successors.  
There appears, therefore, to have been some idea that the fixed expectations might be 
altered by agreement, which seems to be in accordance with the Generational Theory. 
However, there also appears to have been some recognition that old fixed expectations 
often do not simply disappear. The ejection from England of prominent surviving 
members of the House of Wessex, including Edmund and Edward, as well as Edmund’s 
brother and half-brothers, speaks volumes.55 Their claims were potentially superior to 
Cnut’s and their presence might act as a reminder of the irregularities of Cnut’s accession. 
Yet, if they were out of sight, they might more likely be out of mind – if people are not 
thinking of them, they will not think about how their expectations have been frustrated.  
Any fixed associations in favour of Edmund’s infant sons, or, indeed, Æthelred’s other 
sons, were clearly not so potent as to have created virulent opposition to Cnut. The fact 
of Cnut’s raw power and influence cannot be disregarded,56 but there is the sense that 
there were attempts to justify and rationalize his kingship; to attempt to reconcile it with 
people’s expectations. His security on the throne shows that this was largely successful; 
                                                            
53 Lawson, Cnut, 82. 
54 This latter was to become Edward the Confessor. 
55 As Cnut married Alfred and Edward’s mother, Emma of Normandy, these two probably had a measure 
of personal safety, so long as they remained outside of England. It is possible, however, that Cnut had exiled 
Edmund Ironside’s sons, Edmund and Edward the Exile, with the intention of having them murdered 
outside of England; it was perhaps only the generosity or pity of Olaf, K. Sweden and Cnut’s half-brother, 
to whom they had been sent, that saved them. Their onward journey to Hungary certainly seems wise; they 
were a great deal safer there, at least as regards Cnut and his line. Cnut might have had similar designs on 
the head of Edmund Ironside’s brother, Eadwig. In any event, he, too, was exiled, but, unlike his half-
brothers and nephews, soon returned; he was killed or executed shortly thereafter (1017). See: Lawson, 
Cnut, 84–85. 
56 The addition of sweeteners and other incentives also cannot be discounted, which must be weighed beside 
this. Much as the The Student’s Hume says, Cnut, “partly by promises and partly by intimidation, was 
elected king”: David Hume and JS Brewer, The Student’s Hume: A History of England, Based on the 




expectations might be settled to a great extent by victory and acceptance.57 Nevertheless, 
even though the laws of succession might be sometimes overridden, it does not mean that 
they could be entirely disregarded. There was clearly an expectation following Cnut’s 
death that it should be one of his sons who succeeded; the hereditary principle had not 
been destroyed, but merely transferred. 
9.7 Eadgar the Ætheling (1066) – Avoided 
Cnut died in 1035. He was succeeded by his sons Harold and Harthacnut in turn, neither 
of whom had surviving children. The throne then returned to the House of Wessex with 
Edward the Confessor, which fact demonstrates an anxiousness for there to be an orderly 
succession and preferably one based on hereditary right. The Danish claim had displaced 
the Wessex claim, but, the former having dissipated, the Wessex claim once more 
resumed its place.  
Edward died in 1066 and a succession crisis followed. There were arguably four 
claimants: First, Edward’s first-cousin-one-removed, William, D. Normandy, who argued 
that Edward had promised him the throne in 1051;58 moreover, that the Anglo-Dane,59 
Harold Godwinson, E. Wessex, had promised to support his claim in 1064;60 and, besides, 
he had some hereditary right.61 Second, Harold himself, Edward’s brother-in-law, who 
argued that Edward had bequeathed him the throne in extremis.62 Third, Harald Hardrada, 
K. Norway, whose tenuous claim rested on an agreement of 1036.63 Finally, Eadgar the 
                                                            
57 The maxim factum valet might be recalled here. See: supra, 6.13.3.  
58 See: David C Douglas, William the Conqueror (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969), 169, 252. 
59 “Harold’s mother, Gytha, was the daughter of Thorgil Sprakling, a Dane. Her brother, Ulf, married 
Estrid Svendsdatter, the sister of King Cnut. This meant that Cnut was brother to Harold’s mother’s 
sister-in-law”: Stephen Gates, “The Nature and Identity of the Constitution during the Minority of Henry 
III (1216-1227)” (University of Exeter, 2014), 29. 
60 The precise circumstances of this event are debated, but there is every reason to think that Harold’s 
promise, if he made one, was not freely given: See: Douglas, William the Conqueror, 175–78. 
61 See: Douglas, William the Conqueror, 250–51. 
62 See: Douglas, William the Conqueror, 181–82, 252. Whether Edward was at liberty to dispose of the 
kingdom by designation is debateable, as is whether he could change his mind having done so. There was 
perhaps some difference here between English and Norman customs, as Beckerman has discussed. 
Beckerman argued that, in English testamentary custom, verba novissima (the ‘newest’ or most recent 
expression) had priority, whereas, in Normandy, earlier promises were irrevocable and unbreakable. These 
conclusions have been questioned by Tabuteau. Nevertheless, William does not have appeared to deny that 
Edward could change his mind; the matter was quite otherwise with the English magnates who had 
promised to support his claim. See: John S Beckerman, “Succession in Normandy, 1087, and in England, 
1066: The Role of Testamentary Custom,” Speculum 47, no. 2 (April 1972): 258–60; Emily Zack Tabuteau, 
“The Role of Law in the Succession to Normandy and England, 1087,” Haskins Society Journal 3 (1991): 
141–69; George Garnett, Conquered England: Kingship, Succession, and Tenure 1066-1166 (Oxford 
University Press, 2007); Gates, “The Nature and Identity of the Constitution during the Minority of Henry 
III (1216-1227).” 
63 This agreement was made between Magnus Magnusson and Harthacnut, in which they agreed to be one 
another’s successors; they made each to the other the “rightful heir as if he were his brother born”. Whether 
– on Harthacnut’s side – this agreement was supposed to include only Denmark or also to extend to England 
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Ætheling, son of Edward the Exile, grandson of Edmund Ironside, and great-grandson of 
Æthelred II.  
Eadgar possessed the strongest dynastic claim, but he was young and the various promise-
makings had created strong competition. Eadgar was initially passed over and Harold 
made king. 64  Harold defeated Hardrada, 65  but failed to defeat William and died so 
attempting.66 It was at this point that Eadgar was chosen as successor, although his claim 
was quickly abandoned in the face of a belligerent William.  
These events demonstrate the power of presentation, especially designation; the power 
that giving and promising-to-give have in creating expectations. Harold, Hardrada, and 
William all thought that they were the rightful heir because – directly or indirectly – they 
had been given the kingdom by a former king. It also demonstrates that hereditary right 
can be eroded. Eadgar was merely the grandson of someone who had merely been K. 
Wessex for a short while. He was perhaps too far removed from an indisputable king to 
give rise to a strong and indefeasible expectation that he should succeed. Nevertheless, 
his being touted as successor demonstrates the continuing power of heredity – especially 
given his youth and inexperience, and William’s presence nearby with a considerable 
force.67 
                                                            
(of which he was not then in possession), is uncertain. When Harthacnut died without children in 1042, 
Magnus attempted to press his claims pursuant to the agreement. He took Denmark, but stopped short of 
invading England, where Edward the Confessor had already been installed. From his actions, it would 
appear that Hardrada thought England included in the agreement. See: Alison Finlay, ed., Fagrskinna, a 
Catalogue of the Kings of Norway: A Translation with Introduction and Notes (Koninklijke Brill NV, 
2004), 171; Gates, “The Nature and Identity of the Constitution during the Minority of Henry III (1216-
1227),” 28–29. 
64 Freeman, for example, thought that Harold was elected by “the Witan, not of this or that shire or ancient 
Kingdom, but of the whole realm of England”; indeed, he was “freely offered the Crown”. The strength of 
the evidence for Freeman’s claims, however, have been questioned by Round. Cf. Edward Augustus 
Freeman, The History of the Norman Conquest of England: Its Causes and Its Results, vol. 3 (Oxford 
University Press, 1869), chap. 11 (quotes at 21, 24); J. Horace Round, Geoffrey de Mandeville: A Study of 
the Anarchy (Longmans, Green and Co., 1892), 8–9, 437–38.  
65 This was at the battle of Stamford Bridge, 25 September 1066. This was the last time that the Danish 
claim to the English throne was prosecuted – certainly, with any real intent. In 1075, Cnut (son of the late 
Swein Estrithson and brother to the then K. Denmark, Harold) sailed to England with 200 ships after an 
appeal from a group of rebel barons. The Danes arrived too late, however, and contented themselves with 
raids on the coast and York. In 1081, Cnut – now K. Denmark himself – appears to have seriously 
contemplated prosecuting the Danish claim and made significant preparations therefor. William I was 
sufficiently concerned so as to have readied the coasts for invasion by stripping them of supplies; he also 
brought a number of mercenaries from the continent. However, the threat never materialized due to 
infighting in the Scandinavian camp; Cnut was murdered the following year. On these events, see: Stenton, 
Anglo. Sax. Engl., 611, 617; Douglas, William the Conqueror, 232–33, 346–47, 356. 
66 This was at the battle of Hastings, 14 October 1066. For which, see: Douglas, William the Conqueror, 
198–204. 
67 Of course, the fact that he was a ‘native’ (i.e. English) claimant might also have worked in his favour, as 
opposed to the foreigner William of Normandy. Nevertheless, Eadgar was not chosen at random from the 
Anglo-Saxon population; his selection was methodical and deliberate, albeit transitory. 
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The 1066 succession was largely settled by force of arms and chance of battle – by 
conquest. Nevertheless, there is a sense in which that conquest vindicated William’s right. 
Was it not a sign of God’s favour?68 Indeed, of God’s disfavour towards Harold and the 
English?69 In any case, it is clear that no claim was wanton – each argued that they had 
some right because of some reason, which reason was sufficient. There was no singularly 
prevalent and potent expectation, but there were clearly strongly held expectations, which 
followed certain fixed associations.  
9.8 Henry FitzEmpress (1135) – Avoided 
Henry I had two legitimate children.70 His son, William Adelin, died in 1120,71 leaving 
only a daughter, the Empress Matilda. As Malmesbury noted, she had excellent pedigree, 
being descended from William I in the paternal line and from the West Saxon kings in 
the maternal line.72 Her sex, however, posed a problem. Except for perhaps Seaxburh,73 
there had never been a regnant queen in an English kingdom; there had been queen 
regents, but none reigning suo jure.74 Naturally, this led people to wonder whether such 
                                                            
68 There is a strong indication that William’s adherents, if not William himself, thought his accession a sign 
of God’s favour, if not God’s command. See: Douglas, William the Conqueror, 253. 
69 This was the view, for example, of Adam of Bremen and Hariulf. See: Elisabeth van Houts, “The Norman 
Conquest through European Eyes,” The English Historical Review 110, no. 438 (1995): esp. 836, 845. 
70 This was besides a number of illegitimate children. See: Chris Given-Wilson and Alice Curteis, The 
Royal Bastards of Medieval England (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), chaps. 4–5. 
71 His name, Adelin, was, interestingly, a Latinization of Ætheling. He died in the White Ship disaster, when 
the ship in which he was sailing sank, seemingly due to sailing at night-time with an inebriated crew. 
72 William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of England, 482. 
73 Seaxburh of Wessex (d. ca. 674) was the wife of Cenwalh. It is possible that she was sole ruler of Wessex 
for one or two years after her husband’s death, although the fact of her reign is by no means certain. Bede 
neither mentions her by name nor her accession; rather, he records that Cenwalh’s kingdom was divided 
after his death among a number of under-kings. The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle merely notes the occurrence 
of her reign; Æthelweard’s treatment is similar. John of Worcester, later, records the difference of opinion 
between the Chronicle and Bede, but does not decide one way or the other.  Malmesbury, however, follows 
the Chronicle’s story and elaborates somewhat. According to Malmesbury, Seaxburh had been entrusted 
with the rule of the kingdom (regni arbitrium…delegandum putavit) by Cenwalh. It is entirely possible 
that, rather than being queen regnant, Seaxburh was, in fact, a regent for some child who presumably did 
not survive. This was the only reason Sir Charles Oman could imagine to explain this episode. It would 
explain much. See: Bede, The Ecclesiastical History of the English People, 190-191 (4.12); A Campbell, 
ed., The Chronicle of Æthelweard (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1962), 19–20; John of Worcester, 
Chronicle, 23; William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of England, 30; William of Malmesbury, 
Gesta Regum Anglorum, ed. Thomas Duffus Hardy, vol. 1 (Sumptibus Societatis, 1840), 45 (§32); Charles 
Oman, A History of England before the Norman Conquest, 6th ed. (Methuen & Co., 1924), 288. Given the 
relatively advanced status of women in Anglo-Saxon society, it is perhaps surprising that there were not 
more queens regnant. There is a curious story from ninth-century Mercia concerning Cwenthryth and 
Cynehelm (St. Kenhelm). According to Malmesbury, Cynehelm was entrusted to his sister, Cwenthryth, 
“for the purpose of education”. She, however, “entertaining hopes of the kingdom for herself”, had him 
murdered.  Whether this story is based in historical reality is far from clear. See: William of Malmesbury, 
Chronicle of the Kings of England, 238–39. Whether Æthelflæd, Lady of the Mercians (dau. Alfred the 
Great, d. June 918), was an invested queen is doubtful, although she was clearly viewed as such in some 
quarters: Lapidge et al., The Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Anglo-Saxon England, 16; Stenton, Anglo. 
Sax. Engl., 324. 
74 That is, in her own right. 
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a thing were possible – could one seriously associate in one’s mind the crown with a 
woman?  
Henry apparently believed one could. He was anxious, at least initially, that Matilda 
should be his successor. Undoubtedly, he thought it hers by hereditary right, being his 
sole surviving legitimate issue.75 However, he seems to have doubted whether others 
would agree; that this hereditary right would be so potent in people’s minds once gender 
entered the equation. Henry, therefore, adopted a means of impressing on people’s minds 
that Matilda was to be his successor. He had the nobility swear oaths recognizing her as 
his successor (London, 1127). It appears that, in the first instance, they did so happily.76 
Henry miscalculated in subsequently marrying Matilda to Geoffrey of Anjou (1129), 
seemingly without consultation. Many of those who had sworn oaths now considered 
them set aside.77 To put the matter beyond doubt, Henry had the nobility renew their oaths 
at Northampton (1131).78 On 4 March 1133, Matilda gave birth to a son, Henry.79 That 
he was named Henry, after his grandfather, is no insignificant fact; it created an 
association in people’s mind between grandfather and grandson; a family name for a 
family claim. In 1134, according to Hoveden, Henry once again had his barons swear an 
oath – this time both to his daughter and her son.80  
In his final months, Henry’s relationship with his daughter and son-in-law appears to have 
soured. It is rumoured that, on his deathbed, he disinherited Matilda and designated his 
nephew, Stephen,81 as his successor.82 If true, this would provide a fascinating insight 
into Henry’s mind. It would indicate that he thought he had such a power (i.e. of 
disposition)83 and, moreover, that it could set aside hereditary right.  
                                                            
75 It is noteworthy that none of Henry’s legitimate sons, though male, were ever considered as possible 
successors to Henry. 
76 See: C Warren Hollister, Henry I (Yale University Press, 2001), 317–18; Edmund King, King Stephen 
(Yale University Press, 2010), 30–31. There appears to have been some contention as to who would swear 
the oath first – Robert, E. Gloucester (Matilda’s illegitimate half-brother) or Stephen of Blois. 
77 William of Malmesbury, Chronicle of the Kings of England, 483. 
78 See: Hollister, Henry I, 463; King, King Stephen, 36. King has argued that Stephen of Blois – Matilda’s 
future contender – was not present at this second oath-making ceremony. 
79 Wilfred Lewis Warren, Henry II (Methuen, 1977), 11. 
80 Roger of Hoveden, Cronica Magistri Rogeri de Houedene, ed. William Stubbs, vol. 1 (Longmans, Green, 
Reader, and Dyer, 1868), 187; see also William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin 
and Development, 6th ed., vol. 1 (Clarendon Press, 1903), 369. It is not clear whether this oath was intended 
such that Matilda was to succeed her father and then her son to succeed her, or whether her son was 
supposed to directly succeed his grandfather, bypassing Matilda (albeit, perhaps, creating her regent). 
81 This was the son of Henry’s sister, Adela. 
82 See: Hollister, Henry I, 477ff, cf. 308–11; King, King Stephen, 48–49. 
83 See supra, 6.13.2. 
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Henry I died in 1135 and Stephen seized the throne, in a manner not dissimilar to Henry 
himself: through proximity and promptitude. His popularity in London was also a 
considerable factor. There followed a bitter dispute between Matilda and Stephen. That 
Stephen’s coronation excluded Matilda says much for the potency of the idea of the 
coronation (i.e. coupling) in people’s minds; perhaps Stephen had less right, but he was 
still the anointed monarch. For present purposes, the important point is that, throughout 
the majority of the dispute, Matilda appears to be fighting primarily on her own behalf 
and not directly on her son’s. However, there is an argument that this was an avoided 
minority. If Matilda had been ineligible and her son eligible, then Stephen’s accession 
prevented a royal minority.  
To a certain extent, this episode demonstrates a weakness in the hereditary principle. 
However, it seems unlikely that any such situation would have arisen had William Adelin 
lived or had Matilda been male. The principles of heredity still had the greatest force in 
people’s minds; only the novelty of the situation created uncertainty. It was unclear 
whether women could succeed or transmit any right to their offspring. This does not mean 
that the laws of succession were generally unclear or non-existent; they were merely 
unclear in this scenario. 
9.9 Henry the Young King  
Henry II had five legitimate sons of which we know.84 His firstborn son died in infancy, 
leaving Henry’s namesake as the eldest. In June 1170, Henry II had this Young Henry – 
then aged fifteen – crowned. Power-sharing arrangements were not uncommon in Anglo-
Saxon England; 85  crowning one’s successor during one’s lifetime (anticipatory 
association) was not uncommon in France.86 However, in late twelfth-century England, 
it was decidedly uncommon. It is worthwhile considering this, especially given that the 
Young Henry was still arguably a minor when accorded kingly status.  
In 1152, K. Stephen attempted to have his son, Eustace, crowned as junior king; the 
Church refused him.87 This episode is interesting in a number of respects. Firstly, in the 
course of their arguments, a claim was made that Matilda was the result of a bigamous 
                                                            
84 These were: William (b. 1153), Henry (b. 1155), Richard (b. 1157), Geoffrey (b. 1158), and John (b. 
1166) 
85 Supra, n. 23. 
86 Andrew W Lewis, “Anticipatory Association of the Heir in Early Capetian France,” The American 
Historical Review 83, no. 4 (1978): 906–27. 
87 Henry of Huntingdon, The History of the English People 1000-1154, trans. Diana Greenway (Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 88; John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, ed. and trans. Marjorie Chibnall 
(Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1956), 83–86. 
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union. 88  She was, therefore, illegitimate. That this line of argument was pursued 
demonstrates the power of heredity in contemporary thought; to defeat Matilda’s claim 
on this score would be to all but destroy her claim. That Stephen’s own hereditary claim 
was weak – given that he had older brothers89 – appears not to have detracted from the 
supposed weakness of Matilda’s claim. He could build his own claim, if only he could 
destroy Matilda’s first.  
Secondly, it is interesting because Stephen argued that his oath to support Matilda had 
been given under duress. Beneath this argument is a fixed association: oaths need only be 
honoured if given voluntarily. Stephen’s oath was involuntarily given and, therefore, not 
binding. In any case, Stephen argued that his oath, such as it was, was only to an heir 
presumptive;90 further, it was conditional on Henry’s not designating some other heir. The 
implication of the former is that Stephen would have respected the right of a legitimate 
male heir born to Henry by his second wife; once again, the potency of the idea of heredity 
rears its head. The matter of designation requires more consideration.  
According to Stephen’s advocates, Henry I had changed his mind on his deathbed and 
designated Stephen as his successor.91 His quarrels with his daughter and son-in-law 
shortly before his death make this plausible. The scope of his supposed power of 
designation is not revealed. Might he appoint his successor only in the absence of 
legitimate heirs, or might he appoint them even to the exclusion of legitimate heirs? 
Stephen’s later agreement with Henry FitzEmpress to the exclusion of his own son 
favours the latter;92 Stephen’s attempts to assail Matilda’s legitimacy rather favours the 
                                                            
88  Salisbury uses the term “incestis” in reference to the marriage, which Chibnall translated with 
“incestuous”. However, this was not an incestuous union; Henry and his wife, Matilda of Scotland, were 
not closely related. The term would be better translated with “impure”, “unclean”, or “unholy”: John of 
Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, 83; Cf. “incestus, a, um” Smith and Lockwood, A Smaller Latin-English 
Dictionary, 336; “incestus, a, um” James Morwood, ed., Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, 3rd ed. (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 91. It was supposedly bigamous because Matilda had reportedly been a nun, though 
she denied it; the marriage had been approved at the time by Anselm and an ecclesiastical council. Indeed, 
Anselm himself officiated at the marriage, though it is possible that he had lingering doubts as to its validity. 
For this episode, see: Lois L. Huneycutt, Matilda of Scotland: A Study in Medieval Queenship (Boydell 
Press, 2003), 28–30. 
89 It is possible that one of these, William the Simple, had some form of learning disorder or other cognitive 
impairment, hence his epithet.  
90 After the death of Henry I’s first wife and mother to his legitimate children (i.e. William Adelin and the 
Empress Matilda), Henry I remarried – this time, Adeliza of Louvain. Had that union resulted in male 
offspring, Matilda would have been displaced in the line of succession.  
91 John of Salisbury, Historia Pontificalis, 84. 
92 It would appear that a peace, brokered between Stephen and Henry in July 1153, excluded Eustace from 
the throne. By his reaction, it would appear that Eustace’s expectations had been severely frustrated, though 
he died in mid-August – about the time that Henry’s first child, a son, was born. In the autumn, the terms 
of the peace appear to have been worked out still further on the basis of the earlier agreement; it was ratified 
at Winchester in November. Stephen still had a living son, William. It is important to note that part of the 
method by which Henry’s succession was achieved is that Stephen is supposed to have adopted Henry as 
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former. In all likelihood, it was decidedly ambiguous. That designation – in whatever 
form – might create strong expectations concerning the succession demonstrates its 
potency as an idea, even to rival heredity.  
The Church’s reasoning when refusing to crown Eustace is important. Though Stephen 
and Eustace were not on best terms with the Church,93 it is important to notice that the 
Church was at pains to offer a reasoned decision. It could not crown Eustace because it 
regarded Stephen’s oath to uphold Matilda’s claim as binding. Stephen was a usurper; he 
could not pass the throne to his son.94 Whether the Church would have found some other 
reason to refuse had Stephen not sworn the oath is difficult to tell. Nevertheless, its being 
taken as a potent reason is the salient point – as is the fact that it did not deny Stephen on 
the basis that, in England, there could be no such thing as a junior king.  
This episode also highlights the power of coronation as a form of coupling. Stephen 
desired his son’s coronation because, once accomplished, it could not be undone; weak 
title might be perfected by the fact of anointing. There was such a fixed and potent 
association between coronation and being king that it defeated anything that might 
pretend to gainsay it (e.g. lack of title). Stephen hoped to draw on the strength of this 
association; its strength was not lost Henry II. In having the Young Henry crowned, Henry 
effectively confirmed him as his successor. 
Henry might have been emulating French examples; he might have thought his dynasty 
insecure. Whether anticipatory association demonstrates the strength or weakness of the 
hereditary principle is debateable, as is whether it is more an anticipatory or constructive 
behaviour. In any case, Young Henry’s coronation was unique in mediaeval England. 
Things might have been otherwise had Young Henry lived to become sole king and have 
children of his own, or had his brothers lived and seen their children approach maturity. 
As it was, this practice was probably largely forgotten; consequently, its prevalence 
decreased. It would also have been interesting whether Young Henry – had he lived – 
would have required a further coronation, especially given the ceremonial irregularities 
                                                            
his son and Henry taken Stephen as a father (Henry’s father, Geoffrey, C. Anjou, having died in 1151). 
William was probably a few years younger than Henry and, as such, Henry became the eldest of Stephen’s 
surviving sons. There was a clear attempt, therefore, to track as closely as possible to people’s ordinary 
expectations concerning the succession, i.e. that it should proceed on an hereditary principle. On these 
events, see: King, King Stephen, 277ff. 
93 See, e.g. Huntingdon, History of the English People, 88, 92. 
94 For this argument, see Huntingdon, History of the English People, 88. 
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of the first (e.g. being crowned by the Abp. York, rather than Abp. Canterbury – at that 
time, Becket). If so, it would say much about concurrent ideas regarding coupling. 
9.10 Arthur of Brittany (1199) – Avoided 
Arthur was the posthumous son of Geoffrey Plantagenet and grandson of Henry II. He 
was recently twelve when his uncle, Richard I, died in April 1199. The question was 
whether the throne should pass to Arthur, whose father, Geoffrey, would have been the 
next in line but for his premature death, or, alternatively, to John, who was Richard and 
Geoffrey’s younger brother. John had been the son and brother of kings; Arthur only a 
nephew and grandson.  
Henry II might have intended for a while to make John his heir and refused demands to 
name Richard; it was only through duress and weariness that he relented, and allowed his 
barons to swear fealty to Richard.95 Richard appears to have initially been reticent as to 
his heir; he refused to designate either John or Arthur when he left on Crusade in 1190.96 
However, en route to the Holy Land, he made a treaty with Tancred of Sicily in which he 
named Arthur his heir.97 Richard appears to have later changed his mind; on his deathbed 
he designated John.98  
Both Arthur and John had hereditary claims; both had been designated by Richard. There 
is little evidence that either Arthur or John relied upon Richard’s designation; they 
probably rather interpreted it as a confirmation of their pre-existing hereditary right. In 
claiming the throne in 1199, for example, John relied only on hereditary right, divine 
mercy, and general acceptance.99  
Arthur’s claim raised the issue of representation, i.e. whether C, as heir or successor to 
B, might represent B’s claim as heir or successor to A, to the exclusion of some D, where 
B would have inherited or succeeded but for some fact. For example, if B were subject to 
some bar or disqualification, e.g. on account of their gender.100 Alternatively, if B had 
                                                            
95 Warren, Henry II, 617ff; Wilfred Lewis Warren, King John (Peregrine Books, 1966), 37–38; John 
Gillingham, Richard I (Yale University Press, 1999), 94–100. 
96 Sidney Painter, William Marshal: Knight-Errant, Baron, and Regent of England (John Hopkins Press, 
1966), 85. 
97 Gillingham, Richard I, 136–37. 
98 This is, at least, according to Hoveden: Roger of Hoveden, The Annals of Roger de Hoveden Comprising 
the History of England and of Other Countries of Europe From AD 732 to 1201, ed. Henry T Riley, vol. 2 
(Henry G Bohn, 1853), 453. 
99 David A Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery – The Penguin History of Britain 1066 – 1271 (Penguin, 
2003), 296. 
100 Thus, might a son represent his mother in a claim to his grandfather’s lands and titles? There are here 
the examples of Henry II (who claimed through his mother, the Empress Matilda, dau. Henry I) and Edward 
III (who claimed the French throne through his mother Isabella, dau. Philip IV of France). 
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predeceased A, raising the question as to whether B’s children might inherit or succeed 
directly from A. Thus was Arthur’s case: might he represent his father’s claims to the 
English throne, even though his father had never himself held it? Or did John have the 
better claim, not having to rely on some intermediary?  
In deciding the matter, there were obviously other factors, e.g. Arthur’s being based 
primarily in Brittany versus John’s greater connections with England. There was also the 
fact that, in this case, John prevailed militarily. Nevertheless, it clearly demonstrates that 
people had certain expectations. There was some disagreement as to these, but, even still, 
there was broad agreement that the choice was between Arthur and John. Had anybody 
else claimed the throne, it would probably have frustrated everybody’s expectations, 
rather than just some.  
These events also illustrate the danger that lone paternal uncles might pose to royal minors 
– uncles with no surviving brothers to check them in their designs. This is a pattern often 
seen. Nevertheless, it is important to note that John did not claim the throne because 
Arthur was a minor; he claimed it arguing superior right. As such, Arthur’s minority 
perhaps made his claim more vulnerable, but it did not invalidate it.  
9.11 Henry III (1216) – Minority 
After Arthur’s disappearance, John was relatively secure on the English throne until his 
disputes with Pope and barons. When he died in October 1216, England was in the throes 
of civil war. A pretender, Louis [VIII] of France, waged war in the kingdom. John’s eldest 
son, Henry, had only recently turned nine.  
John appears to have undertaken a number of preparatory behaviours, which indicate that 
he expected and desired Henry to succeed him. 101  He gave Henry a name strongly 
associated with the Plantagenet family and kingship.102 He possibly had the freemen of 
Marlborough swear fidelity to Henry as his heir;103 he might have had Falkes de Breauté 
                                                            
101 It seems clear that John’s basic presumption was that, all things being equal, his eldest son – Henry – 
ought to be his heir and that was the natural way of things. This is demonstrated somewhat in a letter he 
wrote to the pope in his final days. Failing divine and papal assistance, he despaired of securing ‘our 
perpetual hereditary succession’ (successionem nostram haereditariam perpetuam): Nicholas Vincent, ed., 
The Letters and Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legate in England, 1216-1218, vol. lxxxiii 
(Canterbury and York Society, 1996), 105. Cf. David A Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III (University 
of California Press, 1990), 12. Not only does this indicate what John desired (i.e. to found a dynasty), but 
also that he felt that this is what he could reasonably have expected – but for the outbreak of civil war. 
102 Henry was, of course, the name borne by John’s father (Henry II) and great-grandfather (Henry I). 
103 In 1209, when Henry was a few years old, John is recorded as having commanded the freemen of 
Marlborough – all those aged fifteen and over – to swear fealty to both himself and his heir (regis haeredi): 
“Convenerunt autum ex praecepto regis apud Merleberge omnes Angliae viri divites et pauperes et 
mediocres, ab annis xv et supra, ibique tam regi quam filio suo Henrico parvulo trienni, utpote regis haeredi, 
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swear an oath to keep Henry’s castles until he was of age;104 he appears to have had 
William, K. Scots, and his son, Alexander, swear to support Henry, in event of his 
death;105 he had the mayor of Angoulême swear “fidelity to Henry, saving fidelity to John 
himself ‘as long as I should live’”;106 and he appears to have taken steps on his deathbed 
to secure the succession.107  In all of this, his actions appear to be directed towards 
securing Henry’s claim, not creating it; he did not designate Henry.108 Whether he could 
have done more is a moot point.109 
Henry’s claim was by hereditary right; Louis’ by presentation, having been chosen by the 
rebel barons. In settling the dispute, the chance of battle, and the growing unpopularity of 
Louis and his troops, both played their parts. Moreover, the Plantagenet loyalists certainly 
had vested interests in supporting Henry.110 Had his interests been diametrically opposed 
to their own, they might have abandoned him. Yet, only a thoroughbred cynic would 
believe that the loyalists supported Henry simply because it suited them,111 and that 
                                                            
juraverunt fidelitatem.” Gervase of Canterbury, The Historical Works of Gervase of Canterbury, ed. 
William Stubbs, vol. 2 (Longmans and Co., 1880), 104. It is possible that John did this at other times in 
other places, but that those occasions were not recorded. On this, see also: Ward, “Child Kingship in 
England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 36, 80. 
104 “donec iste rex legitimae foret aetatis”. This implies that John expected that Henry would succeed him. 
This is recorded in the so-called Barnwell chronicle: William Stubbs, ed., Memoriale Fratris Walteri de 
Coventria, vol. 2 (Longman & Co., 1873), 260. 
105 On this, see: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 81–
82. 
106 Quoted in: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 82. 
107 In his will, probably made during his final illness, John provides that some portion of his goods were to 
provide “support to my sons towards obtaining and defending their inheritance” (‘sustentacione prestanda 
filiis meis pro hereditate sua perquirenda et defenda’): SD Church, “King John’s Testament and the Last 
Days of His Reign,” The English Historical Review CXXV, no. 514 (2010): 505–28. Moreover, Wendover 
reports that John, having confessed to the Abbot of Croxton, “appointed (constituere) his eldest son Henry 
his heir, and made his kingdom swear allegiance to him; he also sent letters under his own seal to all the 
sheriffs and castellans of the kingdom, ordering them one and all to obey his said son”: Roger of Wendover, 
Flowers of History, ed. JA Giles, vol. 2 (Henry G Bohn, 1864), 378; Roger of Wendover, Flores 
Historiarum (Sumptibus Societatis, 1861), 385. John’s expectation and desire to have Henry succeed him 
is also represented in the following lines from the History of William Marshal (written sometime later from 
a biased perspective, it should be added): “…for my son will never govern these lands of mind / with the 
help of anyone but the Marshal”:  AJ Holden, S Gregory, and David Crouch, eds., History of William 
Marshal, vol. 2 (Anglo-Norman Text Society, 2004), ln. 15189-15190 (emph. added).  
108 I am here disagreeing with my earlier opinion: Gates, “The Nature and Identity of the Constitution during 
the Minority of Henry III (1216-1227),” 26–27. 
109 For example, had not attempted to associate Henry in the kingship, as John’s father, Henry II, had done 
with his brother, the Young Henry. Perhaps he recognized the troubles this had caused his father; perhaps 
Henry [III] had been too young; perhaps John simply did not think it necessary. 
110 See Carpenter, The Struggle for Mastery, 300. 
111 There is an interesting story concerning Hubert de Burgh. Louis had been besieging Dover Castle and 
Hubert had been defending it. News reached Louis that John had died, upon which he is said to have said 
the following to Hubert: “Your lord, King John, is dead; it is useless for you to hold this castle longer 
against me…; surrender the castle and come into my fealty, and I will enrich you with great honours and 
you shall be great among my counsellors.” Hubert is said to have made the following reply: “If my lord be 
dead, he has sons and daughters who ought to succeed him; as to surrendering the castle, I would fain speak 
with my comrades of the garrison.” Hubert was justiciar of England and, therefore, had a strong interest in 
the Plantagenet family (for it was they who had made him), but that family’s prospects were at this time 
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people returned to Plantagenet loyalty only because of Louis’ failure. The rebellion had 
been against John; his son was innocent of his crimes – a fact which the loyalists were at 
pains to stress.112 With John no longer around to frustrate people’s expectations through 
his ill-governance, people must have asked themselves – consciously or unconsciously – 
what would I normally expect, in accordance with the fixed associations I hold, to happen 
after the king’s death? The answer, was, of course, that his eldest son would become king 
after him – not some foreign pretender. Rebellion against the Plantagenets had lost its 
reason; its legitimacy.  
The facts that Henry was a minor and that there had been no minor king in England since 
Æthelred II appear not to have mattered. Henry’s age was no bar, though the lack of viable 
alternatives must have reinforced Henry’s claim.113 Even in spite of difficulties later in 
Henry’s reign, it is from this time that the potency of the hereditary principle appears to 
reach new heights. It was sufficient to enable Edward I to succeed Henry, even though he 
was abroad.  
9.12 Edward III (1327) – Minority 
The fact of Edward III’s accession is less remarkable than the manner of his predecessor’s 
decoupling: the abdication/deposition of his father, Edward II. Indeed, insofar as the 
transmission of the throne goes, Edward’s accession simply demonstrates the potency of 
hereditary right – Edward III became king when his father ceased to be such.114 Of course, 
that Edward [III] was the figurehead of the rebellion against his father is important; the 
most legitimate opposition could only be offered by those who expected – and were 
expected by others – one day to be king. Once again, his youth does not seem to have 
mattered in this regard. 
                                                            
poor. It certainly could have been in Hubert’s interests to have switched allegiance, but he was quite clear 
that there was a fixed expectation that prevented him from doing so: if a king has died and left living 
children, then it is they who should succeed and no other whilst they live. The speech above is from Roger 
of Wendover, quoted in: Kate Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1912), 16 
[emph. added]. 
112 An open letter declared: “We hear that a quarrel arose between our father and certain nobles of our 
kingdom, whether with justification or not we do not know. We wish to remove it for ever since it has 
nothing to do with us.” Quoted in: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 22. 
113 “Henry’s claim, although not ideal owing to his youth, was the only viable alternative to Louis: all the 
others were too old and childless, too young, their claims too tenuous or politically unsustainable or simply 
too far away.” See: Gates, “The Nature and Identity of the Constitution during the Minority of Henry III 
(1216-1227),” 43–49, quote at 49. 
114 It is noteworthy, however, that Edward I does not appear, at least in 1272, to have taken the succession 
after his death for granted, for he provided for it in his testament made whilst in Acre on 18 June of that 




9.13 Richard II (1377) – Minority 
In some respects, Richard II’s accession is less straightforward than that of Henry III and 
Edward III; they had directly succeeded their fathers. Richard’s father, Edward of 
Woodstock (‘the Black Prince’), had died in June 1376, predeceasing his own father, 
Edward III, by approximately a year. Woodstock had been heir apparent as his father’s 
eldest son,115 but had never been king. The question of representation arises once more, 
which question was all the more important seeing as Richard had living paternal uncles.  
Richard was not Woodstock’s firstborn son. This explains why Richard did not bear the 
dynastic name of Edward; this had been his elder brother’s name. That child, however, 
had died young.116 On his deathbed, Woodstock appears to have entrusted his wife and 
son into the hands of his father (Edward III) and brother (John of Gaunt, D. Lancaster), 
who both promised to comfort Richard and uphold him in his right.117 This looks very 
much like Woodstock attempting to entrench in people’s minds the idea that Richard was 
his heir and, consequently, heir to everything to which he himself had been. That he saw 
this as Richard’s right reveals an underlying fixed association. 
To an extent, Richard’s importance had already been illustrated some years earlier when 
he had been appointed custos regni.118 However, following Woodstock’s death, there 
appears to have been some anxiety to have Richard confirmed as Edward III’s successor-
in-waiting. Edward immediately invested Richard with the earldom of Chester, but this 
was not enough.119 Parliament requested that Richard be brought before them, so that they 
could honour him as the new heir apparent. Further, they asked that he be made P. Wales 
– evidence of a developing association between the principality and being heir apparent; 
they were told that such a grant was only in the hands of the king. There might have been 
some thought on the part of the Commons of bringing forward Richard’s inauguration by 
                                                            
115 See: W Mark Ormrod, Edward III (Yale University Press, 2011), 558. 
116 He was apparently seven years old when he died, according to his tombstone: John Weever, Antient 
Funeral Monuments, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the Islands Adjacent (W. Tooke, 1767), 204. Saul states 
that he was six when he died: Nigel Saul, Richard II (Yale University Press, 1999), 12. 
117 “Then he called the King, his father, and the Duke of Lancaster, his brother; he commended to them his 
wife, and his son, whom he greatly loved, and straightaway entreated them so that each was willing to give 
his aid. Each swore upon the book and promised him at once that they would comfort his child and maintain 
him in his right. All the princes and barons swore all round to this, and the noble Prince of fame gave them 
a hundred thousand thanks…”: Chandos Herald, The Life & Feats of Arms of Edward the Black Prince, ed. 
and trans. Francisque Michel (J.G. Fotheringham, 1883), 283–84. 
118 See, infra, 9.6.1. 
119 Ormrod, Edward III, 558–59. 
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dethroning Edward III, but nothing came of this. After some delay, Richard became the 
third Plantagenet P. Wales in November 1376.120  
The anxiety to have Richard confirmed as heir apparent demonstrates the strength, rather 
than the weakness, of the hereditary principle at this time. It speaks to a perception that 
the situation was somewhat unusual (in the sense that the intermediate heir, Woodstock, 
had died) and to a perception that the succession might be perverted (particularly in view 
of Gaunt’s supposed pretensions). However, it speaks most of all to people’s anxiety to 
have confirmed that which they expected. A failure to recognize Richard as Edward III’s 
heir would have caused serious consternation; it would have frustrated people’s 
expectations. This is particularly likely in view of people’s enthusiasm for Richard;121 a 
boy who was as yet young and untested, a boy about whom little would have been known, 
but a boy who represented an idea – the idea of a future king. People’s expectations were 
clear, as perhaps were their hopes.122 
There was clearly a prevalent and potent idea that the throne should be passed, where 
possible, along the senior male line. As Simon Sudbury, Abp. Canterbury, stressed in the 
first parliament of Richard’s reign: Richard was king, not by virtue of election, but by 
right.123 Indeed, there is something of a natural law theory running beneath Sudbury’s 
words. He indicated that a higher law and natural order stemming from God were at work. 
This is a fixed, eternal, and immutable part of the constitution of the kingdom of England, 
which it would be folly to gainsay. Sudbury is clear that Richard’s succession was in no 
                                                            
120 This title had been created for Edward II. It had not been given to Edward III, but he had given it to his 
son, Edward of Woodstock: Ormrod, Edward III, 254, 565 (see also n. 49 on this page); Saul, Richard II, 
17. 
121 See: Saul, Richard II, 21–22. 
122 For indications of these hopes, see the poem Death of Edward III: Thomas Wright, ed., Political Poems 
and Songs Relating to English History, Composed during the Period from the Accession of Edw. III to That 
of Ric. III, vol. 1 (Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1859), 215–18. See also, with notes: Celia 
Sisam and Kenneth Sisam, eds., The Oxford Book of Medieval English Verse (Oxford University Press, 
1970), 342–47. 
123 The Abp. Canterbury’s speech ran as follows: “Namely, to rejoice with you over the noble grace which 
God has granted you in the person who is your natural and rightful liege-lord, as has been said, not by 
election nor by any other such a way, but solely by rightful succession to an inheritance: wherefore you are 
by nature the more fully obliged to love him completely, and obey him humbly; and also to thank God, 
from whom all grace and good proceeds, in particular because he has given you so noble a lord as your 
king and governor.”: 'Richard II: October 1377', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-
Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox 
(Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/october-1377 [accessed 7 May 2019] at Item 4. See: Saul, Richard II, 26–27. 
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way surprising, for, since Woodstock’s death, Richard had “occupied a special place in 
the kingdom” – he was heir-apparent.124 
Sudbury’s comments and the smoothness of his accession notwithstanding, Richard’s 
claim to the throne might have not been completely undisputed. There was apparently 
some “suspicion that [Gaunt] might subvert the succession” during the summer of 
Richard’s accession, although this suspicion largely dissipated. 125  Gaunt’s speech in 
Richard’s first parliament professing his innocence is interesting from a constitutional 
viewpoint: “For he said that although he was unworthy, he was a king’s son, and one of 
the great lords of the realm after the king…”126 Gaunt saw himself as pre-eminent within 
the English political hierarchy.  
These themes continued throughout Richard’s reign. We see hereditary right raised in 
respect of the French throne: In the Parliament of February 1383, France was said to be 
Richard’s “rightful inheritance”; later, Sir James Pickering, representing the Commons, 
said that Richard “had a true right to the crown of France”.127 In the second Parliament of 
that year, held in October, Michael de la Pole stated that the government needed a grant 
of taxes to fight the “burdensome wars” begun before Richard’s time and had descended 
to him “just as the honourable crown of England has descended to him by the succession 
of rightful inheritance”.128 The theme of Gaunt’s desires for the throne also resurfaced in 
the ‘affair of the Carmelite friar’ in the late spring of 1384. The Westminster chronicler 
said that, in an act of rashness, Richard ordered Gaunt’s execution, although this is not 
corroborated by other chroniclers and “in any case the king seems to have been rapidly 
                                                            
124 'Richard II: October 1377', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/october-1377 [accessed 7 May 2019] at Item 4.  
125 'Richard II: October 1377', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/october-1377 [accessed 7 May 2019] at Editors’ Introduction. 
126 'Richard II: October 1377', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/october-1377 [accessed 7 May 2019] at Item 13. 
127 'Richard II: February 1383', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/february-1383 [accessed 7 May 2019] at Items 3 and 9. 
128 'Richard II: October 1383', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/october-1383 [accessed 7 May 2019] at  Item 5. 
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dissuaded from such an intemperate course of action.”129 Gaunt does not appear to have 
had designs on the throne in his final years.  
9.14 Edmund Mortimer, 5.E. March (1399) – Avoided 
Like Edward II, hereditary right might have been sufficient to enthrone Richard II; it was 
not enough for him to remain so enthroned. After Richard’s fall, the throne was claimed 
by Henry Bolingbroke, D. Lancaster. If the throne travelled exclusively, rather than 
preferentially, in the senior male, then, given Richard’s lack of issue, Henry was 
Richard’s rightful heir. He was Richard’s closest relative in a male line, being the son of 
Edward III’s third son, John of Gaunt.130 However, Gaunt had had an older brother, 
Lionel of Antwerp, who had had issue, Philippa. She had had a son, Roger, who had died, 
but he had also had a son, Edmund. There was again the issue of representation – whether 
Edmund might represent the claims that his great-grandfather and father might have had 
were they alive; that his grandmother might have had were she male. 
There had been attempts in Edward III’s final year to establish that the throne could not 
pass through Philippa whilst there existed a viable male line; these had failed. 131 
Excluding Philippa would have been something of an embarrassment for the English 
crown – not least because its claim to France rested principally in the idea that women 
might carry the baton in the succession.  
Philippa’s son, Roger, E. March, had possibly been proclaimed by Richard as heir 
presumptive in October 1385; whether this would have been an act of recognition 
(following some principle of gravitation) or designation is unclear. There is every 
indication that Edmund – Richard’s first-cousin-twice-removed – was recognized as 
Richard’s heir following Roger’s death. However, he was not quite eight years old when 
Richard was dethroned in September 1399 – hardly able to press his claim. He was not 
passed over because he was a minor, but his minority made his claim more vulnerable.  
9.15 Henry VI (1422) – Minority 
                                                            
129 'Richard II: April 1384', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, 
Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), 
British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/april-1384 
[accessed 7 May 2019] at Editors’ Introduction. 
130 As such, Bolingbroke was Richard’s first cousin and similar in age. 
131 See: Ormrod, Edward III, 564–65. 
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Henry VI remains the youngest king ever to sit on the English throne,132 which he gained 
when he was eight months and twenty-five or twenty-six days old.133  
9.15.1 Lancastrian Title 
Anybody claiming on the basis of hereditary right must show two things: family title and 
personal title. They must show that the succession runs in their family and, moreover, 
that it identifies them individually. The basis of the Lancastrians’ family title was 
somewhat different to that of their predecessors. It was beginning to look as though family 
title might be conferred and controlled by Parliament.  
This association begins with the assembly that dethroned Richard II in 1399 and 
recognized Henry IV as his successor; Henry having claimed the throne “in right of 
descent vindicated by conquest”, as well as by Richard’s designation.134 This assembly 
was not formally a Parliament,135 but it had a parliamentary aspect.136 Its actions were 
effectively confirmed in Henry’s first parliament; it made Henry’s son, Henry [V], P. 
Wales, whom it also declared heir apparent.137 
This association developed in January 1404 and June 1406, when Parliament was 
involved in clarifying the order of succession after Henry’s death. Parliament was not in 
                                                            
132 Henry VI is not, however, the youngest British monarch: Mary, Queen of Scots (b. 8 Dec. 1542) became 
monarch of Scotland aged only six days old on the death of her father, James V, on 14 Dec. 1452. The 
youngest monarchs, however, are the posthumous kings who were born sometime after their fathers’ deaths 
and, therefore, have been deemed king from the moment of birth. Among the posthumous kings we find 
Alexander IV of Macedon (b. 323 BCE), John I of France (b. 1316), Ladislas of Hungary, Croatia, and 
Bohemia (b. 1440), and Alfonso XIII of Spain (b. 1886). Other notable posthumous children – at least as 
far as English political history is concerned – include Arthur I, D. Brittany (b. 1187), Henry Tudor [VII] 
(b. 1457), and William III (b. 1650). It is worth adding, however, that John I of France, for example, was 
not referred to as ‘king’ until the sixteenth century when the principle of hereditary right was becoming the 
dominant law of succession in France: Lisa Hopkins, Drama and the Succession to the Crown, 1561-1633 
(Ashgate, 2011), 45. 
133 There appears to be some disagreement as to whether Henry became king on the moment of his father’s 
death or the following day. 
134 Gaillard Lapsley, “The Parliamentary Title of Henry IV,” The English Historical Review 49, no. 195 
(1934): 423–49. Walsingham has Henry say: “I, Henry of Lancaster, lay claim to this kingdom, with its 
crown and all other parts belonging to it. I make claim through the royal blood which comes down to me 
from King Henry and through the just cause which God of his grace has sent me for recovering the kingdom 
with the help of my kinsmen and friends. This kingdom was on the point of destruction, owing to the failure 
of its government and the violation of its laws.”: Thomas Walsingham, The Chronica Maiora of Thomas 
Walsingham (1376-1422), ed. James Clark, trans. David Preest (The Boydell Press, 2005), 311. 
135 Lapsley, “The Parliamentary Title of Henry IV.” 
136 Indeed, those persons present were those who had been summoned for a meeting of Parliament. On this 
episode, see in particular: Lapsley, “The Parliamentary Title of Henry IV”; Gaillard Lapsley, “The 
Parliamentary Title of Henry IV (Continued),” The English Historical Review 49, no. 196 (1934): 577–606. 
137 “During the parliament the king with the consent of all the estates of the realm created his eldest son 
Henry [of Monmouth] prince of Wales, adding to his lands the duchy of Cornwall and the county of Chester. 
Later in the same parliament he made him duke of Aquitaine and the next heir to the kingdom of England.”: 
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 312; see also Theodore FT Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead’s English 




full control at this point, but it was becoming clear that Parliament was an appropriate 
place to discuss and confirm points on such issues. In December 1406, changes were 
again made – this time in the form of a statute.138 The association with Parliament thereby 
grew stronger, contributing to a developing fixed expectation that, in any similar 
circumstances, Parliament would be involved. 
As for the propriety of Henry IV’s and Henry V’s titles, it would appear that at least some 
people’s expectations had been frustrated by the Lancastrian possession of the throne.139 
Yet, if Wavrin is to be believed, it would seem that Henry V was in little doubt that he 
would be his father’s successor, even if Henry IV expressed late doubts as to his own 
title.140 If Richard had had surviving children, the Lancastrian position would have been 
much weaker. However, in view of the absence of a clear oppositional claim, the 
increasing length of Lancastrian rule, and Henry V’s (perceived) strength and successes, 
it is unsurprising that there was little doubt as to Henry VI’s claim; the Parliamentary Roll 
for November 1422 declares: “the inheritance of both of the realm and the crown of 
France and of the realm and the crown of England have now descended by right 
[descenduz droiturelment]” to Henry VI.141 
The Lancastrian family claim, deviating somewhat from people’s fixed associations, 
needed time (and success) to gain a fuller sense of legitimacy. People’s evaluative 
expectations probably played a major role in this. They came to associate ideas of 
Lancastrian monarchy with ideas or feelings of goodness; it was a Good Thing.142 It also 
has a great deal to do with habit: people became used to the idea of a Lancastrian monarch 
and, as those who had lived through Richard’s reign began to fade, there were 
increasingly fewer people who had known any different. 
9.15.2 Catherine de Valois’s Pregnancy 
                                                            
138 For discussion of these, see: Plucknett, Taswell-Langmead’s Constitutional History, 494–95. 
139 The failed Epiphany Rising (1400) and Southampton Plot (1415) demonstrate as much. On the Epiphany 
Rising, see: Chris Given-Wilson, Henry IV (Yale University Press, 2016), 160–64. On the Southampton 
Plot, see: Christopher Allmand, Henry V, 2nd ed. (Yale University Press, 1997), 74–78. 
140 John de Wavrin, A Collection of the Chronicles and Ancient Histories of Great Britain, Now Called 
England, trans. William Hardy and Edward LCP Hardy, vol. 4 (Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1887), 166–67. 
141 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1422 [accessed 7 May 2019] at Item 15. 
142 As Carpenter has said: “Once Henry IV had shown himself able to survive his first few shaky years, and 
the exploits of his son, Henry V, had set an almost irremovable gloss on the dynasty, the Lancastrians had 
no need to prove their worth in order to remain kings.” Christine Carpenter, The Wars of the Roses: Politics 
and the Constitution in England, c.1437-1509 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 20. 
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Henry V married Catherine de Valois in May 1420 in France. In February 1421, they 
arrived in England. Ostensibly, this was to introduce Catherine to the country and to make 
certain pilgrimages, but Henry’s ulterior motive was almost certainly to secure additional 
funds for his campaigns.143  
It does not appear to have been Henry’s intention to remain for longer than necessary;144 
news of the defeat at Baugé could only have reinforced this resolution.145 On 10 June 
1421, he arrived at Calais. Catherine, however, remained in England until late May 
1422.146 There are two decisions here: first, that Catherine should stay behind in June 
1421 and, second, that Catherine should go to France in May 1422. The exact motives 
and reasoning behind these decisions are obscure, but the fact that her stay in England 
coincides with her first pregnancy suggests an element of dynastic regard. If this is the 
case, these decisions reflect contemporary attitudes to the succession. To assess whether 
dynastic regard had a role, it is necessary to consider whether it could have plausibly been 
an operating consideration and, if so, what influence it could have had.  
To have been an operating consideration in June 1421, somebody must have known that 
Catherine was pregnant. It has often been assumed that Henry knew that she was pregnant 
when he set sail;147 this is possible, but unverifiable.148 Even if Catherine suspected that 
she was pregnant when she said farewell to her husband sometime in the week or so 
before his embarkation,149 there can be no guarantee that it featured in the decision-
                                                            
143 Desmond Seward, Henry V: The Scourge of God (Viking, 1988), 173. 
144 Charles Lethbridge Kingsford, Henry V: The Typical Medieval Hero (GP Putnam’s Sons, 1901), 348; 
Seward, Henry V: The Scourge of God, 181. It should be noted that this has not always been the opinion of 
historians of the period: J. Endell Tyler, Henry of Monmouth: Or, Memoirs of the Life and Character of 
Henry the Fifth, as Prince of Wales and King of England, vol. 2 (Richard Bentley, 1838), 296. 
145 Henry was probably in northern England on progress with his newly-crowned queen-consort when he 
received the news of the defeat of the English forces at the Battle of Baugé on 22 March 1421, in which his 
brother, Thomas, D. Clarence, had been killed and other important figures in the English camp either also 
killed or captured: Tyler, Memoirs of the Life and Character of Henry V, 2:290, 295; Wavrin, Wavrin’s 
Chronicle, 1399-1422, 4:361. 
146  Catherine departed on the 22 May 1422, although she was undoubtedly preparing her departure 
sometime before this. According to Christie these preparations were being made “[e]arly in 1422” and 
according to Tyler preparations for her departure were being made as early as 26 January 1422: Mabel E 
Christie, Henry VI (Constable and Company Ltd., 1922), 2; Tyler, Memoirs of the Life and Character of 
Henry V, 2:302. Cf.  Ralph A Griffiths, The Reign of King Henry VI, 2nd ed. (Sutton Publishing, 1998), 15. 
147 See, e.g.: Griffiths, The Reign of King Henry VI; Patrick Strong and Felicity Strong, “The Last Will and 
Codicils of Henry V,” The English Historical Review 96, no. 378 (January 1981): 79–102. 
148 Wolffe pointed to the fact that Elizabeth Ryman – one of Catherine’s ladies and later entrusted with the 
“care of the child from its birth” – was given “[t]he unusually generous gift of the manor of Old Shoreham 
for life, made at Canterbury when he was organizing his departure” as an indication that Henry knew of 
Catherine’s pregnancy before his departure. This is possible, but it is circumstantial. The fact that Henry 
made no explicit provisions for his heir in his last will, which he made a short time later, certainly would 
seem to speak against the hypothesis that Henry knew, though, of course, does not rule it out. Bertram 
Wolffe, Henry VI (Eyre Methuen, 1981), 28. 
149 Their child, Henry [VI], was born on 6 December 1421, which means he was probably conceived in 
mid- to late-March. Indeed, if Henry was carried to full term, he probably would have been conceived 
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making process. Indeed, even if she had her suspicions, she might as yet still have been 
cautious about conveying these.150 On balance, we can lean towards Wolffe’s cautious 
statement that “Henry V had probably known, or at the least must have had grounds for 
hope,” at the time of his departure.151  
If they were unaware of the pregnancy in June, it would soon have become apparent and 
clearly the decision was made that Catherine remain in England. Perhaps the most 
significant piece of evidence that that decision was made on the basis of Catherine’s 
pregnancy was the rapidity of her return to France – less than six months after giving 
birth.152 This indicates that Catherine might never have intended to remain in England; it 
was precisely because of her pregnancy that she had.  
There are various reasons why the pregnancy might have prevented her journeying to 
France. There were the dangers presented to the health of the mother and foetus – both in 
the sea crossing and within France, which was then in an unsettled state. Indeed, there 
was the problem about where in France they would be safe. If Catherine were to 
accompany her husband and the army, manifold dangers presented themselves, e.g. 
disease and attack. Indeed, as the pregnancy reached its latter stages, especially the 
                                                            
towards the middle of March. This would accord with our knowledge of Henry V’s and Catherine’s 
movements at that time. In late February, Henry V left Catherine at Westminster, whilst he went out on a 
tour of the country. They do not appear to have seen one another until she joined him at Leicester on the 
eve of Palm Sunday (15 March). The next couple of weeks they appear to have spent together, moving 
through Nottingham and Pontefract and then onto York. It must almost certainly have been during this time 
that Henry [VI] was conceived (assuming, of course, that Henry [VI] was legitimate). Henry left York alone 
to make “pilgrimages to the shrines at Beverley and Bridlington”,  but was interrupted by the news of his 
brother’s death at the start of April: Christopher Allmand, Henry V (Methuen, 1992), 158. Consequently, 
in mid-June she would have been around twelve weeks’ pregnant. She probably would have noticed some 
signs of pregnancy (e.g. morning sickness, missed periods, tiredness, backache, etc.), but we cannot be 
certain that she would have known their true cause; it is unlikely that it would have been outwardly apparent 
at this stage, although it would soon begin to be so. 
150 The chances that she would miscarry would have been relatively low by June, although up until that 
point there may have been a 20%-25% chance that she would miscarry according to some estimates of the 
likelihood of medieval miscarriages - a figure that has to be treated with a great degree of caution: Fiona 
Harris-Stoertz, “Pregnancy and Childbirth in Twelfth- and Thirteenth-Century French and English Law,” 
Journal of the History of Sexuality 21, no. 2 (2012): 270. 
151 Wolffe, Henry VI, 28. 
152 Henry [VI] was born on 6 December 1421 and Catherine returned to the Continent in late May 1422, 
though she was undoubtedly preparing her departure sometime before this. According to Christie these 
preparations were being made “[e]arly in 1422” and according to Tyler preparations for her departure were 
being made as early as 26 January 1422: Christie, Henry VI, 2; Tyler, Memoirs of the Life and Character 
of Henry V, 2:302. Cf.  Griffiths, The Reign of King Henry VI, 15. Given the absence of any mention of 
Henry [VI] accompanying her, we can assume that he remained in England. See: Wavrin, Wavrin’s 
Chronicle, 1399-1422, 4:376; Christie, Henry VI, 2–3. 
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confinement stage,153 Catherine’s mobility would have been severely reduced.154 If she 
were with the army, this would have reduced their mobility; if she were elsewhere, she 
might have been a target and thereby a distraction to Henry. Catherine was safest in 
England.155 
Moreover, Catherine qua queen-mother and the unborn child qua Henry’s heir were 
important assets to Henry. Catherine, in particular, as the K. France’s daughter, was a 
central element to the legitimacy of his claim to France. If she were to die, Henry’s claim 
would have been considerably weakened. Henry and his advisers might therefore have 
deemed it prudent not to take any undue risks with the means and end to the continuation 
of the House of Lancaster, as well as its grip on the thrones of both England and France. 
Such dynastic regard would cross from the ordinary regard that parents have for the 
promulgation of their genes to a special dynastic regard specifically with a view to the 
succession. 
There might also have been a conscious decision that the child should not be aubaine, i.e. 
born abroad. Even if it had been made clear in the middle previous century that an aubaine 
could inherit in England,156 it might have been felt appropriate that a King of England 
should be born in England.157 
                                                            
153 If Matthew Paris is correct in his dates, then Henry III’s wife, Eleanor, remained in confinement for two 
months in 1242 when pregnant with their daughter Beatrice. This was between the Assumption of the 
Blessed Virgin (25 March) and the Nativity of St John the Baptist (24 June): Matthew Paris, Matthew 
Paris’s English History from the Year 1235 to 1273, trans. JA Giles, vol. 1 (George Bell & Sons, 1852), 
431.  
154 Indeed, Kingsford attributed her stay in England precisely to the expectation that Catherine would soon 
begin her confinement: Kingsford, Henry V: The Typical Medieval Hero, 351. 
155 There are a number of recorded incidents where prospective mothers stayed put until their children were 
born. Henry III delayed his return from the Continent in 1243 “as the queen was great either with child or 
some other infirmity”; Harris-Stoertz also lists the examples of Simon de Montfort’s wife and Matilda, D. 
Saxony. Matthew Paris, English History, 1:447; Harris-Stoertz, “Pregnancy and Childbirth in Twelfth- and 
Thirteenth-Century French and English Law,” 273.  
156 “That the Law of the Crown of England is, and always hath been such, that the Children of the Kings of 
England, in whatsoever Parts they be born, in England or elsewhere, be able and ought to bear the 
Inheritance after the death of their Ancestors; which Law our said Lord King, the said Prelates, Earls, 
Barons, and other great Men, and all the Commons assembled in this Parliament, do approve and affirm for 
ever.” De Natis Ultra Mare (25 Edw. III, 1350). 
157 Henry’s child also stood to gain the kingdom of France, of course, and this may have presented itself as 
an opportunity for Henry to give his child greater legitimacy there. However: (a) Henry’s child was the 
immediate heir in England, whereas in France there was an intermediate heir (i.e. Henry V until the death 
of Charles VI); and (b) Henry, his advisers, and his followers were principally English and thus it may have 
been felt the more popular decision to have Henry’s heir born in England (and thus be ‘English’) rather 
than France (and thus be ‘French’). Such reasoning again would indicate a strong dynastic regard with a 
view to the succession. 
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Catherine’s motives for quickly returning to France after Henry [VI]’s birth are also 
obscure. There might have been a lack of affection for the new-born Prince; 158  her 
responsibility towards, or love for, her native country, husband,159 or ailing father might 
have outweighed that which she felt for Henry [VI]. The fact that she travelled with a 
large contingent, accompanied by Henry’s brother, John (D. Bedford), provides one clue 
for the timing.160 It is also possible that she might have been driven to France by Henry’s 
illness, although whether this would have been present – and she known of it – early 
enough to prompt her crossing to France is doubtful.161 However, once again, it is possible 
that her movements were dictated by dynastic regard: not only might her presence besides 
Henry help to legitimate his ongoing battle against her younger brother, Charles, but it 
also meant that Henry might have more heirs in the nearer, rather than more distant, 
future. 
There are, of course, also reasons why Catherine might have remained without any 
reference to her pregnancy,162 and much is conjecture, but it is distinctly possible that it 
was dynastic motives that kept Catherine in England and then took her to France. Beneath 
                                                            
158 It would be wrong to make the assumption that there was a lack of affection simply because it was 
supposedly typical of the mediaeval mindset. For a discussion on emotional attitudes of people in late 
medieval to industrial England, see: Will Coster, Family and Kinship in England, 1450-1800 (Pearson 
Education Ltd., 2001), chap. 2, esp. at 19. 
159 The extent of affection between Henry V and Catherine de Valois has been the matter of some debate. 
The fact, for example, that she was not at Henry V’s deathbed, although staying only a few miles away, 
was interpreted by Seward a demonstrating the lack of romantic attachment between them: Seward, Henry 
V: The Scourge of God, 210. This is, of course, not the only possible interpretation of events: Henry may 
not have wished Catherine to see him in the throes of death or, if he thought that it might be contagious in 
any way, he may have thought it better for her to remain at a safe distance. The possibility can also not be 
discounted that she did actually visit Henry and that it simply was not recorded. 
160 After all, it might have been some time before another contingent went with which she could safely 
travel. See: Wavrin, Wavrin’s Chronicle, 1399-1422, 4:376. 
161 Walsingham recorded that, prior to his death, Henry had “been ill for a long time owing to his excessive, 
unceasing labours.” However, it is difficult to establish the precise chronology of Henry’s decline. Henry 
had overwintered in France to sustain the siege on Meaux, which lasted from October 1421 to March 1422; 
as with many such sieges, sickness spread. Allmand suggested that it might have been during this period 
that Henry’s health began to be affected, before the illness became more noticeable – and terminal – in June 
at Senlis, where Wavrin records that he was “suffering a good deal from illness”. By Christie’s reckoning, 
Henry was bedridden by July. Hardyng, however, does not record that Henry had “toke sickenes” until 
August.  It is possible, therefore, that Catherine could have known that her husband was suffering from 
some ailment, even if it was suspected to be a passing one. Whether she would have known early enough 
and whether it would have been sufficient cause for her crossing to France seems doubtful. Walsingham, 
Chronica Maiora, 445; Allmand, Henry V, 1992, 162; Wavrin, Wavrin’s Chronicle, 1399-1422, 4:384; 
Christie, Henry VI, 3; John Hardyng, The Chronicle of John Hardyng, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1812), 386. 
162 For example, to acquaint herself with, and accustom herself to, her new kingdom; a role in governing 
England might have been imagined for her; or she simply might have been reluctant to leave on the 
appointed day, e.g. because of illness or superstition. If a role was imagined for her, it was not the leading 
role, which went to the D. Bedford and, after his departure in early May 1422, this role was taken by the D. 
Gloucester, see: Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 444 at n. 5. 
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all of this was an assumption based on a fixed expectation: her children by Henry would 
be Henry’s successors and, for this reason, both needed to be protected. 
9.15.3 Henry [VI]’s Name 
At Henry’s baptism, 163  according to Wavrin, he was named ‘Henry’ at his father’s 
behest.164 In this can be seen a preparatory behaviour.  
Names build identity. They affect our personal and social identity; they simultaneously 
distinguish us from others and situate us within our social environment.165 The choice of 
name can be incredibly significant. We typically carry them throughout our lives; they 
are statements of our personal history.166 They also conjure numerous associations. For 
those who have died, naming somebody after them is also a way of preserving their 
memory. Indeed, whilst giving a name is an opportunity to mark a child’s individuality, 
it is also an opportunity to publically demonstrate which social connections are special,167 
as well as bestowing on the child some shared identity;168 it might even be said that 
naming practices or patterns reveal much about a “family’s conception of itself”.169 
Naming children after their fathers is not necessarily an act of vanity. Whereas women 
have certitude of parenthood, men have not historically possessed that same certainty. By 
naming children after themselves, men can recognize them as theirs; they can legitimize 
them and associate them with themselves. Naming Henry [VI] in this way created a 
natural association between him and his father, making it easier to countenance the 
younger as the elder’s successor.170  
                                                            
163 Henry [VI] was born on 6 December 1422 at Windsor castle, seemingly around four in the afternoon: 
Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 444 at n. 2. 
164 Wavrin, Wavrin’s Chronicle, 1399-1422, 4:361. 
165 “Naming [is] a quintessentially social act...naming acts as a critical element in processes of social 
incorporation and the constitution personhood.”: S Benson (2006) 'Injurious Naming: Naming, Disavowal 
and Recuperation in the Contexts of Slavery and Emancipation', in G. vom Bruck and B. Bodenhorn (eds) 
An Anthropology of Names and Naming (Cambridge University Press) pp. 178-94, quoted in: Janet Finch, 
“Naming Names: Kinship, Individuality and Personal Names,” Sociology 42, no. 4 (2008): 711. 
166 “Given that most people retain the same forename’s throughout their lives, the process of naming a child 
therefore roots the very statement of a person's individuality within family relationships.”: Finch, “Naming 
Names: Kinship, Individuality and Personal Names,” 721. 
167 On this point, see Finch, who particularly sees this with regard to naming people after family members: 
Finch, “Naming Names: Kinship, Individuality and Personal Names,” 720. 
168 “More subtly, and on a much wider scale, names can act as a connector which locks an individual into 
a cross-generational history which stretches into both the past and the future. A surname tracks an 
individual's history by indicating a child's parentage. Forenames and surnames both are bestowed by parents 
upon their children. They represent a permanent, cross-generational link.” Finch, “Naming Names: Kinship, 
Individuality and Personal Names,” 721. 
169 Andrew W Lewis, Royal Succession in Capetian France: Studies on Familial Order and the State 
(Harvard University Press, 1981), 2. 
170 Cf. “If the chief is to be recognized as a chief he must, like the ghost of Patroclus, ‘be exceedingly like 
unto himself’. He must live in the same house, wear the same clothes, and do the same things year by year; 
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In many ways, Henry was a fitting name for a successor to the English throne; it was the 
most common name of English kings, followed closely by Edward.171 Even though there 
was an element of fortune as to which names had become the most prevalent in the roll 
of English kings, the fact of their commonness is no coincidence.172 Their recurrence 
shows a clear regard for using patronyms – particularly with elder children. Giving Henry 
a family name associated him with the family claim. It was clearly conveyed with dynastic 
regard.  
9.15.4 Reception of Henry [VI]’s Birth 
The news of Henry’s birth was received joyfully both in England and in the English camp 
in France.173 Indeed, according to Wavrin, there had been “more perfect joy displayed” 
in England “than there had been seen for a long time about any other royal infant”.174 
                                                            
and his successor must imitate him.” Graham Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, 3rd ed. (Constable and 
Company Ltd., 1927). Having the same name is a good start in this regard.  
171 To a certain extent, the prevalence of the name ‘Henry’ was due to people consistently giving their elder 
sons that name, but there was also a great degree of fortune. Had William Adelin outlived his father 
(incidentally the first king of England by the name of Henry), then ‘William’ might have become the 
favourite royal name. Likewise, had Edward the Black Prince (the firstborn son of Edward III) and his own 
firstborn son, also named Edward, outlived their respective fathers, then there might have been at least five 
consecutive monarchs by the name of Edward. Had this been the case, it can be easily seen how ‘Edward’ 
might have become synonymous with the monarchy as ‘Louis’ did in France. Indeed, had Henry IV’s 
firstborn son, Edward, survived, then ‘Edward’ may have continued as a name of considerable pre-
eminence even in spite of the Lancastrian advent. That said, had Henry II’s firstborn son, Henry the Young 
King, or Edward I’s, also called Henry, then ‘Henry’ may still have been the most popular name for English 
kings by the start of the fifteenth century, although the family tree would look quite different. 
172 It can be noted, however, that the Henry VI derived the name ‘Henry’, through his father, from his 
grandfather, Henry IV. However, Henry IV’s name was not patronymic, but, rather, matronymic. His father, 
John of Gaunt, had had three principal partnerships: Blanche of Lancaster, Constance of Castile, and 
Katherine Swynford. In each of them, his firstborn son was called ‘John’, although only one of these (John, 
E. Somerset) survived to adulthood. It is possible, of course, that the two latter born sons called John were 
not called John after their father, but, rather, after their deceased half-brothers, and, therefore, were 
necronyms, rather than patronyms. However, the more likely conclusion remains that they were patronyms. 
Henry [IV] was born to Gaunt by his first wife, Blanche of Lancaster and, having named his firstborn in a 
patronymic fashion, it was probably seen fitting to honour Blanche’s father, Henry Grosmont, the “Good 
Duke” of Lancaster, from whom Gaunt had derived his vast estates jure uxoris. Grosmont himself was the 
son of Henry, 3.E. Lancaster. This Henry was the son of Edmund Crouchback and thus the grandson of 
Henry III. Consequently, Henry VI bore the name ‘Henry’ largely because it was a Lancastrian tradition, 
which had begun as a matronym (being derived through Blanche of Lancaster), even if that tradition was 
ultimately traceable back to Henry III. It is interesting to note that Henry IV had not named his firstborn 
son after himself – who instead was called Edward – but that child died after only a matter of days. However, 
his second-born son, and eldest at the time of his birth, he named ‘Henry’ in the typical patronymic fashion. 
Sydney Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt: King of Castile and Leon; Duke of Aquitaine and Lancaster; Earl 
of Derby, Lincoln, and Leicester; Seneschal of England (Archibald Constable & Co. Ltd., 1905), 94; 
Marjorie Anderson, “Blanche, Duchess of Lancaster,” Modern Philology 45, no. 3 (1948): 156. 
173 Christie, Henry VI, 1; Wolffe, Henry VI, 28. 
174 Wavrin, Wavrin’s Chronicle, 1399-1422, 4:361. Whether it is true that Henry’s birth had been received 
more joyfully than other royal births is difficult to assess quantitatively. Wavrin himself was born around 
1394 and, therefore, his own memory probably only stretched back to around the turn of the century: 
Antonia Gransden, Historical Writing in England, vol. 2 (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 288. Richard 
II, who had abdicated/been deposed in 1399 had not had any children and all of Henry IV’s children had 
been born before he ascended the throne (and probably all before Wavrin was born); thus no child was born 
of a reigning monarch during Wavrin’s living memory – or, indeed, during his lifetime. In fact, the last time 
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Here is an indication that Henry was no ordinary infant.175 It is uncertain how people 
would have reacted had Henry been female, but we can conjecture that the rapturous 
response to Henry’s birth was not only on account of his birth, but also on account of his 
sex. In all likelihood, this behaviour demonstrates a widely held expectation that Henry 
would one day be king (because he was the eldest son of the regnant monarch); it was an 
anticipatory behaviour and a vindication of his hereditary right.  
A further piece of evidence as to the reception of Henry’s birth is provided by Hardyng, 
who notes the burgeoning of Henry V’s support in France shortly thereafter.176 Whilst 
Hardyng himself does not comment on whether this was directly connected to Henry’s 
birth, Allmand believed there to be connection: the prospect of a Lancastrian dynasty was 
now more real; waverers now might throw their lot in with Henry.177 If the two events 
were related, this speaks volumes for Henry as his father’s successor in both England and 
France.  
9.15.5 Henry V’s Testament 
Henry V was certainly concerned about the state of affairs following his death. He made 
a series of wills,178 the ‘third’ and final of which, so far as we are aware, was made on 10 
June 1421, just before his final embarkation for the Continent.179 Henry also made a 
number of codicils: one dated 9 June 1421 in his own hand, the day before the making of 
his third will; another dated 26 August 1422, made at Bois de Vincennes shortly before 
his death.180  
                                                            
a reigning monarch had a (legitimate) child was when Thomas of Woodstock (later D. Gloucester) was 
born in 1355 to Edward III and Philippa of Hainault; and the last time that a first son had been born to a 
reigning monarch was back in 1330, when Edward the Black Prince (also a son of Edward III and Philippa 
of Hainault) was born – the better part of a century before Henry [VI]’s birth. 
175 Cf. “[B]y examining the ceremonials and the literary productions that attended the birth of the Dauphin 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it is very clear that the public understood that a veritable king 
had been born, not just a potential heir”: Ralph E Giesey, “The Juristic Basis of Dynastic Right To the 
French Throne,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 51, no. 5 (1961): 3–47. 
176 “Saynt Dionis then, and castell Boys Vynccent, / Corbell, Pount Melanke, and full great parte of Fraunce, 
/ Burgoyne, Artoys, and Pycardy [to] hym sent / To bone his men without contraryaunce, / And eche cytee, 
to hym sworne in in substaunce, / Walled townes and castelles euery chone, / As hye regent of Fraunce [by 
hym one.]”: Hardyng, The Chronicle of John Hardyng, 386. (Bracketed text by the editor). 
177 Allmand, Henry V, 1992, 167. 
178 A document dated 24 July 1415 is generally considered to be Henry V’s first will. This was followed by 
a document dated 21 July 1417, which is known as his second will, although it has been suggested that it 
was rather in the nature of a letter of wishes than an actual will: Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and 
Codicils of Henry V,” 80. A text of this document can be found in: John Nichols, ed., A Collection of All 
the Wills Now Known to Be Extant of the Kings and Queen of England et Al. from the Reign of William the 
Conqueror to That of Henry the Seventh Etc. (John Nichols, 1780), 236–43. 
179 This “was clearly intended to supersede the 1415 will”: Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and Codicils 
of Henry V,” 83. 
180 Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and Codicils of Henry V,” 84. 
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It has been argued that Henry might have known that Catherine was pregnant when he 
left for France, which was also the time of the making of the third will. The fact that there 
are “no specific provisions” therein for his future heir speaks against this hypothesis, but 
does not necessarily defeat it.181 If he knew, he might have wanted to avoid ‘tempting 
God’;182 he might also have been undecided as to how to provide for his child, which 
decision would be contingent upon the sex of the child, number of children, and state of 
France and England. Furthermore, the possibility of writing a codicil – or even rewriting 
the will – remained open; there was still opportunity to make more specific provisions. 
Nevertheless, in his final attempts, there is a clear assumption that Henry [VI] will be his 
successor; the fact that this is an assumption and there is no act of designation is 
significant. Also significant is the fact that Henry [VI] had been made P. Wales and D. 
Cornwall – both of which were traditionally associated with the eldest son of the king. In 
any case, Henry might not have seen it as being the appropriate place for such matters.183 
9.15.6 Conclusions 
There are a number of anticipatory behaviours apparent prior to Henry V’s death in Henry 
VI’s favour. Nevertheless, there does not seem to have been any sustained campaign of 
constructive behaviours to secure Henry VI’s accession in England during Henry V’s 
reign, which rather demonstrates that it was taken for granted. The idea that Henry would 
succeed was clearly so prevalent and potent that there was no perceived need especially 
to reinforce it. The fact that the matter had some degree of parliamentary approval is 
significant.184  
                                                            
181 Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and Codicils of Henry V.” Strong & Strong in fact assert that “by 
June 1421 Henry knew that the queen was pregnant”.  
182 The idea of tempting God, heaven, providence, etc. being untoward appears to have found its way into 
written English in the fourteenth century (tempting ‘fate’ or ‘fortune’ was a slightly later development): 
"tempt, v.". OED Online. March 2019. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/198973?rskey=qkrzw8&result=2&isAdvanced=false (accessed May 07, 
2019) at meanings 2a and 2b. One such example is to be found in Richard Rolle’s Psalter at Psalm 77:21 
in his translation of the line Et temptauerunt deum in cordibus suis: vt peterent escas animabus suis, which 
he translated as: “And thai temptid god in thaire hertis; that thai aske mete till thaire saules”: Richard Rolle 
of Hampole, The Psalter of Psalms of David and Certain Canticles with a Translation and Exposition in 
English, ed. HR Bramley (Clarendon Press, 1884), 280. Rolle was one of the most widely read writers 
during the fifteenth century, so it is possible that Henry V would have even knew of this line, though, of 
course, we cannot therefore infer that he ever thought or agreed with the sentiment: Nicholas Watson, 
Richard Rolle and the Invention of Authority (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 31. The sentiment, of 
course, had its basis in biblical passages, see: Exodus 17:2 and Deuteronomy 6:16. 
183 “If from ROYAL we turn our eyes to NOBLE teſtaments, we ſhall find them conceived in nearly the ſame 
ſentiments. The care of ſepulture, debts, legacies, and charitable foundations, fill up the common outline.” 
Nichols, Royal Wills, iv. 
184 It can be noted that the situation was rather different for his claim to France. We are not here concerned 
with the French throne; it falls within the constitution of another social group. However, it is worth 
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9.16 Edward V (1483) – Ambiguous 
Edward V is traditionally included in the canon of English monarchs. Whether he ought 
to be is debateable, given that he was never crowned. Indeed, his inclusion in English 
regnal lists is perhaps rather a Tudor legacy. By portraying Edward as a legitimate and 
rightful king of England, Henry VII’s seizure of the throne from the ‘usurper’ Richard III 
seems more justified.  
Both Edward V’s family and personal claims were doubtful. Edward’s family claim had 
been derived from his grandfather, Richard, D. York. Richard was descended in the 
paternal line from Edward III’s fourth son, Edmund of Langley, and in the maternal line 
from Edward III’s second son, Lionel of Antwerp. Insofar as the paternal line was 
concerned, Richard’s claim was inferior to that of the Lancastrians; they descended in the 
paternal line from Edward III’s third son, John of Gaunt. However, if the maternal line 
was any matter, then there was an argument that Richard’s claim was superior, being 
derived from Edward III’s second son. In effect, Richard attempted to revive the Mortimer 
claim; once again sex and representation came into issue.  
Whether Richard, D. York’s designs on the throne, and their continuation by his son, 
Edward [IV], against the Lancastrians were originally justified, after the deaths of Henry 
VI and his son, there was little gainsaying the Yorkist paternal claim; with the descendants 
of Henry IV in the male line all dead, the Yorkist line now represented the most senior 
unbroken male line from Edward III. This was the situation at the time of Edward IV’s 
death. As things stood, Edward V’s family claim would then appear to have been 
strongest, excepting perhaps the fact that this situation had been brought about by 
nefarious means, which might have been thought to have invalidated their claim. 
There is every reason to think that Edward IV thought that his descendants would hold 
the English throne, particularly once he had an heir and had dispensed with his 
Lancastrian rivals. He called his eldest son Edward, after himself; it looked as though a 
new dynasty was to be founded. Unluckily for Edward [V], his father’s death left him 
with a lone paternal uncle (Richard [III], D. Gloucester) – an uncle who was somewhat 
at odds with his sister-in-law and her family, the Woodvilles. There was every reason to 
                                                            
remarking that Henry’s claim was based upon the Treaty of Troyes; an agreement by which the Lancastrians 
became the successors to the Valois claim to the French throne, i.e. through presentation. This claim was 
hotly contested; the Dauphin, Charles [VII], argued that it was his by hereditary right. In the end, Charles 
prevailed. Once again, chance and other factors were involved – not least the fact that he was a ‘native’ 
claimant. However, there was a clear narrative among Charles’ supporters – not least from Jeanne d’Arc – 
that Charles was the rightful king; a right of which he could not be deprived. 
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suspect that there would be a struggle for power. This struggle Richard [III] justified by 
attacking Edward V’s personal claim, i.e. his title. He claimed that Edward V was 
illegitimate, being born of a bigamous union as his father had been pre-contracted to 
Eleanor Talbot.185 
There is something to be made for the argument that Edward was avoided so that a royal 
minority might be avoided. However, there is little contemporary evidence for this. 
Indeed, even though minorities had been avoided in the past, everything points to the fact 
that there was now a very strong presumption in their favour. There was a prevalent and 
potent idea of hereditary right, which idea worked as an exclusionary reason.186 As with 
royal minors before him, it was his vulnerability, not his minority, which was Edward’s 
undoing. In many respects, Richard III’s frustration of people’s expectations by 
supplanting his nephews contributed to his undoing.  
9.17 Edward VI (1547) – Minority 
Henry VII had something of a hereditary claim to the throne through his Beaufort 
heritage, but this was tenuous.187 Nevertheless, it appears to have been sufficient for him 
                                                            
185  “On Sunday, June 22nd, a certain Doctor Shaw was put up to preach at Paul’s Cross ‘the Kyng 
Edwarde’s children wer not ryghtful enheritours unto the crowne, but that the Duke of Glowcetir’s title was 
bettir than thers’.” Kenneth H Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 7th ed. (Aberdeen University 
Press, 1950), 489. 
186 See, supra, 4.14. 
187 He was descended, through his mother Margaret Beaufort, from John of Gaunt (s. Edward III) and his 
mistress – and, later, wife – Katherine Swynford. The children of this pairing had been legitimized by 
Richard II in the Parliament of January 1397, theoretically with full rights. The succession had been 
discussed in the Henry IV’s parliaments of 1404 and 1406 – in the latter parliament, it was discussed twice. 
The ultimate effect of these was to settle the throne on Henry’s sons and their heirs general – male or female 
(interestingly, that the female descendants of Henry’s sons might succeed was a point upon which 
parliament specifically insisted). The line of succession beyond these was left unsettled. Henry had sisters, 
as well as half-siblings; his half-brothers were all Beauforts. The implication was that these might be 
excluded from the succession. In February 1407, John Beaufort, E. Somerset, sought confirmation from 
Henry IV of the Beauforts’ legitimation; Henry duly confirmed this, but, in so doing, introduced a provision 
specifically excluding the Beauforts from the succession. On the parliamentary discussions involving the 
succession, see: Chris Given-Wilson, “Designation and Succession to the Throne in Fourteenth-Century 
England,” in Building Legitimacy: Political Discourses and Forms of Legitimation in Medieval Societies, 
ed. Isabel Alfonso, Hugh Kennedy, and Julio Escalona (Brill, 2004), 102–4. On the Beauforts’ exclusion, 
see: Gerald Harriss, Cardinal Beaufort: A Study of Lancastrian Ascendancy and Decline (Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 40. Henry’s father, Edmund Tudor, was, it should be added, Henry VI’s half-
brother; they shared the same mother, Catherine of Valois, who had firstly been married to Henry V. 
Descent from a dowager queen who married into the English royal family, however, could not constitute 
grounds for a claim to succeed on hereditary grounds. Indeed, even if Henry had some hereditary right, it 
was by no means the strongest: Edward Plantagenet, E. Warwick (s. George, D. Clarence and hence nephew 
to both Edward IV and Richard III) arguably had the best claim; Henry appears to have recognized this and 
had him installed in the Tower of London: GR Elton, England under the Tudors (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1962), 19–20. After having himself crowned, Henry married Elizabeth of York (dau. Edward IV), not only 
to help heal divisions, but also surely to buttress his claim by incorporating something of her hereditary 
right into his own – not to mention, preventing her from marrying another and thereby creating some new 
claim. His claim to the throne thereafter was partly jure uxoris – by right of his wife. 
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to lead the challenge to Richard III, whom he supplanted after defeating at Bosworth. In 
November 1485, Henry declared: “that his coming to the right and crown of England was 
as much by lawful title of inheritance as by the true judgment of God in giving him victory 
over his enemy in battle…”188  Heredity might have helped to engineer a claim, but it was 
incomplete – conquest (i.e. appropriation) completed, if not perfected, it. 
Both Henry VII and his son, Henry VIII, experienced some vulnerability concerning the 
legitimacy of their title.189 However, by the mid-sixteenth century, there was little doubt 
that the English throne was a Tudor possession. In part, this was due to the dispersal of 
contenders, but it was also due to the fact that measures had been taken during Henry 
VIII’s reign to secure his family’s title; in particular, through the three Acts of Succession 
passed in Parliament.190 There were no prevalent and potent ideas as of yet that Parliament 
had exclusive control over the succession, but there was a clear impression being formed 
in people’s minds that Parliament was an appropriate place not only to discuss the 
succession but also to settle it – whether directly or, as in this case, indirectly by granting 
Henry VIII the right to settle the succession by testament.  
As such, Edward VI succeeded by a mixture of hereditary right (it almost certainly would 
have frustrated people’s expectations had he been overlooked), and the designation of his 
father, which designation was made according to parliamentary grant.191 Edward VI’s age 
appears to have been no impediment. Given that he had no paternal uncles who might 
rival his claim or any legitimate royal half-brothers, Edward’s claim was relatively secure. 
9.18 Jane Grey (1553) – Ambiguous 
                                                            
188 'Henry VII: November 1485, Part 1', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, 
Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox 
(Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1485-pt-1 [accessed 8 May 2019] at Item 3. As Elton has said, Henry appears to have 
left the details of his supposed hereditary right “studiously vague”: Elton, England under the Tudors, 19.  
189 In the former case, the conspiracy to place Perkin Warbeck on the throne – who argued that he was 
Richard of Shrewsbury, Edward IV’s second son – stands out. In the latter case, there was Edward Stafford, 
D. Buckingham, who Henry VIII so distrusted – especially given his Plantagenet heritage – as to have him 
executed. 
190 These were the First Succession Act (25 Hen. VIII, c. 22, 1533), Second Succession Act (28 Hen. VIII 
c.7, 1536), and Third Succession Act (35 Hen. VIII, c. 1, 1543). These established the immediate order of 
succession and allowed that Henry VIII might dispose of Crown by letters patent or testament with such 
conditions as he thought fit. This right Henry exercised in his testament – the validity, and, indeed, 
authenticity of which has been doubted. See: AF Pollard, England under Protector Somerset (Kegan Paul, 
Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1900), 3ff; Jennifer Loach, Edward VI, ed. George Bernard and Penry 
Williams (Yale University Press, 2002), 21–25; Suzannah Lipscomb, The King Is Dead: The Last Will and 
Testament of Henry VIII (Head of Zeus, 2015). 
191 It was determined that the Abp. Canterbury should say at Edward VI’s coronation that: “Syrs; here I 
present King Edwarde, rightfull and undoubted enheritour by the lawes of God and man to the Royal 
Dignitie and Crowne Imperiall off this realme…” John Roche Dasent, ed., Acts of the Privy Council of 
England, vol. 2 (London, 1890), 30 (Sunday, 13 February 1547)[emph. added]. 
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Lady Jane Grey, Edward VI’s first-cousin-once-removed, 192  was probably fifteen or 
sixteen when Edward died. According to the terms of the Third Succession Act and Henry 
VIII’s will, Jane stood in the line of succession, though she was behind Henry VIII’s 
daughters, Mary and Elizabeth.193 Edward VI and his government sought to set aside 
Mary and Elizabeth’s claims, not least for fear that they might overturn the new protestant 
settlement – especially the Catholic Mary. To this end, Edward made a ‘Devise’ sometime 
in 1552 or early 1553, settling the succession on Jane’s male descendants. When it 
became apparent in the early summer of 1553 that Edward’s health was failing, the 
‘Devise’ was amended to settle the succession on Jane herself.194  
Edward sought to convene a Parliament to approve this settlement. Indeed, Edward 
Montagu “claimed that without such an act the attempt to reorganize the succession would 
be treasonable”.195 Henry VIII might settle the succession by will; this right had not 
extended automatically to his son. Letters patent had been issued and accepted, but this 
was not enough, seemingly, to overcome the expectation that, seeing as Parliament had 
made the previous settlement, only Parliament could make the next. It was not to have 
the opportunity to do so before Edward died in July 1553. 
In under a fortnight, Mary was queen. The objection to Jane does not appear to have had 
anything to do with her age. Rather, it had everything to do with her title and the 
rightfulness thereof.196 As with Edward V, her age was almost largely irrelevant; it only 
worked to her disfavour by making her more vulnerable. Had Edward had his Devise 
approved by Parliament, the matter could have been quite otherwise. As it was, Jane’s 
succession appears to have more greatly frustrated people’s expectations than Mary’s 
Catholicism.  
9.19 Epilogue: Elizabeth I to Culloden 
                                                            
192 She was descended from Henry VIII’s younger sister, Mary, and her eldest daughter, Frances. 
193 It is worth noting that, for some reason, both Jane’s mother, Frances, and the descendants of Henry 
VIII’s elder sister, Margaret, were excluded from the succession. 
194 See: Paulina Kewes, “The 1553 Succession Crisis Reconsidered,” Historical Research 90, no. 249 
(2017): 468.  
195 Kewes, “The 1553 Succession Crisis Reconsidered,” 468. 
196 It was Lady Jane Grey’s argument that, though Mary and Elizabeth had been appointed to the succession 
by Act of Parliament, their claims had been invalidated: Mary’s by the annulment of her mother’s marriage 
to Henry VIII and Elizabeth’s by her mother’s divorce from Henry VIII on grounds of treason. They were, 
therefore, “clearly disabled, to ask, claim, or challenge the said imperial crown, or any other of the honours, 
castles, manours, lordships, lands, tenements, or other hereditaments as heir or heirs to our said late cousin 
Edward the 6th…” In her own favour, besides Edward VI’s designation, she also mentioned her “being 
naturally born here, within the realm”. Quoted in: Guy Carleton Lee, Leading Documents of English History 
(George Bell & Sons, 1900), 282, 283. 
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The Elizabethan succession question is a topic too large to enter into here.197 However, it 
is worthwhile noting a few points: (1) there was much uncertainty as to who Elizabeth’s 
successor would be if she died childless, which underlines the importance of heredity; (2) 
many attempts were made to have the matter deliberated upon and approved by 
Parliament, which indicates Parliament’s importance;198 and (3) that, in the event, James 
I’s accession was surprisingly smooth, which indicates that matters might be settled by 
common agreement.  
The Stuarts moved away from any reliance on parliamentary title towards hereditary 
right,199 which idea found judicial approval in Calvin’s Case:200 the court declared that 
the Crown was James’ by descent and, moreover, that he was king without “any essential, 
ceremony or act to be done ex post facto: for coronation is but a Royal ornament and 
solemnization of the Royal descent, but no part of the title.”201 Charles I’s downfall 
appeared for a time to have disposed of this right,202 but the Restoration under Charles II 
in 1660 seemed to have resurrected it. This changed under Charles II’s unpopular brother, 
James II. 
Having ejected James II in the ‘Glorious Revolution’, Parliament took it upon itself to 
settle the succession. It did this, first, in the Bill of Rights (1689);203 later, in the Act of 
Settlement (1701)204 and the Articles of Union (1706), as recognized by the Acts of Union 
                                                            
197 This includes doubts not only as to Elizabeth’s successor, but also as to her own succession. On the 
Elizabethan ‘Succession Question’, see esp.: Mortimer Levine, The Early Elizabethan Succession Question, 
1558-1568 (Stanford University Press, 1966); Susan Doran and Paulina Kewes, eds., Doubtful and 
Dangerous: The Question of Succession in Late Elizabethan England (Manchester University Press, 2014). 
198 Indeed, 13 Eliz. I, c. 1, §IV (1571) made it high treason to question the right of Parliament, with royal 
assent, to direct the succession. This is printed in: GW Prothero, ed., Select Statutes and Other 
Constitutional Documents Illustrative of the Reigns of Elizabeth and James I (Oxford University Press, 
1913), 59. See further: John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University 
Press, 1914), 87–88. 
199 This is undoubtedly in no small part, much as Figgis identified, to the fact that James I’s claim to the 
English throne largely rested upon hereditary right, which right was notably confirmed in statutory form in 
James’ first English Parliament (1 Jac. I, c. 1 (1604)): Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 137, 138. The Act 
is printed in: Prothero, Statutes and Other Constitutional Documents 1558-1, 250–51.  
200 Calvin’s Case (1608) Co. Rep. 1a 
201 Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt., ed. John Henry Thomas and John Farquhar Fraser, 
vol. 4 (Joseph Butterworth and Son; J. Cooke, 1826), 18 (VII 10b). 
202 There is an interesting letter written during the Cromwellian Protectorate, which seems simultaneously 
to say that Parliament is empowered to interfere with, and, indeed, control the succession, whilst also being 
largely bound to accept the de facto ruler: Anon., A Copy of a Letter Written to an Officer of the Army by a 
True Commonwealths-Man, and No Courtier, Concerning the Right and Settlement of Our Present 
Government and Governors (London: Thomas Newcombe, 1656), 1. For some discussion on this letter, 
see: Jonathan Fitzgibbons, “Hereditary Succession and the Cromwellian Protectorate: The Offer of the 
Crown Reconsidered,” English Historical Review 128, no. 534 (2013): 1121–24. 
203 1 Will. & Mar., Sess. 2, c. 2 
204 12 & 13 Will. III, c. 2 
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(1707). 205  In one sense, these were by no means revolutionary. Their provisions 
maintained the ancient hereditary pattern in which descent and succession were 
intertwined. The novelty was the fact that the trajectory and conditions of the succession 
were subject to parliamentary grant. English and, shortly thereafter, British, monarchs 
were only such because Parliament made them so. Succession came to rest ultimately on 
a basis not of gravitation, but presentation. 
Nevertheless, it was some while before this idea was fully prevalent and potent. James II 
and his successors continued to press their claims by hereditary – and, indeed, divine – 
right. In the Jacobites, they found many who agreed. This argument, however, died at 
Culloden on 16 April 1746, when the Jacobites were defeated by the Hanoverian forces. 
The death of Charles Edward Stuart in 1788 put the matter entirely beyond doubt. The 
succession lay in Parliament’s gift.  
9.20 Conclusions 
England was a monarchy for almost the entirety the period covered.206 Furthermore, the 
throne tended to admit of only one monarch at any given time.207 Interregna and divided 
power were viewed with distrust. Thus, there were prevalent, potent, and persistent fixed 
expectations that (1) the country should be ruled by a monarch; (2) there ought 
always to be a monarch; and (3) there should be but one monarch. In other words, 
within the social group, roughly defined as those permanently resident in England, there 
ought always to be one person to whom is assigned the bundle of activities and influence 
associated with the title of king or queen regnant of England. Excepting the middle 
decades of the seventeenth century, there appears to have been little idea that the English 
social group should or could be arranged otherwise. In this respect, the constitution was 
fixed. 
Generally speaking, there was also a fixed expectation, particularly in the central part of 
our period, that: (4) the monarch ought to be male. Something of the principle of implied 
                                                            
205 For the text of Article II, see 6 Anne, c. 11: John Selden, Titles of Honor, 3rd ed. (E. Tyler and R. Holt, 
for Thomas Dring, 1672), 494. The Acts of Union were two acts: First, of the English Parliament (Union 
with Scotland Act 1706, 6 Ann., c. 11) and, second, of the Scottish Parliament (Union with England Act 
1707). 
206 This is excepting, of course, the brief period of the Commonwealth and Protectorate. 
207 As we have seen, Stephen failed to have his son, Eustace, crowned during his lifetime. It should be noted 
that Stephen was not told that such a thing was altogether impossible; it was merely impossible in his case 
given his oath-breaking. Henry II and his son, the Young Henry, are the notable exceptions in English 
history to this idea of the absolute exclusivity of the throne. It is to be remembered that Edward IV regarded 
Henry VI as having been deposed; Henry VI might have formerly been a king, but he had been stripped of 
his position. For the most part, it was seen necessary first to topple a king if one wanted to be king oneself; 
rebellion did not follow anointing, anointing followed successful rebellion.  
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exclusion can be seen here.208 It does not seem to have ever been the case that women 
were absolutely and expressly excluded from the throne. However, because people tended 
to associate the throne with males, women were thereby impliedly excluded. Matilda, for 
example, challenged this. Whilst her ultimate failure cannot be solely attributable to her 
sex,209 it seems unlikely there would have been a disputed succession but for her being 
female.  
From the mid-sixteenth century, the idea of regnant queens was more seriously 
entertained: Lady Jane Grey, Mary I, and Elizabeth I all contributed strongly to the idea 
of its possibility.210 Of course, society and monarchy were changing at this time. Warfare, 
too, was changing. With the advent of firearms, bodily size and strength became less 
important; with changes to military tactics, there was less of an expectation that monarchs 
command troops personally. 211  Even though there are famous examples of female 
warriors and commanders, for the most part there had been a firm association between 
these and their being men’s activities. The diminution in importance of this side of the 
role – the disassociation of this activity from monarchy – removed a potential bar to 
women succeeding. Nevertheless, the old idea persisted, if in a modified form: the 
monarch ought preferably to be male. It was only recently that this position changed.212 
There was also a well-established fixed expectation that (5) the throne was the 
monarch’s to enjoy for their lifetime. The early retirement of a monarch – for whatever 
reason – was an extraordinary event, which extraordinary nature had potential to upset 
                                                            
208 See, supra, 3.11. 
209 Her personality and affinities certainly also played their respective parts. 
210 It is notable, though, that, as seen above, Edward VI’s ‘Devise’, whilst naming Jane’s male heirs as his 
successors, originally passed over Jane herself. Her sons, grandsons, etc. might represent her in the 
succession, but she – being female – was not initially countenanced for the throne. Until that point, there 
had been no regnant English queen, not least since Anglo-Saxon days. Whilst Matilda had come close in 
the twelfth century and whilst queen consorts had often acted as regents, the idea of a regnant queen was 
still somewhat strange and foreign – even if the prospect of it had become much more real with Henry 
VIII’s stipulations in his will. Ultimately, it was necessity that moved Edward and his advisors to name 
Jane herself. There simply was not the time to wait for her to have male heirs; by this time, Edward would 
be long dead.  
211 The last British monarch personally to command troops in battle was George II in the Battle of Dettingen 
(27 June 1743). This battle, interestingly, took place in the context of the War of the Austrian Succession 
(1740-48), which was fought over the question as to whether a woman might succeed to, or convey, the 
Habsburg Monarchy – and, if so, which woman was to be preferred. Britain, alongside others, supported 
the claim of Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of the last monarch, Charles VI (who had had no sons). 
This was to be contrasted with the claims of the daughters of Charles VI’s older brother – Joseph I – and 
their spouses. In the event, Maria Theresa and her husband, Francis Stephen (who became Francis I), 
prevailed. 
212 The Succession to the Crown Act 2013 (c. 20). See also: Neil Parpworth, “The Succession to the Crown 
Act 2013: Modernising the Monarchy,” The Modern Law Review 76, no. 6 (2013): 1071–72. 
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and frustrate the generally held expectations as to how and when the throne should be 
transmitted.  
These things clearly indicate that people, throughout the period, held certain fixed 
expectations about how activities and influence were to be distributed within the group 
and, more particularly, how such activities and influence were to be transferred. The fact 
that they did not commit these to writing in any coordinated manner does not detract from 
their prevalence or potency. Indeed, many took these things for granted and never thought 
seriously to question them. Whilst there was some disagreement as to what exactly the 
fixed expectations entailed, and whilst the prevalence and potency of specific 
expectations varied over time (as one would expect from the Generational Theory of 
Law), it must be stressed that there is a world of difference between not having an 
absolutely settled and comprehensive rule (i.e. a singularly potent, prevalent, and 
persistent fixed association that covered each and every possible scenario) and not having 
any rules at all.213  
As we have seen, there were many recurrent ideas that arose concerning the transmission 
of the crown. The most prominent of these was that of heredity – particularly according 
to male-preference primogeniture. One could go so far as to say that this appears to have 
been, for the entirety of the period, the basic presumption. In other words, there was a 
fixed sequential expectation that the death of the king be followed by the coronation of 
their eldest son or, failing that, their nearest male relative. In the earlier part of this period, 
this was drawn largely from supposed custom and natural law; in the latter part, from 
parliamentary approval and disposal. In effect, over time the hereditary principle went 
from one based solely in gravitation to one of gravitation by virtue of presentation.  
Indeed, problems only tended to arise with the hereditary principle where:  
(i) There were familial complications;214  
                                                            
213 As Wormald has said: “Principles did exist, even if they were distorted in practice”. Wormald was 
talking here about Anglo-Saxon England, but the same is true for the rest of the mediaeval period, except 
we would perhaps do well to modify it slightly to say that such principles were sometimes distorted in 
practice. See: James Campbell, Eric John, and Patrick Wormald, The Anglo-Saxons, ed. James Campbell 
(Phaidon Press Limited, 1982), 116. 
214 For example: (a) premature death of heirs (e.g. William Adelin in 1120), sometimes raising the issue of 
representation (e.g. in the cases of Geoffrey, D. Brittany in 1186 and Edward of Woodstock in 1376, whose 
heirs were Arthur of Brittany and Richard [II] respectively);  (b) failure of legitimate and eligible issue, e.g. 
Edward the Confessor’s lack of children, or the fact that Henry I, though he was survived by a number of 
sons, left no legitimate male issue, resulting in the contest between his daughter, Matilda (notably supported 
by her half-brother Robert, E. Gloucester), and his nephew, Stephen of Blois; and (c) remarriage, especially 
where it resulted in new royal children, e.g. Eadgar, who appears to have had four children by three women, 
left behind him the question as to whether it should be his eldest natural son, Edward the Martyr, or his 
346 
 
(ii) The heir was absent from the kingdom;215  
(iii) There was an ongoing challenge to the predecessor’s regime;216 
(iv) The previous monarch had been dethroned or had otherwise proved 
unpopular;217 or 
(v) The heir was a child, i.e. a minor.218 
In terms of royal minors, there were three situations in which they were particularly 
vulnerable, in which their ostensible hereditary right was most likely to be subverted:  
(i) A surviving lone paternal uncle (patruus);219 
(ii) A step-mother with her own royal children, i.e. legitimate, royal half-
siblings;220 or 
(iii) Some ongoing threat, necessitating an adult leader.221 
That the greatest threats to a minor’s title tended to come from within their family both 
demonstrates the strengths and weaknesses of hereditary right. Most people would never 
have countenanced the idea of their own accession. A family connection was necessary 
                                                            
eldest son by his most recent pairing, Æthelred [II], who should succeed, which question was eventually 
settled by the former’s death. 
215 This is especially if they were absent for an extended period. For example, Harthacnut appears to have 
lost out on the English throne, at least initially, through his long period of absence following Cnut’s (i.e. 
his father’s) death. It is interesting to note that Edward I, who was also absent for a considerable period 
following the death of his father, Henry III, appears to have faced a challenge to his title. 
216 This challenge might be considered to be inherited by their supposed successor. For example, Henry 
III’s right to the English throne was contested by Louis [VIII] of France, who had initially been fighting 
against Henry’s father, King John. 
217  This raised the question as to whether the ordinary rules ought to be followed in extraordinary 
circumstances. Again, this can be seen in the case of Henry III in the context of the First Barons’ War and 
Louis [VIII]’s invasion.  
218  This we have seen above: Æthelhelm and Æthelwold (871); Eadwig and Eadgar (946); Edmund 
Ætheling and Edward the Exile (1016); Eadgar the Ætheling (1066, twice); Henry FitzEmpress (1135); and 
Arthur of Brittany (1199). 
219 For example: Æthelwold who was passed over in favour of his sole-surviving paternal uncle, Alfred the 
Great; Eadwig and Eadgar, sons of Edmund I, who were initially passed over in favour of their sole-
surviving paternal uncle, Eadred; Arthur of Brittany who had to face his sole-surviving paternal uncle, 
[King] John; and Edward [V], who was faced with his sole-surviving paternal uncle, Richard [III]. Whilst 
Æthelwold, Eadwig, and Eadgar appear to have at least been tolerated by their respective uncles, Arthur 
and Edward appear to have met untimely fates quite possibly at the connivance of theirs. Indeed, it was 
perhaps this distrust of the patruus, who stood to gain from their nephew’s (or, indeed, niece’s) 
displacement, that made Parliament wary, during the minority of Henry VI, of conveying an over-powerful 
role upon the younger of Henry’s uncles, Humphrey (D. Gloucester). After all, as Fortescue put it, to place 
a person in the care of one who would benefit most from their demise was “quasi agnum committere lupo 
ad devorandum” (like committing a lamb to a wolf to be devoured): JS Roskell, “The Office and Dignity 
of Protector of England, with Special Reference to Its Origins,” The English Historical Review 68, no. 267 
(1953): 253. 
220 For example, Edward the Martyr appears to have been killed, if not by, then on the orders or with the 
complicity of, his step-mother, Ælfthryth – whose son, Æthelred, stood to benefit from Edward’s death. 
221 For example, it might be for this reason that Alfred, rather than his nephews, Æthelhelm and Æthelwold, 
succeeded in 871, given the Viking aggressions. This might also have played a role in the initial avoidance 
of Eadwig and Eadgar in 946. 
347 
 
to establish eligibility, if not title; claims without this – however tenuous – could not be 
taken seriously. Indeed, there is an extent to which everybody consistently agreed with a 
single rule: (6) the most senior representative of the predecessor’s surviving family 
ought to be their successor. The real question was what constituted the ‘most senior 
representative’?222  
In the earlier part of the period, it was more easily argued that this might designate the 
king’s eldest surviving brother, even if the king left infant children; in the latter part of 
the period, it was almost universally taken to designate the monarch’s eldest surviving 
son or, failing sons, daughter – regardless of their age. There was seemingly no fixed 
expectation that was prevalent and potent after the Norman Conquest that the monarch 
absolutely had to be an adult. Indeed, the prevalent and potent idea appears to have been 
that a candidate’s minority did not disqualify them or otherwise make them ineligible to 
succeed.223 As we have seen, Richard III attacked Edward V’s eligibility, not on the 
grounds of the latter’s minority, but on the grounds of the latter’s supposed illegitimacy. 
Purely in terms of the succession, a candidate’s minority was not thought to be a relevant 
or significant consideration.  
Across the centuries, we see a number of preparatory behaviours – both anticipatory and 
constructive – connected with hereditary right.224 For example:  
(i) Selection of birthplace;225  
(ii) Naming practices, especially the giving of dynastic names;226 and  
                                                            
222 This might be interpreted according to various criteria, e.g. age, experience (often conflated with age), 
sex/gender, ability (particularly in warfare, cf. heretoga), wealth (which can be both converted into military 
power and distributed as patronage), and influence (including the size of their following and the overall 
confidence they could command). 
223 Cf. supra, 6.12. 
224 For a discussion of how mediaeval royal children in western Europe were prepared for kingship, which 
naturally involved a number of preparatory behaviours, see: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, 
France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” chaps. 1–2.  
225 There is every reason to think that the place of birth of future English monarchs was important – but not 
decisive. After all, if it had been, Richard [II] of Bordeaux would never have become king. Nevertheless, 
pains quite possibly appear to have been taken to ensure that future heirs to the kingdom were born in the 
right place. Of particular importance is the story about Edward I sending his wife, Q. Eleanor, to Caernarfon 
Castle in Wales so that their child – in this case, a son, Edward [II] – could be born in Wales, so that the 
Welsh might have a Prince ‘free from all blemishes on his honour’ and ‘unable to speak a word of English’: 
Roger L’Estrange, The Case Put Concerning the Succession of His Royal Highness the Duke of York 
(London: M. Clark, 1679), 2. It is worthwhile noting also the statute, De Natis Ultra Mare (25 Ed III, 1350), 
which clarified that the birthplace of heirs to the throne did not have a bearing upon their eligibility to 
succeed. As such, birthplace might be chosen for political gain.  
226 These names were designed to invoke the memory of previous holders of the office – in other words, to 
associate the newborn with their predecessors in others’ minds. It was also a way for a father to show that 
he acknowledged the child, as, after all, whereas maternity is always certain, paternity is less so; giving a 
son their father’s name shows that the father accepts the child as theirs. That there is, for example, a string 
of Edwards who were kings of England, then, is little surprise. Indeed, had Edward of Woodstock ascended 
348 
 
(iii) Investing titles, especially that of P. Wales in later mediaeval England.227 
However, in spite of these and in spite of the general presumption in its favour, hereditary 
right, whilst potent, was not indefeasible. There were other ways in which an expectation 
might be planted in people’s minds that somebody might become king. In particular, there 
were the various forms of presentation.228 Nevertheless, this was unlikely to be potent in 
the face of a clear hereditary right.   
There has been some notion that the English throne, particularly during the Anglo-Saxon 
period, was essentially elective. Heredity might make one a candidate and create a 
presumption in one’s favour, but it was election that made one monarch. To address this 
fully would be beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it can be suggested that, in matter 
of fact, many instances of so-called ‘election’ might be better construed as instances of 
‘adjudication’. In other words, people did not gather to choose their preferred candidate, 
but, rather, to decide – according to certain fixed associations – who had the greatest 
right. Rather than having the character of presentation implicit in the idea of election, 
then, this would rather give an impression of gravitation being the predominating factor.  
In these six respects, then, the basic constitution in England changed but little during the 
period covered. These were ideas that were not only prevalent and potent, but also 
persistent. Nevertheless, there are detectable fluctuations both in terms of what ideas were 
present, and in terms of the extent to which they were prevalent and potent. It is true that 
there were general tendencies, which gives the sense of there being ‘developments’, but 
one also constantly sees certain ideas gaining ground, being checked, and losing ground; 
the extent of conciliar or parliamentary involvement, and the extent to which the throne 
was supposedly elective, are cases in point. The succession, then, is a lesson vitiating 
Whig narratives.  
Of especial interest in the context of the Generational Theory of Law is the extent to 
which each generation appears to have thought that it might settle the succession by 
common agreement, though the extent to which it would be prepared to depart from what 
would normally have been expected was usually conservative. Indeed, in these instances, 
there are parallels with Verfassungdurchbrechungen or ‘exceptive laws’; there is an 
                                                            
the throne and had his firstborn son survived, there would have been two further Edwards, likely as not 
before the turn of the fifteenth century.  
227 Such titles arguably straddle ideas of hereditary right and right by designation. It resolves down to a 
matter of causation: is the title given because of right, or is the right created because the title is given? 
228 After all, if somebody, ostensibly with power and influence, says “You shall be king” (and this is a thing 
that you want), then it is easy for an expectation to arise that this should be the case. 
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admission that normally the case would be otherwise, but, given extraordinary or 
exceptional circumstances, people’s ordinary fixed associations might set aside. There is 
a tangible note of specificity; the general rule (i.e. people’s normal expectations) remains 
valid and is still the guiding principle except in this particular case.  
Even today, in the age of Parliamentary Sovereignty, it is questionable as to whether 
Parliament might radically alter the constitution by disposing of the monarchy or 
drastically changing the terms of succession thereto of its own accord.229 Most people 
would probably expect that there would have to be at least general election with manifesto 
pledges or referenda beforehand. Were Parliament to proceed without this, it is doubtful 
whether the formal constitution, as it stands, would permit the courts to intervene; 
nevertheless, within the wider material constitution, there is every reason to suspect that 
a great many people’s expectations would be frustrated and a constitutional crisis would 
ensue.  
                                                            
229 Particularly in view of the fact that one of the central doctrines of the present constitution is “Whatever 
the Crown in Parliament enacts is law”. In other words, under present arrangements, the monarch would 
theoretically have to agree to any change wrought by Parliament to abolish the monarchy. If the monarch 
were to do so only under considerable pressure – under duress – or if it were done without the goodwill of 
those in line to the throne, then there could well be reason to believe that the abolition was improperly done. 
Indeed, it would be an act of injustice – for those who would be monarch would be deprived of that which 
we would expect them to have and receive, i.e. the crown. Of course, there is reason to doubt whether the 
monarch would be able to refuse any such move – both politically and constitutionally. After all, there is 
the convention that monarchs will not refuse the royal assent to any bill duly passed in Parliament. Even 
though we might still countenance the possibility of their doing so, there is every reason to believe that their 
doing so would frustrate many an expectation – their role is to do Parliament’s bidding, not to frustrate the 
will of Parliament (which is the imputed will of the people – or, at least, of the active members of the 
electorate). Howsoever any such change is wrought, there can be little doubt that, if things continue much 
as they are, the transition to a republican form of government will be a change of great moment – and, quite 
likely, great contention. This might be cushioned by having a longer, rather than a shorter transitional 
period, thereby giving people time to adjust their expectations. For a discussion of the place of the monarchy 
in the constitution and the possibility of moving to a republican constitution, as well as the implication 
thereof, see, e.g.: Richard A Edwards, “Republican Britain - The Constitutional Implications,” Cambrian 
Law Review 31, no. 1 (2000): 1–20.  
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10 – Government and the Minorities: A Study in Provision 
10.1 Introduction 
Periods of royal minority are often associated with periods of regency,1 i.e. arrangements 
made to compensate for a royal’s inability to rule effectively – in this case, because of the 
monarch’s youth.2 Unless children are especially revered or the monarchy is largely 
symbolic, such arrangements are a practical necessity. Without them, much would go 
undone or be improperly done – with potentially far-reaching consequences for law and 
order. 
Arrangements for royal minorities tended to have two effects on the distribution of 
activities and influence. First, there was a process of disassociation whereby the royal 
minor was disassociated, at least for a time, from the exercise of some, if not all, of the 
activities/influence ostensibly attached to their position. Second, there was a process of 
redistribution whereby some, if not all, of those things were thenceforward, albeit perhaps 
with certain restrictions, to be associated with, and exercised, by others (usually a ‘regent’ 
or ‘regency council’).3 
The advent of a royal minority did not necessitate radical or extensive changes to the 
existing constitutional arrangements (i.e. the existing distribution of activities and 
influence). To a large extent, the fact of their minority might be accommodated within 
                                                            
1 On the concepts of regency and minority, and for an explanation of some of the terminology employed in 
this chapter, see Appendix III. 
2 Ward has discussed the mediaeval use of the term ‘regent’, as well similar and potentially alternative 
contemporary terms. In terms of how we ought to describe such situations, Ward expressed preference for 
the term ‘vice-regal guardianship’ over that of ‘regent’. However, these rather seem to import the same 
thing; the former might well be the definition of the latter. As such, it is not necessarily profitable to invent 
new terms, especially when they result in somewhat clumsier and more roundabout phrases. The better 
thing is to ensure that we deploy vocabulary carefully and appropriately, adding qualification where 
necessary. Furthermore, it is important that we distinguish between internal and external perspectives (see 
supra 2.22). From our perspective, it is often appropriate to employ the terminology of regency, because it 
is the terminology – objectively speaking – that makes the most sense for us to use. However, we must 
balance this with the internal perspective, particularly as expressed through the specific vocabulary 
employed and the connotations that that appears to have had (assuming, of course, that there was specific 
vocabulary employed, rather than circumlocutions or avoidance). We ought to discuss the terminology that 
they used and, where we lack an equivalent term, it is appropriate to say that it is like something with which 
we are familiar; perhaps to say that the thing in question is a kind of the thing with which we are familiar, 
rather than saying that it is that thing. Consequently, we might say that a mediaeval person held a position 
assimilating to that of regency, as we would understand it; alternatively, that that mediaeval person was a 
kind of regent, as we would understand it. If appropriate, we might give these specific forms specific names. 
This seems to me to be the most sensible approach. It preserves nuance without making matters over 
complex or convoluted. For Ward, see: Emily Joan Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, 
and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250” (University of Cambridge, 2018), 40ff, 51–52.   
3 To this might also be added a process of creation whereby, in response to the extraordinary nature of the 
situation, new activities/influence might be invented, which were either attached to pre-existing positions 
or formed the basis of new ones. 
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the existing framework. Some pre-existing positions, institutions, etc. might find their 
importance and scope increase somewhat, but most people could continue as before. 
Indeed, there was an extent to which the changes that did occur could be masked. Thus, 
for example, orders might be issued as if they were produced by the minor themselves, 
even though they were actually produced by others; the minor might serve as the 
mouthpiece of government, if not the voice. Whilst this might seem somewhat 
disingenuous, it might help to foster a sense of normality. Consequently, the changes 
made in response to a royal minority might be conservative and, to a greater or lesser 
extent, obscured – but that does not mean that they were not there.  
There are six royal minors considered in this study, i.e. those after the Norman Conquest. 
None of them were suffered to rule from the beginning as if they were an adult. In each 
and every case, alternative arrangements were made. In some cases, these were made 
overtly and deliberately; clear expectations were laid down as to how activities and 
influence were to be distributed and exercised for the duration of the minority. In such 
cases, we might think much more along the lines of made orders and formal 
constitutions.4 By contrast, in other cases, changes were made with far less transparency, 
clarity, and general agreement. In such cases, we will have to think more along the lines 
of spontaneous orders and material constitutions.    
There is not the space here to consider the arrangements that were made in their entireties. 
Instead, the focus is on a narrower aspect: the matter of provision, i.e. how and by whom 
was the distribution of activities and influence during the minorities decided? Who was 
associated with the act of deciding as to which arrangements were to be made? 
Throughout the period, there were, broadly speaking, three candidates who could – 
whether reasonably or not – claim that the power of provision lay with them, i.e. the 
power to decide upon the distribution. These were: (1) the minor’s predecessor; (2) the 
Church; and (3) ‘representative’ bodies.  
The role of each of these with respect to the six royal minors will be considered in turn. 
As will be seen, the influence of each of these changed from generation to generation. It 
will also be seen that each minority was far from anarchy. In each case, those involved 
worked according to, and within a framework of, certain fixed associations and 
expectations.  
10.2 Henry III 
                                                            
4 See, supra, 4.24 and 4.25. 
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10.2.1 Henry’s Predecessor 
Henry III’s father, King John, died in the midst of a crisis. Many of the barons were in 
open rebellion and, moreover, had invited the French Dauphin, Louis [VIII], to challenge 
for the English throne. However, John was still possessed of a loyal following and, at 
least until his final days and hours when he was beset by illness, his mental capacity. 
Thus, even in spite of the questions about his accession,5 loss of continental lands, and 
accusations of misrule, John was regarded by many as King until the end.6 As such, any 
steps that he might have taken to provide for his son’s government might have been 
accepted as authoritative and binding. Whether he took any such steps is debateable.  
Given his relatively advanced age when Henry was born, 7  family history, 8  and 
disturbances of his reign (viz. the conflicts with the K. France and the Barons’ War), it 
was distinctly possible that John might die before his eldest son came of age. However, 
there is no evidence that, prior to his final days, John took steps to provide for his son’s 
government should he die prematurely. Whether he thought he could so provide or, 
indeed, whether he needed to do so, is uncertain, though some of his actions in his final 
days provide us with some insights.  
We can begin with his testament. A reasonable reading of Rymer’s transcription of John’s 
testament would indicate that John thought that he did not have a power to provide for 
the government after his death. There are strong overtones of conciliar government: John 
was dependent upon his fideles (faithful, loyal men); he could only rule through them and 
with their help.9 However, Rymer omitted two crucial words, which fundamentally alter 
the sense.10 John merely said that he relied upon them for the execution of his testament. 
In itself, it tells us little about John’s views on government or ability to provide for his 
                                                            
5 See, supra, 9.10. 
6 In effect, there were many who still regarded the association between John and the kingship with positive 
regard (cf. supra 4.20) – which positive regard gave it its potency.  
7 John was thirty-three when he married the young Isabella of Angoulême (August 1200) and approaching 
forty-one when his first son, Henry [III], was born (October 1207). 
8 His father (Henry II) had been fifty-nine when he died, his paternal grandfather (Geoffrey Plantagenet, 
Ct. Anjou) only thirty-eight; his brothers Henry the Younger, Richard, and Geoffrey had died aged twenty-
eight, forty-one, and twenty-seven respectively. Richard, of course, had died as a result of violence, rather 
than ill health, and so therefore could have expected to live longer. Nevertheless, John would have been 
quite familiar with the idea of mortality.  
9  Thomas Rymer, Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et Cujuscunque Generis Acta Publica Inter Reges 
Angliae et Alios Quosuis, ed. Adamo Clarke and Frederick Holbrooke, vol. 1 (London, 1816), 22. For a 
translation of John’s will based on this text, see: Wilfred Lewis Warren, King John (Peregrine Books, 1966), 
275–76. For the conciliar overtones, see: SD Church, “King John’s Testament and the Last Days of His 
Reign,” The English Historical Review CXXV, no. 514 (2010): 505–28. 
10 Church, “King John’s Testament and the Last Days of His Reign.” 
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son’s government. What is clear is that he made no such provision in his testament.11 This 
is unsurprising given that his testament appears to have been (a) made in extremis, and 
(b) largely concerned with his soul’s salvation.12  
Next, there is a letter that, according to Wendover, John sent from his deathbed to all 
sheriffs and castellans. In it, he ordered them “one and all to obey his said son”.13 A literal 
interpretation of this would argue that John had no notion that there would be a minority 
government. He did not say “obey my son’s protectors,” etc.; he merely said to obey his 
son. As such, John possibly thought it needless to make special provisions for a minority 
government; the current constitutional system could facilitate Henry’s youth without an 
overt, albeit temporary, redistribution of activities/influence. This does not mean that he 
thought Henry able to rule without considerable aid and counsel – simply that John had 
not envisaged special, formalized arrangements for a minority government.  
There is also a letter that John sent on 15 October 1216 (three days before his death) to 
Pope Innocent III, in which he commended “his kingdom and his heirs to the protection 
of the pope.”14 England had been a papal fief since May 1213,15 which theoretically gave 
                                                            
11 Church suggested that the thirteen ‘arbiters’ listed at the end of the document might have been intended 
to form a minority government. These thirteen were: Guala, papal legate; Peter des Roches, Bp. Winchester; 
Richard Poer, Bp. Chichester; Silvester, Bp. Worcester; Aimery de St-Maur, master of the Temple; William 
Marshal, E. Pembroke; Ranulf, E. Chester; William de Ferrers, E. Derby; William Brewer; Walter de Lacy; 
John of Monmouth; Savaric de Mauléon; and Falkes de Bréauté. However, whilst these individuals were 
certainly important during Henry’s minority, there appears to be little evidence that they ever acted as a 
group, which indicates that John never intended them to (except insofar as his testament was concerned). 
The fact that John probably did not intend this is reinforced by the omissions of Hubert de Burgh (the 
justiciar) and Richard Marsh (the chancellor). See: Church, “King John’s Testament and the Last Days of 
His Reign,” 14, 15ff.  
12 Church, “King John’s Testament and the Last Days of His Reign,” 15ff. 
13 Roger of Wendover, Flowers of History, ed. JA Giles, vol. 2 (Henry G Bohn, 1864), 378; Roger of 
Wendover, Flores Historiarum (Sumptibus Societatis, 1861), 385. 
14 Nicholas Vincent, ed., The Letters and Charters of Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, Papal Legate in England, 
1216-1218, vol. lxxxiii (Canterbury and York Society, 1996), n. 140b. 
15 In 1205, following the death of Hubert Walter (Abp. Canterbury), John fell out with Pope Innocent III 
over the question of provision to the see of Canterbury. In theory, the right of electing a bishop belonged 
to the chapter of the cathedral. However, seeing as the Abp. Canterbury was no mere provincial bishop, the 
king’s nominee had normally been accepted. This did not happen in this case. John was unwilling to accept 
their candidate (Reginald, a sub-prior) and they were unwilling to accept John’s candidate (John de Grey, 
Bp. Norwich). The matter was referred to Innocent, who found both candidates unworthy. Instead, he 
proposed a candidate of his own – Stephen Langton. However, Langton was unacceptable to John and an 
impasse was reached. In 1208, Innocent placed England under interdict; in 1209, he excommunicated John; 
and in 1212, he threatened to deprive John of his throne and invited Philip II, K. France, to invade England. 
The very real threat of invasion worried John and he sought to make peace with Innocent – who would only 
consider it if John conceded on every point. John, in despair, did so, and on 15 May 1213 England became 
a papal fief. John gave homage and fealty to the Pope, and promised that England would pay an annual 
tribute to Rome. This was not the first time that England had, at least in theory, been the vassal of a foreign 
power. During Richard I’s captivity under the Holy Roman Emperor (Heinrich VI), England had been 
promised as a fief of the Empire as a condition of Richard’s release. This promise appears to have been 
quickly forgotten; the papacy’s claims on England, by contrast, were somewhat longer lived. Given 
England’s need of the papacy’s support, this fact is none too surprising. See: Warren, King John, esp. chap. 
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the Pope some oversight over English affairs as suzerain and, indeed, now made the Pope 
the guardian of John’s children (and they his wards). Consequently, the letter could be 
seen as John exercising some power of provision in favour of the Pope. However, the 
opposite conclusion seems more convincing: John thought that he had no such power, 
because that power – that activity – resided, not in him, but in the Pope. The letter, then, 
was a recognition of this and, if anything, symbolized a handover of power.  
Finally, there is the account presented in the History of William Marshal.16 According to 
the History, John asked those by his deathbed “to see that he [William Marshal, E. 
Pembroke] takes charge of my son and always keeps him under his care, for my son will 
never govern these lands of mine with the help of anyone but the Marshal”.17 Certainly, 
the impression that one gets form this is that John wanted to create an association in 
people’s minds between William, on the one hand, and caring for and advising Henry III, 
on the other. However, whether John thought that this necessitated a formal 
disassociation, as well as redistribution and/or creation, of activities/influence is unclear 
– as is whether this was rather after the manner of a ‘letter of wishes’ than a strict 
command.  
10.2.2 The Church 
The letter that John had sent to Innocent III was, in fact, received by Innocent’s successor, 
Honorius III. Upon receiving the letter, Honorius immediately appointed Guala Bicchieri 
as papal legate with “full power without appeal to do what he thought expedient for the 
king and the kingdom”.18 This was reinforced by the further grant of extensive powers in 
April 1217.19  
The initial letter did not reach England for some weeks, but Guala, who had been in 
England when John died,20 was already playing a significant role in England as the Pope’s 
representative. It was probably he who accepted Henry’s homage to the papacy at Henry’s 
                                                            
5; HWC Davis, England under the Normans and Angevins, 1066-1272, 10th ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 
1930), 319, 353–69. 
16 The History was certainly biased and written sometime later than many of the events it describes. It is 
possible that this scene was extrapolated from later events: David Crouch, William Marshal: Knighthood, 
War and Chivalry, 2nd ed. (Pearson Education Ltd., 2002), 124. 
17 AJ Holden, S Gregory, and David Crouch, eds., History of William Marshal, vol. 2 (Anglo-Norman Text 
Society, 2004), ln. 15167-15191. 
18 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 13. 
19 GJ Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part I,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 18 (1904): 
256. 
20 He had been in England for around fifteen months at the time of John’s death: Kate Norgate, The Minority 
of Henry the Third (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1912), 62. 
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coronation on 28 October 1216 in Gloucester,21 and he played a prominent role in the 
assembly that took place the following day, which appointed William to the leading 
position in the government.22 
Whilst it is clear that William was appointed during the Gloucester assembly, precisely 
by whom he was appointed is rather less clear.  
The testimony of the History has William at least being nominated by the assembly, 
although the actual appointment itself was perhaps made by Guala;23 in the very least, it 
was Guala who formally invested him.24 Superficially, the Barnwell Chronicle’s narrative 
is somewhat different. It reported that William, Guala, and Peter des Roches (Bp. 
Winchester) were jointly “entrusted with the king and the kingdom ‘by the common 
counsel’ of the magnates.”25 All three would, therefore, seem to have owed their authority 
to the assembly, rather than, for example, the assembly and William owing theirs to 
Guala. It would also mean that Peter, who became Henry’s tutor, held his position by 
virtue of the assembly and, consequently, was not beholden in this regard to William or 
Guala. Certainly, the Barnwell narrative supports Peter’s later protestation, recorded in 
                                                            
21 Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third, 4. 
22 William was originally styled as ‘justiciar’, which, over the course of a couple of weeks, was used at 
least on four to six occasions. This title had much to recommend it. In the past, justiciars had been much 
the king’s alter ego and had often acted as regent in cases of absence. However, there was a problem. There 
was already a justiciar: Hubert de Burgh. Hubert had, until that point, been engaged in the defence of Dover 
castle, and it was probably because of him that the practice of referring to William by the title was brought 
to an end. There had been dual justiciars in the past (e.g. Robert of Leicester and Richard de Luci in 1159, 
and Hugh de Puiset of Durham and William de Mandeville in September 1189), but it was usually a singular 
office. Moreover, there was seemingly a fixed expectation that justiciars were appointed by monarchs. John 
had not removed Hubert and Henry was too young to do so; the justiciarship, therefore, could be neither 
made nor unmade. Some other title would have to be found for William. From mid-November 1216, 
William was styled rector noster et regni nostri (‘guardian of ourselves and our kingdom’). This title was 
unprecedented and disappeared when William retired in April 1219. Exactly what it imported is unclear, 
though it implies sweeping powers, i.e. a wide range of activities and a high level of influence. It can be 
noted that Ward was of the opinion that the element ‘rector’ in the title, whilst “implying a leader or 
governor”, also had “connotations of a more tutorial role, such as master or instructor”. On the use of the 
title ‘justiciar’, see: FM Powicke, King Henry III and the Lord Edward: The Community of the Realm in 
the Thirteenth Century (Oxford University Press, 1966), 7; Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part I,” 
246; Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third, 70; Crouch, William Marshal: Knighthood, War and 
Chivalry, 127. On the justiciarship: Francis West, The Justiciarship in England 1066-1232 (Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), passim, and, for the examples of dual justiciarships, 35 and 65. For Ward: Ward, 
“Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 44. 
23 After having been suggested for the regency, William appears to have been reluctant to accept. He only 
did so after Guala had offered him spiritual rewards. Whether this was an offer ‘too tempting to be refused’, 
as Painter thought, or whether Guala added it as a sweetener whilst ‘requiring’ William to accept the role, 
as Norgate thought, remains unclear. Sidney Painter, William Marshal: Knight-Errant, Baron, and Regent 
of England (John Hopkins Press, 1966), 196; Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third, 7. 
24 “Thereupon, as was his duty, the legate handed everything over, / And the worthy Marshal took into his 
care / Both the King and the realm.”: Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, 
2:ln. 15558-15561. 




the History, that William had only been entrusted with the kingdom – not the king. 
William, however, appears to have thought this false. He had been entrusted with both; 
Peter’s authority was beholden to his.26 
William appears to have been given some power of provision with regards to 
appointments. For example, the History says that Guala – notably exercising a controlling 
influence – was quite specific that it was William, not the magnates, who should decide 
on the matter of who should be entrusted with Henry’s person.27 However, the magnates, 
too, appear to have had some powers over appointments.28 Yet, when, in mid-1217, a 
number of magnates petitioned that Ranulf (E. Chester) should be William’s coadjutor, 
in view of William’s advanced age, this petition was made neither to William nor the 
other magnates, but to Honorius – who refused it.29 This would indicate that there was 
some prevalent and potent – if not universal and absolute – fixed association between the 
papacy and the ultimate power of provision. William’s powers were controlled by the 
Pope and, if anybody wanted to change the structure of government, it was to the Pope, 
not some native officer, that they must appeal.  
The question of provision arose again in early 1219, when it became clear that William 
was dying. In April, he called a council to his bedside.30 It appears from the History that 
William initially intended that the magnates elect a direct successor, if it pleased Henry.31 
This would indicate, of course, that William thought they had such a power – even if not 
in 1216, then now in 1219. However, after Peter’s protestation, William appears to have 
taken the decision into his own hands.32 The following day, he entrusted Henry “to the 
care of God, the pope, and the papal legate”; indeed, he seemed to be of the opinion that 
only the Pope could keep England safe. 33  Henry was then, despite Peter’s further 
protestations, publically given over to the care of the legate (now Pandulf).34 This can be 
seen in two ways. On the one hand, it might demonstrate that it was accepted that William 
                                                            
26 See Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 106. 
27 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, 2:ln. 15581-15610. 
28 For example, in November 1218, Ralph de Neville was appointed by a Great Council as keeper of the 
king’s seal; he later argued that, as he had been appointed by a Great Council, only a Great Council could 
dismiss him: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 94–95. 
29 AJ Holden, S Gregory, and David Crouch, eds., History of William Marshal, vol. 3 (Anglo-Norman Text 
Society, 2006), 165; James W Alexander, Ranulf of Chester: A Relic of Conquest (The University of 
Georgia Press, 1983), 76–77. 
30 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 103–4; Crouch, William Marshal: Knighthood, War and Chivalry, 
139; Painter, William Marshal, 277. 
31 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, 2:ln. 17987-17988.  
32 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, 2:ln. 18025-18028. 
33 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, 2:ln. 18050-18060. 
34 Holden, Gregory, and Crouch, History of William Marshal, 2004, 2:ln. 18091-18114. 
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had the power to determine his successor, besides by those in Peter’s camp.35 On the other 
hand, it might be seen as William defaulting on making a choice – in the absence of an 
internal appointment, Henry’s care fell back to his overlord, i.e. the Pope.36 There is every 
reason to suspect that both interpretations had contemporary support.  
William’s position was allowed to lapse upon his death and there followed a period (1219-
21) in which the government was directed by a triumvirate: Pandulf (papal legate), Hubert 
de Burgh (justiciar), and Peter des Roches (Bp. Winchester and king’s guardian). These 
worked relatively harmoniously on a number of occasions, particularly in the earlier part 
of this period. However, there was also a significant amount of jostling for position. On 
the one hand, this pitted Pandulf against Hubert and Peter; on the other hand, it pitted 
Hubert and Peter against one another. By and large, it was Hubert who came out the 
better. As time wore on, his influence increased significantly, such that he was found to 
be increasingly acting without either Pandulf or Peter, though in conjunction with the 
King’s Council – indeed, there appears to have been some expectation that the latter be 
involved in making decisions.37 
The basis of these arrangements is far less clear than in the case of William. To a great 
extent, it can be seen as a fall-back position, in which each of those involved relied largely 
on their own natural authority – Hubert as the justiciar, Peter as Henry’s guardian, Pandulf 
as the papal legate, and the Council as representative body of the magnates. Nevertheless, 
papal oversight remained. By April 1220, consent had been obtained from the Pope for a 
second coronation;38 in May 1220, Pandulf secured permission from the Pope to, in effect, 
“change the king’s governor”, which heralded the end of Peter’s guardianship;39 and, in 
July 1221, Pandulf himself was recalled on papal authority.40 Indeed, in April 1223, it 
looked as though the Pope was about to bring the minority to an end – i.e. collapse the 
minority government – as he had sent letters ordering the members of the government to 
deliver to Henry “the free and undisturbed disposition of his kingdom”.41 The Pope 
                                                            
35 See, e.g.: Turner, “The Minority of Henry III. Part I,” 293–94. 
36 See, e.g.: Painter, William Marshal, 279. 
37 Such a view can be seen most clearly in the dispute concerning the decision over Harbottle Castle. 
Vieuxpont and the E. Salisbury both challenged the government on this decision on the basis that it had 
been made by a clique, rather than the council proper. In effect, the government had acted with improper 
authority: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 209–10, 236. 
38 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 187. 
39 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 243. 
40 This was upon the petition of Stephen Langton (Abp. Canterbury) – largely on the basis that Pandulf’s 
position as legate conflicted with Langton’s position as primate, although it was also something of a 
reflection of the increasing strength of the government: Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 254. 
41 Carpenter, The Minority of Henry III, 301. 
358 
 
clearly thought that this, which would fundamentally change the basis of the government, 
was within his discretion.  
In the event, these letters were not enforced – at least, not immediately. In the summer, 
the government formally wrote to the Pope asking that he withdraw the letters. He refused 
to do so, being reluctant to rescind what he had granted, although he qualified them by 
granting discretion to Henry as to when they would come into force. The delay of the 
letters’ implementation shows that the Pope’s influence was not so great as to compel 
those in England to obey whatever. Nevertheless, the referral back to the Pope shows a 
willingness to be ruled by him. Had Honorius refused to bend, it would have been 
interesting to see whose will prevailed. In the event, something of a compromise was 
reached – the creation of an option.   
That there was an association between the papacy and the power of provision during 
Henry III’s minority can little be doubted, even if the precise nature of this association is 
less clear. It does not seem that the Pope himself made any detailed provisions for Henry’s 
government. He was too far removed to do so. Instead, he entrusted his legates to act as 
they thought appropriate, seemingly within a wide ambit. Not only was the Pope 
associated with this power, therefore, but it was deemed that it could be delegated. It was 
perhaps his representatives’ willingness to cooperate with the English magnates and 
proceed by consent that makes it less clear as to the boundaries of the Pope’s powers of 
provision – including whether the association between the Pope and the power of 
provision might operate to the exclusion of other parties, viz. the magnates.  
10.2.3 ‘Representative’ Bodies 
As has been seen, the role of the magnates in determining the structure of the government 
is somewhat unclear. They were clearly prominent in the Gloucester assembly of 28 
October 1216 where William was appointed. Both the History and the Barnwell Chronicle 
have them playing an instrumental role in the process, though it is only the latter that 
paints them in a more dominant light. Indeed, even though, as has been seen, the 
magnates, when gathered in Great Councils, appear to have had some powers of 
appointment, and even though William appears to have mooted the idea of their electing 
his successor, there can be little gainsaying that it was to the papal legates and the Pope 
that appeals were made when any major changes were to be made. Moreover, even though 
Hubert appears to have been supported by the magnates through various councils 
throughout the period of his ascendency, he owed his position, not to them, but to the 
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natural authority derived from his status as justiciar and in the absence of some superior 
officer appointed by the Pope.  
Even though there does not appear to have been a prevalent and potent idea that the 
ultimate power of provision lay in the magnates, there nevertheless appears to have been 
some idea that they should be consulted.  
10.2.4 Interim Conclusions 
John, whether or not he thought that he might have some power of provision extending 
after his death, does not appear to have exercised it. After his death, there appears to have 
been some desire to proceed on the basis of consensus, if not consent. Given the problems 
during his reign and its aftermath, this is understandable. Nevertheless, it seems that the 
power of provision was largely identified with the Pope and his legates. Whether the 
Pope’s exercise of this power would have been accepted had he (or his representatives) 
chosen a structure or personnel that the magnates found profoundly disagreeable is 
something of a moot point, as is whether the magnates themselves could have made 
provision without the Pope’s express permission or approval.  
Indeed, however these parties – the papacy and the magnates – worked out the details of 
government, that the power of provision was associated with these, and these alone, is 
abundantly clear. The exercise of such a power was not within the remit of any private 
individual; it was not associated with some foreign prince, such as the K. France or the 
Holy Roman Emperor; it was not associated with the ‘Commons’, which, as yet, had little 
by way of direct representation. If any of these had tried to make provision, it is unlikely 
that it would have been accepted (at least, readily and without recourse to violence), 
because there was no notion – i.e. fixed association giving rise to fixed expectations – 
that these were persons associated with such an activity. 
10.3 Edward III 
10.3.1 Edward’s Predecessor 
Edward III, like Henry III, came to the throne following a crisis in his father’s reign. 
However, Edward’s father, Edward II, had been defeated, discredited, and dethroned – 
unlike Henry’s father who had died whilst still in possession of his throne and a significant 
backing, not least from the papacy. There is no evidence that Edward II made any attempt 
to influence the structure or personnel of his son’s government. Given the fact of his 
unpopularity and downfall, this is unsurprising. He had forfeited his right to rule – and, 
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with it, any claim that he might have had to determine what happened during Edward III’s 
first years on the throne. None of the activities or influence associated with the kingship 
were now associated with Edward II, this included.  
10.3.2 The Church 
One of the greatest differences between Henry III’s minority and all subsequent 
minorities – including Edward III’s – was the papacy’s role. It had claimed powers during 
Henry III’s minority unparalleled in any of the others.  
The papacy was not yet unimportant in Edward’s time, but its influence over secular 
matters had begun to decline.42 Both Edward I of England and Philip IV of France, for 
example, had successfully asserted themselves vis-à-vis the Church.43 In theory, England 
was still under papal overlordship, but the potency of this idea was waning. In 1334, 
England would make the last of its intermittent financial contributions as a papal fiefdom; 
in 1343, would make it illegal for anybody to carry letters from the papacy in Avignon 
that might be prejudicial to the interests or rights of the King;44 and, in 1366, would 
repudiate papal overlordship altogether.45 The papacy was still influential in its way, but 
there was no pretence that the Pope had any direct role in the orchestration of English 
government. The fact that it had only recently transferred to Avignon and was more 
concerned with its relations with the continental powers also probably played a role; it 
was in little position to assert overlordship of England. 
Of course, the Church was not yet without influence. There were still the ecclesiastical 
members of Parliament – Archbishops, Bishops, Abbots, and Priors. Indeed, on some 
occasions, these outnumbered the lay members,46 even if the lower clergy preferred to 
absent themselves where they could.47 Thus, the Church might exert a large degree of 
influence through Parliament, but only through Parliament and as an element thereof. 
Neither individual members of the Church (whether Pope, Archbishops, etc.) nor the 
Church as a distinct social group (e.g. when sat in convocation) had any especial claim to 
                                                            
42 CW Previté-Orton, A History of Europe from 1198-1378, 3rd ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1951), chaps. 
11–12. 
43 CW Previté-Orton, Outlines of Medieval History, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1933), 352ff; 
Previté-Orton, A History of Europe from 1198-1378, esp. 228-286. 
44 Goldwin Smith, A Constitutional and Legal History of England (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1955), 201. 
45 Geoffrey Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy (Thames and Hudson, 1968), 161. 
46 For example, in 1295 there were 90 spiritual peers as opposed to 45 lay peers; in 1509, the numbers were 
48 and 36 respectively: Henry St Clair Feilden, W Gray Etheridge, and DHJ Hartley, A Short Constitutional 
History of England, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1911), 124.  
47 Luke Owen Pike, Constitutional History of the House of Lords (Macmillan & Co., 1894), 156–57. 
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determine the distribution of activities and influence within the secular government.48 
Had they tried, they probably would have failed; such was not an activity associated with 
them qua ecclesiastics.  
10.3.3 ‘Representative’ Bodies 
It is unclear as to whether Edward III was deemed incapable of ruling by virtue of 
immaturity and, therefore, in need of some form of regency government.49 After all, he 
had already been Keeper of the Realm (i.e. regent).50 Moreover, Edward, being two 
months above fourteen, was somewhat older than Henry III had been at the time of 
accession;51 he had greater experience and, as has just been mentioned, had already held 
high office, even if only nominally.52 Nevertheless, it is clear that, for the first three years 
                                                            
48  Indeed, many of the prelates sat in Parliament, not because of their spiritual status, but rather per 
baroniam – because they held land from the Crown. In many respects, therefore, they were, like their lay 
peers, essentially there for secular reasons; their being prelates was something of a coincidence. 
49 Indeed, whether or not this ought to be designated as a period of ‘minority’ or, perhaps, rather, as a period 
of ‘tutelage’ is something of a contested point. For those terming the period a minority, see, e.g.: Kenneth 
H Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 7th ed. (Aberdeen University Press, 1950), 139; Bertram 
Wilkinson, The Later Middle Ages in England, 1216-1485 (Longman, 1969), 132. ‘Tutelage’ was the term 
employed by Stubbs (at least, the compiler of the contents page) and, more recently, Ormrod: William 
Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Development, 5th ed., vol. 3 (Clarendon 
Press, 1896), vi; W Mark Ormrod, Edward III (Yale University Press, 2011), chap. 3. 
50 When Edward II fed England in the face of Isabella and Mortimer’s invasion, it was deemed that the 
situation had become one in which the king was able, but not present. In other words, an absentee regency 
was triggered (see App. II). As Edward had made no provision for the government in his absence, so it was 
argued, Isabella (Edward [III]’s mother) and her supporters appointed Edward [III] as Keeper of the realm, 
ostensibly with the consent of the community of the realm. Edward was thirteen years old at the time. (It 
can be noted that Edward had also been appointed Keeper of the Realm in August of the previous year, in 
view of Edward II’s imminent departure for France, though, in the event, it was Edward [III] who went 
and, therefore, although appointed previously, did not hold the position until 1326). That this was an attempt 
to arrogate power to Isabella’s party cannot be doubted. Moreover, whether anybody but the king had a 
right to appoint a regent in his absence is questionable. Nevertheless, there was clearly an effort to maintain 
a sense of normalcy: the King was outside the realm and, therefore, people expected that there would be 
some regent acting in his stead. It is unsurprising, therefore, that Edward [III]’s keepership lapsed when 
Edward II re-entered the realm, albeit as a prisoner. After all, the keepership was only valid and legitimate 
by virtue of Edward II’s absence and only for so long as he remained absent. See: Ormrod, Edward III, 33, 
44–45, 47. 
51 Although it is clear that Henry III did not achieve his majority upon turning fourteen (though it was 
deemed that he no longer required a guardian from this time, even if this was something of a pretext for 
removing Peter des Roches), there were French precedents for fourteen being the threshold for majority: 
Norgate, The Minority of Henry the Third, 73. There were also the earlier examples of Otto III (Holy Roman 
Emperor) and Frederick I (K. Sicily and later Holy Roman Emperor). Indeed, under Roman law, fourteen 
marked the transition from childhood to adolescence: Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law (Oxford 
University Press, 1954), 164–65. 
52  Whether this spoke against the need for a regency during Edward III’s ‘minority’ turns on the 
comparability of absentee regencies and regencies by virtue of immaturity. There are good reasons for 
treating them differently. A youthful regent for an absent monarch might be tolerated because that monarch 
could exercise oversight. As such, a youthful regent need not have a great deal of actual power. By contrast, 
a youthful monarch would have full powers and, moreover, would lack a superior power to direct and 
control their actions. The experience and abilities of a youthful monarch mattered much more than those of 
a youthful regent. Therefore, the fact that Edward had already held the keepership did not necessarily 
preclude a period of regency in view of his minority. The keepership was a lesser position than the kingship; 
holding the former did not mean holding the latter without restrictions.  
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of his reign, Edward played little role in the government. This was largely due to the de 
facto regency of his mother, Isabella of France, and her partner, Roger Mortimer. 
However, there does appear to have been a movement at the start of Edward’s reign 
towards instituting a formal regency council, if not also a regent, for the period of his 
minority.  
Just as in the case of Henry III, there appears to have been some idea that such matters 
ought to be settled through communal deliberation. In Henry’s case, by the magnates in 
Great Council; in Edward’s, by Parliament. The fact that a council – of whatever nature 
– was appointed in the Parliament of January 1327 is significant, even if its membership 
might have been decided beforehand.53  It indicates that there was a perception that 
Edward was as yet unable to choose his own counsellors. More importantly, it is an 
indication that there was some idea that Parliament was an appropriate place for 
discussing and deciding such matters. Indeed, given the Statute of York (1322),54 there 
was probably a growing expectation – both in terms of prevalence and potency – that it 
would be consulted in such matters.  
Henry, E. Lancaster, appears to have headed this council. Indeed, he is described as 
having been made custos at Edward’s coronation,55 which title implies some form of 
regency. Whilst Edward was probably considered too old to require a personal guardian,56 
the Council’s and Lancaster’s appointments seem to indicate an intention to institute a 
regency government. Edward was young and unproved; 57  there was a desire to put 
arrangements into place to ensure effective rule.  
However, the Council quickly became a nonentity. Instead, Isabella and Mortimer – most 
especially the latter – ruled in Edward’s name. Yet, there are indications that, in 
subverting the power of the Council, Isabella and Mortimer frustrated people’s 
                                                            
53 Indeed, its membership had possibly been decided even before Edward’s coronation. Leland, a somewhat 
‘dubious’ source, lists the members of the council and suggests that it was instituted owing to Edward’s 
‘tender age’. See: James F Willard and William A Morris, eds., The English Government at Work, 1327-
1336, vol. 1 (The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1940), 132. The appointed members were: Abp. 
Canterbury; Abp. York; Bp. Winchester; Bp. Hereford; Henry, E. Lancaster; E. Marchal; E. Kent; E. 
Warrene; Sir Thomas Wake; Sir Henry Percy; Sir Oliver of Ingham; and John of Roos.  
54 This enacted that the consent – of prelates, earls, barons, and the community of the realm – was required 
for the enactment of legislation. This built on earlier ideas, e.g. the expectation in clauses 12 and 14 of 
Magna Carta that the greater personages in the kingdom be consulted – particularly when financing was 
involved. 
55 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in Its Origin and Development, 4th ed., vol. 2 
(Clarendon Press, 1896), 387. 
56 Ormrod, Edward III, 58. 
57 There was a recognition that Edward was not yet of full age, e.g. in respect to the Forest Charter: Ormrod, 
Edward III, 58. 
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expectations – not only of good government, but also of legitimate government. Thus, for 
example, in October 1328, Lancaster refused to attend the Salisbury Parliament until the 
Council’s power was restored; he also issued a list of charges against Isabella and 
Mortimer’s government. After some military manoeuvring, Lancaster stood down on the 
promise that his grievances would be addressed in the next Parliament; he paid £11,000 
to secure pardon.58  Furthermore, this might be seen in the development of rumours 
concerning Edward II’s survival – one of which ensnared his brother, Edmund of Kent.59 
Mortimer had frustrated people’s expectations as to who could rule and how such a 
position might be achieved – even to the point of people wanting to restore one considered 
to be a bad king (viz. Edward II).  
In January 1328, Edward married Philippa of Hainault; in June 1330, she gave birth to 
their first child – a son. In October 1330, when a Great Council met at Nottingham, 
Edward was just shy of eighteen. Edward appears to have thought himself sufficiently 
mature; it would be intolerable for things to continue as they were for much longer. He 
should be king in deed as well as name – this is what he and others expected. 
Consequently, Edward surprised and arrested Mortimer during the night at Nottingham. 
He declared that, henceforth, he would govern.60  
Mortimer was subsequently tried and found guilty; he was executed on 29 November 
1330. There is a distinct sense amongst his contemporaries that Mortimer had acted above 
his station; he had arrogated powers to himself of which he was undeserving and to which 
he was not entitled. One of the principal charges made against him was that he had set 
aside the Council. 61  He had frustrated people’s expectations of right and good 
governance; he had broken the law and undermined the constitution. For that, he deserved 
– in their eyes – to die.  
Thus, even though the idea that a Council appointed by Parliament should be inviolable 
was not yet sufficiently prevalent and potent to have prevented Isabella and Mortimer 
from seizing power, there is clearly a sense that the frustration of its existence and 
operation by Isabella and Mortimer frustrated people’s expectations.  
10.4 Richard II 
10.4.1 Richard’s Predecessor 
                                                            
58 Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 143. 
59 This cost Edmund his life; he was executed in March 1330. 
60 Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 145. 
61 Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 145. 
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Richard II was ten years and five months when he succeeded his grandfather, Edward III, 
in 1377. Richard’s father, Edward of Woodstock (‘the Black Prince’), had died in the 
June of the previous year, leaving the nine-year-old Richard as heir apparent to Edward 
III, then on the cusp of turning sixty-three. Woodstock, though Richard’s father, had never 
been king himself and so it is unsurprising,62 especially given the fact that the incumbent 
was still alive, that Woodstock did not make – or, indeed, try to make – provisions for his 
son’s minority government.63 
King John and Edward II, given the circumstances of their ends, can perhaps be forgiven 
for not attempting to make provisions for their successors’ governments. However, 
Edward III was clearly elderly and in ill-health. It would not have required a great deal of 
foresight to see that he might die before Richard came of age. Indeed, the anxiety to have 
Richard confirmed as Edward’s successor is unsurprising in this light.64 
People were obviously thinking ahead to the future and, under these circumstances, it 
might have been sensible to consider how the country would be governed if that future 
was rather closer than further. However, there was certainly no initiative on Edward III’s 
part to make any such provisions. This could be explained by his poor health and the fact 
that the government was largely at this time controlled by his eldest surviving son, John 
of Gaunt. It is difficult to give credence to ideas that Gaunt planned to murder Richard 
and take the throne for himself (at least, at this stage),65 but Gaunt might well have not 
considered it in his interests to make especial effort to plan his nephew’s government 
before it was an established fact. In any case, he had greater problems with which to 
contend. 
10.4.2 The Church 
                                                            
62 Though, there was a precedent for the heir-apparent making provision for the succession and government 
in the event of their and their predecessor’s dying before the next heir came of age. This is to be found in 
the will made by Edward I on 18 June 1272 at Acre whilst he was on crusade. There had recently been an 
attempt on his life and so the impetus for making the will is understandable. Cf. JR Studd, A Catalogue of 
the Acts of the Lord Edward, 1254-1272 (PhD Thesis: University of Leeds, 1971), 731–32; JS Roskell, 
“The Office and Dignity of Protector of England, with Special Reference to Its Origins,” The English 
Historical Review 68, no. 267 (1953): 217 (n.1). 
63 He had seemingly taken the measure of entrusting Richard into the care of his father (Edward III) and 
brother (John of Gaunt, D. Lancaster): “Then he called the King, his father, and the Duke of Lancaster, his 
brother; he commended to them his wife, and his son, whom he greatly loved, and straightaway entreated 
them so that each was willing to give his aid. Each swore upon the book and promised him at once that they 
would comfort his child and maintain him in his right. All the princes and barons swore all round to this, 
and the noble Prince of fame gave them a hundred thousand thanks…”: Chandos Herald, The Life & Feats 
of Arms of Edward the Black Prince, ed. and trans. Francisque Michel (J.G. Fotheringham, 1883), 283–84. 
64 See, supra, 9.13. 
65 See Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 240. 
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Throughout Edward III’s reign,66  and, indeed, the fourteenth century as a whole, the 
papacy’s standing decreased markedly;67 England no longer considered itself a papal 
fiefdom. Indeed, there was a growing body of antipapal literature.68 There was also an 
increasing body of anticlerical sentiment – particularly among the followers of Wycliffe 
and Hus, who had support in England (not necessarily for unselfish purposes) from the 
likes of Gaunt. The depredations of the Avignon papacy, especially under Clement VI, 
had not helped the papacy’s cause; the English Statute of Provisors (1351) is readily 
understood in this context.69 This antipapal sentiment was plain in the January of the year 
in which Richard acceded when the crown’s intention of resisting papal usurpations was 
declared.70 That the papacy was also on the verge of entering into the Great Schism at the 
time of Richard’s accession is also a point that should not be forgotten.  
Any idea that the papacy should be able to interfere directly in English affairs was 
becoming increasingly impotent; the idea that the Pope was overlord of England, all but 
forgotten. Spiritual peers continued to sit in Parliament, but, as before, there was no notion 
that any member or body of the Church outside of Parliament had any right or power to 
determine the structure of the English government. 
10.4.3 ‘Representative’ Bodies 
The first years of Richard’s reign are characterized by a series of continual councils. 
These were in form and function, if not in name, essentially regency councils – they were 
there recipients of the redistributed activities/influence.71  
Why a regency was not formally declared is difficult now to say. It might have something 
to do with associations between regencies and senior members of the monarch’s family.72 
                                                            
66 See, supra, 10.3.2. 
67 Previté-Orton, A History of Europe from 1198-1378, 225ff. 
68 There had been some French pamphlets drawn up at the end of the thirteenth century to counter the claims 
made by Boniface VIII: Previté-Orton, A History of Europe from 1198-1378, 231. 
69 25 Edw. III, c. 4. See: Barraclough, The Medieval Papacy, esp. 152-154. 
70 May McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 1307-1399 (Oxford University Press, 1959), 395. 
71 NB Lewis, “The ‘Continual Council’ in the Early Years of Richard II, 1377-80,” English Historical 
Review 41, no. CLXII (1926): 246–47; James Fosdick Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the 
Middle Ages (Oxford University Press, 1913), 115; Thomas Frederick Tout, Chapters in the Administrative 
History of Mediaeval England, vol. 3 (Longmans, Green and Co., 1928), 323, 326. 
72 Cf. Ward’s argument that, looking across western Europe during the central mediaeval period, “direct 
kinship with the child king was not as important for potential guardian(s) [of king and kingdom] in the 
central Middle Ages as the predecessor’s nomination or recognition by the kingdom’s magnates”: Ward, 
“Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 153. The idea that close 
relatives had a right to the regency was certainly neither universally prevalent nor potent; it also appears to 
have been defeasible. Moreover, as Ward recognized, a much more prevalent and potent idea was that the 
monarch’s relatives – most particularly, their senior male paternal relatives – ought to have some significant 
role in advising the monarch; that they had a right to provide counsel, which ought not only to be heard but 
also heeded; in the very least, to be given due consideration. These latter ideas had a greater sense of 
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After all, if there is a regency, should there not be a regent? And should not that regent 
be a close relative of the king? In Richard’s case, this would probably mean the 
empowerment of one of his uncles – most likely, Gaunt, who remained a divisive figure.73 
Consequently, it might have been calculated that not declaring a regency would frustrate 
people’s expectations less than declaring one and depriving Gaunt of some preeminent 
position within it; at least, it was less likely to provoke conflict. Alternatively, a formal 
regency was simply thought unnecessary;74 Richard’s youth might be accommodated 
without ceremony. 
There was something of a pretence that Richard was “fully competent to govern”.75 
However, the appointment of a continual council in July 1377, shortly after Richard’s 
coronation, was clear recognition that, in the very least, he needed help – more so than an 
able and trusted monarch. Whilst there was a strong expectation that monarchs would 
have counsellors to advise them, it was largely within their discretion as to how, when, 
and by whom such advice was given.76 The council, such as it was, tended to be an 
indefinite and fluid body. Only in perceived times of crisis was there typically movement 
to give it and its workings greater definition: to fix its membership; to clarify its members’ 
duties, powers, and objectives; to clarify the mode, method, and level of remuneration of 
                                                            
fixedness to them than the former; the former appeared far more contingent. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
denied that the latter ideas lend themselves easily to the former: as the monarch’s natural counsellors and 
as persons whose interests might be said to greatly coincide with that of the monarch’s, would it not be 
sensible for them to act as regent? In sum, it is difficult to deny that there was some association between 
regency and kinship; the nature and strength of that association varied with time and place. For Ward’s 
recognition of the role of kin as counsellors, see: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and 
Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 155. 
73 McKisack notes the antipathy towards him from the higher clergy, the London capitalists, and the 
Commons: McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 399–400. It is also important to remember that there were 
rumours around this time that Gaunt had designs on the throne himself. See: Nigel Saul, Richard II (Yale 
University Press, 1999), 27–28. 
74 Cf. Baldwin’s argument that, even though it was “certain that the council would be the ruling power in 
the state for the time”, “[n]o special law or definition of a regency was considered to be necessary, as the 
government was conducted under the usual forms by authority of the king and council.” For Baldwin, the 
real question was not whether or not there would be a regency, but, rather, to what extent should the council 
be defined, by whom, and with what powers of oversight? See: Baldwin, The King’s Council in England 
during the Middle Ages, 120 (emph. added). 
75 Saul, Richard II, 28. See also: Tout, Chapters, 3:323–24. 
76 Preferably, this would be a trusted, wise, experienced, and representative group whose advice – both 
individually and collectively – the monarch acknowledged and heeded, if not always followed. Monarchs 
who failed to seek and take good advice in the right manner from the right people tended to be poorly 
regarded – perhaps to their ruin. Edward II’s failure to seek and take good advice from the right people or, 
rather, a broad and inclusive group of people, explains much of his downfall. His over-reliance on, first, 
Piers Gaveston, and, later, the Despensers, to the exclusion of most everyone else frustrated a lot of people’s 
expectations – particularly seeing as Gaveston’s and the Despensers’ advice was thought to be partial and 
unwise. They were not trustworthy, considerate advisors. Richard II, too, would later frustrate many 
people’s expectations in this way in his reference to, and reliance on, a select and exclusive group – 
especially on Robert de Vere.   
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councillors; to improve its transparency and accountability, particularly by removing the 
powers of provision and oversight from the crown to other bodies, e.g. parliament.  
The fact that the Good Parliament, in the previous year and in view of Edward III’s 
senility, had already attempted – and failed – to give the council greater definition and 
form cannot be discounted.77 In many respects, the reforms of 1377 were a renewal of the 
previous year’s attempts. 78  Nevertheless, they were still ultimately a response to a 
situation in which the monarch was not deemed fully able – except, rather than Edward’s 
dotage, that situation was now Richard’s minority. People desired greater clarity as to the 
distribution of activities and influence; they wanted to know what to expect and from 
whom to expect it; they wanted to facilitate and encourage, if not ensure, good 
governance.79 That they decided to build upon an existing institution – the council – is 
unsurprising. Rather than developing new associations, they had only to modify pre-
existing ones.   
The first continual council was appointed by a Great Council, i.e. a gathering of magnates. 
It was charged with aiding the Chancellor and Treasurer, who were members of the 
Council ex officio,80 as well as ensuring the defence of the realm.81 As in the cases of 
Henry III and Edward III, we see a broader, somewhat representative body involved in 
structuring the new government. Whether or not this body felt compelled to involve itself, 
it clearly thought itself competent to do so; it was an activity that might be associated with 
them. It is unclear whether the Commons felt aggrieved by not being included at this time 
– whether their expectations were thereby frustrated. As will be seen, they seized upon 
the opportunity to modify the council later in the year, which certainly indicates that they, 
too, felt that this was an activity in which they might participate.82 It should be noted, 
however, that the extent of parliamentary involvement in governmental appointments had 
already been, and would continue to be, a bone of contention – a fact that goes towards 
demonstrating the Generational Theory of Law. However, the period from just before the 
                                                            
77 In great part, its failure was due to John of Gaunt’s lack of position – or, at least, influence – on the 
council. On this, see: Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the Middle Ages, 116–20. 
78 “With the death of Edward III and the accession of Richard II there came a natural attempt on the part of 
the popular party to reassert itself against the Gaunt dictatorship”: Lewis, “The ‘Continual Council’ in the 
Early Years of Richard II, 1377-80,” 249. 
79 There was, it seems, a desire to enhance the rule of law. Cf. Appendix I. 
80 As was, it should be added, the Keeper of the Privy Seal. 
81 Tout, Chapters, 3:326. 
82 It is possible that, rather than being aggrieved at their not having been involved, the Commons might 
have been aggrieved by their interests and views being insufficiently considered and represented on the 
Council. For something of this point of view, see: Lewis, “The ‘Continual Council’ in the Early Years of 
Richard II, 1377-80,” 249. 
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start of Richard’s minority in 1377 to the end of Henry VI’s minority in 1437 was a period 
in which the council “was most under parliamentary pressure”; when Parliament had 
greatest claim to influence, if not control, the executive body.83 That this was bookended 
by royal minorities is notable.  
The first Council lasted until Parliament convened in October 1377. Its personnel was 
there adjusted more to the Commons’ liking; its powers remained unaltered. This Council 
sat a year’s term, i.e. until October 1378. Owing to the circumstances of this Gloucester 
Parliament, the names of the new councillors were not then announced, but a new council 
appears to have been decided upon nevertheless – again with unaltered powers.84 This 
council, too, served a year’s term. Indeed, a little more, as the next Parliament convened 
in January 1380. Here, it met with a poor reception and was disbanded. The Commons 
demanded that “only the five great officers be chosen in parliament”.85 Part of the reason 
stated for this was that Richard, recently turned thirteen, was “now of great discretion and 
handsome stature”.86  
Parliament clearly thought itself able to involve itself in provision to, and oversight of, 
Richard’s government in the absence of Richard’s being able to do this himself. There is 
no sign of any regard for Edward III’s wishes or for any outside power (e.g. the Pope). It 
is equally clear that the continual councils were to fit into the existing structure; they were 
principally to support the existing officers of state in exercising the activities and 
influence already allotted to them.  
It is curious that neither Gaunt nor his brothers were named as members of these councils. 
What this represents is unclear. Their involvement in government might have been 
assumed or otherwise expected; there was no need to name them.87 It is also possible that 
this was an attempt to exclude them from power somewhat, even if they were granted 
some degree of oversight,88 and were not wholly unrepresented on the councils. Either 
way, it says interesting things about the sorts of ideas people had concerning the 
                                                            
83 Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the Middle Ages, 116. 
84 Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the Middle Ages, 122–24. 
85 Baldwin, The King’s Council in England during the Middle Ages, 124. 
86 'Richard II: January 1380', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, 
Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), 
British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/january-1380 
[accessed 8 May 2019] at Item 12. 
87 They were part of a group of so-called ‘natural counsellors’ – able and expected to advise and guide the 
monarch by virtue of their lineage. The continual council appointed in the Good Parliament of 1376, for 
example, had been specifically charged to work with Edward III’s sons, John and Edmund: Ormrod, 
Edward III, 554. 
88 Saul, Richard II, 28. 
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distribution of activities and influence – both as to who might possess them and how 
people might be excluded from possessing them. Another possibility is that Richard’s 
uncles did not want to be on the council – maybe they felt that the time was not right or 
that theirs would not be the preponderating influence.89 
Whilst in the period 1377-80 there was something approaching a regency government, 
the period 1381-89 is more ambiguous. Richard seems to grow in importance during these 
years. The reluctance to allow Richard or his uncles (especially Gaunt) to leave the 
country to campaign abroad in 1382-83 is testament to this.90 In view of concerns over 
the continuing disturbed state of domestic affairs, the persons exercising the central and 
greatest activities and influence could not be spared.  
Nevertheless, there are clear indications that Richard was not deemed trustworthy or 
capable of directing the government independently. In the Parliament of November 1381, 
Richard FitzAlan (E. Arundel) and Sir Michael de la Pole were appointed “to attend the 
king in his household and to counsel and govern his person”.91 This had followed a 
demand for a commission led by Gaunt to investigate the state of the household and “‘the 
estate and governance’ of the king’s person”.92  Clearly, there was a perception that 
Richard could not yet sufficiently manage his own affairs without substantial guidance, 
let alone the activities and influence associated with kingship. 
Much as was the case with Edward III, it was Richard II who brought his ‘minority’ to a 
conclusion. In May 1389, he asked the Council how old he was and, once he had 
established that he was of age, being twenty-three, he declared his intention to manage 
the government himself.93 The way in which Richard went about this is important; he 
relied on fixed associations to achieve the desired result. He pointed to the fact that an 
adult king could expect to exercise their full powers without constraint; as he was now 
clearly an adult, it was neither right nor fitting that others should continue to govern in 
his stead. To do so would frustrate a legitimate expectation. Once the dissonance inherent 
in the situation was exposed, it was difficult to argue that Richard was in the wrong.94 
                                                            
89 See: Lewis, “The ‘Continual Council’ in the Early Years of Richard II, 1377-80,” 249–50; McKisack, 
The Fourteenth Century, 400; Saul, Richard II, 28–29. 
90 McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 428–30. 
91 McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 426. 
92 McKisack, The Fourteenth Century, 426. 
93 Saul, Richard II, 203. 
94 Whether May 1389 is the appropriate date to assign to the end of Richard’s minority is a difficult question. 
There is every reason to suspect that Richard thought it had ended earlier; he simply had not relied upon it 
until then. As such, May 1389 was the time at which his majority was fully realized, though the threshold 
probably was reached earlier. 
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Parliament, especially in the first years of Richard’s reign, appears to have been deemed 
the appropriate place to discuss and determine the structure and personnel of Richard’s 
government. Whilst Parliament was not yet sovereign in these matters, the sense is that 
many people’s expectations would have been frustrated if Parliament had not at least been 
consulted. Thus, rather than a fixed expectation that Parliament would determine the 
structure and personnel of the government, it was probably rather a fixed expectation that 
the matter be brought to them for discussion. In the event, that led to the appointment of 
councillors and, ultimately, the disbanding of the Council.  
10.5 Henry VI 
10.5.1 Henry’s Predecessor 
At nine months old, Henry VI was markedly younger than any other English king at the 
time of accession. He could neither walk nor talk, let alone rule in any meaningful sense. 
Henry III, Edward III, and Richard II had all been able to repeat and swear their 
coronation oaths (presumably with some degree of understanding); Henry VI could not. 
It would in fact be many years before he was crowned. Furthermore, the earlier minors 
might have acted, if needed, as mouthpieces for their advisers; they could have been the 
face, if not the driving force, of government; there might have been some pretence of 
normality. With Henry VI, there could be no such pretence. The conclusion was 
unavoidable: there had to be some form of regency government by reason of immaturity.95 
Henry was present, but entirely incapable of fulfilling the expectations of kingship. 
Henry VI’s father, Henry V – unlike John, Edward II, and Edward III – was at the height 
of his powers when he died. Moreover, unlike John and Edward II, he had seemingly been 
ill for some time.96 Consequently, not only was it more likely that any attempt that he 
might make to settle his son’s government would be successful, but he perhaps also had 
greater opportunity to do so. Nevertheless, the extent to which Henry V attempted to 
provide for his son’s minority government is unclear.  
                                                            
95 See Appendix III, 14.1.2. 
96 Walsingham recorded that, prior to his death, Henry had “been ill for a long time owing to his excessive, 
unceasing labours.” However, it is difficult to establish the precise chronology of Henry’s decline. Henry 
had overwintered in France to sustain the siege on Meaux, which lasted from October 1421 to March 1422; 
as with many such sieges, sickness spread. Allmand suggested that it might have been during this period 
that Henry’s health began to be affected, before the illness became more noticeable – and terminal – in June 
at Senlis, where Wavrin records that he was “suffering a good deal from illness”.  By Christie’s reckoning, 
Henry was bedridden by July. Hardyng, however, does not record that Henry had “toke sickenes” until 
August. Walsingham, Chronica Maiora, 445; Allmand, Henry V, 1992, 162; Wavrin, Wavrin’s Chronicle, 
1399-1422, 4:384; Christie, Henry VI, 3; John Hardyng, The Chronicle of John Hardyng, ed. Henry Ellis 
(London, 1812), 386. 
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Henry made no provision in his will of 10 June 1421; given that Henry [VI] had not yet 
been born, this is unsurprising. The will, as it was, was largely concerned with the 
salvation of Henry’s soul, distribution of his private property, and settlement of his debts. 
However, when it was apparent that he might die, codicils were drawn up on 26 August 
1421, in which he made a number of provisions for his son. Henry especially identified 
Humphrey, D. Gloucester, 97  and Thomas Beaufort, D. Exeter, 98  as Henry [VI]’s 
guardians and protectors. Humphrey was entrusted with the care of Henry [VI]’s affairs, 
whereas Thomas was entrusted with his “upbringing and education”.99  
However, Henry V does not appear to have made explicit and incontrovertible written 
provision for his son’s government.100 It is possible that he intended the government to 
be included in Humphrey’s remit, although this appears merely by implication. Likewise, 
it is possible that he disposed of the government orally. This might indicate that he felt 
on shakier ground disposing of the government of the kingdom, as opposed to that of his 
son’s person and personal affairs. It might also indicate that he did not want to dictate the 
structure of government, even if he was not afraid to express his thoughts, opinions, and 
wishes thereon. It might simply indicate that Henry saw his testament as an inappropriate 
place to deal with affairs of state.  
Henry V’s precise intentions remain obscure, but the fact that he did not plainly and 
unambiguously dispose of the governments of England – or, if he did, that this was 
obscured by his contemporaries – is significant.101 It indicates that there was no clear 
expectation that Henry could, or should, do this.  
Indeed, in December 1422, the Lords, in response to a petition that Henry VI’s uncle, 
Humphrey (D. Gloucester), had made in the Parliament of the previous month, were 
firmly of the opinion that Henry V had not been possessed of any such power of provision. 
                                                            
97 To Humprey was given the tutelam et defensionem nostri carissimi filii principales: Patrick Strong and 
Felicity Strong, “The Last Will and Codicils of Henry V,” The English Historical Review 96, no. 378 
(January 1981): 84. 
98 To Thomas was given persone sue regimen et gubernationem ac servitorum suorum circa personam 
suam electionem et assumptione; in this he was to be assisted by Henry FitzHugh and Walter Hungerford, 
who were to attend the Henry [VI]’s person. Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and Codicils of Henry V,” 
84–85. 
99 Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and Codicils of Henry V,” 85. 
100 “What the 1422 codicils do not contain are any direct, indisputably clear provisions for the government 
of England and France during a prospectively long royal minority”: Strong and Strong, “The Last Will and 
Codicils of Henry V,” 85. 
101 It seems that Bedford had been entrusted by Henry V with the defence, and by implication governance, 
of Normandy, if not France, for the duration of Henry VI’s minority; it was perhaps the D. Burgundy who 
Henry V intended to have the regency of France, if he would accept it: Bertram Wolffe, Henry VI, Yale 




Humphrey had argued that the regency should be his – not only as the eldest 
representative of the royal house in England, but also as the designate of Henry V.102 
Importantly, he argued that he was supported in this matter by precedent. In effect, he 
argued that there was some fixed association, which supported his claim. The Lords did 
not take this claim lightly. They 
“had greet and long deliberation and advis, serched precydentes of the 
governaill of the land in tyme and cas semblable…toke also information 
of the lawes of the land of suche persones as be notably lerned 
therynne…”103 
On 5 December 1422, they dismissed Gloucester’s claim and concluded, in Vickers’ 
words: “that no precedent or law admitted of the hereditary title, and that the late King 
could not dispose of the government of the kingdom after his death save with the consent 
of the Estates.”104 Gloucester’s expectations had clearly been frustrated, but, so the Lords 
argued, his expectations had been badly founded. This could be demonstrated by 
reference to past events.105  
Both Henry III and Edward I appear to have made some provisions in their testaments for 
the governance of the kingdom during the minority of their respective heirs, although 
these turned out to be unnecessary.106  However, such provisions were by no means 
                                                            
102 Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 210. There was also the fact, of course, that 
Gloucester had been custos Anglie until Henry V’s death and might have expected, therefore, a role of that 
nature to continue to vest in him afterwards. 
103 The full portion of the relevant text, in modern English, is as follows: “whereupon the lords spiritual and 
temporal assembled there in parliament, among whom were you, my lords your uncles, the present bishop 
of Winchester, and the duke of Exeter, and your cousin, the late earl of March, and the earl of Warwick, 
and a great number of others who are still alive, had great and long deliberation and advice, searched 
precedents for the governance of the realm in similar times and situations when kings of this realm have 
been under age, taking also information concerning the laws of the realm from such persons who are most 
learned thereon, and finally found your said desire not based or grounded in precedent, nor in the law of 
the realm, which the deceased king did not have the power to alter, change or propose in his lifetime or by 
his will or otherwise without the assent of the three estates, nor to commit or grant the governance or rule 
of this realm to any person after his lifetime: but that on that matter, the said lords found your said desire 
to be not in accordance with the laws of this realm and against the rights and freedom of the estates of the 
same realm.” 'Henry VI: October 1427', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, 
Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox 
(Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/october-1427 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 25. 
104 Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 387 [emph. added]. Or, as the Lords originally put it: “the 
Kyng that ded ys, in his lyf ne migzt by his last will nor otherwyse altre, change nor abroge [abrogate] with 
oute thassent of the thre Estates, nor committe or graunte to any persone, governaunce or rule of this land 
lenger thanne he lyved”. Quoted in: Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 210. 
105 For example, in 1377, John of Gaunt, who was in a comparable position to his grandson, Humphrey, 
had not been appointed regent in respect of his nephew, Richard II.  
106 Henry’s was written in 1253 before he left for Gascony; Edward’s was written in 1272 whilst he was in 
the Holy Land and, in matter of fact, before his father, Henry III, had died. Henry III was succeeded by 
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routinely made and, as has been seen, none of the monarchs discussed so far made clear 
and extensive provisions for their successor’s government. Whether they would have 
succeeded if they had tried and, if so, to what extent, is difficult to say. However, the 
impression that one gets in November/December 1422 is that, in spite of Humphrey’s 
protestations, there was no prevalent or potent idea that the monarch had a power of 
provision extending after their death. Indeed, the Lords were firmly of the opinion that 
the government after the monarch’s death was entirely beyond their sphere of influence; 
it was an activity not associated with their role.107 A monarch might express their wishes, 
but nothing more. 
10.5.2 The Church 
As we have seen, the idea of the papacy’s feudal overlordship over England had been 
categorically rejected in the 1360s, having already been a hollow claim for some time. 
The Avignon Captivity had weakened the strength of the papacy considerably and the 
Western Schism had only recently been repaired. Indeed, this latter event had led to an 
increase in the prevalence and potency of ideas of Conciliarism, i.e. the idea that supreme 
authority in the Church lay not with the Pope, but, rather, in an ecumenical council. The 
Pope and the Church were no longer the force they once were.  
Antipapal, anticlerical, and nonconformist sentiments had continued to grow in England. 
This is evidenced by the renewal of the statutes of Provisors and Praemunire in the 1380s-
90s,108 and by the persistence and growth of Lollardy. The Abp. Canterbury and the other 
bishops still held preeminent positions within English society; they still commanded 
                                                            
Edward I and Edward I by Edward II; both Edward I and Edward II were adults when they acceded. See: 
Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 217 (n. 1); Studd, A Catalogue of the Acts of 
the Lord Edward, 1254-1272, 731–32. 
107 Roskell thought this to be a new constitutional principle, although it is possible that it was only fully 
articulated some time into Henry’s minority. Whether it was entirely new is difficult to tell, seeing as this 
was the first time that it was properly tested. It might have been extant and prevalent before, but it had not 
come into issue. However, what can be said with certainty is that the potency of the principle was 
undoubtedly proved during Henry’s minority. See: Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of 
England,” 217–18. 
108 Enforcement of the Statute of Provisors Act  (13 Ric. II, c. 2, 2: 1389-90), which recited the effect of the 
Statute of Provisors (25 Edw. III, c. 4, 1351); Statute of Praemunire (16 Ric. II, c. 5: 1392), which followed 
the Statute of Praemunire (27 Edw. III, st. 1, 1353). On the Statutes of Provisors and Praemunire, see: 
Cecily Davies, “The Statute of Provisors of 1351,” History 38, no. 133 (1953): 116–33; Fredric Cheyette, 
“Kings, Courts, Cures, and Sinecures: The Statute of Provisors and the Common Law,” Traditio 19, no. 
1963 (1963): 295–349; EB Graves, “The Legal Significance of the Statute of Praemunire of 1353,” in 
Anniversary Essays in Medieval History by Students of Charles Homer Haskins (Houghton Mifflin, 1929), 
57–80; WT Waugh, “The Great Statute of Praemunire,” The English Historical Review 37, no. 146 (April 
1922): 173–205; WT Waugh, “The Great Statute of Praemunire,” History 8, no. 32 (1924): 289–92; Daniel 
Frederick Gosling, “Church, State, and Reformation: The Use and Interpretation of Praemunire from Its 
Creation to the English Break with Rome (PhD Thesis)” (The University of Leeds, 2016). 
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deference and respect; they still expected to counsel the monarch. However, there never 
appears to have been any notion that either the English or international Church had any 
say over how Henry’s government was to be structured. This was a secular matter for 
secular bodies – even if those secular bodies happened to include prelates. It is true that 
one of the major figures during the minority was Henry Beaufort, Bp. Winchester, but 
this was largely due to his familial connections,109 wealth, and offices that he held (viz. 
the chancellorship), rather than his status as a churchman. 
10.5.3 Parliament 
Henry V died on 31 August 1422 in Vincennes, France. His death seems not to have been 
known in England before 10 September,110 and, given that many of the magnates were 
then in France, it was only a small group who met at Windsor on 28 September. Having 
sworn homage and fealty to Henry VI, they decided to convene Parliament. On the 
following day, they issued summons for 9 November.111 By the time this Parliament met, 
Charles VI of France was also dead. Henry VI was now – in theory, at least – king of both 
England and France.112  
This Parliament was under no illusions as to the reasons for its being summoned. In his 
opening address, the Abp. Canterbury made plain that the assembly’s raison d’être was 
“la tendre age nostre soverain” – the tender age of the king.113 As it says further down the 
                                                            
109 Beaufort was one of John of Gaunt’s sons and, therefore, a half-brother to Henry IV, uncle to Henry V, 
and great-uncle to Henry VI. 
110 Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 194. 
111 “Parliamentary sanction for whatever constitutional form government was to assume under the infant 
king was evidently then considered necessary. And on Michaelmas day the parliamentary writs of 
individual summons and the writs authorizing the elections of knights of the shire, citizens, and burgesses, 
were dated at Windsor. Parliament was to meet on the first possible day after the lapse of the customary 
minimum period of forty days between summons and assembly, namely, on 9 November.” Roskell, “The 
Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 195. 
112 The Parliament Roll presents the Parliament as having been called by the king “because of important 
and urgent business” and being held on his authority, though “on account of certain reasons” he could not 
attend in person, thereby entrusting Gloucester with the presidency of the Parliament. Obviously, this was 
a fiction. Henry VI himself played no active part in convening this Parliament; he had no idea what a 
parliament was. What this demonstrates is the potency and inflexibility of the idea that it was the king who 
called parliaments, and that parliaments were held under their authority and at their discretion. This was a 
powerful fixed association. If the Council or anybody else had convened parliament in their own name, it 
would have frustrated people’s expectations; indeed, such an assembly could not be called a parliament. 
For the reasons for calling Parliament, see: 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne 
Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 1. 
113 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 5. There are many other references to Henry’s 
youth throughout the entries for this session.  
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Roll, they had assembled “because of the immediate need for governance…, as much for 
the keeping of the peace and the administration of justice, as for the exercise of the offices 
pertaining to the king”; moreover, it convened “so that, by the common assembly of all 
the estates of the realm, and by their wise counsel and discretions, the better governance 
might be provided”.114 They had assembled because Henry VI’s immaturity had rendered 
him unable, though present, to perform his duties; it was for them, assembled together as 
a body, to determine what was to be done – to make the necessary arrangements and 
appointments. 
As has been seen, Parliament forcefully asserted itself and its rights vis-à-vis both Henry 
V and Humphrey.115 Indeed, that Humphrey was due the regency on account of his birth, 
Parliament deemed “ayenst the rigzt and fredome of thestates of the…land”.116  The 
structure and personnel of a minority government was not to be determined by some 
formula or by grant of the late king, but by grant of Parliament. Indeed, they appear to 
have been wary of allowing Humphrey a title such as rector regni or tutela, as those 
implied powers (i.e. activities and influence) that would not be subject to parliamentary 
control; they would make Humphrey responsible only to Henry VI and only then, of 
course, once Henry had come of age – a dozen or more years down the line.117 Parliament, 
as they asserted in January 1427, was the repository of the exercise of royal authority in 
the absence of a present and able monarch.118 
Whilst Parliament was content to accept the “king’s nominations” for the officers of state 
(i.e. chancellor, treasurer, etc.),119 it took a more proactive role with regard to those who 
                                                            
114 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 12 [emph. added]. 
115 Interestingly, summons were issued to Humphrey, D. Gloucester, who had been custos Angliae (i.e. 
regent by virtue of Henry V’s absence). Neither he nor his brother, John (D. Bedford), had previously 
received summons as regents. It would appear, therefore, that the meeting of 28 September considered 
Humphrey’s position as custos Angliae to have been either destroyed by Henry V’s death or suspended 
pending confirmation. The fact that Gloucester’s commission was deemed to cease at his brother’s death 
says something interesting. There was obviously a perception that he was regent for Henry V and by virtue 
of his absence; when Henry V died, the reason for Gloucester’s commission evaporated. Gloucester’s 
expectations were clearly frustrated. He made so much known to the Council on 6 November. That he was 
to open and dissolve Parliament ‘by assent of the Council’ was, he argued, “a departure from precedent and 
prejudicial to his rights”. The Council stood firm; official documents were now subscribed Teste Rege, 
rather than Teste Custode: Vickers, England in the Later Middle Ages, 386–87. 
116 Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 210. 
117 Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 213ff. 
118 Cf. Roskell, “The Office and Dignity of Protector of England,” 220. It is also interesting that Parliament 
clearly thought that it could only provide for the government of England; the war in France might be a part 
of their concern, but the governance of France was not. 
119 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
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would support those officers. In view of the fact that Henry, being so young, could not 
“attend personally to the protection and defence of his realm”,120 Parliament found it 
necessary to appoint a Protector and Defender of the Realm.121  For this purpose, it 
appointed, in the first place, the eldest of Henry V’s surviving brothers, John (D. 
Bedford), and, in his absence, Humphrey (with which, as has been seen, Humphrey was 
not entirely pleased).122 This position was not so much that of a regent per se, but, rather, 
one tasked more specifically with maintaining the integrity and peace of the realm,123 and 
organizing the defence thereof. To this was appended the role of king’s chief counsellor 
and various other minor powers.124  
Parliament proceeded to elect a continual council and define some of its powers.125 There 
are echoes of 1327 and 1377. Whilst it was clear that anything of importance could not 
be done by this Council in the absence of either John or Humphrey, it was equally clear 
that these latter were to govern through the Council. In effect, they were presidents of the 
Council with special powers; they could not act simply of their own accord or as they 
pleased.  
By and large, the arrangements set out at the start of the minority persisted for the duration 
of the Protectorate. In the following Parliament of October 1423, further clarifications 
                                                            
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 16. 
120 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 24. 
121 ’protectour et defensour de roialme’; ‘protectore et defensore regni Anglie’: 'Henry VI: November 1422', 
in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark 
Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 
2019] at Items 19 and 24 respectively, et passim. 
122 Bedford was at this time still in France and so this effectively made Gloucester Protector. 'Henry VI: 
November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour 
Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British 
History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/november-1422 
[accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 24. Cf. 'Henry VI: October 1427', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, 
ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and 
Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-
series/parliament-rolls-medieval/october-1427 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 26. 
123 It is somewhat interesting to note that the realm and the church are mentioned separately.  
124 For example, regarding appointments. See: 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval 
England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne 
Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Item 25. 
125 'Henry VI: November 1422', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-Wilson, Paul 
Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 
2005), British History Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-
medieval/november-1422 [accessed 10 May 2019] at Items 26-33. 
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were made as to the powers of the Council, but the general plan was maintained. When 
Humphrey travelled to the Low Countries in late 1424, meaning that both he and John 
were abroad, Beaufort served in their stead. This appears largely to be a consequence of 
his being Chancellor, the preeminent office of the day.  
After Humphrey’s return, his relationship with Beaufort soured. John returned to mediate 
and, in the ‘Parliament of Bats’ (Leicester, February 1426), a reconciliation was achieved, 
although it resulted in Beaufort’s resignation as chancellor. The same Parliament once 
again asserted the primacy of Parliament and, when not in session, the Council vis-à-vis 
the Protector.126 Indeed, it had both John and Humphrey agree to be “advised, demened 
and reuled” by the Council,127 – emphasising the limits of their discretion.128  
The Protectorship lasted until Henry’s English coronation on 6 November 1429, from 
which point John and Humphrey were styled ‘principal councillors’.129 Nevertheless, 
Henry remained some time away from exercising real and extensive influence; the 
conciliar form of government was, therefore, maintained. Indeed, when Humphrey, in 
November 1434, attempted to move power away from the Council towards Henry (i.e. to 
redistribute it) – so that Henry might exercise it under Gloucester’s influence – he found 
himself blocked; Henry was not yet deemed capable of shouldering the government.130 
Indeed, it was not until October 1435 that he appears to have attended a council 
meeting.131 
In the years 1436-37, Henry appears – at least superficially – to assume greater 
responsibility. In July 1436, he took the important step of starting to exercise his powers 
of grace. Bedford had died in September 1435, the government was in financial difficulty, 
and control over France was loosening. There is an argument, therefore, that “the moment 
had come when a unanimous recognition of royal power was both necessary and 
possible”.132 Nevertheless, this was by no means a comprehensive assumption of power 
– not only was it not until the spring of 1437 that life grants began to be made, 133 but 
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dispensing grace was still some distance short of managing affairs of state. In any case, 
such a move can only have been countenanced and permitted in view of Henry’s 
impending fourteenth birthday.  
In the summer of 1437, Henry undertook an “extended tour” of England,134 and, at a Great 
Council in November, his relationship with the Council was formally redrawn. 135 
Henceforward, Henry was to be far more prominent and pivotal, although the Council 
was to be retained. Indeed, its new form was based on a precedent of 1406, which 
indicates a willingness to return to a more traditional relationship between King and 
Council. Whether this marks the minority’s end is debateable. Henry was only recently 
sixteen and there remained questions as to whether he could as yet carry the burden of 
government. Indeed, not a great deal changed following this readjustment.136 It was not 
until 1439, when Henry was eighteen, that the Council began to wane as the primary 
institution of government.137 
Thus, there was clearly a prevalent and potent fixed expectation throughout Henry’s 
minority that the government of England was to be conducted by the Council and that it 
did so on Parliament’s authority. As has been seen, this was not a universal belief – 
Humphrey and, to a lesser extent, John both appear to have thought themselves to have 
some rights that existed independently of, and could not be contravened by, Parliament. 
They appear to have been sincere in this belief, but Parliament – at least insofar as the 
right of regency was concerned – was firm. Humphrey’s expectations, were badly 
founded: he had misunderstood the law; he had misunderstood the constitution. 
10.6 Edward V 
10.6.1 Edward’s Predecessor 
During Henry VI’s reign, the monarchy’s prestige had decreased; Edward IV had 
forcefully reasserted it. Parliament, which had assumed a greater role under the later 
Plantagenets and Lancastrians, was largely subservient to Edward IV. In many respects, 
therefore, Edward IV was in a better position than many of his predecessors to provide 
for his son’s government. However, whether he did so is unclear. He possibly appointed 
his brother, Richard (D. Gloucester), as Protector and there was possibly a codicil made 
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to his testament, but there is no definite evidence of either.138 Given what had passed half 
a century earlier, one would suspect any provision made by Edward might have carried 
weight, but would have been in itself insufficient.  
10.6.2 The Church and ‘Representative’ Bodies 
As in the previous minorities, the first occurrence was the convention of a council; this 
possibly took place even before Edward IV’s funeral.139 As previously, this was a place 
in which people’s initial expectations might be tested – and tested they appear to have 
been. The decision appears to have been made to crown Edward [V] immediately, thereby 
obviating the need for a Protectorate (and averting a contest to possess it).140 Richard was 
not present at this meeting and whether he knew of its decisions when he took matters 
into his own hands on 30 April – by seizing Edward’s person at Stony Stratford – is 
unclear.141 
Another council was convened on 10 May, in which the coronation was postponed and 
Richard named as Protector.142 In some respects, Richard’s actions are reminiscent of 
those of Humphrey, Henry VI’s uncle.143 Whilst Humphrey did not take such drastic 
measures as Richard, both appear to have seen themselves as holding a special position 
by virtue of their being the king’s paternal uncle – a special relationship entitling them to 
the pre-eminent position in the kingdom. Nevertheless, Richard did not try to make 
himself into an all-powerful regent, to which Humphrey had aspired. He acted in concert 
with a council, albeit one shorn largely of the influence of the king’s mother’s family.  
The adoption of the protectorate model, including the fact that it would last only until 
Edward’s coronation, demonstrates an unwillingness to make radical innovations. This 
model had precedent. The protectorate of Henry VI’s uncles, for example, had ended upon 
Henry’s coronation. It was, therefore, a position associated with the period between the 
old monarch’s death and the new monarch’s coronation, where the latter was a child; by 
virtue of this association, this move would have been concordant with people’s 
expectations. There is some evidence that Richard considered extending the Protectorate 
                                                            
138 AJ Pollard, Late Medieval England, 1399-1509 (Pearson Education Ltd., 2000), 325. 
139 Pollard, Late Medieval England, 324. 
140 This, of course, relied on the fixed association between there being an anointed monarch present within 
the kingdom and there not being a Protector, which latter role was deemed unnecessary in such 
circumstances. 
141 Pollard, Late Medieval England, 327. 
142 Pollard, Late Medieval England, 327. 




beyond Edward’s coronation, notably with parliamentary approval, but this plan was 
dropped.144 It is possible that Richard’s seizure of the throne was influenced by the 
improbability of securing parliamentary approval for such a plan. After all, to extend it 
beyond Edward’s coronation would be an innovation; it would be harder to secure 
agreement. 
Richard’s full reasons for seizing the throne are unclear. He might have genuinely thought 
himself his brother’s rightful heir, but there is every reason to suspect other motives 
besides – not least loss of power to the Woodvilles. Whatever the case, planning for 
Edward’s minority ceased. Everything that had been decided theretofore had only ever 
been designed as an interim solution; the permanent solution looked set to be decided in 
Parliament. The Church, besides complying with the arrangements made and 
participating through the Lords Spiritual, looked set to have no role whatsoever; certainly, 
the Pope was in no position to dictate anything.  
10.7 Edward VI 
10.7.1 Edward’s Predecessor 
Besides settling the succession in his testament,145 Henry VIII also sought to provide for 
his son’s minority government. Henry, therefore, was the first monarch to make clear 
provision for their successor’s minority government. However, he did this, not under his 
own authority, but under the authority of Parliament. It had granted him this power in the 
Second Succession Act (1536), which also provided that any effort to undermine Henry’s 
settlement would be High Treason.146  
According to the will, his executors were to act as Edward’s Privy Council, and were 
entrusted with the government of the king and kingdom until Edward turned eighteen.147 
This was a broadly representative body, albeit preponderantly Protestant and excluded 
the most ardent Catholics;148 it largely reflected the politics of the end of Henry VIII’s 
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reign.149 Henry made no indication that any of these councillors were to have any especial 
powers over and above their peers.  
Theoretically, Henry’s settlement was effective – except insofar as it lasted only three 
days.150  On 31 January 1547, the executors elected Edward Seymour (Edward VI’s 
maternal uncle) as Lord Protector,151 for which act Edward VI’s consent was obtained the 
following day.152 At the beginning of March, Thomas Wriothesley was dismissed from 
his position,153 which probably made easier the strengthening of Seymour’s position 
shortly thereafter,154 on 13 March.155 He was effectively empowered to do whatever was 
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necessary; he had the Council to aid him, but he was also given power to choose 
councillors. He was also by this time D. Somerset. It is notable that the Parliament that 
had been sitting at the time of Henry VIII’s death was dissolved,156 as was deemed proper; 
it was not involved in drawing up the new settlement, even if a predecessor Parliament 
had provided the ultimate basis therefor. 
The chain appears thus: Parliament had empowered Henry VIII; he had empowered his 
executors; they had empowered Somerset. The powers that Henry had given his executors 
were certainly extensive, but whether they extended to reconstituting the government is 
debateable.157 That there appears to have been some planning and cajoling to bring this 
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reconstitution to fruition provides us with reason to be sceptical, although there is some 
evidence it was concordant with Henry’s intentions.158 Nevertheless, there was some 
discomfort surrounding the use of a dead sovereign’s authority for present purposes;159 
for this reason, Edward was made complicit in arrangements.160  
Thus, Henry VIII clearly had a power of provision extending after his death. However, 
not only was this a power conferred on him by Parliament, but there was some uneasiness 
about following the commands of a person now dead. Henry’s powers were, therefore, 
patently thought to be limited.  
10.7.2 The Church 
During Henry VIII’s reign, the relationship between the English social group and the 
Church – and, more specifically, the Papacy – changed markedly. The Reformation had 
occurred. The Papacy no longer had any prevalent or potent claims to influence English 
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affairs. According to the Act of Supremacy, the English monarch was now master of the 
English Church; the Church could little be master of them. 
Of course, the persistence of Catholicism – not least in Edward’s elder sister, Mary [I] – 
showed that the new view of the Catholic Church was not yet universally prevalent and 
potent. There were some who still thought that the Pope should be heeded. Nevertheless, 
there is no indication that there was a generally prevalent and potent idea even among 
Catholics that the Pope might dispose of the government of England as he saw fit. 
Certainly, when Mary claimed the throne, she made no appeal to papal authority; rather, 
she appealed to human (i.e. domestic) and divine law.161 
10.7.3 ‘Representative’ Bodies 
The title of Lord Protector was not new, but Somerset’s powers were more far-reaching 
than his predecessors. 162  Indeed, his position strengthened in the months after his 
appointment. However, over the following two and a half years, estimations of Somerset 
decreased, particularly among his fellow nobles and the gentry; in John Dudley, E. 
Warwick, he found a rival. Realizing that the Council was opposed to him, Somerset fled 
with Edward to Windsor. By 10 October 1549, it was clear his cause was hopeless and he 
surrendered.163 
The Council, as it had made the Lord Protector, unmade him. Dudley had a position 
comparable to Somerset’s. He, like Somerset, could choose the Council. However, the 
title of Lord Protector had come to represent a form of autocracy; Dudley wished to avoid 
such connotations and, consequently, adopted the title of Lord President of the Council. 
In October 1551, he was elevated to D. Northumberland. Dudley’s power lasted until 
Edward’s death. 
Whilst Parliament theoretically provided the basis for these arrangements, it played a far 
less active role than that played by equivalent bodies in the earlier minorities. Indeed, for 
the first years of Edward’s reign, at least, it appears to have largely accepted the Council’s 
policies and not questioned the way in which the government was constructed. In no small 
part, this was undoubtedly due to the fact that “the gentry who controlled the Council 
were also the dominant force in Parliament”.164 It was arguable, based on precedent, that 
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Parliament had the power – and, indeed, the right – to determine the structure and 
personnel of government. However, in the event, that idea, even if it was prevalent, was 
not sufficiently potent to come to the fore. Unlike in the case of Henry VI, there does not 
appear to have been an idea that the matter of provision must be determined in Parliament, 
but whether the Members of Parliament and others thought that they might have an option 
we will probably never know. If so, they apparently either saw no need to exercise it or 
the will to exercise it was lacking; or, perhaps, they thought the authority of the earlier 
Parliament conjoined with Henry VIII’s will was enough.  
10.8 Conclusions 
Children were not revered in mediaeval England. Although there might have been an 
association between childhood and innocence, this did not amount to a belief in some 
inherent and unerring childish wisdom. A child might make a figurehead, but not a 
governor. In England, immaturity was a valid reason to vary the governmental structure 
– for there to be some process of disassociation and redistribution of activities and 
influence. 
It is remarkable, though unsurprising, how quickly after monarchs’ deaths contemporaries 
set about trying to ensure that everybody knew who was to perform what activities and 
who was to have what influence. Amongst this, one thing is abundantly clear: It was not 
the case that just anybody could decide on the structure and personnel of government. No 
ordinary individual could have determined this – or, at least, done so with any success. 
There was no prevalent and potent association between ordinary individuals and the 
activity of provision. This activity could only be undertaken by particular people under 
particular guises. For example, an ecclesiastic – such as an Archbishop – could not 
provide for the structure or personnel of the government qua ecclesiastic, although, as we 
have seen, at times there clearly was an idea that they might do so as a member of 
Parliament.   
Insofar as most people were concerned, there was, at times at least, probably some level 
of tolerance regarding by whom the decision was to be made.165 Whilst it was clear that 
no ordinary villein, serjeant, burgess, guildsman, etc. could make the decision, so long as 
there was some measure of agreement amongst the ‘great personages’ of the realm, the 
arrangement made might generally be regarded as having been well-made.166 In other 
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words, inasmuch as good government was provided, people were largely content to accept 
whatever arrangement was made and however it was made. Thus, insofar as most were 
concerned, whilst this expectation might be easily frustrated (e.g. by some villein 
attempting to exercise a power of provision), it might also easily be fulfilled.  
The expectations of those more closely associated with the government, however, were 
probably somewhat narrower. For them, some general measure of agreement was 
insufficient. The decision had to be made by particular individuals or groups of 
individuals, namely either by the minor’s predecessor, the Church, or some 
‘representative’ body.  
As a monarch themselves and as a concerned relative (if not parent or grandparent), it 
was arguable that a minor’s predecessor had a power, if not a right, to determine how that 
minor’s government would be structured – what positions there were to be, who would 
fill them, and what that would mean for the royal minor themselves. It was arguably not 
dissimilar to situations in which the monarch embarked on an extended period of absence 
abroad, as if they were waging a war in some far-off place.167 In such cases, it was 
generally admitted that the monarch could structure the government in their absence. The 
only difference was that, in this case, the monarch’s absence was absolute and permanent. 
However, as has been seen, there never appears to have been a prevalent and potent idea 
that it was a part of the natural authority of the monarch to determine the structure of 
government after their death; it was not part of the royal prerogative. Indeed, the Lords 
during Henry VI’s minority were very clear on this matter in their response to Humphrey, 
D. Gloucester. Even Henry VIII could only make such provision after having been given 
the power by Parliament and, even then, Edward VI had to be made complicit in the 
arrangements so as to allay any fears of their illegitimacy – the government was to be 
based on his authority, not his late father’s.168  
The Church, in the person of the Pope and through his appointed representatives, had a 
very strong claim at the start of our period as regards the power of provision. Whilst it is 
unclear as to how far this claim could have been pressed in the face of opposition, the fact 
that it was potent in people’s minds is evident from the close involvement of the papal 
                                                            
167 Cf. App. III, 14.1.1. 
168 Had Henry III’s or Edward I’s provisions in their wills for a minority government needed to be used, it 
is possible that the argument that the power of provision extending after the monarch’s death lay within the 
prerogative, but, as it was, these attempts were never tested and the idea that appears to have generally 
persisted is that it was not. 
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legates and the fact that matters were referred to the Pope himself. These ideas, however, 
did not persist. In theory, the Pope might have asserted rights to the same powers, as 
exercised during Henry III’s minority, during the minority of Edward III. However, there 
existed no prevalent or potent association to this effect. Indeed, for the rest of the period, 
the only formal influence the Church had in this matter was through its representation in 
Parliament – even if many of those were there, not so much as churchmen, but as feudal 
lords.  
In each of the minorities, a ‘representative’ body of sorts played a significant role – 
‘representative’, of course, in the sense that they represented the views at least of the 
nobility, if not the population as a whole. The Gloucester assembly was instrumental in 
William Marshal’s appointment; Parliament played an especially active role in the 
minorities of Richard II and Henry VI, during which time the potency of its association 
with the power of provision appears to have been strongest; Parliament laid the basis of 
the arrangements for Edward VI’s government. 169  Parliament’s will was perhaps 
frustrated in the case of Edward III and there was not time for it to assert itself in the case 
of Edward V. Both of these examples indicate the importance of the material constitution 
– the fact that theoretical niceties might be overridden or set aside by those with actual 
power (viz. Isabella and Mortimer, and Richard [III]), although, as subsequent events 
show, such arrogations of power were not without their repercussions.170  
The material constitution shows itself in other ways. For example, had Hubert de Burgh 
not have asserted himself at the start of Henry III’s minority, it seems probable that 
William Marshal would have continued as ‘justiciar’, rather than having some new 
position created for him. Similarly, the importance of trust and personalities, as well as 
                                                            
169 It can be noted that, in 1788, Pitt argued that precedent showed that it was Parliament’s prerogative and 
duty to provide ‘for the exercise of the royal authority’; it was for Parliament to choose how power was to 
be exercised and by whom; regency did not fall naturally upon the heir apparent by virtue of some inherent 
right, as was contested by Fox and others. In terms of precedents, Pitt drew on events during the reigns of 
Edward III, Richard II, and Henry VI; he said that precedents subsequent to Henry VI’s reign showed, 
apparently, that “no one instance could be found of any persons having exercised the royal authority, during 
the infancy of the King, but by the grant of the two Houses of Parliament, excepting only where a previous 
provision had been made…”. It is interesting to note Fox’s dislike of the invocation of mediaeval 
precedents, which spoke to a more barbarous time; it is also interesting to note Burke’s equal dislike, though 
his objection was rather on the ground that the occurrence of some constitutional event did not necessarily 
provide a basis for a legal precedent. These debates had been brought about by a severe mental disturbance 
suffered by George III in 1788; he recovered in 1789 and the debates ended – for a time, at least. John W 
Derry, The Regency Crisis and the Whigs, 1788-9 (Cambridge University Press, 1963), 94ff, 158, et passim; 
quotes at 95. 
170 Mortimer, as we have seen, was forcibly removed from his ascendency executed (10.3.3); Richard III 
found that many turned against him and, ultimately, lost his crown to Henry Tudor at the Battle of Bosworth, 
which act was supported by the fact that there was a perception that Richard had upset the English 
constitution – he was a usurper.  
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practical considerations, is also demonstrated. Thus, the Lords’ opposition to Humphrey, 
D. Gloucester’s assuming the regency during Henry VI’s minority was probably 
motivated in large part, not only by their preference for his brother, John (D. Bedford), 
and not only by their wariness of him, but also by the fact that, as patruus, Humphrey 
might have an agenda to serve, which agenda might not be capable of being fully 
addressed until Henry VI came of age – if Henry even made it that far.  
Nevertheless, in spite of these other influences and considerations, the fact is that there 
were almost always attempts to rationalize these things and situate them within the 
context of the web of fixed associations. Thus, the Lords’ opposition to Humphrey was 
not framed in terms of personalities, etc., but, rather, in terms of the facts that: 
Humphrey’s position as custos was destroyed on Henry V’s death; Henry V had no power 
to appoint Humphrey as regent after his death; and it was up to Parliament to decide how 
the government was to be structured and operated or, in its absence, the Council. Thus, 
Humphrey had no right to the regency or, indeed, right to any especial power in the 
government except that which Parliament or the Council gave him. According to the fixed 
associations of the time, Humphrey could legitimately expect nothing more than this.  
It can also be said that a monarch’s death, leaving a minor successor, did not precipitate 
a revolution in government. Adaptation was conservative and, insofar as possible, clothed 
in familiar garments; there was a desire to conform as closely as possible to people’s pre-
existing expectations. Thus, even though there were some special roles creates (rector for 
William Marshal, Protector for Humphrey, etc.), for the most part, the same offices and 
bodies continued. There was still a justiciar,171 chancellor, curia regis, Parliament, etc. 
The minorities were accommodated within the pre-existing frameworks. Indeed, it can be 
said that, in many respects, the best way in which a monarch could provide for the 
government of their successor, particularly if they were a minor, was to leave behind them 
a well-ordered system of government – a system in which everybody was clear as to what 
activities are expected of them and where they stand in terms of their influence vis-à-vis 
others.  
What this study on the matter of provision shows is that there were clearly prevalent and 
potent, even if not persistent, ideas throughout the period covered concerning who was 
able to decide as to how activities and influence were to be distributed during a royal 
minority. Sometimes these were contested; sometimes they were frustrated (even if a 
                                                            
171 That is, before the disappearance of the office later in Henry III’s reign. 
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remedy were later found, e.g. in the case of Mortimer). Nevertheless, the facts remain that 
there was some distribution of activities and influence (i.e. constitution) and, moreover, 
some fixed expectations about how that distribution should be made and look (i.e. 
constitutional laws), even if these things were not universally prevalent and potent, and 
even if they changed over time. In these things, then, we can see the Theory of 
Constitutional Ubiquity, the Associational Theory of Law, and the Generational Theory 

























11 – The Future of Constitutional History 
“What men have done and said, and  
above all what they have thought – that is history.”1 
11.1 The Framework 
Griffith wrote: 
“The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, changing from day to 
day, for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that 
would be constitutional also.”2 
It is not, of course, literally true that every event or non-event is constitutional – 
meteorological patterns, geological processes, etc. have nothing directly to do with 
constitutions. However, every event or non-event involving social animals reveals 
something about the structure of the groups to which they might be thought to belong. In 
other words, every event or non-event regarding social animals has a constitutional 
bearing. With this qualification in mind, Griffith was absolutely right – about each and 
every imaginable constitution. This means, as Marshall said, “no easy logical limit can 
be set to the labour of the constitutional lawyer,” for, “any branch of the law…may throw 
up constitutional questions.”3 Constitutions permeate and influence everything we do; 
they change as we change.  
It will be remembered that the framework consists principally of three theories: the 
Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity; the Associational Theory of Law; and the 
Generational Theory of Law.  
The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity postulates that every imaginable social group has 
a constitution of some kind, i.e. some distribution of activities and influence as between 
its members. This applies to all social animals, but most especially to human groups. 
Humans, more so than other animals, have the self-awareness and advanced cognitive 
abilities to perceive, understand, and shape the constitutions of the groups to which they 
belong. It is second nature to us. There can be little doubt that this has been the case for 
                                                    
1 This is a quote by FW Maitland and was quoted in: HDH, “Review: English Constitutional Ideas in the 
Fifteenth Century, SB Chrimes,” The Cambridge Law Journal 6, no. 2 (1937): 265. 
2 JAG Griffith, “The Political Constitution,” The Modern Law Review 42, no. 1 (January 1979): 1–21. 
3 Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Theory (Oxford University Press, 1971), 6. [Emph. added] 
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at least tens of thousands of years.4 There is, then, no point in human history that cannot 
be subjected to constitutional analysis. This is not to say that all constitutions are of the 
same type. We can differentiate them on many grounds. This is also not to say that many 
so-called constitutional principles that we take for granted have always been prevalent 
and potent; there has not always been a clear separation of clearly defined powers, for 
example. But we must not confuse constitutions with good constitutions, which mistake 
is too often made. A constitution is such whether we think it good or bad, and each and 
every social group has one. 
Of course, the fact that constitutions permeate the social world does not mean that they 
are some kind of mystical æther, which cannot be isolated and studied. The subject-matter 
of constitutional study is sets of social agents, and the distribution as between those agents 
of specific kinds of activities and influence. More specifically, it is where particular 
patterns of these things seem apparent, which seem to have some level of significance – 
to us and, more importantly, for the agents themselves.5 This is the heart of constitutional 
study and, to lead into the next point, it can be said that many of the aforementioned 
patterns, particularly those felt to be particularly significant to the social agents involved, 
have a habit of hardening into fixed expectations so strong that they are deserving of the 
name ‘law’.  
The Associational Theory of Law theorizes that laws are defined by their structure and, 
moreover, that they are essentially psychological phenomena – they are associations in 
the mind so strong that they appear to be fixed. These arise from the neurological 
architecture of our brains; they are produced by our propensity to identify and create 
patterns; they are an attempt to make sense of, and navigate, the world around us – not to 
mention, control it. These associations give rise to corresponding expectations, which 
might be either fulfilled or frustrated. We do not like it when our associations are 
frustrated. It is from this that we derive our desire for the so-called rule of law,6 as well 
as our sense of justice. 
                                                    
4 After all, though beliefs and customs might change, we are – by and large – physiologically and 
psychologically the same as our ancient ancestors.  
5 Indeed, it can be said that the more time and effort that is expended by the agents concerned upon settling 
the distribution of activities and influence within the group, making provision for the resources necessary 
for the realization of those activities and influence, and setting clear expectations about what can and cannot 
be done, the greater will be the impression of the group and its constitution. These will appear to us with 
greater forcefulness and, more to the point, will be of greater consequence.  
6 For more on this point, see Appendix II. 
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Jurists might formalize and systematize these associations, but in so doing they do not 
change the basic fact that they are only going to be effective if they are sufficiently 
prevalent, potent, and persistent in individuals’ minds. Moreover, it does not change the 
basic reality that, perhaps even in spite of juristic specification, there will be fixed 
associations that are prevalent, potent, and persistent.  
As constitutions permeate every part of social life, there will be a great many fixed 
associations – specific ideas that people have – pertaining to the distribution of activities 
and influence. In other words, there will be things that, to all intents and purposes, are 
constitutional laws. Once again, this is true regardless of time or place, although this does 
not mean that the content, generation, structure, enforcement, etc. of these laws is the 
same. Any differences, however, should not mislead us. It all resolves down to the same 
thing: different kinds of fixed association existing in people’s minds. The majority of 
these we learn directly from others.  
The Generational Theory of Law has two parts. The argument of its descriptive part is 
that constitutions and laws are constantly changing. This is because the people involved 
are constantly changing, as well as the ideas that they hold and the situations in which 
they find themselves. They will imperfectly copy the ideas of previous generations; they 
will forget ideas or aspects of those that they held; they will adapt their ideas to present 
challenges; the prevalence and potency of various ideas will fluctuate over time. Such 
changes are not necessarily good or bad, for better or worse. They do not necessarily 
represent ‘progression’ or ‘development’. Evolution – whether biological or social – is 
neither, as of necessity, linear nor goal-orientated, passing through certain successive and 
unavoidable ‘stages’ towards a greater or higher ‘end’, or, indeed, towards ‘perfection’.7 
Certainly, we might identify certain trends and trajectories, and, moreover, we can 
certainly have our opinions on the changes that have happened, but we must careful not 
to oversimply matters or commit many of the numerous fallacies that threaten. Each 
generation must be treated on its own terms; we must be wary of grand, idealized 
narratives or, indeed, meta-narratives. 
                                                    
7 Such ideas were common in the nineteenth century. For example, they are to be found in Auguste Comte’s 
‘law of three stages’: Auguste Comte, The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, ed. Harriet Martineau, 
vol. 1 (George Bell & Sons, 1896), 1ff. It can also be found in Hegel and Marx, on which, see, e.g.: Howard 
Williams, “The End of History in Hegel and Marx,” The European Legacy 2, no. 3 (1997): 557–66. It is 
particularly strong in the work of Spencer, see esp.: Herbert Spencer, The Evolution of Society: Selections 
from Herbert Spencer’s Principles of Sociology, ed. Robert Leonard Carneiro (The University of Chicago 
Press, 1967). See further: Alex Mesoudi, Cultural Evolution: How Darwinian Theory Can Explain Human 
Culture and Synthesize the Social Sciences (University of Chicago Press, 2011), 37–40. 
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The argument of the moral part of the Generational Theory of Law is that no generation 
should feel bound to accept blindly and uncritically the constitutions and laws of its 
predecessors. This is not an argument that every generation ought to make a concerted 
effort to overhaul and depart from previous constitutions and laws; merely that each 
generation ought to do what it thinks good and right without such conceptions being 
disproportionately influenced by perceived past practice. It is for each generation to 
decide for itself how to live.  
We can reject, then, the Natural Law and rationalist claims that, to borrow words from 
Savigny, “there is a practical law of nature or reason, an ideal legislation for all times and 
all circumstances, which we have only to discover”.8 We can also reject historicist claims 
that laws and constitutions are determined by, and limited to, historical and socio-
biological processes, revolving around the some ‘organic connection’ to the ‘character of 
the people’ or ‘life of the nation’, etc.9 However, we need not go so far as pure legal 
positivism in believing that legislation is the totality of law, for law – even if not 
necessarily for the strict purposes of the practising doctrinal lawyer – is clearly more 
pervasive than this. It can – and, indeed, does – exist and develop outside of deliberate 
enactments by bodies constituted specifically for that purpose.  
Yet, whilst we need not surrender to fate or the uncontrollable facts of one’s nature, as 
perhaps the historicists might have us do, we also need not surrender to the perceived 
uncontrollability of evolutionary forces, as Hayek might have us do. Thus, we need not 
surrender to a belief, almost, that nature, for better or worse,10 through the adoption of 
laissez faire social policies, ought to be allowed to run its course, as if guided by some 
Smithian ‘invisible hand’ – not least because this belief leads easily into social Darwinism 
and notions of the ‘survival of the fittest’.11 As sentient and intelligent creatures, there is 
no reason why we should not feel able to make deliberate and concerted efforts to improve 
our lives – including by shaping laws and constitutions in ways that we see fit. This might 
mean preserving what we think to be tradition; it might mean departing from it. But, 
                                                    
8 Friedrich Carl von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, trans. 
Abraham Hayward (Littlewood & Co., 1831), 23. 
9 See, esp.: Savigny, Vocation of Our Age, 27. 
10 Cf. Ritchie: “From natural selection there have resulted wonderful adaptations, but how much of suffering 
by the way, how much of horrid cruelty in these adaptations themselves?” David George Ritchie, 
Darwinism and Politics, 2nd ed. (Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891), 4. 
11 For Hayek, see: Friedrich August Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New Statement of the Liberal 
Principles of Justice and Political Economy (Routledge Classics, 2013), esp. Pt. (or “Volume”) 1. The 
mutual antagonism and incompatibility between what Hayek called ‘evolutionary rationalism’ and 
‘constructivist rationalism’ has been questioned, for example, by Jenkins: Iredell Jenkins, Social Order and 
the Limits of Law (Princeton University Press, 1980), 15ff. 
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whatever we choose, we will probably find that, to a greater or lesser extent, change 
happens anyway – often in ways that we cannot foresee. In keeping, then, with the spirit 
of sociological theories of law, we can adopt a view towards laws and constitutions that 
is at once both descriptive-dynamic and creative. We can describe how they are 
manifested in people’s behaviours and how they change over time, and we can play some 
active part in this. 
Parts II-III sought to show the applicability and explanatory power of this framework – 
at least, in its descriptive and analytical aspects.  
It was evident in Chapter 7 – on mediaeval constitutional ideas – that, throughout the 
mediaeval period, there were certain fixed associations and corresponding expectations 
relating to the distribution of activities and influence within various social groups. In 
particular, whether the product of design, nature, or reason, there was thought to be a 
natural order to society – a natural distribution of activities and influence (which, it can 
be added, largely conformed to ideas of monarchy and patriarchy). 
Chapters 8 and 9 looked more specifically at the issues of succession and provision – both 
of which relate to how and by whom activities and influence come to be/are distributed – 
in the context of the English royal minorities. It was clearly not the case that anybody 
could succeed to the throne or that anybody could determine the structure of the 
government – only particular individuals could do this, whether alone or in a body, and 
do so at particular times and in particular ways. In other words, there were prevalent and 
potent ideas about who could succeed and how, and who could determine the structure of 
government and how. These might not have been absolutely universal; these might have 
had grey areas; these might not always have been the only consideration. But this does 
not detract from the facts that: there were various fixed expectations; people mostly did 
attempt, at least, to act in accordance with them; their frustration was met antagonistically; 
and generally workable arrangements were made in which certain expectations guided 
action (even if these expectations shifted and changed from time-to-time).  
The fact that the minorities were generally accommodated within existing structures and 
practices, and that the vast majority of these went unchanged during the minorities, is 
testament to the fact that there was a relatively stable distribution of activities and 
influence, supported by a set of prevalent, potent, and persistent fixed associations whose 
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frustration would – and did – result in confusion, outrage, and demands for justice.12 
Whether these would fall within the purview of a class of jurists is a different – and, 
indeed, interesting – question, but, for the constitutional historian, what really matters is 
how people ultimately behave and the thought processes underlying that behaviour.13    
11.2 Aim, Tasks, and Approach of the Constitutional Historian 
The aim, tasks, and approach of the constitutional historian should be clearly stated.  
11.2.1 Aim  
The aim of constitutional history is simple: to describe and analyse, insofar as possible, 
the constitutions of social groups as they existed in the past.  
11.2.2 Tasks 
In order to achieve the above aim, the constitutional historian must study the:   
(1) Various social groupings in past human populations (particularly those that seem 
to have had some measure of meaning and reality for their ostensible members); 
(2) Distribution of activities and social influence as between the members thereof; 
(3) Extant fixed associations therein, with consideration given to the prevalence, 
potency, and persistence of those associations;  
(4) Effect of those fixed associations on the distribution of activities and social 
influence;  
(5) Complexity, externalization, and systematization of these arrangements;  
(6) Changes to these arrangements over time and causes thereof; and 
(7) All the while, to ensure that the focus remains on people – on their beliefs and 
their behaviours.14 
                                                    
12 As has been seen, Roger Mortimer ultimately lost his life because he frustrated the fixed expectations of 
his contemporaries as to who should wield power and how they should come by it. Alternatively, Richard 
III’s tenure on the throne was probably in no small part ill-fated because he frustrated his contemporaries’ 
fixed expectations concerning the succession to the throne. See, supra, 10.3.3 and 9.16. 
13 For the constitutional historian, this might mean distinguishing ‘black-letter’ from ‘living’ law; separating 
‘positive’ from ‘customary’ law. The constitutional historian must be alive to the weightings given to each 
of these in different periods and places, and must also be alive to which would be countenanced and 
accepted in recognized courts of law. However, the constitutional historian must not arrogantly assume that 
one is better or more valuable than the other. 
14 As McFarlane once wrote, it is a misconception to believe “that it is possible and desirable to write the 
history of institutions apart from the men who worked them. Institutions sometimes seem to have a life of 
their own, but this is only an appearance. They are born, develop, change, and decay by human agencies. 
Their life is the life of the men who make them. Constitutional history is concerned with men.” KB 
McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford University Press, 1973), 280. 
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Through these, we can better understand the constitutions of societies in times past. 
Indeed, by following these things down to the current time, we can better understand why 
the world is as it is today.  
11.2.3 Approach 
The constitutional historian ought to have recourse to all available evidence, drawing on 
multiple types where possible;15 each piece of evidence ought to be carefully evaluated 
as to its reliability and the insight it provides; each piece ought to be considered within 
its context; one ought only to rely on evidence that is credible, convincing, consistent, 
and pertinent; evidence ought not to be excluded or ignored because it is somehow 
inconvenient. To paraphrase Russell, one should ask only ‘what are the facts and what is 
the truth that the facts bear out’; one should not let oneself be ‘diverted either by what 
one wishes to believe or what one thinks would be good if it were believed’.16 Where the 
evidence does not support our opinions, we must change our opinions. 
All conclusions ought only to be as strong as the evidence. Caution must be exercised 
when employing inference, extrapolation, and speculation. In particular, one must not 
assume uniformity across time and localities; just because something might have been 
true of one group in one area at one time, it does not follow that it was likewise true 
elsewhere or at other times.17 Similarly, caution ought to be exercised when employing 
assumptions. These ought always to be interrogated; they ought to be explained and 
                                                    
15 For the constitutional historian, this means, in particular, not relying solely on documentary evidence, 
particularly on ‘legal’ codes. Without knowing anything of the circumstances and manner of their creation, 
and their subsequent use and interpretation, we are not only likely to fail to understand the documents 
themselves, but to fail to appreciate the wider picture or, even worse, be misled into believing a past that 
never happened. Just because something has been written does not mean that it was widely accepted or 
effectual; the intentions behind it might be quite different to what we might at first guess.  
16 This wording is adapted from what Bertrand Russell said at the end of his Face to Face interview, 
broadcast on the BBC in 1959: “When you are studying any matter, or considering any philosophy, ask 
yourself only: what are the facts and what is the truth that the facts bear out? Never let yourself be diverted 
by what you wish to believe, or by what you think would have beneficent social effects if it were believed. 
But look only, and solely, at what are the facts.” In particular, we have to be wary of our confirmation bias 
– our predisposition to pay greater attention to, and believe more readily, those things that confirm or 
otherwise attune with our prior beliefs, prejudices, etc., which danger is all the more real if one approaches 
any matter with an agenda.  
17 As Andrews has said, it is also important to bear in mind, inter alia, that, even though there might be 
some overarching cooperation between various groups, it does not follow that those groups are similarly 
structured or operate on the same lines: “[it is] necessary to remember that constitutional growth and 
centralization do not presuppose local uniformity, and that the local conditions are not everywhere the same, 
cannot be everywhere traced to the same causes, or be the result of like influences.” Charles McLean 




justified;18 any reliance thereon ought to be minimal and anything based upon them 
regarded as, at least in some degree, hypothetical. 
Constitutional history ought to be devoid of metaphysical ideas and entities. Everything 
that has been said and done has been the result of the actions of real individuals. These 
occurred in specific places at specific times; they happened, and happened as they did, 
because of specific reasons. One ought to be sceptical of anything that seems to have 
appeared spontaneously and without identifiable cause. 
The constitutional historian ought to avoid moralizing; constitutional history should 
inform, not preach. Likewise, one ought to avoid ethnocentrism and, indeed, snobbery – 
measuring other societies, whether past or present, against one’s own, often with a belief 
in the superiority of one’s own.19 Furthermore, one must always steer clear of notions of 
destiny or fate; of notions of preordained stages of society through which each social 
group must pass, each of which represents some improvement upon the last.20 One ought 
also to avoid grand, sweeping narratives, especially where these pretend to outline the 
‘growth’ or ‘development’ of the institutions, etc. of a nation, etc., or, indeed, where they 
draw from some idea of permanent features or enduring characteristics. Similarly, whilst 
one ought not to embark on a crusade to purge the past of things resembling the present, 
one ought to be cautious in identifying too closely with the past and, in particular, with 
historical persons. Indeed, one must also be cautious in attributing motives, ideas, and 
ideals to historical persons, especially where the actual evidence for these is meagre, 
untrustworthy, or biased. It is particularly important that we do not use historical persons 
for our own ends.  
One of the downfalls of the Victorian constitutional historians was their propensity to 
draw the lines of battle along lines of great constitutional principle – that the one side 
represented, for example, ‘constitutionalism’ and the other ‘absolutism’. In some cases, 
                                                    
18 Of course, being assumptions, they need not be proved if proof cannot be achieved with sufficient ease 
or significant diversion. Justification is merely required to show that any assumptions have not been adopted 
carelessly or capriciously. Naturally, the more consequential the assumption, the greater the justification 
that is required; if the assumption is of critical importance, then it really ought to be fully justified – to such 
an extent that it is difficult to treat it as an assumption any longer.  
19 See: William Graham Sumner, Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usages, Manners, 
Customs, Mores, and Morals (Ginn and Company, 1906), 13–15; Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture 
(Houghton Mifflin Company, 1989), 3–4. 
20 One must be wary, too, of concluding that certain ‘primitive’ societies (e.g. Australian aborigines), as 
exist in the modern day, exhibit some ‘primordial form’ of social organization, which form preceded other 
more advanced forms: “Since we are forced to believe that the race of man is one species, it follows that 
man everywhere has an equally long history behind him. Some primitive tribes may have held relatively 
closer to primordial forms of behaviour than civilized man, but this can only be relative and our guesses 
are as likely to be wrong as right.” Benedict, Patterns of Culture, 18. 
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they can perhaps be forgiven; historical figures sometimes distinguished themselves on 
similar grounds. However, chance events, vested interests, biases, and prejudices often 
played as much, if not a more powerful, role. Even where the historical actors themselves 
argued that their quarrel regarded constitutional principle, this was often those matters of 
self-interest, etc. clothed in principle. Their outward aim might seem admirable; their 
motives, dubious. In writing history rather than chronicles – to take McFarlane’s 
distinction21 – Victorian writers tended to impose too strong a meta-narrative upon the 
events they were describing. In other words, they found purpose and meaning in events 
that were only dimly connected; the products of chance rather than providence; the 
products of flawed and fickle human beings rather than rational, consistent agents with 
grand ideals. Their writings were compelling and remain so. However, modern 
constitutional historians must avoid their mistakes. We must not invest ourselves in the 
past and historical persons; we must not overgeneralize or oversimplify the past; we must 
not take pride in developments or accomplishments in which we had no part. 
Thus, the constitutional historian ought to adopt an approach that is methodical, open-
minded, empirical, grounded, objective, detached, critical, discerning, and cautious. In 
short, the constitutional historian ought to be as any other historian.22  
11.3 Constitutional and Political History 
The study of politics helps us to explain much of what happened in the past. The royal 
minorities are no exception. As is evident from what has been said, events surrounding 
the royal minorities were often driven by personal interests and desires. Moreover, they 
were in large part a function of who was possessed of the greater resources and charisma 
at any given time – not to mention ‘luck’.  
However, if one were to look at these things alone, one would fall considerably short of 
explaining why things happened precisely as they did.  In fact, one would fail miserably. 
This is because the royal minorities, as with all events in human history, can only be 
properly understood by also taking into account people’s fixed associations and 
corresponding expectations – particularly regarding the distribution of activities and 
social influence as between the members of the social group. These define for people 
                                                    
21 KB McFarlane, Lancastrian Kings and Lollard Knights, ed. GL Harriss and JRL Highfield (Oxford 
University Press, 1972), 6. 
22 Much as Plucknett said in his discussion of Maitland: “Once the professor of law embarks upon history 
he has become a historian, the legal history is not law, but history”. Theodore FT Plucknett, “Maitland’s 
View of Law and History,” Law Quarterly Review 67 (1951): 190. 
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what is possible. They inform their basic assumptions about what social life does or 
should look like. They dictate to a large extent both the manner and direction of their 
actions. These associations and expectations might change; they might be frustrated; they 
might be the subject of considerable disagreement. Nevertheless, they have a very real 
and tangible effect on how people think and behave. As such, there is everything required 
by the constitutional historian to undertake their work. 
Certainly, in some periods of history the task of the constitutional historian will be more 
difficult than others – particularly if they are primarily focusing on identifying something 
more after the nature of a legal or formal constitution. Yet, to focus solely on trying to 
find a legal or formal constitution would as greatly mislead one as by solely focusing on 
‘politics’; it would not entirely explain how people actually thought and behaved.23 For 
this, one must look to the wider political or material constitution – to the actual 
prevalence, potency, and persistence of particular constitutional ideas, as affected perhaps 
by ulterior motives. These cannot be ignored. So-called legal or formal constitutions are 
not only often a product of these, but are also largely contingent upon them.24 
11.4 Humanizing Spirit of the Framework 
The writing of history has changed in recent centuries. It has become more rigorous and 
objective; it has come to recognize the complexity and contingency of events. However, 
there often seems to be an assumption that things in the past were – and must have been 
– different. Indeed, there is something of an obsession with trying to show just how 
different it was. This attitude requires modification.  
We have noted in the Generational Theory of Law the variation and accumulation 
principles. However, it does not follow from either that everything in the past need, as of 
                                                    
23 “That the historical process in the Middle Ages was overwhelmingly determined and conditioned by the 
law is now more and more recognized. It is the close interlacing of law and history in the Middle Ages 
which makes it impossible to see the true nature of the historical conflicts in the Middle Ages without at 
the same time also recognizing that they primarily concerned the law. Whether it is the Investiture Contest, 
or the dramatic conflicts between popes and emperors, or the quarrel between king and barons in thirteenth-
century England, or the councils disputing the authority of the pope, and so forth, the theme underlying 
these and so many other medieval conflicts was that of the law and of jurisdiction. […]. Government and 
law were at all times so intimately linked with each other that they appear as one and the same thing, seen 
from different angles. As Maitland once said, ‘in the Middle Ages the law was the point where life and 
logic met’.” Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Methuen 
& Co. Ltd., 1974), 19–20. 
24 As Loughlin has said, for contemporary lawyers, “[h]aving grown up under the influence of positivism, 
there is a danger of forgetting that the foundations of legal order are political.” Martin Loughlin, The Idea 
of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 133. 
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necessity, be radically different to the present. There is, as it were, a modernity fallacy; 
an idea that modernity is qualitatively and categorically different to the past.  
When we begin to understand the humanity of historical persons, we see that they were 
not all that different to us. Their basic concerns and preoccupations were the same, as was 
their general physiological and psychological composition.25 Indeed, when we begin to 
understand their humanity properly, as well as our own (i.e. to see them and ourselves as 
living creatures), we begin to see that we are not all that different to other animals – 
particularly those more closely related to us. Thus, we begin to realize that many of the 
differences we thought to exist are, actually, rather superficial. Indeed, often these 
supposed differences begin to look as though they were invented by people obsessed with 
creating differences. We might praise their ingenuity, creativity, and imagination, but we 
cannot praise their wisdom. 
It is vital that historical study is infused with an understanding of humanity. For the 
constitutional historian, this is imperative. It is hoped that the proposed framework will 
help in this regard. In the first place, it seeks to place the emphasis not on abstractions, as 
if they were divorced from people,26 but, rather, on ideas as held by living, breathing 
people. In the second place, it encourages us to focus on the constitutions of groups of 
people. The fact that they happened to live in another time and place is incidental. We 
cannot ignore or undervalue their historical position, but we should not allow this to 
obscure their humanity, as though living some centuries or millennia ago made them 
fundamentally different.27  
                                                    
25 Cf. “There is a general tendency to think of medieval men and women as if they were such saints or 
devils as we see on churches, carved in stone; but the more we study them the more we realize that they 
were flesh and blood, most remarkably like us.” Though: “But if human nature was much the same, the 
conditions of life were very different, and if we are to understand our ancestors we must try and look at the 
facts of their lives from their own points of view.” LF Salzman, English Life in the Middle Ages (Oxford 
University Press, 1926), 21 [emph. added], 22. 
26 For example, it is common for purportedly ‘pure’ theories of law, such as Kelsen’s, practically to forget 
people altogether, as though somehow extraneous or irrelevant. This is a grave error and must be remedied. 
See: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967). His aim, 
as he outlines it on page 1, is to develop a ‘pure theory of law’ and, in so doing, “to eliminate from the 
object of this description everything that is not strictly law”. Indeed, he appeared to be of the belief that the 
‘science of law’ had been ‘adulterated’ by being “uncritically…mixed with elements of psychology, 
sociology, ethics, and political theory”. Naturally, we ought not to uncritically approach any matter, but, to 
a great extent, these things cannot be avoided. 
27 Of course, if we begin to speak in tens of thousands of years, or even hundreds of thousands of years, 
then the picture will be somewhat different. The tracing of human evolution remains an ongoing project; 
there is much that is still unclear and tentative. Nevertheless, we can assert with reasonable certainty that 
there was some time in the past when there were creatures that, though they might resemble us in some 
respects, did not think and behave like us. For this reason, we would perhaps have to treat them rather as 
we would other non-human animals, when it comes to the matter of analysis, rather than as we treat humans. 
For most constitutional historians, however, this will be of no concern; we are here speaking of a time 
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11.5 The Framework’s Future 
The chief merit of the framework is its explanatory and corrective power; it will hopefully 
go some way towards ensuring that constitutional history is henceforward written with 
the right object and in the right tone. It will not render everything heretofore written as 
redundant or worthless. Quite the contrary. We owe a great deal to the constitutional 
historians of the past – especially those of the Victorian period. However, constitutional 
history has certainly suffered from its association with the latter.28 It has become 
synonymous with them; when their approach was rejected, constitutional history as a 
whole went too. This was rather like throwing out the proverbial baby with the bathwater. 
Constitutional history, properly understood and undertaken, is a perfectly valid and 
valuable pursuit, and one that can stand in its own right. We can profitably use the works 
of earlier constitutional historians, but these were, of course, products of their time and 
must be approached with that in mind.  
The framework will hopefully also provide a bridge between fields and subjects that have 
become separated – in particular, history, public law, legal history, and, of course, 
constitutional history. These are, in many respects, complementary endeavours; each can 
benefit from the other.29 This is not to encourage argumenta ad antiquitatem, i.e. appeals 
to history or tradition. It is simply that their fusion helps us to better understand both how 
things were and why they are now as they are.  
The framework is not yet perfected. It can certainly be further developed and refined; the 
full extent of its applications worked out. However, its general outline and argument are 
unlikely to change. Hopefully, then, the framework as here presented can provide a solid 
basis for future work – and act as a corrective to the approaches that preceded it.   
It has a great deal to contribute to debates on living constitutions, originalism, as well as 
political versus legal constitutionalism. It also has a great deal to contribute to debates on 
                                                    
period long before any with which the typical constitutional historian will be concerned. For all intents and 
purposes, taking into account some degree of variation, we can reasonably assume that people have changed 
but little – physiologically and psychologically – in the last few thousand years.   
28 See supra, Chaps. 1 and 2. 
29 Cf. Allison’s argument, for example, that “Howsoever most legal historians lost interest in English public 
law and/or most English public lawyers lost interest in legal history, that diminution and paucity rendered 
English public law less intelligible and its basic features and development more obscure”: JWF Allison, 
“History To Understand, and History To Reform, English Public Law,” The Cambridge Law Journal 72, 
no. 3 (2013): 531. 
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stare decisis,30 customary law, and international law.31 The greatest problems that it faces 
are how to deal with ideas of collective responsibility and intergenerational justice, i.e. 
how much one group and one generation can be held accountable for the actions of those 
that preceded them. After all, if some wrong has been done, there is an expectation that it 
be corrected – that justice be done. If this is not done by the supposed perpetrators, then 
should it be up to some others – their successors – to make amends, particularly if they 
have in some way benefitted from the misdeeds of their forebears? Furthermore, if there 
is to be some form of responsibility, then for how long should it last and how far should 
it go? Should the twentieth generation be as responsible as the second?  
These questions cannot be tackled at length here, but the answer probably lies along the 
following lines. Subsequent generations are not responsible for the actions of previous 
generations; it would be wrong to punish them for the crimes of others. However, each 
generation must recognize its own good fortune and the misfortunes of others. It should 
seek, therefore, to aid and assist those of lesser fortune, not out of some sense of guilt or 
shame, but out of a sense of humanity. The matter is slightly different when it comes to 
agreements, but the principle is the same. If one generation has made an agreement, then 
subsequent generations should not feel absolutely bound by its terms. Nevertheless, it 
should seek insofar as possible to honour them, because they have given rise to 
expectations on the parts of others. Not to honour those terms would be to frustrate others’ 
expectations, and would probably lead to resentment and retaliation – especially if there 
has been a heavy reliance on the fulfilment of these expectations. As such, each 
generation should feel free to renegotiate terms and agreements, but it should never seek 
to dispense with them out of hand. Naturally, the fact that generations tend to overlap 
somewhat makes the idea of honouring previously made agreements more tolerable.  
                                                    
30 Frankfurter J in Helvering v Hallock 309 US 106 (1940) at 119 said something of the greatest interest on 
this topic, and one can see readily how it might be understood using the tools from the proposed framework: 
“We recognize that stare decisis embodies an important social policy. It represents an element of continuity 
in law, and is rooted in the psychologic need to satisfy reasonable expectations. But stare decisis is a 
principle of policy, and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however recent and 
questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, 
intrinsically sounder, and verified by experience.” 
31 For a lengthy discussion of the concept of constitutions in the context of international law, see: Bardo 
Fassbender, “The United Nations Charter As Constitution of The International Community,” Columbia 
Journal of Transnational Law 36 (1998): 529–619. Fassbender correctly argued that the international 
community has a constitution and that the UN Charter plays a significant part in giving that constitution 
definition. However, the idea that it is the constitution of the international community – or, at least, the 
international legal community – is perhaps too bold.  
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Besides questions of justice between past and present generations, there is also the 
question of justice as between present and future generations. Can any given generation 
do whatever it likes without any regard to the well-being of future generations? Is there 
any requirement that each generation lives sustainably? Can any generation remove the 
safeguards from which it has benefited?32 Again, this is neither the time nor place for 
extended discussion, but the answer will probably come back to that idea of humanity. If 
we remember the humanity of those that will come after us and imagine how they might 
think and feel, then it can hardly be doubted that each generation should have a care for 
those that will come after it.  
Every social group, then, has a constitution – a distribution of activities and influence, – 
which its members are free to shape as they will, though the merits of past arrangements 
should be considered and a care had for those yet to come. It is the ultimate task of 
constitutional historians to study the arrangements of each social group and, in particular, 
to study the fixed associations permeating those arrangements. In so doing, regard should 
be had both to supposedly formal and authoritative declarations, and to people’s actual 
beliefs and behaviours. All should be done in the right way, in light of the theories here 
suggested. In this way, constitutional history might be revived and prosper once more. 
                                                    
























Appendix I: Corporations, States, and the Theory of Constitutional 
Ubiquity 
12.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this appendix is to consider corporations and, most especially, States in the 
context of the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity. 
12.2 Corporations 
Can social groups be regarded in law as corporations; as bearers of rights, duties, and liabilities 
distinct from those of their members? To a great extent, this is for each legal system to decide. 
However, in principle, it is possible to assign rights, duties, and liabilities to social groups. 
However, corporations are not as natural persons. Much as Maitland said,1 everything must be 
done by and through real individuals; every right, duty, and liability held on behalf of, or in 
respect to, identifiable individuals. They place the benefit or burden on the group collectively; 
how it is actually enjoyed or discharged is for them to decide. The corporation, being a 
construct and a fiction, does nothing.  
It is also up to each legal system to decide the extent to which individuals are protected from 
the duties and liabilities incurred by the group; the extent to which they might be held 
individually and personally responsible.2 It would seem sensible to hold individuals responsible 
for any wrongs they commit, though in the rectification of that wrong the group might assume 
some vicarious liability – especially if that wrong was done whilst in the service of that group 
and if justice might not otherwise be done.  
The nature and length of any rights, duties, and liabilities assigned to corporations must be 
carefully considered; furthermore, the time at which any such corporation is deemed to perish. 
There is a great danger, for example, of permanently alienating rights to corporations, whose 
existence is but a façade, thereby depriving real people of their enjoyment. For example, it 
would be senseless to have land ‘owned’ by a corporation when there is nobody to have the 
                                               
1  “[A state] is capable of proprietary rights; but it is incapable of knowing, intending, willing, acting… [It] does 
no act, speaks no word, thinks no thought, appoints no agent.” Translator’s Introduction to Gierke: Otto Gierke, 
Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans. Frederic William Maitland (Cambridge University Press, 1922), xx–
xxi.  
2 Naturally, there is some economic sense in limiting liability, especially in profit-making enterprises, as this will 
encourage people to take greater risks, knowing that the personal risk involved is minimized. 
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use and benefit of it. There is also risk of engorgement;3 the accumulation of rights in 
corporations,4 especially those not subject to ordinary duties and liabilities.  
12.3 Nature of the State 
States are often thought of as being largely – if not exclusively – modern phenomena and, 
moreover, their rise in the early modern period is often associated with the advent of 
constitutions and public law.5 There is an argument, therefore, that there could not have been 
such a thing as a constitution during the mediaeval period because there was then no such thing 
as a State. According to the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity, this argument does not hold, 
because constitutions are not tied exclusively to States. There would have existed constitutions 
regardless as to the existence of any such States. However, whether there was – or could have 
been – such a thing as a State during the mediaeval period still bears consideration.  
12.3.1 States as Social Groups 
The first point to be made is that the State – whatever else it is exactly – is a type of social 
group. This is amply demonstrated by its reliance on the presence of social agents. In the 
absence of social agents (i.e. people), it disappears; without anybody to act ‘on its behalf’, it 
disappears; without anybody to imagine it, it disappears. States can always be reduced to sets 
                                               
3 This was a particular concern during the Middle Ages. The donation of land in mortmain (from manus mortua, 
‘dead hand’) was a matter of contention between crown and church, bearing in mind the context of a feudal 
society: “Because the church never died, never married, and never had children, none of the incidents of tenure 
[aids, fines, reliefs, escheats, dues, wardship, marriage, etc.] could apply to this land.” Bryce Dale Lyon, A 
Constitutional and Legal History of Medieval England, 2nd ed. (WW Norton and Company, 1980), 459. See 
further: John Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History, 5th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2019), 262–63; 
Theodore Ft Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed. (Butterworth & Co (Publishers) Ltd, 1956), 
541–42. Besides the fact that corporations do not have the natural lifecycles and life-events of people, there was 
also the risk that they would be free of – or immune to – obligations that would otherwise be expected. In 
particular, in feudal society, the performance of services. This, in theory, places a greater burden on everybody 
else, as they have to make up the shortfall. It should be added that the mediaeval objection was not to the church 
holding land per se, but, rather, to its holding large amounts of land and, moreover, the fact that it was being used 
purposefully to avoid the feudal incidents – essentially, a ‘loophole’ being exploited to the frustration of others’ 
expectations. Their answer was not to ban gifts of land to the church. Instead, it was to regulate it; in particular, 
the Statutes of Mortmain 1279 and 1290.  
4 As Geldart and his editors said with regard to mortmain in 1959: “The original reason for the rule disappeared 
with the disappearance of the incidents of tenure. But the rule is [or, rather, was] still a part of the law because it 
was found useful for another reason. It prevents the accumulation of land in the hands of bodies who have not got 
the same free powers of alienation as natural persons.” William Geldart, Elements of English Law, ed. William 
Searle Holdsworth and HG Hanbury (Oxford University Press, 1959), 82. All mortmain legislation was repealed 
the following year by the Charities Act 1960. For a history of mortmain legislation, see: AH Oosterhoff, “The 
Law of Mortmain: An Historical and Comparative Review,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 27, no. 3 
(1977): 257–334. 
5 Take, for example, Loughlin’s argument that public law emerged and developed alongside modern states, which 
both emerged in the early modern period, albeit drawing on mediaeval ideas: Martin Loughlin, Foundations of 
Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2010), 2, 17ff.  
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of individuals exhibiting certain sets of beliefs and behaviours; they are not metaphysical, 
overarching entities.6 This is no different to any other social group.  
Some have happily accepted that the State is a form of social group.7 Others appear more 
reluctant to categorize it so; if it must be a social group, then it is such sui generis.8 From a 
juristic viewpoint, this might hold; from an anthropological viewpoint, it cannot. It is obviously 
true that States have peculiar features that justify us in giving them a distinct label.9 However, 
it does not follow that they must be something so entirely different so as to be sui generis – at 
least, any more than other types of social group are sui generis. We like to think of States as 
being special, but they are not.10 
The question remains, therefore, as to whether this specific kind of social group could have 
existed during the mediaeval period. To answer this, we must know what is meant by ‘State’ – 
if, indeed, it can be said to mean anything at all.11  
12.3.2 Definition of States 
                                               
6 A metaphysical theory of the state was proposed, for example, by Bosanquet, who built heavily on Hegel and 
Thomas Hill Green inter alia. It was Bosanquet’s theories that were the especial object of Hobhouse’s criticism 
of idealistic (i.e. metaphysical) theories of the state, which he characterised as follows: “The root of this 
conception is the common self. It is the notion that one mind, one will vastly greater than yours or mine, constitutes 
the life and directs the course of each organized society”. Naturally, Hobhouse thought this to be badly founded. 
There is a passage of his worth particular mention: “The actual institutions of a society are not the imperfect 
expression of a real will, which is essentially good and harmonious, but the result into which the never-ceasing 
clash of wills has settled down with some degree of permanency, and that result may embody much less of justice, 
morality and rationality than the explicit ideas of many an individual mind”. Cf. Bernard Bosanquet, The 
Philosophical Theory of the State, 4th ed. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1923); Leonard Trelawney Hobhouse, The 
Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1918), quotes at 87 and 86 
respectively.  
7 For example: Nick W Barber, The Constitutional State (Oxford University Press, 2010), xi, 25–33, et passim.  
8 For example: Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (Oxford University Press, 2003), 5–6, 59–60.  
9 Cf. Maitland: “For, when all is said, there seems to be a genus of which State and Corporation are species. They 
seem to be group-units; we seem to attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these units. 
Let it be allowed that the State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we ourselves are not 
the slaves of a jurist’s theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if between the State and an immeasurable gulf 
and ask ourselves no questions about the origin of species.” Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age, ix 
[translator’s introduction]. 
10 Cf. Pound: “I do not think the thoughtful lawyer believes in ‘the necessary and a priori pre-eminence of the 
state over other groups’. If he has given any attention to legal history he cannot. But he cannot fail to observe that 
we are, and have been since the sixteenth century, in an era of paramountcy of political organization of society 
and that the social control with which he has to do is exercised through that organization and presupposes that 
organization for its efficiency. For his purposes he assumes that de facto pre-eminence without needing to 
postulate it as a necessary or universal proposition to be accepted by those who look at the phenomena of social 
control from other standpoints and for other purposes.” Roscoe Pound in the Preface to Georges Gurvitch, 
Sociology of Law (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd., 1947), xii–xiii. 
11 The difficulties of defining the term ‘State’ have been recognized by many, but see, e.g.: Christopher Pierson, 
The Modern State, 2nd ed. (Routledge, 2004), chap. 1. 
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Theories of statehood abound, although two types of theory appear most prominent. On the 
one hand, declarative theories argue that there is a set of criteria, the fulfilment of which is 
sufficient for statehood. On the other hand, constitutive theories argue that recognition of 
statehood, most especially by other States, is both necessary and sufficient.12 In this view, 
statehood is a sort of exclusive club. From an ontological perspective, this view is somewhat 
problematic and runs the risk of resulting in strained language: some entities might be 
recognised as states, though bearing little resemblance to the common idea of a state, whereas 
others might not be recognized, even though to all intents and purposes they look very much 
like one. In this light, the declarative theory appears the more sensible.  
What, then, could be said to characterize States? Indeed, are there any essential qualities that 
States must have in order to be considered States? To answer these questions, we can begin by 
setting out a list of features often associated with States today:  
- Sizeable and relatively stable population;13 
- Occupation of a (large) consolidated geographical area; 
- Few, coordinate centres of recognized authority;14 
- Paramountcy, supremacy, hegemony, etc. within its area;  
- Tangible degree of independence from ‘foreign’ influence and interference;15 
- Represent their populations in external relations (e.g. trade, diplomacy, etc.); 
                                               
12 See: Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 2003), 86–88; Eva 
Erman, “The Recognitive Practices of Declaring and Constituting Statehood,” International Theory 5, no. 1 
(2013): 129–50. 
13 At least for the so-called ‘nation state’, this is population is taken to be coextensive with the ‘nation’. Cf. 
Gianfranco Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects (Polity Press, 1990), 26–27. 
14 These first three criteria are roughly equivalent to the first three criteria of statehood, for the purposes of 
international law, as laid out in the Montevideo Convention 1933, Art. 1: “The state as a person of international 
law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” Indeed, this Convention very firmly 
adopts a declarative theory of statehood, for, in Art. 3, it is stated: “The political existence of the State is 
independent of recognition by the other States.”   
15 This and the previous criterion are often taken together to mean ‘sovereignty’. Whether it is necessary that there 
be (absolute and general) sovereignty is debateable, as is where that sovereignty is ultimately said to reside, but it 
is worth marking Hinsley’s definition of sovereignty: “the idea that there is a final and absolute political authority 
in the political community…and no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere”.  Francis Harry Hinsley, 
Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1986), 26. This is reflected in Jackson’s distinction between 
‘positive’ and ‘negative’ sovereignty: Robert H Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and 
the Third World (Cambridge University Press, 1991), 26–31. That sovereignty ought to be absolute and general, 
excepting some rights that cannot be surrendered, even in the social contract, and last for so long as it can be 
maintained, was famously argued by Hobbes: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. JCA Gaskin (Oxford 
University Press, 1996), esp. 115-122 [XVIII], 139-148 [XXI].  
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- Bodies performing legislative,16 and executive functions; 
- Classes of professional, salaried administrators;17 
- Developed systems of taxation;18 
- Developed systems of law and jurisdiction,19 including systems of criminal law with 
public enforcement systems;20 
- Hierarchies of specialised and general courts for legal determination, clarification, and 
dispute resolution; 
- Classes of professional, salaried, independent judges; 
- Monopoly on the legitimate use of force/violence;21  
- Professional, salaried police forces;22 
- Professional standing armies, navies, and, since the early twentieth century, air-
forces;23 
- Professional, salaried intelligence agencies; 
- Welfare systems, encompassing health, housing, financial assistance, etc.; 
- Comprehensive and open education systems; 
                                               
16 Kelsen, for example, thought that states are necessarily legal orders of some description (though not all legal 
orders are states). Indeed, “[a] state not governed by law is unthinkable”. According to Kelsen, there must be 
‘established organs’ who “in the manner of the division of labour, create and apply the norms that constitute the 
legal order; it must display a certain degree of centralization”. In short: “The state is a relatively centralized legal 
order.” We must bear in mind that Kelsen thought that legal orders must necessarily include some coercive 
element, meaning that states, by implication, must also possess some coercive quality; they are coercive orders. 
See: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967), 286, 312, 318–
19. 
17 Cohen, for example, attributed to ‘bureaucracy’ (i.e. “a set of officials, priests, nobles, slaves, eunuchs, and 
their sub-organizations”) the ‘primary task of maintaining continuity in early states’: Ronald Cohen, “State 
Origins: A Reappraisal,” in The Early State, ed. Henri JM Claessen and Peter Skalnik (Mouton Publishers, 1978), 
35. 
18 After all, in many respects it is taxation that makes the rest possible. Cf. Friedrich Engels, The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property, and the State, trans. Ernest Untermann (Charles H Kerr & Company, 1902), 206; 
Pierson, The Modern State, 23–26. 
19 On this point, it is worthwhile marking the words of Pollock and Maitland: “Different and more or less 
competing systems of jurisdiction, in one and the same region, are compatible with a high state of civilization, 
with a strong government, and with an administration of justice well enough liked and sufficiently understood by 
those who are concerned.” Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before 
the Time of Edward I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1968), xcv. 
20 These public enforcement systems stand in contrast to systems of self-help, which are wont to lead to internecine 
conflict and blood feuds. 
21 Cf. Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich, vol. 1 (University of California Press, 2013), 54–56. 
22 Manchester Liberalism, according to Oppenheimer, went so far as to argue that the State should “exercise only 
needful police functions”: Franz Oppenheimer, The State, trans. John Gitterman (Free Life Editions, 1975), 3. On 
Manchester Liberalism, see, e.g.: Elisabeth Wallace, “The Political Ideas of the Manchester School,” University 
of Toronto Quarterly 29, no. 2 (1960): 122–38; Gregory Bresiger, “Laissez Faire and Little Englanderism: The 
Rise, Fall, Rise, and Fall of the Manchester School,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 13, no. 1 (1997): 45–79. 
23 Indeed, states, in the view of Lenin, are “bodies of armed men”. Quoted in: Poggi, The State, 73. 
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- A written and codified constitution; 
- A separation of powers; 
- Generally recognised as a State. 
To these might be added certain functional attributions or obligations,24 i.e. States exist to: 
- Concentrate power; 
- Monopolize the legitimate use of force/violence; 
- Defend against external aggression;25 
- Guarantee law and order;26 
- Protect and promote life, liberty, health, and property;27  
- Enforce contracts and rights;  
- Control the factors of production; 
- Manage the economy;28 
- Facilitate and promote the welfare of its citizens, subjects, population, etc.;29  
- Facilitate and promote progress;  
- Embody and execute the will of the people, or general will;30 
- Promote, uphold, instil, etc. certain values, morality, and religion; 
                                               
24 Cf. Donisthorpe: “These two fundamental questions, ‘What is the State?’ and ‘What does the State?’ though 
standing clearly apart, are usually confounded and treated together. Now, although they may be equally vital, that 
is no reason for assuming that those who agree upon the one point must necessarily hold identical views on the 
other.” Wordsworth Donisthorpe, Individualism: A System of Politics (Macmillan & Co., 1889), 60. Indeed, 
Weber was firmly of the opinion that States cannot be defined by their functions: “It is not possible to define a 
political organization, including the state, in terms of the end to which its action is devoted. [T]here is no 
conceivable end which some political association has not at some time pursued.” Weber then went onto argue that 
States can only defined by their means, i.e. a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Weber, Economy and 
Society, 1:54–56, quote at 55. 
25 Cf. Donisthorpe, Individualism, 63–64. 
26 Cf. Donisthorpe, Individualism, 64. 
27 These were the raison d’être of the State for Locke, on which see: JB Bury, A History of Freedom of Thought 
(Williams and Norgate, 1913), 101. See further, e.g., Spinoza: “[T]he ultimate aim of government is…to free 
every man from fear, that he may live in all possible security; in other words, to strengthen his natural right to 
exist and work without injury to himself or others. […]. In fact, the true aim of government is liberty.” Benedict 
de Spinoza, A Theological-Political Treatise and A Political Treatise, trans. RHM Elwes (Dover Publications, 
Inc., 2004), 258-259 [Theo.-Pol. Tr., XX].  
28 Cf. “To-day, almost every developed State is ceaselessly active in economic affairs.” GDH Cole, Social Theory, 
3rd ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1923), 83. 
29 For example, through more basic mechanisms such as sanitation and waste management (cf. Donisthorpe, 
Individualism, 66.), or provision of healthcare and education, or through more extensive measures, such as systems 
of wealth redistribution and control of the factors of production.  
30 Cf. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Maurice Cranston (Penguin Books, 2004). 
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- Establish and maintain class domination, or prevent inter-class conflict.31  
Whether any of these are necessary or sufficient remains to be seen, as does whether, with 
regard to functions, they merely represent things that States have done or can do – or, indeed, 
things that States must do with a modicum of success to qualify as States.32 However, it is clear 
that, if some number of the above criteria, taken as they are, are to be the measure of a State, 
then it seems unlikely that States could have existed during the mediaeval period, even if there 
were mediaeval parallels.   
The argument here is as follows: A State is the set of more or less defined (political) 
institutions,33 though it is not any one of these in particular,34 which coordinate and direct the 
lives of a particular group of people in a particular area, and which institutions, or some subset 
thereof, represent that group in external affairs.35 These institutions are social groups in 
themselves, as distinct from, even if to some degree coextensive with, the wider social group 
that they regulate.36 The more that the institutions and their geographical jurisdiction are 
defined, the greater and wider their coordinating and directing powers, and the greater recourse 
                                               
31 Engels, for example, thought that the State originally came about to promote peace among classes, but, naturally, 
the economically powerful class gained the ascendency and then used the State to reinforce their dominance. 
Oppenheimer, by contrast, was more radical: “The State, completely in its genesis, essentially and almost 
completely during the first stages of its existence, is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a 
defeated group, with the sole purpose of regulating the domination of the victorious group over the vanquished, 
and securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad. Teleologically, this domination had no 
other purpose than the economic exploitation of the vanquished by the victors.” Engels, The Origin of the Family, 
Private Property, and the State, 208–12; Oppenheimer, The State, 8. These can be contrasted with the ideas of 
Elman Service, for example, who argued that, rather than the State being instituted to defend inequality, it was the 
State itself that created that inequality. See: Cohen, “State Origins,” 33. 
32 Thus, for example, Jackson has argued that many developing countries have (or had at the time when he wrote) 
‘quasi-states’, which are ineffective, inefficient, illegitimate, and unstable, and, therefore, not true States: Jackson, 
Quasi-States.  
33 Institution, in this sense, can be understood to mean a social group, which does have a specific purpose or 
function, viz. one that is legislative, executive, judicial, or administrative. 
34 For example, the State ought not to be taken to mean the government or the Crown. Even though these might 
be the primary directive power within the State, to treat them as being the State in toto tends towards being 
dissatisfactory. Louis XIV was incorrect, therefore, when he declared – or, at least, is reported to have declared – 
that “l'état, c'est moi” (‘the state, it is I’); governments and monarchs (whether in their natural or juristic bodies) 
constitute a part of a state, not its totality. On this, see, e.g.: Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins, British Government 
and the Constitution: Text and Materials, 7th ed. (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16–19. Cf. Martin 
Loughlin, “The State, the Crown and the Law,” in The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and Political Analysis, ed. 
Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne (Oxford University Press, 1999), 33–76. That Louis XIV made the reported 
statement has been doubted, see, e.g.: John Neville Figgis, Churches in the Modern State (Longmans, Green and 
Co., 1913), 150. 
35 Cf. Ralph Miliband’s definition of a state as “a number of particular institutions which, together, constitute its 
reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system.” Ralph Miliband, “The State in 
Capitalist Society” (1969), quoted in Turpin and Tomkins, British Government and the Constitution, 16. 
36 Cf. Cohen, “State Origins,” 32. 
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that is had to them in interactions with other groups, the greater justification there is for using 
the term ‘State’.  
If this definition is broadly accepted, then there seems little reason to doubt that there could be 
States in times and places other than our own, even if it might sometimes be difficult to 
differentiate them from other types of social group (e.g. bands, tribes, clans, chieftaincies, etc., 
though it can be said that the levels of centralization, coordination, direction, and cohesion,37 
tend to be lower in these than that which we associate with States). Indeed, as it would be 
surprising for the modern State to appear as if from nothing, it is often possible to see elements 
that we associate with modern States – e.g. systems of taxation, salaried administrators, 
standing military forces, etc. – to a greater or lesser degree in historical formations. The modern 
State, therefore, should not be considered the be-all-and-end-all of a State and, instead, it is 
better to proceed by way of qualification. So long as it is remembered that historical and 
modern States have their differences,38 just as individual States have their differences,39 there 
is little need to deny historical formations the title of ‘State’.  
Of course, none of this is to say that the modern State is necessarily the best form of social 
organization, or, indeed, a good one; neither is it to say that the modern State ought to be an 
aspiration for all societies nor that other systems of social organization might not be equally 
valid, especially given different socio-economic and environmental conditions. To make such 
judgements is the task of the political philosopher, not the constitutional historian. Indeed, 
whether the State is thought to be ‘big’ or ‘small’, ‘strong’ or weak’, etc., it is not the purpose 
of the Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity to judge, but merely to describe and understand. 
                                               
37 Cf. Cohen, “State Origins,” 35. 
38 As Pierson has said, modern states have far greater capacity and scope than historical states: “New forms of 
administration, new techniques for record-keeping, new technologies for the transmission and processing of both 
people and information gave the modern state powers to govern which were simply unavailable to more traditional 
states.” Pierson, The Modern State, 13. There is also the fact that modern States, at least in the West and as a civil 
power, unlike their mediaeval counterparts, do not have to contend with a rival ecclesiastical and spiritual power; 
the declining power of the Pope and religion in general, and the concomitant rise in secularism, naturally opened 
the way for the State to claim far more wide-ranging competencies and powers than ever before. For one view of 
this development, see e.g.: John Neville Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 
1914); John Neville Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius, 1414-1625, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1916). 
39 This is as true historically as it is today. Indeed, historical States have been classified in many different ways, 
e.g. city-states, maritime states, imperial states, territorial states, feudal states, theocratic states, absolutist states, 
industrial states, nation states, etc. Cf., e.g.: Pierson, The Modern State, chap. 2; Oppenheimer, The State; David 
Held, “The Development of the Modern State,” in Formations of Modernity, ed. Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben 
(The Open University, 1992), 71–126; Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992, 2nd 
ed. (Blackwell Publishers, 1992), chap. 1. 
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12.3.3 The State and Other Social Groups 
Something ought to be said briefly about the relationship between the State and other social 
groups under the framework.  
Firstly, as to existence: It can certainly be said that State recognition might bring with it certain 
rights and privileges, albeit accompanied by certain liabilities, for certain social groups and 
types thereof. Likewise, State non-approval or disapproval might prove to be a severe 
disadvantage, if not fatal, to a group-idea. However, there is no necessary connection between 
States, on the one hand, and the formation and maintenance of social groups, on the other. The 
officials representing the State might wish, to a greater or lesser extent, to attempt to control 
the types, number, etc. of social groups extant within its jurisdiction, as well as what members 
of those groups qua members might do, and introduce measures (i.e. laws) to that effect. But 
the extent to which this is effective will greatly depend on the extent to which people believe 
in this control and act accordingly. Ultimately, however, the existence of social groups, insofar 
as they constitute a reality for their members and stakeholders, depends not on the State, but 
on individuals.  
Secondly, as to loyalties: It is usually the case that the State confers compulsory membership 
on those normally resident within their borders, most especially those either born within that 
State’s territory or to parents with membership of that State. ‘Aliens’, whether resident or 
visiting, especially for extended periods of time, are normally required to register their 
presence, and perhaps also their activities, with the State. Subject to certain qualifications, such 
aliens might at some time and in some way become members (i.e. citizens). Thus, almost 
everybody within a State has a relationship to, if not membership of, that State. The question 
arises from this as to whether any other social group or, indeed, our conscience can assert a 
superior claim on us to the exclusion of the State,40 and, if so, in what circumstances and to 
what extent? The Theory of Constitutional Ubiquity provides no answers to these questions; it 
says only that there is a possibility for contingency in these matters and that, whichever 
arrangement there is, it can be described by the theory. 
12.3.4 The State and Mediaeval England 
                                               
40 Cf. GC Field, Political Theory (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1956), 190. 
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With the foregoing in mind, and in view of the case studies in Part III, we can quickly discuss 
whether mediaeval England can be said to be possessed of a State. Naturally, the mediaeval 
period is a long one, but, at least from the period of unification in the tenth century, England – 
as a social group, or, rather, a series of social groups – exhibited many of the features that we 
associate with States.  
It had, for its time, a relatively large population, which lived in a relatively consolidated area, 
even if the borderlands were sometimes contested. There were coordinated centres of authority, 
which came increasingly under the control of a central government ranged around the monarch 
and various departments (e.g. the Chancery, Chamber, Exchequer, etc.). There were systems 
of taxation, which tended to become more regular and complex. England was largely 
independent of other authorities; the Roman Church laid some claims to ultimate control, but, 
for the most part, this did not change the fact that England was ruled mostly from within. There 
was an executive in the form of the monarch and their officials; as the period wore on, a distinct 
legislature took shape. There was a system of criminal law, which tended to strengthen as time 
went on; local remedies and self-help became increasingly obsolete. There came to be a class 
of salaried and professional administrators – at first, largely provided from the ranks of the 
clergy, then, later, from secular backgrounds.41 There came to be a class of professional and 
salaried judges; their independence was at times doubtful, as was their integrity, but their 
existence is the salient point. England did not really possess a standing army, although there 
were local and feudal levies (complemented by systems of conscription and impressment), as 
well as systems to provide for the hiring of mercenaries (e.g. scutage); in other words, there 
were systems in place to facilitate the raising of a military force, as well as systems of 
requisitioning to obtain the necessary vehicles (e.g. ships), supplies, etc. Likewise, there was 
no standing police force, although there were systems in place for policing, e.g. sheriffs, 
coroners, and the tithing system.  
There was no general system of welfare support, state-sponsored education system, or a written 
and codified constitution. In these respects, the constitution of the mediaeval English state 
differs markedly from many modern constitutions. Indeed, we can see that what is referred to 
changes over the course of the period, especially as socio-economic and technological changes 
took place. Yet, as can be seen from this brief overview, there is good justification for saying 
                                               
41 From the late fourteenth century, for example, councillors were paid salaries. See CW Prosser and Margaret 
Sharp, A Short Constitutional History of England (Longmans, Green and Co., 1938), 93. 
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that mediaeval England was possessed of a State. Mediaeval political thought was not devoid 
of theories of the State.42 Indeed, in many ways, their terminology was not that far removed 
from ours, except that where we say ‘State’, they might have said civitas.43 It might have been 
a State unlike many modern states, but to say that it had a State would be neither ahistorical 
nor anachronistic.  
                                               
42 Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), for example, has been said to have made the “first exposition of the theory of 
the State”, which he did with “enviable clarity”. See: Walter Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in 
the Middle Ages, 3rd ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1974), 248ff. More generally, see: Antony Black, Political Thought 
in Europe, 1250-1450 (Cambridge University Press, 1992), chap. 7. 
43 Black, Political Thought in Europe, 1250-1450, 22; Ullmann, Principles of Government and Politics in the 
Middle Ages, 285. 
417 
 
Appendix II – The Rule of Law1 
13.1 The Rule of Law: Its Nature and Raison d’Être 
In order to understand the rule of law, one needs only to answer four questions: (1) what 
is law, (2) what does it mean to say that law ‘rules’, (3) why ought law to rule, and (4) 
how might law be made to rule, i.e. how might the rule of law be achieved? The first three 
of these questions can be answered simply and quickly in the light of the framework. 
Laws, as set out in the Associational and Generational Theories of Law, are fixed 
associations. To say that laws – fixed associations – ‘rule’ is to say that those associations 
are actually fixed in practice: they describe, correspond to, and are fulfilled by objects 
and events in the real world; things exist and happen in accordance with them, and not 
otherwise. 
Our desire for this to be the case – for law to rule – stems from our basic psychological 
needs to understand and, more fundamentally, to feel safe and secure. We desire the rule 
of law because we desire for things to exist and happen according to fixed, discernible 
patterns; it helps to create a sense of there being order, regularity, predictability, and 
stability; it (ostensibly) makes things simpler; it provides for consistency of action; it 
helps us to live and act with a degree of confidence, as we can make decisions and 
investments today with a fairly good idea of what the future will hold. Whilst in some 
respects the rule of law limits what we may do,2 it makes deciding what we are to do 
easier and, indeed, might even protect and empower us (although, these latter rely on the 
qualities of the laws themselves, rather than the rule of law directly).  
The point is that if things are irregular and unpredictable, and if we are rarely sure as to 
what we ought to do or what the consequences of our actions will be, then we are more 
likely to exist in a state of heightened vigilance and tension; our sympathetic nervous 
system, which is central to our stress-response (i.e. preparing us for flight, fright, or 
                                               
1 This was originally a section within chapter four, i.e. on the transmission of associations. Whilst it does 
explore some of the implications of the Associational Theory of Law, it was not quite in the direct line of 
argument; it was for this reason that it has been moved to an appendix. In moving it to the appendix, I have 
taken the opportunity to develop, expand, and rearrange it.   
2 Cf. “[Codes of conduct] are a restriction on what we may do without upsetting an order on whose existence 
we all count in deciding our actions”: Friedrich August Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty: A New 
Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and Political Economy (Routledge Classics, 2013), 179.  
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freeze), is more likely to be activated at a higher level for longer. Over time, not only does 
this affect our day-to-day quality of life, but also our health.3  
When we speak of the ‘rule of law’, we are obviously speaking only of those laws – of 
those fixed associations – over which we, as humans, have control; those which we can 
shape and determine within the confines of the natural world. We are not speaking of the 
laws of physics; these rule whether we like it or not. In practical terms, then, we are 
dealing only with those steps that we can take to make the world – particularly in its social 
aspect – easier to understand and navigate, more orderly and predictable. This does not 
mean that there cannot be complexity. It means only that any such complexity is not 
beyond comprehension, whether in theory or in practice; even if one might not understand 
the why and wherefore of some law or laws, at least one will be able to understand how 
one ought to think and what one ought to do.  
Of course, the rule of law does not in itself completely fulfil our need to feel safe and 
secure. This depends heavily on other things, especially: (1) social factors, e.g. whether 
we feel loved unconditionally by others and feel included within our social groups; (2) 
economic factors, e.g. whether we think that we have the materials and resources to 
survive, both now and in the foreseeable future; and (3) environmental factors, e.g. 
whether or not we think there to be real, consequential, and imminent threats to ourselves 
and our property, or to our friends, allies, relations, associates, suppliers, providers, 
dependents, etc. and their property. It also very much depends upon (4) the tenor and 
force of the laws. Draconian and oppressive laws with disproportionate adverse 
consequences attending breaches thereof are less likely to fulfil our need to feel safe and 
secure; we will constantly be in fear that a minor indiscretion might result in serious 
repercussions.    
What the rule of law does provide, however, is a sense of safety and security by, in the 
very least, helping us to feel that we understand how the world around us operates. We 
might not like what is coming, but at least we can know – with a reasonable degree of 
certainty – what is likely to happen. After all, it is easier to prepare – both physically and 
mentally – for a known thing than an unknown thing. If it is a bad thing that is coming, 
then we might take steps to avoid or defeat it, or mitigate its ill-effects. The central point 
is that we need not constantly be on high alert, and our stress-response constantly induced, 
                                               
3 On the physiology of the human stress response and its effects on health, see esp.: Robert M Sapolsky, 
Why Zebras Don’t Get Ulcers, 3rd ed. (St. Martin’s Griffin, 2004). 
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ready to respond at a second’s notice to any and every potential threat: we know what the 
likely threats are, when they are likely to occur, and how they might best be avoided, 
defeated, or mitigated, etc. In other words, it provides us with a measure of control; it also 
gives us the opportunity to make our peace with things.4  
It is almost needless to say that the rule of law has been infamous for its indefinability.5 
However, in the context of the framework, it is eminently simple. It boils down to the 
following: The rule of law describes a situation in which, generally speaking, everybody 
thinks and acts in accordance with some set or sets of shared fixed associations and not 
otherwise; a situation in which we know, generally speaking, what to expect of others and 
others know what to expect of us. The question arises, therefore, how might this situation 
be achieved – how might law be made to rule? 
13.2 Requirements and Enhancements 
It is important to differentiate between those things (1) that are necessary for the rule of 
law and (2) those things that make the rule of law better or, rather, make for a rule of law 
worth having. We can differentiate, therefore, between things that are required for the 
rule of law and things that enhance it; between requirements and enhancements. This 
distinction is not always sufficiently recognized.  
There are two fundamental requirements for the rule of law. These are prevalence and 
potency. In other words, for law to rule – for it to be successful – there must exist some 
number of fixed associations, which are both prevalent and potent; for law to rule in a 
meaningful sense, this number ought to be significant, if not substantial. It is, then, their 
conjunction and their being generally true that creates a sense of there being the rule of 
law. Thus, if there is a sufficiently large set of laws that are both prevalent and potent, if 
                                               
4 Cf. Cohen: “That the law should be readily knowable is, thus, essential to its usefulness. So far is this true 
that there are many inconveniences or injustices in the law which men would rather suffer than be paralyzed 
in their action by uncertainty.” Morris Raphael Cohen, “The Place of Logic in the Law,” Harvard Law 
Review 29, no. 6 (1916): 624. Indeed, the overriding desire for certainty was expressed by Lord Mansfield: 
“In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty: and therefore, it is of more consequence 
that a rule should be certain, than whether the rule is established one way or the other. Because speculators 
in trade then know what ground to go upon.” Vallejo v Wheeler (1774) 1 Cowp. 143 at 153. 
5 Barnett, for example, has called it an “elusive” concept, capable of “different interpretations by different 
people”. Similarly, Kirchheimer has said that the rule of law represents “a mixture of implied promise and 
convenient vagueness” and Walker went further and said that it is “concept of the utmost importance but 
having no defined, nor readily definable, content”. Indeed, Shklar even once (in)famously argued that the 
rule of law has essentially become meaningless “thanks to ideological abuse and general over-use.”Hilaire 
Barnett, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 10th ed. (Routledge, 2013), 44; Judith N Shklar, “Political 
Theory and the Rule of Law,” in Political Thought and Political Thinkers, ed. Stanley Hoffmann 
(University of Chicago Press, 1998), 21; Kirchheimer and Walker are quoted in Roger Cotterrell, Law’s 
Community: Legal Theory in Sociological Perspective (Oxford University Press, 1997), 160.  
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everyone knows what they are and abides by them, then there can be said to exist the rule 
of law. These things must be true if the rule of law is to be said to exist at any given time. 
For the rule of law to exist over time, there must also be a measure of persistence, but 
this is of secondary importance to prevalence and potency. 
If prevalence and potency are to be achieved, then there are five other requirements – or, 
one might rather say, preconditions – that must be fulfilled. These are existence, 
expression, exposure, assimilation, and compulsion. These make a framework through 
which the rule of law can be understood and against which it can be measured. The 
achievement of these things is the achievement of the rule of law. However, it is important 
to stress that the achievement of these things is not necessarily the achievement of the 
best rule of law or, indeed, of the rule of the best law. As said above, there is a difference 
between establishing the rule of law and enhancing it; there is also, as just indicated, a 
difference between the rule of law and the rule of good law – or, at least, what we think 
to be ‘good’ law.  
For the most part, the rule of law can be enhanced by improving the modes and means of 
existence, expression, exposure, assimilation, and compulsion; by making them more 
efficacious, efficient, and reliable. In many respects, which enhancements are appropriate 
will depend on the social groups, legal systems, and circumstances in question. Smaller, 
more informal, homogeneous groups do not likely require a developed system of courts, 
even if they nevertheless require some means of settling cases of doubt, dispute, and 
deviancy; larger, more formal, heterogeneous groups are more likely to require such a 
developed system if a rule of law that is worthwhile having is to be established. 
Whilst there is a difference between establishing and enhancing the rule of law, it remains 
possible to discuss the two things together, because they both have to do with prevalence 
and potency; this is their test and measure. The one has to do with whether prevalence 
and potency have been achieved, the other with how well they have been achieved. Any 
discussion, however, of some so-called ‘rule of good law’ belongs in some other place. It 
cannot be prescribed in the manner that establishing and enhancing the rule of law can be 
prescribed; the latter have only to do with form, whereas the former has to do with content 
or substance. This is a subject to which we will return. 
The framework and the principles that flow from it will be discussed imminently. This 
will be couched in terms of qualities that laws must have if they are to become prevalent 
and potent. It is perhaps worthwhile stating beforehand, however, that they all drive 
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towards the same things: individuals must know what the laws are, those laws must be 
able to shape how those individuals think and behave, and individuals must feel some 
compulsion to follow them.6  
13.3 Existence 
13.3.1 Existent 
It seems almost too obvious to need stating, but, in order for there to be fixed associations 
that are both prevalent and potent, there must first be some fixed associations in existence. 
There cannot be the rule of law without any laws.  
Laws, as has been discussed under the Associational and Generational Theories of Law, 
can be created in a number of ways. Some arise through ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ processes, 
i.e. without any deliberate and coordinate action. These are often labelled with terms like 
customs, customary laws, conventions, folkways, mores, etc. Others arise through more 
deliberate and concerted actions – usually through formal processes and by formal 
declarations. These can take many forms, e.g. proclamations, edicts, statutes, etc.  
Fundamentally, it does not matter, for the purposes of the rule of law, which form laws 
take or from which source they emanate. If there are laws in existence – of whatever form 
or provenance – that are prevalent and potent, then there is a foundation upon which the 
rule of law might exist.  
13.4 Expression  
13.4.1 Expressed 
It is all very well to exist. However, if fixed associations are to become prevalent, if they 
are to be assimilated by a number of individuals, they must first be expressed, e.g. in 
words or actions, orally or in writing. Only then is there the possibility that other 
individuals might come to know them, and think and act according to them. Unexpressed 
laws cannot be followed. 
In a great many respects, written forms are superior to oral forms. They are more stable 
and enduring; they leave less room for doubt, ambiguity, and uncertainty – especially 
when drafted diligently; they rely less on human memory, the products of which might 
be perverted as much by time as by will; they are harder to ignore; they are, in many 
                                               
6 Cf. Raz: “It [the rule of law] has two aspects: (1) that people should be ruled by the law and obey it, and 
(2) that the law should be such that people will be able to be guided by it.” Joseph Raz, The Authority of 
Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1979), 213. 
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respects, less open to exploitation and abuse (though imprudently, unwisely, or 
iniquitously drafted provisions might be greatly exploited and abused). It was somewhat 
for these reasons that Andrew Horne was prompted to write his Mirror of Justices in the 
fourteenth century. He spoke of those who would ‘never consent to having the right 
usages put into writing’, because ‘power might thereby be taken from them to pervert 
judgment’, which, until that time, had been informed by great regard to the advancement 
of themselves, their friends, and their lords.7  
However, there is an extent to which precise written forms are less important than perhaps 
often assumed as “[h]uman behavior must conform to laws and contracts without constant 
reference to explicit documents”;8 in many respects, the more important thing, at least in 
everyday practice, is the impression (the ‘gist’) that they create.9  
13.5 Exposure 
13.5.1 Disseminated 
Mere expression is not enough; there must also be exposure. This means that laws must 
be expressed in the presence of others – whether directly or indirectly, through formal or 
informal channels, through their application or explication. Laws must be made known 
if they are to be prevalent. In practice, this means that they need to be disseminated or 
promulgated.  
Dissemination or promulgation to a certain extent happen naturally. People observe and 
imitate how others around them behave; we can here recall the resemblance principle.10 
However, if laws are to be disseminated widely and faithfully, and, indeed, if they are to 
become in any measure persistent, then more time and energy will probably need to be 
invested into the process of dissemination.  
                                               
7 Andrew Horne, Mirror of Justices, ed. William Joseph Whittaker (Selden Society, 1895), 1–4; Andrew 
Horne, The Mirrour of Justices: Written Originally in the Old French, Long Before the Conquest; and 
Many Things Added [Trans. 1646], trans. William Hughes (John Byrne & Co., 1903), 12–15. Horne’s 
mistrust of unwritten traditions, however, was perhaps also driven not only by his personal experiences (see 
Maitland’s introduction to Whittaker’s translation, at xxii), but also by the fact that unwritten traditions 
tend to have lesser regard for written sources, and Horne was anxious that one written source – the 
Scriptures – ought to be given primacy. As such, his agenda was to bring the Common Law – or, rather, 
the ‘false judges’ thereof – within the precepts of what he regarded to be the dictates of God. All things 
considered, the Mirror was not a particularly accurate book, neither was it successful in its time. 
Nevertheless, at least some of his motives for writing a law book are understandable. 
8 Valerie F Reyna and Charles J Brainerd, “Comment on Article by Professor Wohlmuth,” Journal of 
Contemporary Legal Issues 8 (1997): 288. 
9 Cf. Paul C Wohlmuth, “Jurisprudence and Memory Research,” Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 8 
(1997): 249–86; Reyna and Brainerd, “Comment on Article by Professor Wohlmuth.” 
10 Supra, 4.9. 
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There are more direct methods of dissemination, such as formal or informal systems of 
instruction and education. Formal systems are typified by their greater structure and 
planning. They are more likely to involve time spent in a classroom; to involve theoretical 
and abstract discussion. Informal systems, on the other hand, are typified by their 
piecemeal and ad hoc nature; the ‘content’ is acquired primarily through accumulated 
experience. This, naturally, is likely to involve more time, as it were, in the field; to 
involve a period of apprenticeship; to be practical and hands-on. Such direct methods are 
exemplified by the systems of legal education provided by the Inns of Court in England 
during the mediaeval and early modern periods – at least in regards to the English 
common law. There was some formal content delivery, e.g. readings (i.e. lectures) given 
by learned members on certain subjects, as well as the study of certain texts and treatises. 
However, a greater part of the student’s education was derived from attending court 
proceedings, and observing and participating in the legal process.  
Indirect methods typically involve expression through some medium – in particular, 
through the written word. This might be in the form of official publications, which profess 
to contain authoritative and incontrovertible statements of the law; it might be in the form 
of unofficial publications, expressing private opinions on, or interpretations or 
experiences of, the law. Thus, law might be published as statutes, codes, constitutions, 
ordinances, law reports, etc.; it might be found in glosses, commentaries, textbooks, etc.  
Ideally, laws ought to be disseminated in such a way that individuals might be exposed 
to them on multiple occasions, preferably according to their need and at their 
convenience. In other words, laws ought to be deposited – figuratively or literally – in 
well-known and readily-accessible places, such that people might come into contact with, 
and consult, them.11 Undoubtedly, as Lord Woolf has said, the existence of law libraries 
                                               
11 This is particularly in view of the fact that there is the prevalent – and largely sensible idea – that 
ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of the law does not excuse). After all, what use would a law be if 
it might be avoided by wilful – or feigned – ignorance? Moreover, much as Holmes argued, the application 
of law and delivery of justice might be viewed as public goods and, for this reason, “[p]ublic policy 
sacrifices the individual to the general good”; it might seem unfair to enforce a law against a person who 
knew not of it, but it is a greater evil to deprive the community at large of the rule of law: Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, The Common Law (Little, Brown, and Company, 1923), 48. Nevertheless, there ought to be a 
reasonable chance of knowing the law. This does not mean that everyone need be familiar with the totality 
of laws, but merely with those concerning activities in which they might or do participate. Where these 
activities are of a specialist nature, there will usually be an expectation that the persons concerned first 
familiarize themselves with the relevant laws before undertaking the activities. However – and this must be 
stressed – they can only do so if there is some place where, or some person from whom, they might discover 
and learn them, preferably without having to go to extensive or unreasonable lengths there to obtain.  
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– ‘treasuries’ and ‘warehouses’ of law – is important in this regard;12 in the modern age, 
digitization and publication online in recognized places is equally important.  
13.6 Assimilation 
Mere existence, expression, and exposure are insufficient. For laws to meaningfully affect 
people’s thoughts and behaviours, they need to be assimilated. In order to achieve and 
expedite this, there are a number of qualities that laws ought to have.  
13.6.1 Intelligible 
If laws are to be assimilated, they must first be expressed in a form such that they are 
understandable or comprehensible; they must be accessible to the intellect. Laws that are 
in a foreign language, or that are convoluted or complex are less likely to be incorporated 
and retained successfully and faithfully. If they are not so incorporated and retained, they 
are unlikely to become prevalent and potent. 
In an ideal world, every law would be comprehensible to everyone without any especial 
training; they would be readily intelligible by all. However, given variations in situational 
complexity and individual ability, as well as the fact that not all laws will be relevant to 
everybody, a more realistic aim is for laws to be intelligible to those for whom they have 
some relevance – preferably with a minimum of effort. In practice, this means that laws 
that affect everybody ought to be readily understandable by everybody, whereas those 
affecting a smaller number might be suffered to be more abstruse. If a law is important, 
though more difficult to comprehend, then effort ought to be made to explain it. 
In any complex and comprehensive legal system, there will likely always need to be those 
learned in the law – those who have devoted considerable time and effort to the study 
thereof, people to whom others might have recourse when wishing to understand the law 
and its implications. In part, this is because, as has already been said, some situations will 
almost certainly be more complex than others and, moreover, not everybody will have 
the same intellectual ability. Moreover, there is the fact that even though individual laws 
might be readily comprehensible, systems of laws will require more effort to understand. 
As such, it is more convenient to have recourse to individuals that have expended that 
effort, rather than requiring everybody so to expend. Nevertheless, such systems of law 
ought to be intelligible when they are explained. Thus, even though not everybody might 
                                               
12 Lord Woolf, “The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution,” The Cambridge Law Journal 63, no. 
2 (2004): 317ff. 
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be their own lawyer, they should still be able to understand the operation and effects of 
the law and the legal process.13  
It ought to be stressed that clarity, precision, and concision are ever virtues; laws ought 
always to be drafted as clearly, precisely, and concisely as possible. In a word, laws ought 
to be expressed elegantly.  
13.6.2 Stable14 
Laws should not purposefully be changed too often; radical changes should be avoided 
where possible. Changing laws too often or too radically affects our ability to assimilate 
them faithfully and successfully; it would also probably frustrate our desire for constancy 
and consistency; it would make us feel insecure. 
There is a limit to what individuals can learn within a given timeframe, especially with 
other demands upon their time. If changes to the law are made too frequently, people are 
far more likely to struggle both to understand them in their entirety, and to assimilate 
them faithfully and successfully. Indeed, confusion is likely to result – especially where 
changes are not effectively communicated.  
If radical changes need to be made, these ought to be made with a recognition that 
individuals require time to assimilate anything new, particularly if it is especially alien to 
them, as well as time to adjust. As such, radical changes should be made clearly and 
methodically. An extended notice period ought to be considered, during which time 
especial effort is made to disseminate the new law, ensuring that it will be both prevalent 
and potent upon its coming into effect. Consideration might also be given to introducing 
the changes incrementally, such that people have additional time to adjust and might 
adjust to each part in turn. Furthermore, a grace period might also merit consideration, 
such that the full force and rigour of the changes will not be immediately felt. Besides 
providing more time for adjustment, it also recognizes that mistakes, misinterpretations, 
                                               
13 Cf. “Those who ask that the law be made so plain that every man may be his own lawyer, and who ask 
that the courts be filled with men who know less law and more justice, are simply quarrelling with the 
constitution of the human mind. One might just as well ask that every man be his own engineer or every 
man his own doctor.” John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law, ed. Charles J Reid Jr, 2nd ed. (Liberty Fund, 
Inc., 1998), 331. 
14 It is interesting to reflect on Pound’s remark concerning that which Cardozo called “the great antinomy”: 
“Law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still”. Roscoe Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (The 




etc. are more likely in the early stages of implementation; it would be a more 
compassionate, forgiving, and understanding approach. 
It should also be recognized that attempting to change too many laws, especially if done 
so often and radically, is in many respects futile. After all, in order for these attempts to 
have any measure of success, one needs to change how people think, which means 
altering the ponderous and unwieldy mass of prevalent and potent fixed associations 
extant within the given population. Even though some individuals might be able to 
influence this, it is not really within their power to change it;15 that relies on the 
willingness of the population to cooperate or, perhaps, obey – if they can. Naturally, 
certain measures might be adopted to incentivise absorption, as it were, but humans are 
not like machines with switches and replaceable memory; change (i.e. new learning) 
requires both time and effort, and perhaps some level of investment also.  
13.6.3 Identified 
There needs to be some selection criteria by which we can identify those laws that are 
supposed to be prevalent and potent, such that we know which of them we are supposed 
to assimilate and follow, and which of them we should ignore. In this way, aspiration can 
be made reality. 
The rule of law, therefore, requires some rules of recognition.16 These might require us 
to discriminate on the basis of the sources from which fixed associations emanate; they 
might require us to discriminate on the basis of their content. Thus, we might only accept 
as law those fixed associations issued by particular persons or groups, or those that meet 
certain other requirements, e.g. conforming to certain standards. In general principle, it is 
better for rules of recognition to focus primarily on identifying the legitimate sources of 
law; their content can then be judged according to what these sources have to say. 
13.7 Compulsion 
Whereas expression, exposure, and assimilation have more to do with prevalence, 
compulsion has more to do with potency. Potency can only be achieved if we feel some 
                                               
15 Cf. “[A]ll moral (and legal) rules serve an existing factual order which no individual has the power to 
change fundamentally; because such change would require changes in the rules which other members of 
the society obey, in part unconsciously or out of sheer habit, and which, if a viable society of a different 
type were to be created, would have to be replaced by other rules which nobody has the power to make 
effective.” Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 193. 
16 See: supra, 3.15. 
427 
 
irresistible force or urge that compels us to think or act in accordance with certain fixed 
associations and not others.  
Compulsion might be internal or external. In other words, we might feel compelled to 
think or act in accordance with certain fixed associations either through some intrinsic 
feeling that we must so think or act, or because some outside agent or circumstance is 
compelling us to so think or act. Compulsion might also be voluntary or involuntary. In 
other words, we might be compelled to think or act in accordance with certain fixed 
associations after a process of positive and definite decision, as a matter of choice; 
alternatively, we might so think or act, not as a matter of choice, but as a matter of internal 
or external compulsion.  
Compulsion might be achieved in a number of different ways. Internal and voluntary 
compulsion can both be encouraged and achieved primarily through education. In other 
words, we feel compelled to think and act in accordance with certain fixed associations 
because that is how we have learned – perhaps, how we have been taught – to so think 
and act. Similarly, compulsion can be encouraged by having and making plain the 
rationale behind laws or their implementation – for if we can agree, on a rational and 
intellectual level, that there is good reason for the law, we are more likely to follow it, 
even if we are not entirely comfortable with it.  
Compulsion can also, of course, be encouraged through the use of incentives and 
disincentives; put another way, rewards and punishments. Incentives or rewards, of 
course, will be made to encourage thought and behaviour in accordance with the ‘right’ 
fixed associations; disincentives or punishments to discourage thought and behaviour 
divergent from or contrary to those fixed associations, or, indeed, any thought and 
behaviour in accordance with any ‘wrong’ fixed association. Whilst the role of education 
is perhaps the more important, the role of positive and negative consequences tends to 
receive more attention.17  
                                               
17 There is a sense in which education and systems of reward and punishment are connected. For example, 
Clark has argued that: “The motive to obedience…under what men have understood by law, has been, I 
believe, always in some manner connected with the extraneous approval or disapproval of other beings, 
either human or, if superhuman, capable of understanding human conduct and motives.” Edwin Charles 
Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, a Comment on Austin (Cambridge University Press, 1883), 125. Naturally, 
expressions of approval or disapproval are important in the teaching and learning process, because, as social 
animals, we tend to modulate our thoughts and behaviours towards those for which we receive positive 
feedback and away from those for which we receive negative feedback; we want to conform because we 
want to be accepted. Naturally, to reinforce any such approval or disapproval, there can be attached certain 
rewards and punishments – often ones that take material form. However, whilst this encourages compliance 
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Compulsion – and, of course, potency – has also a great deal to do with how competing – 
and, perhaps, conflicting – thoughts and courses of action are settled. In this respect, there 
are overlaps with assimilation, as there is a limit to which competing and conflicting fixed 
associations can be faithfully and successfully assimilated – at least, in the long-term. 
There are some qualities, therefore, that have been included here under compulsion, but 
which might easily also find a home under assimilation.  
13.7.1 Accepted 
It is not enough for laws merely to be known and applicable; they must also, in some 
measure, be accepted or acknowledged as establishing fixed relationships – albeit perhaps 
grudgingly, and against one’s will and better judgment. No law could be prevalent and 
potent – at least, not for long – without some measure of general recognition.18 
13.7.2 Followed 
Laws ought to be consistently used and applied where appropriate, and only where 
appropriate;19 this should be done in a timely fashion, such that there is less cause to doubt 
that they are actually being followed. This means not only that they are actually prevalent 
and potent, but that they appear to be so. This appearance is important, not only because 
it helps to increase their prevalence, but also because it further encourages their potency. 
It is almost a truism that potency breeds potency and that impotency breeds impotency.20 
                                               
and whilst for some it might provide a motive to conform, there is a great deal to be said for the argument 
that many ‘obey’ the law, not because they are afraid of how others might react if they do not, but purely 
and simply because they are convinced that it is the way that things should be. Perhaps the receipt of 
approval and disapproval helped them to form this view, but, once formed, the motive to obey becomes 
entirely a matter of internal compulsion. 
18 “No rule of law was ever successful or ever endured unless it received practical general acceptance among 
the whole body of the people, for the simple reason that a rule of law not accepted by any considerable 
portion of the people can never be enforced. The history of law is strewn and will continue to be strewn by 
just such palpable wrecks of law not enforced and not enforceable. […]. Acceptance by the community is 
needed to breathe life into the edict of the harshest despot.” Zane, The Story of Law, 249. 
19 As Bingham has said, there ought to be, where appropriate, “law not discretion”; in other words, 
“Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the 
exercise of discretion”: Tom Bingham, “The Rule of Law” (Penguin Books, 2010), 48ff. This also means, 
as Dicey, for example, identified, that there ideally ought to be no punishment or penalty except following 
a breach of law (nulla poena sine lege – no punishment without law) and as determined by due process of 
law: Albert Venn Dicey, An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, ed. ECS Wade, 10th 
ed. (MacMillan Education Ltd, 1959), 188. 
20 Kelsen suggested that, for legal norms to be valid, they must have a “minimum of effectiveness”, i.e. “A 
norm that is not obeyed by anybody anywhere, in other words a norm that is not effective at least to some 
degree, is not regarded as a valid legal norm.” This is not to say that he thought that validity and 
effectiveness were the same thing. As he identified, whether something is “actually applied and obeyed” is 
a different thing to whether it “ought to be obeyed and applied”; efficacy is a condition of validity, not 
validity itself. Kelsen later transferred the idea of efficacy to the legal system as a whole: “[A] legal order 
does not lose its validity when a single norm loses its effectiveness. A legal order is regarded as valid, if its 
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There are a number of things that help to ensure that laws are being consistently used and 
applied in their appropriate contexts.21 
The first is effective systems of reinforcement, i.e. systems that remind people of the 
expectations that exist regarding their thoughts and behaviours. This might be achieved, 
for example, through signs, messages, and notices sent or posted at appropriate times or 
in appropriate places. Training programmes and, more especially, refresher courses also 
work to the same end.  
The second is effective systems of adjudication. This means that there are recognized 
individuals within the social group tasked with deciding upon cases of doubt, dispute, and 
deviancy, particularly where some harm or damage seems apparent or foreseeable. In 
other words, individuals entrusted with: declaring what the law is where it is unclear, 
settling who is in the right in specific cases according to law, and identifying cases in 
which the laws have not been followed as they ought to have been followed. It is sensible 
that individuals so entrusted have some power (or, rather, influence) to take actions upon 
their findings – to resolve, remedy, protect, punish, etc. It is perhaps worthwhile adding 
here that justice ought not to be summary, but only executed after due process, and with 
due diligence and care; it should be quick, though not hasty.  
The third is effective systems of enforcement, which (a) encourage and ensure compliance 
with the law, and (b) prevent, detect, and correct non-compliance, i.e. deviancy. A large 
element of enforcement is, of course, systems of incentives and disincentives, of rewards 
and punishment, of sanctions.22 It is best if the tasks of enforcement are entrusted to 
                                               
norms are by and large effective (that is, actually applied and obeyed).” One can understand his reasoning 
under the Associational Theory of Law. For something to be considered valid, there really needs to be some 
impression that it is actually valid; this is greatly facilitated by its acceptance, and its use and application. 
However, it would be wrong to make validity ultimately and necessarily dependent upon efficacy. Validity 
is based on whether or not one accepts the premises of something, at least in theory; whether people endorse 
and actually follow the thing in question is another matter. For Kelsen, see: Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of 
Law, trans. Max Knight (University of California Press, 1967), 10–11, 212–13.  
21 Much as Pollock has said: “It is hardly conceivable that any community should recognise such rules 
[binding on themselves], as distinct from rules binding on mankind in general, without having some way 
of administering them; but that is a secondary point.” Having mechanisms, etc. to administer, enforce, 
reinforce, etc. laws is likely to be beneficial to the social group at large, and such mechanisms might help 
to determine – according to certain rules of recognition – which laws ought to be prevalent and potent, and 
which ought to be regarded as ‘laws’ in a technical sense. But, as laws are defined by their structure, not 
by any systems that are developed to ‘manage’ them, as it were, the existence of such mechanisms is a 
separate issue from that of the existence of law – and the rule thereof. For Pollock, see: Frederick Pollock, 
A First Book of Jurisprudence, 5th ed. (Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1923). 
22 Sanctions come in many forms. For example: (1) social sanctions, whether formal or informal, which 
involve changes – especially negative – in the way that others behave around and towards us (e.g. 
chastisement, withdrawal of affection or friendship, shaming, humiliation, degradation of status, restriction 
or deprivation of liberty, stigmatization, ostracism, outlawry, etc.); economic or pecuniary sanctions (e.g. 
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certain individuals and bodies, and if people are discouraged from pursuing justice 
outside and in spite of them; it is best if there is a situation in which, in the words of 
Pollock and Maitland, “[s]ave in cases particularly excepted, the man who takes the law 
into his own hands puts himself in the wrong, and offends the community.”23 
It is, of course, all very well having systems of adjudication and enforcement, but they 
are worth little if there are prohibitive barriers to access them. Such barriers might 
include: (i) physical or logistical barriers, such as might be caused by the relevant 
officials being (erratically) peripatetic or located a great distance away; and (ii) economic 
or fiscal barriers, such as might be caused by setting fees too high or providing 
insufficient financial assistance to those who require it (e.g. in the form of legal aid). 
Consequently, it makes sense to make efforts to reduce or eliminate barriers to access. 
Nevertheless, it ought to be stressed that the existence of such barriers does not 
necessarily prevent there being the rule of law – laws might be prevalent and potent in 
spite of them.  
It has been said that the impression that laws are being followed is important. In this 
regard, it is important that our expectations are not regularly being frustrated and that, 
moreover, if they have been frustrated, that our expectations of what should happen as a 
consequence of such frustration are quickly followed. In other words, if our expectations 
have been frustrated, we expect timely rectification. From this we can derive some sense, 
at least, that our fixed associations are being adhered to.  
13.7.3 Concordant 
Unless laws are consistent and coherent with one another, it is difficult for them to 
become prevalent and potent – at least, with any sense of regularity. Inconsistency and 
incoherence invite confusion, and confusion invites uncertainty and paralysis. 
Nevertheless, it would be unrealistic to expect a legal system – as a ‘living’ entity, as it 
were, and constantly changing,24 – to have perfect internal concordance: “the law is 
                                               
distraint, fees, tariffs, charges, etc.), spiritual sanctions (e.g. excommunication, damnation, etc.), or 
corporeal/physical sanctions (e.g. infliction of bodily harm, such as flogging; execution; etc.). These act 
both as disincentives and correctives. This is not, of course, necessarily to advocate any of these forms of 
punishment. 
23 Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward 
I, ed. SFC Milsom, 2nd ed., vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1968), xciv.  
24 Cf. The Generational Theory of Law (supra, Chap. 5). 
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always approaching, and never reaching, consistency”.25 Consequently, in order to be 
functional and effective, there must be a minimum of internal concordance within a legal 
system; ideally, internal concordance ought to be high and, thereby, confusion and the 
potentiality therefor reduced to a minimum.  
13.7.4 Ordered 
As there need to be rules of recognition, there also need to be rules of ordering; there 
must be some laws governing arrangement and priority within and between systems, 
especially where there is potentiality for conflict or seeming lack of concordance as 
between the terms of said systems.26 We need to know which laws to follow and in which 
order in any given circumstance. If we are unsure as to this, then confusion and 
inconsistency are likely to arise. These are the enemies of prevalence and potency, and, 
consequently, of the rule of law.  
13.7.5 Realistic 
Unrealistic laws might become prevalent for a time, but they are likely to fail in the long-
term if they are unable to direct behaviour in a sustainable manner, i.e. be successfully 
expressed across time.  
Besides being realistic, laws should also not have a deleterious effects to those that follow 
them or those around them. After all, if their expression causes harm to those expressing 
them, especially if it results in their destruction, then their very potency will adversely 
affect their prevalence – others will be less inclined to follow them and there might very 
well be fewer people around who could follow them. 
13.7.6 Prospective 
If laws are to guide our thoughts and actions, they must be known before those thoughts 
and actions take place.27  
Retroactively changing fixed associations will likely, ceteris paribus, frustrate our desire 
for predictability – especially if done often. This is because we will exist in a constant 
                                               
25 Holmes, The Common Law, 36. Cf. Cohen: “The law, of course, never succeeds in becoming a completely 
deductive system. It does not even succeed in becoming completely consistent. But the effort to assume the 
form of a deductive system underlies all constructive legal scholarship.” Cohen, “The Place of Logic in the 
Law,” 624. 
26 See, supra, 3.15. 
27 Cf. Justice Chase’s dictum from Calder v Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798) at 388: “[N]o man should be compelled 
to do what the laws do not require nor to refrain from acts which the laws permit.” 
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state of uncertainty; we will not know which of our present fixed associations might at 
some point become invalidated.  
There is, it ought to be said, a place for retroactive or retrospective law-making where 
laws have resulted in some gross injustice, or where they have proved to be particularly 
unwise or impracticable.28 In other words, they are permissible where there is a 
recognition that there is some inadequacy or failing in the original law, the evil 
consequences of which might be remedied or avoided in some measure by changing its 
historic application.29   
13.7.7 Universal 
Insofar as possible, laws ought to apply equally and always within each given universe 
and class, i.e. there should not be arbitrary discrimination in their application.30 This 
makes them both easier to assimilate and follow; it also means that they are being 
followed consistently. 
Ideally, these universes and classes should be larger rather than smaller, and have fewer 
exemptions therefrom,31 meaning that individuals have fewer laws and permeations 
thereof to memorize. However, it does not necessarily follow that absolutely everybody 
should always belong to the same universe or class. As such, the rule of law might equally 
exist in societies with systems of castes and slavery as those without. The rule of law 
                                               
28 Justice Chase continued, in his judgment in Calder v Bull (ibid., at 391): “Every law that takes away or 
impairs rights vested agreeably to existing laws is retrospective, and is generally unjust and may be 
oppressive, and it is a good general rule that a law should have no retrospect; but there are cases in which 
laws may justly, and for the benefit of the community and also of individuals, relate to a time antecedent to 
their commencement, as statutes of oblivion or of pardon.”  
29 There has been a distinction drawn between retrospective legislation and ex post facto legislation, the 
latter of which, in Justice Paterson’s words from Calder v Bull (ibid., at 396), refers to laws introduced 
respecting “crimes, pains, and penalties”; they create a crime, pain, or penalty where previously there was 
none. Paterson continues: “The historic page abundantly evinces that the power of passing such laws should 
be withheld from legislators, as it is a dangerous instrument in the hands of bold, unprincipled, aspiring, 
and party men, and has been two often used to effect the most detestable purposes.” It was precisely this 
ban on ex post facto laws (i.e. retrospective penal statutes) that many early State constitutions in the United 
States had sought to ban – in no small part, for fear of Bills of Attainder. As seen above, Justice Chase 
thought that there might be some place for retrospective legislation in general; Paterson, expressing his 
opinion obiter dictum (at 397), said he would have extended the ban to all retrospective legislation if he 
could have done so.  
30 Much as Pollock put it: “Rules of law being once declared, the rule must have the like application to all 
persons and facts coming with it”. This Pollock placed under the heading ‘Equality’, which heading was 
joined by ‘Generality’ and ‘Certainty’ to form for him the basis of ‘justice being administered according to 
law’: Pollock, A First Book of Jurisprudence, 37–46, quote at 38.  
31 Cf. the words from the first Agreement of the People (1647): “That in all laws made or to be made every 
person may be bound alike, and that no tenure, estate, charter, degree, birth, or place do confer any 
exemption from the ordinary course of legal proceedings whereunto others are subjected.” Samuel Rawson 
Gardiner, ed., The Constitutional Documents of the Puritan Revolution, 1625-60, 3rd ed., 1906, 335. 
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might dictate one law for one type of person, and another law for another type of person. 
What makes this abhorrent to the modern eye is its subversion of our ideas of equality 
and our basic shared humanity – but this is not the same thing as the subversion of the 
rule of law. From a purely practical perspective, the rule of law suggests having fewer 
classes, rather than more; it is our greater sense of right and justice that dictates how these 
classes might, or should, be drawn. This point is continued further down. 
13.8 Summation 
In order for there to be the rule of law, laws need to be: 
1) Existent; 6) Identified; 11) Ordered; 
2) Expressed; 7) Accepted; 12) Realistic; and 
3) Disseminated; 8) Followed; 13) Universal.32 
4) Intelligible; 9) Prospective;   
5) Stable; 10) Concordant;   
It is these things that help to make laws both prevalent and potent; to achieve existence, 
expression, exposure, assimilation, and compulsion.  
13.9 A Formal Theory 
                                               
32 This list has a number of crossovers, for example, with that proposed by Fuller. He suggested that laws 
ought to be (1) enunciated; (2) publicized; (3) prospective; (4) comprehensible; (5) coherent; (6) realistic; 
(7) stable; and (8) consistently applied. For a summary of these, see: Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
2nd ed. (Yale University Press, 1969), 39, see also more generally chap. 2. There are also crossovers with 
Raz, although he perhaps goes further. He argued that, for law to rule, laws must be: (1) prospective, open, 
and clear; (2) relatively stable; (3) made in accordance with an open, stable, clear, and regular process; (4) 
enforced by an independent judiciary; (5) enforced in accordance with the principles of natural justice; (6) 
subject to judicial review vis-à-vis their use by public authorities; (7) supported by an accessible judicial 
system; and (8) not subject to such discretion that might pervert their natural course. See: Raz, The Authority 
of Law, 214–18. There are also crossovers with the list proposed by Hayek, who suggested that ‘true’ laws 
ought to be: (1) general and prospective; (2) known and certain; and (3) blind as to persons, except insofar 
as identifiable differences justify different treatment (he talks of ‘equality before the law’). Moreover, for 
there to be the rule of law, in Hayek’s theory: (4) private citizens and their property are not to be ‘an object 
of administration by the government, not a means to be used for its purposes’; (5) administrative decisions 
ought to be amenable to judicial review; (6) coercion is admissible only in accordance with law; (7) 
exceptional laws should be restricted to exceptional circumstances defined by law (i.e. states of crisis or 
emergency, states of siege); and (8) the principle of ‘no expropriation without compensation’ ought to be 
adhered to. Friedrich August Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Routledge Classics, 2006), chap. 14. 
Similarly, there are crossovers with Bingham’s list, who thought that the rule of law entailed that: (1) laws 
must be accessible and, insofar as possible, intelligible, clear, and predictable; (2) questions of legal right 
and liability ought ordinarily to be decided according to law, not discretion; (3) laws ought to apply equally 
to all, except insofar as objective differences justify differentiation; (4) public officers ought to exercise 
their offices in good faith, to the purpose, and intra vires; (5) the law should afford adequate protection of 
human rights; (6) means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive delay, bona fide civil disputes; 
(7) state adjudicative procedures ought to be fair; and (8) the state should adhere to its obligations under 
both national and international law. Bingham, “The Rule of Law,” pt. 2. 
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This is a ‘formal’ theory of the rule of law. So long as there are fixed associations that are 
actually prevalent and potent, there exists the rule of law. It is the jurist’s task to know, 
describe, and apply these;33 to critique them where necessary and propose improvements 
in the proper manner.  
Substantive theories go further. They argue that there are particular fixed expectations 
that ought to be both prevalent and potent; expectations running contrary to these ought 
not to be prevalent and potent, and, indeed, ought not to be considered as, or associated 
with, the idea of ‘law’.34 Such theories tend to subscribe to Augustine’s maxim: lex 
iniustia est non lex.35 To arrive at such conclusions, substantive notions of the rule of law 
infuse ideas of goodness and rightness into the idea of law. They confuse the rule of law 
with the rule of good law.36 They tend invoke ideas of so-called natural law and rights, 
which are fallacious and unsustainable;37 law has no ‘inner morality’. 
13.10 Other Aspects of the Rule of Law? 
There are other features often thought to be intrinsic to the rule of law, which ought to be 
considered.38 
                                               
33 I am here building on Kelsen, where he said that the task of the ‘science of law’ was to “to know and 
describe” the law: Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, 69. 
34 For a discussion on formal and substantive theories, see: Paul P Craig, “Formal and Substantive 
Conceptions of the Rule of Law : An Analytical Framework,” Public Law, 1997, 467–87. 
35 ‘An unjust law is not law’. This formulation is not quite Augustine’s, although it is generally considered 
to be based on a passage from his De libero arbitrio (‘The Free Choice of the Will’): “For an unjust law, it 
seems to me, is no law”. Augustine of Hippo, Saint Augustine: The Teacher, The Free Choice of the Will, 
Grace and Free Will, trans. Robert P Russell (The Catholic University of America Press, 1968), 81 (1.5.11). 
As has been noted, the idea was not novel with Augustine; it can be found earlier in Plato, which is an 
important point when we consider the impact of neo-platonism on Augustine’s thought: Lewis Ayres, Medi 
Ann Volpe, and Thomas L Humphries, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Catholic Theology (Oxford 
University Press, 2019), 394; FC Copleston, A History of Medieval Philosophy (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1972), 
chap. 3. 
36 As Austin has said: “The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or 
be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry.” 
John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and The Uses of the Study of Jurisprudence 
(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954), 184. 
37 To quote Bentham: “Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical 
nonsense – nonsense upon stilts.” Jeremy Bentham, “Anarchical Fallacies, Being an Examination of the 
Declaration of Rights Issued During the French Revolution,” in The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John 
Bowring, vol. 2 (William Tait, 1843), 501. To paraphrase Zane, the sentences of natural law are merely 
constructions of the individual mind being asserted - nay, masquerading – as the deductions and 
declarations of ultimate wisdom: Zane, The Story of Law, 135. 
38 The following all feature in the works of both Raz and Bingham. See: Raz, The Authority of Law; 
Bingham, “The Rule of Law.” 
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First, there is the idea of equality under law or isonomy,39 i.e. fixed associations ought to 
apply irrespective of the identity of those involved. To an extent, this follows from the 
principles outlined above. In order to be prevalent and potent, it is helpful if laws have 
qualities of consistent application and universality. However, equality under law is often 
taken to mean the idea that everybody – regardless of race, age, gender, socio-economic 
status, etc. – should be treated equally (i.e. the same) by the law.40 There should not be 
one law for one set of people and another law for another set. This is entirely admirable, 
but, as indicated above, not intrinsic to the rule of law. It is perfectly possible for there to 
be fixed associations that apply to different sets of people in the same circumstances. 
What makes this idea abhorrent is our sense of justice,41 – our sense that similar things 
ought to be treated similarly; that like cases ought to be determined alike;42 that all should 
be treated equally except insofar as “objective differences justify differentiation”.43 As 
we are all similar in the sense that we are all human, it would seem insupportable to treat 
anybody as though they were subhuman or intrinsically different.  
Second, there is the idea that there ought to be access to some sort of legal system. In 
other words, it is necessary that, for the rule of law to make sense, there ought to be some 
formal, institutionalized mechanisms to enforce, and ensure compliance with, those laws. 
Again, this is important, but not intrinsic – for the simple reason that it is not strictly 
necessary. There can be prevalent and potent fixed associations without any such 
mechanisms; informal systems of enforcement might be adequate. Nevertheless, such 
                                               
39 For a brief history of the term isonomy and its progenitor isonomia, see: Hayek, The Constitution of 
Liberty, 144–45. 
40 Justice, so they say, is blind. On the iconography of justice, particularly as portrayed by the goddesses 
Ma’at, Themis, and Justitia (respectively of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome), see: Martin Loughlin, 
Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Hart Publishing, 2000), 
55–63, the portrayal of justice as blindfolded at 58-60. Besides being blindfolded, the goddess of justice is, 
today, typically represented as holding, in the one hand, a set of scales and, in the other, a sword; she is 
dressed in a simple white garment, which symbolizes purity and virtue. She is also represented as a woman, 
which undoubtedly is underpinned by some idea that justice ought to be attractive; she is nevertheless 
portrayed as being strong and resolute; the sword adds to the impression of strength.  
41 See, supra, 3.14. 
42 Cf. Bracton: “If like matters arise let them be decided by like, since the occasion is a good one for 
proceeding a similibus ad similia” (“si tamen similia evenerint per simile iudicentur, cum bona sit occasio 
a similibus procedure ad similia”). Henry de Bracton, De Legibus Et Consuetudinibus Angliæ (Bracton on 
the Laws and Customs of England), ed. George Woodbine, trans. Samuel E Thorne (Harvard Law School 
Library, 2003), 2:21, http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/. On the use of analogical reasoning in law, see, e.g.: 
Gerald J Postema, “A Similibus Ad Similia: Analogical Thinking in Law,” in Common Law Theory, ed. 
Douglas E Edlin (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007), 102–33. 
43 These are words that form a part of Bingham’s third criterion for the rule of law: Bingham, “The Rule of 
Law,” chap. 5. 
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mechanisms can immensely aid in facilitating prevalence and potency and, consequently, 
ideally ought to be in place. 
Third, there are the so-called principles of natural justice, which are really principles of 
adjudication. These are twofold: (1) the rule of integrity, i.e. determinations ought to be 
made according to fact and law, and not otherwise;44 and (2) the rule of fair hearing, i.e. 
all substantially affected parties ought to be heard, or have the opportunity to be heard, in 
good time, prior to any determination being made.45 These are normally embodied by 
certain mechanisms and procedures.46 These help to ensure that justice is both done and 
seen to be done; it reassures us that our fixed associations will actually be followed. 
However, these mechanisms and procedures are not intrinsic to the rule of law. They do 
not guarantee the rule of law with their presence; it might exist in their absence.47 
                                               
44 This first facet of the principles of adjudication is normally presented as being a rule against bias, i.e. 
individuals ought not to determine causes in which they personally have some sufficiently significant 
interest; they ought not to determine causes in which they might stand to gain or lose according to the 
outcome. The Latin phrase associated with this is nemo in propria causa judex, esse debet – no one should 
be made a judge in his or her own cause. Even if this interest is declared and even if the person determining 
the case seems of good character, there is a strong argument that they ought to be barred from making any 
determination nevertheless. There is always the possibility that their reasoning might be swayed by their 
interest. Determinations ought to be reserved, insofar as possible, for disinterested parties; interested parties 
should be disqualified. The rule against bias applies as much in cases of long-standing interest, as in cases 
where those deciding the case are subject to bribery or blackmail – in cases where some personal interest 
in the outcome is created. As such, the rule against bias might be said to be complemented by a rule against 
corruption; there ought to be laws against giving and taking of bribes, and against blackmail. Besides the 
qualities of impartiality and disinterestedness, those making determinations ought to have a further quality: 
steadfastness. This can be best facilitated by ensuring that those making determinations have a degree of 
security; they should not fear some negative consequence (e.g. censure, sanction, removal, etc.) – whether 
at the time or in the future – for having made decisions correct according to law. It is for this reason that 
judges serving during pleasure and elected judges are abhorrent; judges ought to serve subject to good 
behaviour, i.e. subject to their interpreting and applying the law properly. They should not have to fear 
making unpopular determinations – whether unpopular with some given individual (e.g. some monarch) or 
some wider group of people (e.g. some judicial electorate). Thus, there ought to be a rule of security. The 
rule of integrity attempts to capture all of these things in a single title; it stipulates that there ought to be 
mechanisms to ensure that judges are impartial, disinterested, incorruptible, and secure insofar as they 
faithful to the law; there should be nothing that might tempt or sway them from their duty.  
45 The Latin phrase often quoted is audi alteram partem – hear the other party or side. This is important for, 
to paraphrase Proverbs 18:17: the one story seems good until the other side is heard. There is an argument 
that this idea extends to a right to seek professional advice and representation, such that no party ought 
necessarily to be disadvantaged by their lack of knowledge or skill. Naturally, if this right is admitted, then 
there is a further argument that there ought to be material assistance available for those wanting professional 
advice and representation, though they are unable to afford it. Otherwise, there would be reason to suspect 
that ‘justice’ would lie with those with the greatest means and the deepest pockets.  
46 Many of these have been mentioned above, e.g. judges ought to be disqualified where they have some 
vested interest in the case; attempts to corrupt the legal process ought to be penalised; judges ought to serve 
subject to good behaviour; parties ought to be notified of any proceedings against them and have an 
opportunity to make submissions; etc. 
47 They cannot guarantee the rule of law, because they govern the process, not the outcome. By a like token, 
the rule of law might still exist in their absence, because the correct outcome might be reached, even if there 
are deficiencies in the process – especially if that process is only open to abuse, though not actually abused. 
Thus, interested parties might make determinations as if they were disinterested parties; the correct 
determination might be made, even though only one side might have been represented. This is not, of 
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Anything that tends to increase prevalence and consistent potency of fixed associations 
tends to enhance the rule of law, as does anything that tends to increase the efficiency, 
efficacy, and reliability of their administration; anything that tends to impede or 
counteract these things tends to diminish the rule of law. As Raz has said, the rule of law 
is but one virtue of a legal system; it does not necessarily make it a good one.48 Absolute 
equality before and under the law, sustenance of liberal democracy, the availability of 
appropriate and proportionate remedies for a range of manifest wrongs,49 – these are all 
examples of things that go towards making a good legal system – for the rule of good law 
– but none are intrinsic to the rule of law.  
13.11 Limits of the Rule of Law 
Much is made of the rule of law. However, overzealously pursuing the rule of law, in the 
sense of making law all-pervasive and absolute, might be undesirable and detrimental. 
Indeed, most people tacitly accept that there must be limits to law. This aspect is often 
overlooked.  
Firstly, there are many cases in which it is not deemed worthwhile to develop fixed 
expectations; it would be unnecessarily and excessively prescriptive. After all, fixed 
associations are supposed to make the world simpler and more predictable; if they 
proliferate unnecessarily, the world becomes more complex. We would have to invest far 
greater time and energy into learning and assimilating them; to monitoring for times when 
we ought to be applying them. These are arguments of simplicity and clarity. 
                                               
course, an argument that such mechanisms and procedures ought to be omitted from any legal system. It is 
simply a statement of the fact that the rule of law, whilst encouraged by them, is not secured by them.   
48 “It is also to be insisted that the rule of law is just one of the virtues which a legal system may possess 
and by which it is to be judged. It is not to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or 
otherwise), human rights of any kind or respect for persons or for the dignity of man. A non-democratic 
legal system, based on the denial of human rights, on extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual 
inequalities, and religious persecution may, in principle, conform to the requirements of the rule of law 
better than any of the legal systems of the more enlightened Western democracies. This does not mean that 
it will be better than those Western democracies. It will be an immeasurably worse legal system, but it will 
excel in one respect: in its conformity to the rule of law.” Raz, The Authority of Law, 211. 
49 This is such that it might be said, as Willes CJ did in Winsmore v Greenbank (1745) Willes 578, “that 
the law will never suffer an injury and a damage without a remedy”: Albert Kiralfy, Potter’s Outlines of 
English Legal History, 5th ed. (Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1958), 172. Of course, there are different 
degrees of wrong and different degrees of injury, damage, etc. It would be neither possible nor profitable 
to attempt to address every wrong, but it makes a great deal of sense to address all wrongs that are 
sufficiently serious – either in their nature or effects. There are, almost as a matter of course, a number of 
complicating factors. Should cognisance only be taken of the wrongful act itself, or should any mitigating 
factors, and any intent or recklessness respecting the wrongful act be taken into account? Should a remedy 
be recoverable from anybody besides the wrongdoer? Etc.   
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Secondly, there is the argument of liberty: individuals ought to be able to choose for 
themselves – according to their own motives, intentions, desires, plans, etc. – how to live 
their lives without excessive interference. Consequently, there ought to be areas in which 
laws either do not tread or, if so, only lightly. Indeed, there is the argument that, rather 
than diminishing personal freedom, it ought to be the purpose of law to protect it;50 in 
effect, law ought to be used to limit law.  
Thirdly, there are instances where it is thought positively beneficial not to have fixed 
associations. This is the argument of pragmatism. After all, fixed associations – by their 
very nature – embody rigidity. Sometimes flexibility is preferred. This is particularly true 
in view of the fact of changing circumstances,51 and where fixed associations might 
prevent us from doing that which we would otherwise think needs doing – especially that 
which we deem necessary, including for self-preservation. Alternatively, where they 
might cause us to do things that would seem ill-advised. Furthermore, when one considers 
human fallibility, as well as the shortcomings of human imagination and foresight, it 
becomes more appealing to allow for some degree of personal freedom, i.e. liberty;52 by 
                                               
50 This, for example, was the argument of Locke, although he advanced it in the context of arguing that 
freedom could not be achieved in a lawless society: “[T]he end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to 
preserve and enlarge Freedom; For…where there is no Law, there is no Freedom.” John Locke, Two 
Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 1988), 306 [Second Treatise, §57]. 
Hayek built on this by saying that laws can be used to establish a private sphere, in which individuals are 
free from coercion and violence, and are protected against fraud and deception; in which they can largely 
decide for themselves – according to their own ideas, beliefs, motives, intentions, desires, plans, etc. – how 
to act. For Hayek, this could only be properly guaranteed by the acceptance of a centralized coercive power 
– i.e., the state – to ensure and enforce observance of the law, see: Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty, esp. 
126. 
51 Cf. Cardozo: “Overemphasis of certainty may carry us to the worship of an intolerable rigidity. If we 
were to state the law today as well as human minds can state it, new problems, arising almost overnight, 
would encumber the ground again.” Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 19. 
52 It is these very facts that Hayek puts at the centre of his arguments in favour of individual or personal 
freedom: “[T]he case for individual freedom rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable ignorance of 
all of us concerning a great many of the factors on which the achievement of our ends and welfare depends.  
/ If there were omniscient men, if we could know not only all that affects the attainment of our present 
wishes but also our future wants and desires, there would be little case for liberty.” Hayek, The Constitution 
of Liberty, 27. Further: “The fundamental reason why the best that a government can give a great society 
of free men is negative [in the form of peace, freedom, and justice] is the unalterable ignorance of any 
single mind, or any organization that can direct human action, of the immeasurable multitude of facts which 
must determine the order of its activities. Only fools believe that they know all, but there are many.” Hayek, 
Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 464. See further: Friedrich August Hayek, “Individualism: True and False,” 
in Individualism and Economic Order (The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 1–32. In other words, if 
other people always knew what would be best for us, then we would have little cause to argue that we 
should direct our own affairs; they would be better directed by others and there would be an argument that 
every part of our lives ought to be governed in their totality by laws determined by those others. Essentially, 
Hayek’s argument for liberty – in this respect, at least – rests on the idea of humility: it would be arrogant 
to assume that we know what is best for everyone always, and, as a consequence of that, to seek to impose 
our will and ideas on others, including by excessive law-making. If ‘mistakes’ are to be made, it is better 
that they are made by individuals concerning themselves, rather than by lawmakers concerning everyone.  
Indeed, it is this ability of individuals to engage in a process of ‘trial and error’, according to Hayek, which 
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the same token, to entrust certain individuals and bodies with some discretionary 
decision-making powers concerning the group, its members, and its activities, especially 
if those persons so entrusted are possessed of greater knowledge (including real-time 
information) and expertise than the general population, and the wherewithal to make them 
count.53 Few would contest, however, that such discretion justifies capriciousness, 
arbitrariness, or, indeed, unreasonableness; uncontrolled or unlimited powers.54 Further, 
such discretion might be limited to interim and provisional solutions, pending proper 
deliberation, decision, and implementation.55 
Fourthly, there is the argument of achievability – it is futile and, indeed, perhaps even 
harmful, to attempt to regulate certain things by law, for example, to attempt to discover 
and impose a ‘just price’ or a ‘just wage’.56  
Finally, there is the argument that, whilst it is generally beneficial to have fixed 
associations, they can sometimes lead to undesirable results – particularly when context 
and other considerations are taken into account. As such, there are situations in which 
their application or effect should be mitigated or disregarded. This argument favours 
                                               
enable improvements to come about that could never have been achieved in a planned or designed society: 
Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 474-75 et passim.  
53 The extent to which these individuals and bodies ought to respect personal freedom is, of course, a matter 
for debate – in particular, whether the personal freedom, or some aspect or aspects thereof, of some number 
of persons ought to be sacrificed for the good of the rest. Whether one believes that these entrusted persons 
– in effect, executive agencies – should respect personal freedom and, if so, to what extent, the argument 
nevertheless remains that there is some sense in which it is desirable for there to be some flexibility as to 
how a group might respond to changing circumstances.  
54 In other words, discretion ought to be circumscribed and supervised by law, and exercised according to 
certain dictates of policy, reason, fairness, etc. – i.e. in many respects, by fixed associations more generally 
considered. Cf. Sir Edward Coke: “For discretion is a science or understanding to discern between falsity 
and truth, between wrong and right, between shadows and substance, between equity and colourable glosses 
and pretences, and not to do according to their wills and private affections; for as one saith, talis discretio 
discretionem confundit [such discretion confounds discretion].” (Rooke’s Case, Co. Rep. 5, 99, 100): 
Edward Coke, The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt., ed. John Henry Thomas and John Farquhar Fraser, 
vol. 3 (Joseph Butterworth and Son; J. Cooke, 1826), 204. Further, Lord Mansfield: “But discretion, when 
applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by 
humour: it must not be arbitrary, vague, and fanciful; but legal and regular.” R v Wilkes (1770), 4 Burr. 
2527. Further, Lord Kenyon: “it must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised on such an occasion 
is not a wild but a sound discretion, and to be confined within those limits within which an honest man, 
competent to discharge the duties of his office, ought to confine himself”: Wilson v Rastall (1792) 100 E.R. 
1283.  
55 Cf. Locke’s argument the ‘good of society’ often requires concentrating some powers in the hands of 
some executive, because legislators are not always “able to foresee, and provide, by Laws, for all, that may 
be useful to the Community”. This, however, is only an interim solution and lasts “till the Legislative can 
conveniently be Assembled” (Second Treatise, §159). Locke, Two Treatises of Government, 374. 
56 This, certainly, was the argument of Hayek. See: Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, chap. 10. It is 
worthwhile paying particular attention to the following: “though it is the aim of law to increase certainty, 
it can eliminate only certain sources of uncertainty and it would be harmful if it attempted to eliminate all 
uncertainty…” Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 283. 
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equity, justice, and reason, which things themselves, it must be said, rely heavily on 
systems of fixed associations. 
13.12 Statutes of Limitations and the Rule of Law 
There is a question as to the extent to which statutes of limitations – which impose a 
certain timeframe within which legal proceedings must be initiated – are compatible with 
the rule of law. Is it right that, purely because a certain amount of time has elapsed, some 
occasion of dispute or deviancy can no longer be settled in accordance with the laws? In 
particular, is it right that instances of wrongdoing – whether purposeful or not – should 
not result in the usual consequences, simply because it has not been caught or raised as 
an issue in time (e.g. because it went unnoticed or undetected, or because the victim has 
been unable to bring proceedings previously)?    
The short answer is that statutes of limitations are compatible with the rule of law – so 
long as the timeframes within which claims or prosecutions must be brought are not set 
too narrowly. After all, it does often take some time for things, and their greater 
significance, to become apparent. Indeed, there are many sensible reasons for imposing 
statutes of limitations. In the first place, there are considerations of the workload of the 
judiciary. By restricting the number of cases that can come before the adjudicators, they 
are thereby enabled to better handle and cope with the cases that they do have before 
them. It also discourages speculative, capricious, and malicious claims or prosecutions 
made long after the fact. Moreover, as time passes, the availability of evidence tends to 
diminish, meaning that it actually becomes much more difficult for adjudicators to 
ascertain the facts and apply the laws thereto. Without statutes of limitations, therefore, 
the adjudicators are likely not only to have more work to do, but the work is also likely 
to be more difficult.  
More importantly, statutes of limitations often serve the same ends as the rule of law itself 
– to give people a sense of safety and security. After all, they provide protection to people 
against legal proceedings being initiated against them for ‘historic’ actions or inactions. 
It means that individuals can plan and invest with greater confidence that they will not 
suddenly find themselves being embroiled in proceedings about events that they might 
hardly even remember.  
On the other side of things, however, it is easy to see how statutes of limitations might 
frustrate our sense of the rule of law – especially where the time limits appear to be 
somewhat arbitrary. After all, why should it be that the laws will be applied in a certain 
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case one day and not the next? In order for this situation not to arise, it is important that 
statutes of limitations are used wisely. There are a number of things that can help in this 
regard. 
The first is the sensible imposition of the time limits – they should neither be so short as 
to likely frustrate people’s expectations nor so long that there is little use in having them. 
There needs to be reasonable opportunity for any wrong to become apparent and for any 
actions regarding it to be commenced, but, equally, there is little point in setting the 
deadline a long time after a reasonable period of opportunity has elapsed.  
The second is that not all time limits should necessarily begin at the same time. It makes 
sense that some should begin at the time when the disputed event or purported act of 
deviancy occurred. In other cases, it makes greater sense that the time limit begins at the 
point the one or the other is discovered or, rather, realized. After all, it could be considered 
unfair to require that people bring a claim or prosecution before they have realized that 
there is any basis for such a course of action.  
The third is that there are good arguments for using statutes of limitations differently as 
concerning ‘private wrongs’ (i.e. torts) and ‘public wrongs’ (i.e. criminal acts) – more 
specifically, using them more sparingly in the latter. Our sense of justice is more likely 
to be frustrated if they are used liberally respecting public wrongs, especially respecting 
those we deem more serious in nature (e.g. homicide, sexual assault, etc.); these sorts of 
things we expect to be punished regardless as to when they occurred, though the nature 
and severity of that punishment might be modulated according to the amount of time that 
has elapsed and what has passed in the interim.  
Naturally, statutes of limitations, where they create fixed associations, fit in with the rule 
of law. If they are used wisely, then there is little cause for avoiding them. Indeed, there 
are compelling reasons in their favour.  
13.13 Concluding Remarks 
The rule of law does not mean the tyranny of law;57 the limits of law does not mean the 
commencement of tyranny.58 There needs must be balance. If we are to fulfil our 
                                               
57 For ‘brute legalism’, we might say. 
58 “Where the law ends, there tyranny begins”. As Loughlin identified, this is often associated with William 
Pitt the Elder (see his speech in the House of Lords, 9 January 1770), but is found earlier in Locke: Locke, 
Two Treatises of Government, 400 [Second Treatise, §202]. Cf. Loughlin, Sword and Scales, 13. 
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psychological need for regularity and certainty, there must be laws that are prevalent and 
potent within our social networks. This means that we know what to expect of others and 
what others expect of us. As contrasted with the arbitrary rule of some person or body 
(the so-called ‘rule of men’), it also means that we are not exposed so much to human 
capriciousness, fickleness, partiality, self-interest, vindictiveness, etc.;59 to the “incertain 
and crooked cord of discretion”.60 Laws, in theory, are more regular and predictable than 
people,61 as well as impartial.62 However, making laws overly stringent and prescriptive 
might frustrate our other needs and desires; it might even endanger us. Indeed, laws, 
unlike people, are unthinking and unfeeling. They know not whether their dictates are 
reasonable or unreasonable, right or wrong, good or bad. Only people can decide this. If 
we are to live and live well, we need law – but neither too much nor too little, neither too 
weak nor too strong.   
The rule of law, as has been said, is but one aspect of a good legal system. It helps us to 
feel that we understand what has happened, what is happening, and what is likely to 
happen in the future. It helps us to feel safe in knowledge, though not necessarily and 
absolutely safe in ourselves and our surroundings. This requires a great deal more. A 
good legal system will build on the foundation of the rule of law by facilitating and 
promoting our feelings of safety and security. However, these ought not to be treated as 
ends in themselves. They ought always to be pursued as part of a wider goal of helping 
people to live and live well – or, at least, to live as well as possible given the 
circumstances. After all, a good legal system cannot guarantee sufficient food yields to 
feed any given population (which depends, not least, upon the weather). It can, however, 
make us feel that our social world is rightly ordered; that we are fairly done by within it; 
                                               
59 Cf. “[B]ut he who bids man rule adds an element of the beast; for desire is a wild beast, and passion 
perverts the minds of rulers, even when they are the best of men.” Aristotle, The Politics and The 
Constitution of Athens, ed. Stephen Everson, trans. Jonathan Barnes and JM Moore, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 88 (Pol. 1287a30-32).  
60 These are the words of Sir Edward Coke; he contrasted this with the “golden and streight metwand 
[metewand] of the law”: Edward Coke, The Fourth Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (London, 
1644), 41. 
61 Cf. “And between men between whom there is injustice there is also unjust action…, and this is assigning 
too much good in themselves and too little of things evil in themselves. This is why we do not allow a man 
to rule, but rational principle, because a man behaves thus in his own interests and behaves as a tyrant.” 
Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica Nichomachea),” in Great Books of the Western World, Vol. 9: The 
Works of Aristotle (II), trans. WD Ross (William Benton, 1952), 382 (Bk. V, Ch. 6, 1134a-b). 
62 Cf. “For it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one, 
nor whether it is a good or bad man that has committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive 
character of the injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being wronged, 
and if one inflicted the injury and the other has received it.” Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics (Ethica 
Nichomachea),” 379 (Bk. V, Ch. 4; 1132a). 
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that it best promotes our chances of survival; that it best promotes our well-being and our 
ability to flourish.  
A final point ought to be made concerning the relationship between the rule of law and 
constitutions. In a fundamental sense, the rule of law (that things should exist and occur 
in accordance with some shared set of fixed associations and not otherwise) and 
constitutions (the distribution of activities and influence as between sets of social agents) 
are separate and distinct things. Nevertheless, there is naturally a close relationship 
between them: the rule of law profoundly affects the stability and operation of 
constitutions. The rule of law means that people are exercising their allotted activities and 
influence – and nothing besides these – in a regular, consistent, and predictable manner; 
it means that any distribution or redistribution that takes place does so according to set 
patterns and procedures. This is especially important when it comes to ‘public powers’ 
and ‘public offices’, which affect social groups at large. As such the rule of law, as well 
as the respecting and upholding thereof, are important and commendable characteristics 
of a constitution, and the relevant social agents that are a part of it, to have.  
However, the lack of the rule of law – to whatever degree – does not mean the lack of a 
constitution. Even if activities and influence are not distributed or carried out in an orderly 
and consistent fashion, there are still activities and influence, and some distribution 
thereof. It might not be a particularly good, coherent, or intelligible constitution, and it 
might not be a particularly stable one, but a constitution it remains. The rule of law tends 
to make for better – or, at least, more effective – constitutions,63 and total disregard for 
the rule of law might destroy a particular constitutional settlement or arrangement, but, 
in the final analysis, the rule of law and constitutions are not inseparable bedfellows.  
                                               
63 The rule of law tends to make for better, or more effective, constitutions in the sense that it tends to make 
them more stable. It does not, of course, automatically result in there being a good constitution sitting beside 
and within a system of good law. To take a stock example, the Nazi regime in the 1930s and ‘40s is well-
known to have operated largely according to law, which law did not universally work towards good ends. 
There is a sense, however, in which the law was used here to undermine the rule of law, in the sense that 
some laws were passed granting sweeping and extensive (i.e. plenary) powers to Hitler’s government – 
especially through the Ermächtigungsgesetz (23 March 1933), which amended the Weimar Constitution. 
This amendment increased the government’s breadth of discretion, which step, as such steps tend to do, 
moved things away from the ‘rule of law’ towards the ‘rule of men’, even if that rule of men was 
underpinned by law. The existence of discretion is not, of course, in itself necessarily offensive to the rule 
of law; it only becomes so when it begins to be exercised summarily, capriciously, unjustifiably, 
devastatingly, etc. Generally speaking, therefore, it can be said that there existed the rule of law in Nazi 
Germany, though there were concerning tendencies that speaks towards there not being the best rule of law. 
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Appendix III: Regency and Minority 
14.1 Regency 
Regencies arise from a monarch’s inability to carry out those activities and influence normally 
associated with their position. It has been said by others that regencies arise in three or four 
situations.1 In fact, there are fundamentally only two: 
(1) Absentee regencies: the monarch is, generally speaking, able to do their duties, but is 
not physically present to do so; they are able but not present; 
(2) Presentee regencies: the monarch is, or can be, physically present, but is for some 
reason unable to carry out their duties; they are present but not able.2  
14.1.1 Absentee Regencies 
In absentee regencies, the monarch tends to be regarded as cognitively and physically able. 
They are simply too far removed from the centres of government to be able to perform their 
normal duties in a timely fashion – usually due to their being abroad. Consequently, there is 
need to cause others to do those things that (a) would normally be done by the monarch and 
(b) need doing in their absence. Such need was more acute in the mediaeval period than today. 
Before modern infrastructure and telecommunications systems, people and information 
travelled much more slowly – even across relatively short distances. For urgent decisions, 
absent monarchs were effectively useless. The best they could do was provide for the 
government in their absence and leave instructions for foreseeable eventualities. Absentee 
regencies were common throughout the mediaeval period.3  
Absentee regencies have two notable features. The first is provision: The monarch determines, 
at least in some way, how activities and influence are to be distributed and exercised during 
their absence. The second is oversight: Even though the monarch might be unable to make 
day-to-day decisions, decisions of lesser urgency or greater consequence might still be referred 
                                                            
1 Feilden states infancy, illness, madness, and absence; Medley states absence, vacancy, minority, and mental 
incapacity. Henry St Clair Feilden, W Gray Etheridge, and DHJ Hartley, A Short Constitutional History of 
England, 4th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1911), 29; Dudley Julius Medley, A Student’s Manual of Constitutional 
History, 6th ed. (Oxford University Press, 1925), 87–91. 
2 It might also be said that a further possible situation for a regency is one which there is an interregnum (i.e. a 
vacancy of the throne) and some arrangement is necessary for the government during this period. However, as a 
regency is defined by the fact that the regency government is acting in the monarch’s name, this precludes this 
situation from being called a regency proper.  
3 See, esp.: Francis West, The Justiciarship in England 1066-1232 (Cambridge University Press, 1966), passim. 
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to them; they might continue to oversee the administration more generally, including 
overseeing appointments, dismissals, etc.4  
The commencement conditions for absentee regencies have often been unclear. For example, 
are they triggered automatically by the monarch’s departure from the kingdom or must they be 
formally established? Furthermore, might one be declared whilst the monarch is still present, 
albeit incommunicado (e.g. on pilgrimage or in some far-flung part)? Indeed, what is the 
difference between regency and deputyship? There are no general answers to these questions. 
14.1.2 Presentee Regencies 
Presentee regencies tend to ask more serious questions about monarchs’ abilities. They arise 
when the monarch is unable to do what is expected of them, regardless of their location – 
usually due to some cognitive deficiency.5 There are three grounds for presentee regencies: (1) 
immaturity; (2) infirmity; and (3) incompetence.  
Immaturity is where the monarch, by virtue of their youth, lacks sufficient mental capacity (i.e. 
ability to perform complex planning and decision-making), sufficient experience (i.e. 
knowledge),6 or, indeed, sufficient physical strength and control (e.g. to wield arms and fight). 
There is usually an assumption that such deficiency is temporary. Immaturity is most relevant 
in the context of royal minorities.  
                                                            
4 Perhaps the most notable examples of provision and oversight in England come from the period when Richard I 
was absent on crusade. He appears to have initially installed Hugh Puiset (Bp. Durham) and William Mandeville 
(E. Essex) as co-regents in his absence. Mandeville, however, died shortly afterwards (October 1189) and Richard 
first raised William of Longchamp (the Chancellor) to be co-regent with Puiset and then, later, made Longchamp 
sole regent (June 1190). Longchamp, however, proved unpopular and Richard sent Walter of Coutances (Abp. 
Rouen) back with two letters dated February 1191 – the first commanding that Longchamp and the barons come 
to terms and the second, following the failure of the first, enabling the removal of Longchamp. In the event, 
Longchamp was eventually removed on the authority of the second letter. As such, Richard provided for the 
government in his absence and continued to exercise some oversight over its structure. For this period, see: HWC 
Davis, England under the Normans and Angevins, 1066-1272, 10th ed. (Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1930), 287–91, 
313–17; Frank Barlow, The Feudal Kingdom of England 1042-1216, 5th ed. (Longman, 1999), 310–13; John 
Gillingham, Richard I (Yale University Press, 1999), 120–222.  
5 It is possible, though much rarer, for a regency to come about in the case of some physical inability, though this 
would rather be considered a case of deputyship than regency per se. 
6 Cf. the words of the statute 28 Hen. VIII, c. 17,  which provides that acts passed whilst the king is under the age 
of twenty-four might be unilaterally revoked after attainment of that age: “Forasmuch as laws and statutes may 
happen hereafter to be made within this realm at parliaments held at such times as the kings of the same shall 
happen to be within age, having small knowledge and experience of their affairs, to the great hindrance and 
derogation of the imperial crown of this realm, and to the universal damage of the common wealth of subjects of 
the same…” George Burton Adams and H Morse Stephens, eds., Select Documents of English Constitutional 
History (The Macmillan Company, 1901), 246. It should be noted that this statute was repealed in Edward VI’s 
first year (1 Edw. VI, c. 11). See: Frederic William Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, ed. Herbert 
Albert Laurens Fisher (Cambridge University Press, 1908), 253–54. 
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Infirmity is where the monarch has some physiological,7 or, more likely, psychological 
disorder or impairment,8 including the effects of old age (i.e. senility).9  
Incompetence is where the monarch is ostensibly mature and unimpaired, but is nevertheless 
found lacking in their ability. They seem incapable of acting appropriately (i.e. as expected).10 
Where incompetence seems incorrigible, dethronement has sometimes been viewed as an 
alternative to regency.11 
There is a close relationship between these. Incompetence, for example, can easily be recast 
as, or excused as being, immaturity or infirmity, which are generally considered to be more 
acceptable.12 This interchangeability might explain the protracted nature of some royal 
minorities; incompetence might be excused as immaturity.  
What presentee regencies signally lack is provision and (royal) oversight. As such, there is 
good reason for treating them differently to absentee regencies.13 Whether the various forms of 
presentee regency need be treated differently to one another is another question. The outlook 
in cases of immaturity is certainly more positive than that in cases of infirmity or incompetence. 
There is greater risk that the latter will be chronic.   
14.2 Minority 
Minors are so regarded until they reach the age of majority, which is a threshold between 
childhood and adulthood. Questions arise concerning: (1) its location and (2) the sufficient 
conditions for crossing it. 
                                                            
7 For example, in England, Henry IV struggled greatly with his health in his final years, which meant that his son, 
Henry [V], often had opportunity to direct affairs, though he might have to step back during periods of remission. 
However, where the monarch retains their mental faculties, this type of regency is much more likely to be akin to 
absentee regencies; the monarch might still have provision and oversight. Indeed, such situations are more likely 
to be construed as periods of deputyship, rather than regency. 
8 In England, Henry VI and George III provide examples of severe psychological disturbances, which necessitated 
the institution of alternative arrangements.  
9 In England, Edward III’s senility became increasingly apparent in his final years. Furthermore, owing to the 
physiological incapacity of his eldest son, Edward of Woodstock (the ‘Black Prince’), the government was 
exercised largely under the direction of his next eldest surviving son, John of Gaunt. 
10 In England, Henry III and Edward II serve as examples, who were both displaced for a time by parties of 
magnates, although whether these are truly regencies is debatable. 
11 We might think here of Edward II and Richard II, in particular.  
12 After all, there is usually a sense that these things cannot be helped by the individual in question; they are not 
their fault, whereas incompetence is.  
13 It is worth noting Ward’s opinion that conflating ‘absentee kingship’ and child kingship “obscures various 
subtleties of the provisions when a child was king”: Ward, “Child Kingship in England, Scotland, France, and 
Germany, c.1050 - c.1250,” 42. 
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There are a number of approaches to these questions. Firstly, the threshold might equate to 
attainment of a certain numerical age; such attainment, normally defined in years, is sufficient 
for achieving one’s majority. Thus, a person might achieve their majority upon their eighteenth 
or twenty-first birthday. Secondly, some physiological sign might be required, e.g. facial hair 
or menstruation. Thirdly, the completion of some rite of passage might be required – often 
involving the completion of some task or participation in some ceremony. In such cases, a 
person’s numerical age might matter but little; they attain their majority only if the rite of 
passage is performed successfully. For males, such rites have historically often involved the 
assumption of arms and armour. Fourthly, the demonstration of some competency or ability 
might be required, which demonstration is sufficient to show that one is of age; one needs to 
demonstrate that one has the cognitive or physical ability to do a certain thing with a given 
measure of success. This is not dissimilar to a rite of passage, except that rites of passage tend 
to be more overtly symbolic and ceremonial; demonstrations are more eminently practical.14 
Besides location and sufficient conditions, there are three further questions. Firstly, is the age 
of majority discretionary or non-discretionary, i.e. is there some element of choice involved? 
Secondly, is it graduated or binary, i.e. achieved in stages or all at once?15 Thirdly, is it targeted 
or comprehensive, i.e. might a person might be “of age” for some things, but not others?16  
There is one final question, which is of supreme importance. What is the effect of crossing the 
threshold? What happens when one comes of age? Does it make any tangible difference, for 
example, as to what one is permitted or expected to do? Is it, perhaps, rather a mark of honour? 
In the context of royal minors, did attaining their majority alter their constitutional position?  
There are no universal or objective answers to these questions. They are culturally relative. In 
some societies, children become adults sooner than in others, and do so in different ways.  
                                                            
14 There are indications in the mediaeval English legal treatises of Glanvill and Bracton that, amongst those of 
lower social status at least, this was the primary method by which a child would become an adult. For the heir of 
a burgess, it was simply necessary to be able to undertake their father’s business. By contrast, for the heirs to 
military fees and sokemen, the age of majority was based upon chronological age – twenty-one and fifteen 
respectively: Ranulf De Glanvill, The Treatise on the Laws and Customs of the Realm of England Commonly 
Called Glanvill, trans. GDG Hall (Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1965), 82; Henry de Bracton, De Legibus Et 
Consuetudinibus Angliæ (Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England), ed. George Woodbine, trans. Samuel E 
Thorne (Harvard Law School Library, 2003), 250–51, http://bracton.law.harvard.edu/. 
15 In modern-day United Kingdom, for example, it would appear to be graduated. At 10, a person assumes legal 
responsibility for their actions; at 16, people are allocated National Insurance Numbers, meaning that they can 
work full-time, and they can also have consensual sex; at 17, people can apply for, and obtain, a driving licence; 
at 18, they can vote, stand for office, etc.  
16 For example, a person might be deemed old enough to marry or engage in sexual activities, and as yet remain 
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